

HISTORY OF GREECE;

FROM THE

-EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENETATIVE
CONTEMPORARILY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

By GEORGE GROTE.

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

FROM THE DEFEATS OF POTIDÆA DOWN TO THE END
OF THE FIRST YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

EVER before the recent hostilities at Korkyra and Potidæa, it had been evident to reflecting Greeks that prolonged obscurity of the Thirty years' truce was becoming uncertain, and that the mingled hatred, fear, and admiration which Athens inspired throughout Greece would prompt Sparta and the Spartan confederacy to seize any favourable opening for breaking down the Athenian power. That such was the disposition of Sparta was well understood among the Athenian allies, however considerations of prudence and general disunion in reacting might postpone the moment of carrying it into effect. Accordingly not only the Spartans when they revealed had applied to the Spartan confederacy for aid, which they appear to have been prevented from obtaining chiefly by the pacific interests then uniting the Corinthians, but also the Lacedæmonians had endeavoured to open negotiations with Sparta for a

State of feeling in Greece not upon the Thirty years' truce, but the Peloponnesian war—recognition probably of war—Action of those that act in—concluding—demonstrating—truce with the Lacedæmonians.

similar purpose, though the intention to whom along the proposition could have been communicated, since it long remained secret and was never executed, had given them no encouragement.¹

The affairs of Athens had been administered, under the ascendancy of Pericles, without any view to extension of empire or encroachment upon others, though with constant reference to the prohibition of war, and with anxiety to keep the city in a condition to meet it. But even the splendid internal ornaments, which Athens at that time acquired, were probably not without their effect in provoking jealousy on the part of other Greeks as to her ultimate views.

The only known incident, wherein Athens had been brought into collision with a member of the Spartan confederacy prior to the Euclyrean dispute, was her decree passed in regard to Megara—prohibiting the Megarians, on pain of death, from all trade or intercourse as well with Athens as with all ports within the Athenian empire. This prohibition was grounded on the alleged fact that the Megarians had harboured runaway slaves from Athens, and had appropriated and cultivated portions of land upon her border; partly land, the property of the goddesses of Eleusis—partly a strip of territory disputed between the two states, and therefore left by mutual understanding in common pasture without any permanent enclosures.² In reference to this latter point, the Athenian herald Antemachides had been sent to Megara to remonstrate, but had been so rudely dealt with, that his death shortly afterwards was imputed to the Megarians.³

¹ Thucyd. II. 2-12. This proposition of the Lacedæmonians at Sparta, which have been made before the collision between Athens and Corinth at Corinth.

² Thucyd. I. 18. *ἡμετέρας ἀγροὺς ἀλλοτρίους ἐκείνοις ἔχουσιν, καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων ἀγροὺς ἀλλοτρίους ἡμῶν.* See also the note on Thucyd. I. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

³ Thucyd. I. 18. *ἡμετέρας ἀγροὺς ἀλλοτρίους ἐκείνοις ἔχουσιν, καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων ἀγροὺς ἀλλοτρίους ἡμῶν.* See also the note on Thucyd. I. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

connected to prevent it from being included: in which case the prohibition might have been a subject of perpetual dispute between the two countries." See, Compare Thucyd. I. 18, about the border territory round Eleusis.

⁴ Thucyd. I. 18. In regarding the reasons of this law, one of earlier date passed by Athens against the Megarians, mentions only the two allegations here noticed—wrongful cultivation of territory and reception of runaway slaves. He does not allude to the herald Antemachides; still he does he notes that some of the day which Antemachides had when sent to Megara of this period have to do with it, between the Peloponnesian war

We may reasonably suppose that ever since the result of Megara fourteen years before—which ceased to Athens as irreparable mischief—the feeling prevalent between the two cities had been one of bitter animosity, manifesting itself in many ways, but so much unperpetrated by recent events as to provide Athens to a signal revenge.¹ Exclusion from Athens and all the ports in her empire, comprising nearly every island and seaport in the Aegean, was so ruinous to the Megarians that they loudly complained of it at Sparta, representing it as an infraction of the Thirty years' truce, though it was undoubtedly within the legitimate right of Athens to refuse—and was even less harsh than the systematic expulsion of foreigners by Sparta, with which Pericles compared it.

These complaints found increased attention after the war of Euboea and the blockade of Potidea by the Athenians. The sentiments of the Corinthians towards Athens had now become angry and warlike in the highest degree. It was not simply resentment for the part which animated them, but also the anxiety further to bring upon Athens as strong a hostile pressure as should preserve Potidea and its garrison from capture. Accordingly they lost no time in endeavouring to rouse the feelings of the Spartans against Athens, and in inducing them to irritate to Sparta all such of the confederates as had any grievances against that city. Not merely

feeling im-
portance of
the Corin-
thians in
bringing
about a
general war,
for the
purpose of
preventing
Potidea.

upon the personal sympathies of Peri-
cles, viz. that first, when young men
of Athens went away for military train-
ing from Megara; next, the
Megarian youth mingled themselves
in carrying off from Athens "the
captives themselves," one of whom
was the mistress of Pericles, upon
which the latter was so enraged that
he proposed the sentence of exclusion
against the Megarians (*Plutarch, Ath-
ens, 16*—*see PERICLES, Pericles, 1, 101*).

Next, during the Peloponnesian war
they made no exception with the
political friends of the time. But the
most serious hatred against Athens and
its leader caused by Athenian re-
fusal. Though Thucydides, not men-
tioning the fact, yet declares that
the Megarian death had really been
condemned by the Megarians, and
there probably was a popular feeling at
Athens to that effect, under the influ-

ence of which the deceased would
inspired a public funeral near the
Porosian gate of Athens, leading to
Olympia; see *Plutarch, Pericles, 10*,
Athens, 16, *Demosthenes, 2, 101*.
Thucydides, 1, 101, 1, 101. The language
of *Plutarch (Pericles, 10)* is probably
falsely copied. "The Megarian death
condemned to have been caused by the
Megarians," viz. the Megarians, and
not Athens. That neither Thucydides,
nor *Plutarch* himself, believed that the
Megarians had really caused the death,
is pretty certain; otherwise the fact
would have been stated when the
Athenians were sent to complete it
the sentence of exclusion, being a
fact so particularly significant to all
Athenians living.

Thucydides, 1, 101, *Demosthenes, 2, 101*,
Athens, 16, *Plutarch, Pericles, 10*,
Athens, 16, *Demosthenes, 2, 101*,
Athens, 16, *Demosthenes, 2, 101*.

the Nigritians, but several other confederacies, came thither as spectators; while the *Aligians*, though their insular position made it perilous for them to appear, made themselves vehemently heard through the mouths of others, complaining that Athens withheld from them the autonomy to which they were entitled under the treaty.¹

According to the Lacedæmonian practice, it was necessary that the Spartans themselves, apart from their allies, should decide whether there existed a sufficient case of wrong done by Athens against themselves or against Peloponnesians—either in violation of the Thirty years' truce, or in any other way. If the determination of Sparta herself were in the negative, the case would never even be submitted to the vote of the allies. But if it were in the affirmative, then the latter would be consulted to deliver their opinion also: and assuming that the majority of votes coincided with the previous decision of Sparta, the entire confederacy stood then pledged to the given line of policy—if the majority was contrary, the Spartans would stand alone, or with such only of the confederates as concurred. Each allied city, great or small, had an equal right of suffrage. It thus appears that Sparta herself did not vote as a member of the confederacy, but separately and individually as leader—and that the only question ever submitted to the allies was whether they would or would not go along with her previous decision. Such was the course of proceeding now followed. The Corinthians

3. Theophilus G. W. Lippman also also addresses the committee. 4. Miller (captioned as a "retired" letter in his name) states that the transfer remains "provisionally" (here intended to be, in the Third Party Trust, confirmed) pending "further" before the period actually passed, but the central address against the President, ultimately realized and continued after the history of Platon. It is noted on the contrary, that the "Third Party" Trust is intended to, which the American International Society of New is sending them to Washington.

The lower engine might even be discontinued by the company to focus on the needs of the market.

But, she said, on the other hand, if we consider the 120,000, it will appear possible that the working of the 1930s never again may have been repeated, as a decade of "depression and disaster," as we call it. At the same time, the conditions may have produced, that by the same rule as before were up. When, then, she said, she thought she had been

However, we must recognize that the one plan does not exclude the other. The situation may have taken advantage of this in enjoining their prayer for intercession. This seems to have been the idea of the President, when he says—*and the superior situation*.

together with such other of the confederates as felt either aggrieved or alarmed by Athens, presented themselves before the public assembly of Spartan citizens, prepared to prove that the Athenians had broken the truce and were going on in a course of wrong towards Peloponnesians.¹ Even in the oligarchy of Sparta, such a question as this could only be decided by a general assembly of Spartan citizens, qualified both by age, by regular contribution to the public taxes, and by obedience to Spartan discipline. To the assembly so constituted the deputies of the various allied cities addressed themselves, each setting forth his case against Athens. The Corinthians chose to reserve themselves to the last, after the assembly had been inflamed by the previous speakers.

Of this important assembly, on which so much of the future fate of Greece turned, Thucydides has preserved an ancient verbatim copy.² First, the speech delivered by the Corinthian envoys. Next, that of some Athenian envoys, who, happening to be at the same time in Sparta as some other nations, and being present in the assembly as as to have heard the speeches both of the Corinthians and of the other confederates, obtained permission from the magistrates to address the assembly in their turn. Thirdly, the address of the Spartan king Archidamus, on the course of policy proper to be adopted by Sparta. Lastly, the brief, but eminently characteristic, address of the Egean Rheneisides, on putting the question for decision. These speeches, the composition of Thucydides himself, contain substantially the sentiments of the parties to whom they are ascribed. Neither of them is distinctly a reply to that which has preceded, but each presents the situation of affairs from a different point of view.

The Corinthians knew well that the audience whom they were about to address had been favourably prepared for them; for the Lacedæmonian authorities had already given an actual promise to them and to the Peloponnesians, at the moment before Potidaea revolted, that they would invade Attica. Great was the con-

A assembly
of the
Spartans
regularly
admitted
by means
of the allied
powers.
Thucydides
has that
Athens had
violated
the truce.

¹ Thucyd. I. 41. *corruptio* follows: change of tense in these two verbs in the *Alphabet* has resulted in *Alphabet* in the original. The text should be *Alphabet*. The

lation in sentiment of the Spartans, since they had declined
 landing aid to the much more powerful island of
 Lesbos when it proposed to revolt—a revolution
 occasioned by the altered interests and sentiments
 of Corinth. Nevertheless, the Corinthians also knew
 that their positive grounds of complaint against
 Athens, in respect of wrong or violation of the
 existing truce, were both few and feeble. Neither
 in the dispute about Potidaea nor about Korkyra had
 Athens infringed the truce or wronged the Peloponnesian
 alliance. In both she had come into collision with Corinth,
 singly and apart from the confederacy. She had a right, both
 according to the truce and according to the received maxims of
 international law, to lend defensive aid to the
 Korkyraeans, at their own request: she had a right
 also, according to the principles laid down by the
 Corinthians themselves on occasion of the result of
 Sarno, to restrain the Potidaeans from revolting.
 She had committed nothing which could fairly be
 called an aggression. Indeed the aggression both in
 the case of Potidaea and in that of Korkyra was
 decidedly on the side of the Corinthians; and the
 Peloponnesian confederacy could only be so far implicated as it
 was understood to be bound to suppress the separate quarrels,
 right or wrong, of Corinth. All this was well known to the
 Corinthian envoys; and accordingly we find that in their speech
 at Sparta they touch but lightly and in vague terms on positive
 or recent wrongs. Even that which they do say completely
 justifies the proceedings of Athens about the affair of Korkyra,
 since they confess without hesitation the design of arming the
 large Korkyraean navy for the use of the Peloponnesian alliance:
 while in respect of Potidaea, if we had only the speech of the
 Corinthian envoy before us without any other knowledge, we
 should have supposed it to be an independent state, not connected
 by any permanent treaty with Athens—we should have supposed
 that the siege of Potidaea by Athens was an unprovoked
 aggression upon an autonomous ally of Corinth¹—we should

The
 Corinthians
 address the
 assembly
 first, after
 the envoys
 of the allies
 have been
 allowed to
 speak
 Athens.

Under
 national
 maxims
 of the time,
 as touching
 upon the
 rights in
 dispute
 between
 Athens and
 Corinth—
 Athens is
 the right.

¹ Thucyd. i. 106. at p. 106. in English. Thucyd. i. 106. at p. 106. in English. Thucyd. i. 106. at p. 106. in English. Thucyd. i. 106. at p. 106. in English.

case, and to carry forward Peloponnesus, with gallantishd dignity, as it had been transmitted to her from her predecessors.²

Such was the memorable picture of Athens and her citizens, as exhibited by her harrow enemy before the public assembly at Sparta. It was calculated to impress the assembly, not by appeal to reason or particular misdeeds, but by the general system of unprincipled and endless aggression which was impossible to Athens during the past—and by the certainty held out that the same system, unless put down by measures of decisive hostility, would be pushed still farther in future in the other role of Peloponnesus. And to this point did the Athenian envoy (speaking in Sparta about some other negotiations, and now present in the assembly) address himself in reply, after having asked and obtained permission from the magistrates. The empire of Athens was now of such standing that the younger men present had no personal knowledge of the circumstances under which it had grown up; and what was needed as information for them would be impressive as a reminder even to their elders.³

He began by disclaiming all intention of defending his native city against the charge of specific wrong or alleged infractions of the existing treaty. This was no part of his mission; nor did he recognize Sparta as a competent judge in dispute between Athens and Corinth. But he nevertheless thought it his duty to vindicate Athens against the general character of injustice and aggression imputed to her, as well as to offer a solemn warning to the Spartans against the policy towards which they were obviously tending. He then proceeded to show that the empire of Athens had been honestly earned and amply deserved—that it had been voluntarily acknowledged even proved upon her—and that she could not abdicate it without impugning her own separate existence and security. Far from thinking that the circumstances under which it was acquired needed apology, he appealed to them with pride, as a testimony of the genuine Hellenic patriotism of that city which the Spartan suspicion now seemed disposed to run down as an enemy.⁴ He then

The account
of the
speech of
Athens
here is
not from
anywhere
and how
it was
undoubtedly.

city against the charge of specific wrong or alleged infractions of the existing treaty. This was no part of his mission; nor did he recognize Sparta as a competent judge in dispute between Athens and Corinth. But he nevertheless thought it his duty to vindicate Athens against the general character of injustice and aggression imputed to her, as well as to

offer a solemn warning to the Spartans against the policy towards which they were obviously tending. He then proceeded to show that the empire of Athens had been honestly earned and amply deserved—that it had been voluntarily acknowledged even proved upon her—and that she could not abdicate it without impugning her own separate existence and security. Far from thinking that the circumstances under which it was acquired needed apology, he appealed to them with pride, as a testimony of the genuine Hellenic patriotism of that city which the Spartan suspicion now seemed disposed to run down as an enemy.⁵ He then

² Thucyd. i. 15.

³ Thucyd. i. 15.

⁴ Thucyd. i. 15. (The speech is a
superbly skilful piece of oratory.)

death, upon the circumstances attending the Persian invasion, setting forth the superior forwardness and the unflinching endurance of Athens, in spite of vagueness suggested from the Spartans and other Greeks—the preponderance of her naval force in the entire armament—the directing genius of her general Themistocles, complimented even by Sparta herself—and the title of Athens to rank on that memorable occasion as the principal ally of Greece. This alone ought to urge her empire from approach; but this was not all—for that empire had been tendered to her by the pressing instance of the allies, at a time when Sparta had proved herself both incompetent and unwilling to prosecute the war against Persia.¹ By simple exercise of the restraining force inseparable from her presidential obligations, and by the relaxation of various allies who revolted, Athens had gradually become unpopular, while Sparta too had become her enemy instead of her friend. To relax her hold upon her allies would have been to make them the allies of Sparta against her; and thus the motive of fear was added to those of ambition and revenge, in inducing Athens to maintain her imperial dominion by force. In her position, no Grecian power either would or could have acted otherwise: no Grecian power, certainly not Sparta, would have acted with so much equity and moderation, or given so little ground of complaint to her subjects. Were they had suffered while under Persia; were they would suffer if they came under Sparta, who held her own allies under the domination of an oligarchical party in each city; and if they hated Athens, this was only because subjects always hated the great dominion, whatever that might be.²

Having justified both the origin and the working of the Athenian empire, the survey concluded by warning Sparta to consider calmly, without being hurried away by the passions

¹ *Thucyd.* i. 95. At that time, a Spartan embassy, not ungenerous toward Athens, and pressing warlike designs on the former with threatenings of other evils for Athens' disobedience, and who could make nothing of Sparta, did Sparta no

good. *Thucyd.* i. 95. At that time, a Spartan embassy, not ungenerous toward Athens, and pressing warlike designs on the former with threatenings of other evils for Athens' disobedience, and who could make nothing of Sparta, did Sparta no good. *Thucyd.* i. 95.

² *Thucyd.* i. 95.

against Athens, had probably spoken to Sparta, pride, treating it as an insupportable disgrace that almost the entire land force of Dorian Peloponnesians should be thus lashed by one single Ionic city, and should hesitate to commence a war which one invasion of Attica would probably terminate. As the Corinthians had tried to excite the Spartans by well-timed taunts and reproaches, to the subsequent speakers had aimed at the same objects by panegyric upon the well-known valour and discipline of the city. To all these arguments Archidamus set himself to reply. Invoking the experience of the elders his contemporaries around him, he impressed upon the assembly the grave responsibility, the uncertainties, difficulties, and perils of the war into which they were hurrying without preparation.¹ He reminded them of the wealth, the population (greater than that of any other Grecian city), the naval force, the cavalry, the hoplites, the large foreign dominion of Athens, and then asked by what means they proposed to put her down? Ships they had few; trained men not fewer; wealth, next to none. They could indeed invade and ravage Attica, by their superior numbers and land force. But the Athenians had possessions abroad sufficient to enable them to dispose with the produce of Attica, while their great navy would retaliate the like ravages upon Peloponnesians. To suppose that one or two devastating expeditions into Attica would bring the war to an end would be a deplorable error: such proceedings would merely enrage the Athenians, without impairing their real strength, and the war would thus be prolonged, perhaps for a whole generation.² Before they determined upon war, it was absolutely necessary to provide more efficient means for carrying it on; and to multiply their allies not merely among the Greeks, but among foreigners also. While this was in process, envoys ought to be sent to Athens to remonstrate and obtain redress for the grievances of the allies. If the Athenians refused this—which they were

2. The first 100 copies of the book are given to the library, and the remaining 100 copies are given to the library, and the remaining 100 copies are given to the library.

*Editorial Note: In 1991 and 1992, the authors received papers submitted from the United States, Canada, and other nations, including Japan, relating to the use of the term "transsexual" in the context of the study. The authors have decided to use the term "transsexual" in the text of the study.

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Abstract
This study examined the relationship between the use of the Internet and the use of other information sources. The study was conducted with a sample of 1,000 students from a large university in the United States. The results showed that the use of the Internet was positively related to the use of other information sources. The study also found that the use of the Internet was related to the use of other information sources in a non-linear fashion. The study has implications for the design of information systems and the development of information literacy programs.

probably would do, when they saw the propagations going forward, and when the soil of the highly-cultivated soil of Athis was held over them in terror without being actually comminuted—as much the better; if they refused, in the course of two or three years war might be commenced with some hopes of success. Archidamus reminded his countrymen that their allies would hold them responsible for the good or bad issue of what was now determined; admonishing them, in the true spirit of a conservative Sparta, to cling to that cautious policy, which had been ever the characteristic of the state, displaying both tenets on their taciturn and paucity on their values. "We Spartans owe both our bravery and our profusion to our admirable public discipline: it makes us valiant, because the sense of shame is more closely connected with discipline, as valour is with the sense of shame: it makes us prudent, because our training keeps us too ignorant to set ourselves above our own limitations, and holds us under sharp restraint so as not to betray them." And thus, not being overwise in unprofitable accomplishments, we Spartans are not given to despise our enemy's strength in clever speech, and then meet him with shortcomings in reality. We think that the capacity of the neighbouring state is much on a par, and that the chances in reserve for both parties are too uncertain to be discriminated beforehand by speech. We always make real preparations against our enemies, as if they were

1 Thucyd. 1. 10, 11.

"Thucyd. 1. 10. Archidamus to his subjects. He is discussing the policy of the state, and the policy of the state is to be a conservative state, and to be a conservative state is to be a state which is not given to despise our enemy's strength in clever speech, and then meet him with shortcomings in reality. We think that the capacity of the neighbouring state is much on a par, and that the chances in reserve for both parties are too uncertain to be discriminated beforehand by speech. We always make real preparations against our enemies, as if they were

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of superior judgment. The great point of the speech is that the state is to be a conservative state, and to be a conservative state is to be a state which is not given to despise our enemy's strength in clever speech, and then meet him with shortcomings in reality. We think that the capacity of the neighbouring state is much on a par, and that the chances in reserve for both parties are too uncertain to be discriminated beforehand by speech. We always make real preparations against our enemies, as if they were

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pondering wisely on their side: we must count upon security through our own preparations, not upon the chance of their errors. Indeed there is no great superiority in one man as compared with another: he is the strongest who is trained in the strongest trials. Let us for our parts not condemn this discipline, which we have received from our fathers, and which we still continue to our very great profit: let us not hurry on in one short hour a resolution upon which depend so many lives, so much property, so many cities, and our own reputation. Besides, let us take time to consider, since our strength puts it fully in our power to do so. Send envoys to the Athenians on the subject of Peuce and of the other grievances alleged by our allies, and that too the rather as they are ready to give us satisfaction: against one who offers satisfaction, custom forbids you to proceed, without some previous application, as if he were a proclaimed wrong-doer. But at the same time make preparation for war: such will be the course of policy at once the best for your own power and the most terror-arousing to your enemies."

The speech of Archidammon was not only in itself full of plain reasons and good sense, but delivered altogether from the point of view of a Spartan; appealing greatly to Spartan conservative feeling and even prejudice. But in spite of all this, and in spite of the personal esteem entertained for the speaker, the tide of feeling in the opposite direction was at that moment irresistible. Spuchidammon—one of the five Ephors, to whom it fell to put the question for voting—closed the debate. His few words mark at once the character of the man, the temper of the assembly, and the simplicity of speech, though without the wisdom of judgment, for which Archidammon had taken credit to his contemporaries.

"I don't understand (he said) those long speeches of the Athenians. They have praised themselves abundantly, but they have never rebutted what is laid to their charge—that they are guilty of wrong against our allies and against Peloponnesians. Now if in former days they were good men against the Persians, and are now anti-Sparta against us, they deserve double

The speech of Archidammon was in fact a political. Every last sentence aimed at the Spartan feeling.

punishment as having become evil-doers (instead of good).¹ But we are the same now as we were then: we know better than to sit still while our allies are suffering wrong: we shall not adjourn our aid while they cannot adjourn their sufferings.² Others have in abundance wealth, ships, and horses, but we have good allies, whom we are not to abandon to the mercy of the Athenians; nor are we to trust our redress to arbitration and to words, when our wrongs are not confined to words. We must help them speedily and with all our strength. Let no one tell us that we can, with honour, deliberate when we are actually suffering wrong: it is rather for those who intend to do the wrong to deliberate well beforehand. Resolve upon war then, Lacedæmonians, in a manner worthy of Sparta. Suffer not the Athenians to become greater than they are; let us not betray our allies to ruin, but march with the aid of the gods against the wrong-doers.³

With these few words, so well calculated to defeat the pre-
 cential admonitions of Archidamus, Sthenelaidas put
 the question for the decision of the assembly—which
 at Sparta was usually taken neither by show of hands,
 nor by deposit of balls (as in ours, but by cries analogous
 to the *Ay* or *No* of the English House of Commons—the
 presiding Ruler declaring which of the cries predominated.
 On this occasion the cry for war was manifestly the stronger.⁴
 Yet Sthenelaidas affected inability to determine which of the two
 was the louder, in order that he might have an excuse for bringing
 about a more impressive manifestation of sentiment and a
 stronger apparent majority—since a portion of the minority
 would probably be afraid to show their real opinions as indi-
 viduals openly. He therefore directed a division—like the
 Speaker of the English House of Commons when legislation is
 in favour of *Ay* or *No* is questioned by any member—"Such of you
 as think that the treaty has been violated and that the Athenians
 are doing us wrong, go to that side; such as think the contrary,

¹ Compare a similar sentiment in the speech of the Thebans against the Phocians (Plutarch, *Phocian*, 21, 22).

² Thucyd. i. 85. *ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῖς ἀλλοῖς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμεῖς ἀλλοτρίοι, ἀλλὰ συμμάχοι, οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἡμῶν ὅτι μὴ καὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ αὐτῶν ὅτι μὴ ἡμῶν.*

³ *ἡμεῖς οὐδὲν ἄλλο τι ποιοῦμεν.*

⁴ There is here a play upon the word *αἶψα* which it is not easy to preserve in a translation.

⁵ Thucyd. i. 85. *ἀποδοῦναι ἀλλοτρίοις τὰς πόλεις ἀδικήματα, καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἀδικήματα ἀποδοῦναι.*

to the other side". The assembly accordingly divided, and the majority was very great on the warlike side of the question.

The first step of the Lacedæmonians, after coming to this important decision, was to send to Delphi and inquire of the oracle whether it would be beneficial to them to undertake the war. The answer brought back (Theophrastus seems hardly certain that it was really given¹) was, that if they did their best they would be victorious, and that the god would help them, invaded or uninvaded. They at the same time convened a general congress of their allies to Sparta, for the purpose of submitting their recent resolution to the vote of all.

To the Corinthians, in their anxiety for the relief of Potidæa, the decision to be given by this congress was not less important than that which the Spartans had just taken separately. They sent round envoys to each of the allies, entreating them to authorize war without reserve. Through such instigations, acting upon the general impulse then prevalent, the congress came together in a temper decidedly warlike. Most of the speakers were full of invective against Athens and impatient for action, while the Corinthians, waking as before to speak the last, wound up the discussion by a speech well calculated to secure a hearty vote. Their former speech had been directed to shame, excoriate, and alarm the Lacedæmonians; this point having now been carried, they had to reform, upon the allies, generally, the dissension as well as the impulse of swelling from a willing leader. The cause was one in which all were interested, the island states not less than the aggrandisees, for both would find themselves ultimately victims of the encroaching despotism. Whatever efforts were necessary for the war ought cheerfully to be made, since it was daily throughout that they could arrive at a secure and honourable peace. There were good hopes that this might soon be attained, and that the war would not last long—so decided was the superiority of the confederacy, in numbers, in military skill, and in the equal heart and obedience of all its members.² The

The Spartans sent to Delphi to inquire of the oracle whether it would be beneficial to them to undertake the war.

General congress of allies at Sparta. Speeches of the Corinthians, urging the allies to authorize war without reserve.

¹ Theophrast. l. i. 114. ² Theophrast. l. i. 115, 116. And so forth in the whole of the history, where the war is mentioned.

during the whole fourteen years which¹ had elapsed since the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce;² and, moreover, that that truce marked an epoch of signal humiliation and reduction of her power. The triumph which Sparta and the Peloponnesians then gained, though not sufficiently complete to remove all fear of Athens, was yet great enough to inspire them with the hope that a second combined effort would subdue her. This mixture of fear and hope was exactly the state of feeling out of which war was likely to grow. We see that even before the quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra, sagacious Greeks everywhere anticipated war as not far distant.³ It was now breaking out even for occasion of the revolt of Samos;⁴ peace being then preserved partly by the commercial and nautical interests of Corinth, partly by the preponderance of Athens. But the quarrel of Corinth and Corcyra, which Sparta might have appeared behindhand had she thought it her interest to do so, and the junction of Corcyra with Athens, exhibited the latter as again in a career of aggression, and thus again brought into play the warlike feelings of Sparta; while they converted Corinth from the advocate of peace into a clamorous organ of war. The revolt of Potidæa—dominated by Corinth and encouraged by Sparta in the form of a positive promise to invade Attica—was in point of fact the first distinct violation of the truce, and the initiatory measure of the Peloponnesian war. The Spartan meeting, and the subse-

¹ Finckh's biography of Pericles is very interesting from its illustration of circumstances, according to all modern then feelings and tendencies which really belong to a time. Thus he remarks, p. 105, the desire for increasing possession of Sicily, and even of Corcyra and the Cyclades coast, as having become very popular at Athens even before the death of Myronides and Calicles, and before those other circumstances which preceded the Thirty years' truce; and he gives much credit to Pericles for having repressed such commercial aspirations. Yet again, thus he says directed towards Sicily could not have sprung up to the Athenian mind until after the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. "It was impossible that they could make any such in that direction until they had established their alliance with Corcyra, and this was only done in the

year before the Peloponnesian war." But he, even then, is a qualified assent, and with good reason. At the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians had sailing but two, while the Peloponnesians had large bodies of all along the side of Sicily. While it is very true, therefore, that Pericles was naturally inclined to discourage such and distant enterprises of ambitious merchants, we cannot give him the credit of keeping down Athenian desires of acquisition in Sicily, or towards Corcyra or against this latter war was involved in the catalogue of Athenian expeditions for such desires were hardly known until about the death—in spite of the assurance again repeated by Finckh, *Antiquities*, v. 17.

² Thucyd. i. 11—12.

³ Thucyd. i. 94, 95.

quest diagrams of allies at Sparta, served no other purpose than to provide each formation as were requisite to ensure the movement and hearty action of numbers, and to clothe with imposing addition a state of war already existing in reality, though yet unproclaimed.

The sentiment in Peloponnesians at this moment was not the fear of Athens, but the hatred of Athens, and the confident hope of subduing her. And, indeed, such confidence was justified by plausible grounds. Men might well think that the Athenians could never endure the entire devastation of their highly cultivated soil,—or at least that they would certainly come forth to fight for it in the field, which was all that the Peloponnesians desired. Nothing except the unparalleled economy and unshaken resolution of Pericles induced the Athenians to persevere in a scheme of patient defence, and to trust to that moral superiority which the enemies of Athens, save and except the judicious Archidamus, had not yet learned fully to appreciate. Moreover, the confident hopes of the Peloponnesians were materially strengthened by the widespread sympathy in favour of their cause, prevailing as it did the intended liberation of Greece from a despot city.¹

To Athens, on the other hand, the coming war presented itself in a very different aspect; holding out nothing less than the certainty of prodigious loss and privation—even granting that, at this heavy cost, her independence and union at home and her empire abroad could be upheld. By Pericles, and by the more long-sighted Athenians, the chance of unavoidable war was foreseen even before the Euboean dispute.² But Pericles was only the first citizen in a democracy—educated, trusted, and listened to more than any age else by the body of citizens, but warmly opposed in most of his measures, under the free speech and latitude of individual action which reigned at Athens, and even bitterly hated by many active political opponents. The formal determination of the Lacedæmonians to declare war next of course here been made known

The hope
and confidence
of the
Greeks in
the aid of
Sparta; the
hope in the
aid of
Athens.
The hope
and confidence
of the
Greeks in
Athens
with com-
plicity and
sympathy
towards
the Athenians
was the
main cause.

¹ Thucyd. 2. 13.

² Thucyd. 1. 10; Plutarch, Pericles, c. 18.

at Athens by those Athenian envoys who had entered as unavailing protest against it in the Spartan assembly. No steps were taken by Sparta to carry this determination into effect until after the congress of allies and their pronounced confirmatory vote. Nor did the Spartans even then send any herald or make any formal declaration. They despatched various propositions to Athens, not at all with a view of trying to obtain satisfaction, or of providing some escape from the probability of war, but with the contrary purpose—of multiplying demands and enlarging the grounds of quarrel.¹ Meanwhile the deputies, retiring home from the congress to their respective cities, carried with them the general resolution for immediate warlike preparations to be made with as little delay as possible.²

The first acquisition addressed by the Lacedæmonians to Athens was a political manoeuvre aimed at Periklēs, their chief opponent in that city. His mother, Agaristē, belonged to the great family of the Alk-mæonids, who were supposed to be under an inextinguishable hereditary taint, in consequence of the marriage committed by their ancestor, Megaklēs, nearly two centuries before, in the daughter of the Kylonian suppliants near the altar of the Venerable Goddess.³

Assent to this transaction was, it still had sufficient hold on the mind of the Athenians to serve as the basis of a political manoeuvre. About seventy-seven years before, shortly after the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, it had been so employed by the Spartan King, Kleomenēs, who at that time exacted from the Athenians a clearance of the ancient marriage, to be effected by the banishment of Kleisthenēs (the founder of the democracy) and his chief partisans. This demand, addressed by Kleomenēs to the Athenians at the instance of Megara, the rival of Kleisthenēs,⁴ had been then shapd, and had served well the purposes of those who sent it. A similar blow was now aimed by the Lacedæmonians at Periklēs (the grand-nephew of

¹ Thucyd. i. 125. In using it before delivery of reply, they were adopting a precedent of diplomacy, thus obliging the receiving authorities to do so in return, for as in diplomacy.

² Thucyd. i. 126.

³ See the account of the Kylonian revolution, and the marriage which followed, in *Ant. Rhod.* i. 2.

⁴ See Herodotus, v. 70; compare it with Thucyd. i. 126; and see also *Ant. Rhod.* i. 2.

lived active life, managed their own affairs, and supported themselves by their powers of pleasing. These women were incoercible, and were doubtless of every variety of personal character. The most distinguished and superior among them, such as Aspasia and Theodora,¹ appear to have been the only women in Greece, except the Spartan, who either inspired strong passion or excited moral ascendency.

Perikles had been determined in his choice of a wife by those family considerations which were held almost obligatory at Athens, and had married a woman very nearly related to him, by whom he had two sons, Xanthippos and Parades. But the marriage, having never been consummated, was afterwards dissolved by mutual consent, according to that full liberty of divorce which the Attic law permitted. Perikles concurred with his wife's male relations (who threw her legal guardianship in giving her away to another husband.) He then took Aspasia to live with him, had a son by her who bore his name, and continued ever afterwards on terms of the greatest intimacy and affection with her. Without adopting those exaggerations which represent Aspasia as having contributed to Perikles his distinguished eloquence, or even as having herself composed orations for public delivery, we may reasonably believe her to have been qualified to take interest and share in that literary and philosophical society which frequented the house of Perikles, and which his unprincipled son Xanthippos—degraded with his father's regular expenditures, as withholding from him the means of supporting an extravagant establishment—reported abroad with exaggerated calumnies, and turned into ridicule. It was from that warlike young man, who died of the Athenian epidemic during the Peloponnesian War, that his political enemies and the comic writers of the day obtained the celebrated remark

Family size
of 100,000
is more
likely with
a group
of 100,000
than with
a group of
100,000
individuals.

7 The chief subjects with some of his friends to Theodor, his dialogue with Howard the description of his manner of living, are among the most curious remnants of literary sociology, on a side very imperfectly known to us (Cassidy, *Manuscript*, II, 22).

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Allegory, xlii, p. 771. Illustrating the difference of chemistry and alchemy between some of these alchemists and others—and *Allegory*, xlii, p. 782.

† *Postcard*, Portland, v. 19. Also reprinted in many other journals, under the name *Postcard*, with some minor changes in the text.

tions, which served them as matter for scandalous attack on the privacy of this distinguished man.¹

While the comic writers attacked Perikles himself for alleged intrigues with different women, they treated the name of Aspasia as public property without any mercy or reserve: she was the Cynephila, the Delanoeira, or the H&ed, to this great H&edk&ed or Zeas of Athens. At length one of these comic writers, Hermippos, not contented with comic attacks, indicted her before the dikastery for impiety, as participant in the philosophical discussions held, and the opinions professed, among the society of Perikles, by Anaxagoras and others. Against Anaxagoras himself, too, a similar indictment is said to have been preferred, either by Kleon or by Thasykles son of Nikarchos, under a general resolution recently passed in the public assembly at the instigation of Diopitides. And such was the sensitive antipathy of the Athenian public, shown afterwards finally in the case of Sokrates, and exhibited in this instance by all the artifices of political hatred, against philosophers whose opinions conflicted with the received religious dogmas, that Perikles did not dare to place

Anaxagoras on his trial. The latter retired from Athens, and a sentence of banishment was passed against him in his absence.² But Perikles himself defended Aspasia before the dikastery. In fact the indictment was as much against him as against her: one thing alleged against her (and also against Phaidias) was the reception of free women to facilitate the intrigues of Perikles. He defended her successfully and procured a verdict of acquittal; but we are not surprised to hear that his speech was marked by the strongest personal emotions and even by tears.³

The dikasts were accustomed to such appeals to their sympathies, sometimes even to extravagant scenes, from ordinary accused persons. In Perikles, however, we must find an outbreak of emotion, such as was something quite unparalleled; for constant self-mastery was one of the most characteristic

Prosecution of Anaxagoras for impiety, together with Aspasia.—Anaxagoras retires from Athens.—Perikles defends Aspasia before the dikastery, and obtains her acquittal.

¹ Plutarch, Perikles, c. 11—15.
² This seems the more probable story, but there are references of unimportant character to some other public complaint against Perikles.

³ 11—15; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 12; Diodor. Sicul. 5. 13, 14. See also K&edn&ed, Fragment. Anaxagoras, p. 47—48.
⁴ Plutarch, Perikles, c. 12.

features in his character.¹ And we shall find him, near the close of his political life, when he had become for the moment unpopular with the Athenian people, distressed as they were at the moment with the terrible sufferings of the pestilence, bearing up against their unshared anger not merely with dignity, but with a pride of conscious innocence and desert which rises almost into defiance; inasmuch that the rhetor Demosthenes, who attributes the speech of Pericles as if it were simply the composition of Thucydides, censures that historian for having violated dramatic propriety by a display of insolence where humility would have been becoming.²

It appears also, as far as we can judge amidst very imperfect data, that the trial of the great architect Phidias, for alleged embezzlement in the contract for his celebrated gold and ivory statue of Athena,³ took place nearly at this period. That statue had been finished and dedicated in the Parthenon in 437 B.C., since which period Phidias had been engaged at Olympia in his last and great masterpiece, the colossal statue of the Olympian Zeus. On his return to Athens from the execution of this work, about 433 or 432 B.C., the accusation of embezzlement was instigated against him by the political enemies of Pericles.⁴ A slave of Phidias, named Micon, planted himself as a suppliant at the altar, pretending to be cognizant of certain facts which proved that his master had committed perjury. Motion was made to receive his depositions and to ensure to his person the protection of the people; upon which he revealed various statements so greatly impeaching the pecuniary probity of Phidias, that the latter was put in prison, awaiting the day for his trial before the dikastery. The gold employed and charged for in the statue, however, was all capable of being taken off and weighed, so as to verify its accuracy, which Pericles dared the so-

Prosecution of the architect Phidias for an embezzlement.—instigated by the political enemies of Pericles. Charge of Pericles against Phidias inserted.

¹ Plutarch, Pericles, c. 7, §§ 10-12.

² Plutarch, l. c. c. 1; compare also his striking expressions, c. 10; George Bullard, in Thucydides, vol. i. p. 11, p. 12.

³ Plutarch, Pericles, c. 11. See also *Antiquities and Institutions*.

⁴ Thucydides, about preceding Phidias

with the charge of embezzlement, was the story told which is mentioned against Phidias's capture, with which, however, no necessary argument (Plutarch, Pericles, c. 11).

⁵ See the dissertation of G. Muller (in Plutarch, vol. i. p. 11, p. 12, who says just the facts in the order in which I have given them.

means to do. Besides the charge of unbecomement, there were other circumstances which rendered Phidias unpopular. It had been discovered that, in the relief on the frieze of the Parthenon, he had introduced the portraits of himself and Perikles in conspicuous positions. It seems that Phidias died in prison before the day of trial; and some even said that he had been poisoned by the enemies of Perikles, in order that the suspicions against the latter, who was the real object of attack, might be aggravated. It is said also that Drakontides proposed and carried a decree in the public assembly, that Perikles should be called on to give an account of the money which he had expended, and that the dikasts, before whom the account was rendered, should give their sentence in the most solemn manner from the altar. This latter provision was modified by Agoraios, who, while proposing that the dikasts should be 1500 in number, retained the vote by publican in the vote according to ordinary custom.¹

If Perikles was ever tried on such a charge, there can be no doubt that he was honorably acquitted; for the language of Thucydides respecting his pecuniary probity is such as could not have been employed if a verdict of guilty on a charge of peculation had been publicly pronounced. But we cannot be certain that he ever was tried. Indeed another accusation urged by his enemies, and even by Aristophanes in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, implies that no trial took place: for it was alleged that Perikles, in order to avert this danger, "blow up the Peloponnesian war," and involved his country in such confusion and peril as made his own aid and guidance indispensably necessary to her; especially that he passed the decree against the Megarians by which the war was really brought on.² We know enough, however, to be certain that such

¹ Plutarch, *Perikles*, c. 32-33.

² Aristophanes, *Fra. 507-509*, compare *Acharn.* 557; *Spicars* ap. *Boeckh*, vii. 25, 26; and the *Scholia* on the two passages of Aristophanes; *Plutarch*, *Perikles*, c. 32.

Whether he will, as Plutarch, *Antisthenes*, c. 7, relate another tale, that Aristophanes once approached Perikles when he was in exile, and spoke and entertained, and asked him the reason: Perikles told him that the time was near at hand for rendering his account, and that he was considering how this might be done; upon which Aristophanes advised him to borrow money how he could avoid doing so. The result of this advice was that Perikles plunged Athens into the Peloponnesian war; compare Aristophanes, *Fra. 507*, with the *Scholia*, and *Spicars*, *Frags.* 17.

On this occasion, however, the measure did not succeed, nor did the Athenians listen to the requisition for banishing the sacrilegious Alkmeonids. On the contrary, they replied that the Spartans too had up amount of sacrilege to clear off; for they had violated the sanctuary of Perikles at Cape Tenarus, in dragging from it some helot suppliants to be put to death, and the sanctuary of Adiklos Chalkidion at Sparta, in blocking up and starving to death the guilty regent Pausanias. To require that Lacedæmon might be cleared of these two acts of sacrilege, was the only answer which the Athenians made to the demand sent for the banishment of Perikles.¹ Probably the actual effect of that demand was to strengthen him in the public esteem;² very different from the effect of the same measure when practised before by Kleomenes against Kleisthenes.

Other Spartan envoys shortly afterwards arrived with fresh demands. The Athenians were now required—1. To withdraw their troops from Potidæa. 2. To replace Megara in its autonomy. 3. To repeal the decree of exclusion against the Megarians.

It was upon the latter that the greatest stress was laid; an intimation being held out that war might be avoided if such repeal were granted. We see plainly from this proceeding that the Lacedæmonians acted in concert with the anti-Periklean leaders at Athens. To Sparta and her confederacy the decree against the Megarians was of less importance than the rescue of the Chalkidian troops now blocked up in Potidæa. But on the other hand, the party opposed to Perikles would have much better chance of getting a vote of the assembly against him on the subject of the Megarians; and this advantage, if gained, would serve to weaken his influence generally.³ No objection was claimed however on either of the three points; even in respect to Megara, the decree of exclusion was vindicated and upheld against all the force of opposition. At length the Lacedæmonians—who had already received upon war and had sent their envoys in more compliance with the exigencies of ordinary

¹ Thucyd. i. 129, 130, 131.

² Plutarch, Perikles, c. 38.

practising not with any ¹view of bringing about an accommodation.—and a third batch of envoys with a proposition which at least had the merit of disclosing their real purpose without disguise. Diogenes and two other Spartans announced to the Athenians the simple injunction: "The Lacedæmonians wish the peace to stand, and it may stand, if you will leave the Greeks autonomous". Upon this demand, so very different from the preceding, the Athenians resolved to hold a fresh assembly on the subject of war or peace, to open the whole question anew for discussion, and to determine once for all on a peremptory answer.²

The last demands presented on the part of Sparta, which went to nothing less than the entire extinction of the Athenian empire—combined with the character, often wavering and insecure, of the demands previously made, and with the knowledge that the Spartan confederacy had pronounced positively in favour of war—seemed likely to produce unanimity at Athens, and to bring together this important assembly under the universal conviction that war was inevitable. Such however was not the fact. The reluctance to go to war was dense amidst the large majority of the assembly; while among a considerable portion of them it was so predominant, that they even now reverted to the opening which the Lacedæmonians had before held out about the anti-Megarian decree, as if that were the chief cause of war. There was much difference of opinion among the speakers, several of whom insisted upon the repeal of this decree, treating it as a matter far too insignificant to go to war about, and denouncing the slowness of Pericles for refusing to concede such a trifle.³ Against this opinion Pericles entered his protest, in a language decisive and encouraging, which Dionysius of Halicarnassus ranks among the best speeches in Thucydides. The latter historian may probably himself have heard the original speech.

First and peremptory requirement of Sparta—peace to stand by treaty held at Athens on the whole subject of war and peace.

Great difference of opinion in Athens—mostly—important speech of Pericles.

¹ Thucyd. i. 105. Another agrees, from the words of Thucydides, that three various demands of the Lacedæmonians were made by one embassy, albeit by two successive arrivals, with fresh instructions, but remaining during a month at the

venue between January and March, all A.C. inserted in the text of the passage of events at Athens; compare Xenophon, *Hæcæta*, vi. 4, 12.

² Thucyd. i. 106. *Pericles, Pericles, &c.*

"I continue, Athenians, to adhere to the same opinion, that we must not yield in the Peloponnesian—though I possibly know that men are in one mood when they sanction the resolution to go to war, and in another when actually in the contest—their judgments then depending upon the turn of events. I have only to repeat now what I have said on former occasions; and I adjure you who follow my views to adhere to what we jointly resolve, though the result should be partially unfavourable, or else not to take credit for wisdom in the event of success.¹ For it is very possible that the contingencies of events may depart more from all reasonable track than the counsels of man: such are the unexpected turns which we habitually impute to Fortune. The Lacedæmonians have before now manifested their hostile aims against us, but on this last occasion more than ever. While the truce prescribes that we are to give and receive amicable satisfaction for our differences, and each to retain what we possess, they not only have not asked for such satisfaction, but repudiate it when tendered. They choose to write complaints by war and not by discussion: they have got beyond the time of complaint, and are now already with that of command. For they enjoin us to withdraw from Potidæa, to leave Ægina free, and to rescind the decree against the Megarians: nay, these last scraps are even more to prodigals to us than we must leave all the Greeks free. Now let some of you believe that we shall be going to war about a trifle if we refuse to rescind the Megarian decree, which they chiefly put forward as if its repeal would avert the war. Let some of you take blame to yourselves as if we had gone to war about a small matter. For this small matter contains in itself the whole test and trial of your mettle: if ye yield it, ye will presently have some other greater action put upon you, like men who have already trampled on one point often for; whereas

¹ Thucyd. l. 145. *Adhuc enim eis spectant, ut negotiorum brevis tempus sit, quibus et illi, qui bellum non cupiunt, habere ut, ut cupiunt, non cupiunt. Sed cum illi cupiunt, non cupiunt, sed cum illi cupiunt, non cupiunt. I could have wished to the translation to preserve the play upon the words *specant, cupiunt, non cupiunt* throughout from this sentence, and*

which seems to have been applicable to the main. *Adhuc enim cupiunt ut spectent et non ut cupiunt, sed ut cupiunt, non ut cupiunt.* In a manner which cannot be improved, depending even, all reasonable explanation, *specant* which referred to *cupiunt* have the usual meaning. "Inquis, difficult in learning, or in sense."

if ye hold out stoutly, ye will make it clear to them that they must deal with you more upon a footing of equality."¹

Pericles then examined the relative strength of parties and the chances of war. The Peloponnesians were a well-working population, with few slaves, and without wealth, either private or public: they had no means of carrying on distant or long-continued war. They were ready to expose their persons, but not at all ready to contribute from their very narrow means. In a land-war, or a single land-battle, they were invincible, but for systematic warfare against a power like Athens, they had neither competent leadership, nor habits of concert and punctuality, nor money to profit by opportunities, always rare and unexploited, for successful attack. They might perhaps establish a fortified post in Attica, but it would do little serious mischief; while at sea, their inferiority and helplessness would be complete, and the invincible Athenian navy would take care to keep it so. Nor would they be able to reckon on tempting away the able foreign seamen from Athenian ships by means of funds borrowed from Olympia or Delphi.² For besides that the mariners of the dependent islands would find themselves losers even by accepting a higher pay, with the certainty of Athenian vengeance afterwards—Athens herself would suffer to man her fleet in case of need, with her own citizens and metics: she had within her own walls stevedores and mariners better as well as more numerous than all Greece besides. There was but one side on which Athens was vulnerable: Attica unfortunately was not an island—it was exposed to invasion and ravage. To this the Athenians must submit, without committing the imprudence of engaging a land-battle to avert it. They had abundant lands out

The nature of the war—land-war, and not a sea-war—made it impossible for the Peloponnesians to carry on a distant or long-continued war.

¹ Thucyd. i. 100.

² Thucyd. i. 100. Pericles is saying that the Peloponnesians, and other states that do not have a navy, cannot afford to engage in a distant or long-continued war. He is saying that they cannot afford to engage in a distant or long-continued war.

³ Thucyd. i. 101. Pericles is saying that the Peloponnesians, and other states that do not have a navy, cannot afford to engage in a distant or long-continued war. He is saying that they cannot afford to engage in a distant or long-continued war.

the peninsula, lands for the use of the navy, and, thus, the navy, which was the main strength of the Athenians, was the main strength of the Athenians.

There is a reply to those who say that we have to have been concerned by the Peloponnesians, and that we have to have been concerned by the Peloponnesians, and that we have to have been concerned by the Peloponnesians.

of Attica, insular as well as continental, to supply their wants, while they could in their turn, by means of their navy, ravage the Peloponnesian territories, whose inhabitants had no subsidiary lands to recur to.¹

"Mourn not for the loss of land and houses (continued the orator). Reserve your mourning for men: houses and land acquire not men, but men acquire them.² Nay, if I thought I could prevail upon you, I would exhort you to march out and ravage these yourselves, and thus show to the Peloponnesians that for them at least ye will not truckle. And I could exhibit many further grounds for confidently anticipating success, if ye will only be willing not to aim at increased dominion when we are in the midst of war, and not to take upon yourselves new self-imposed risks; for I have ever been more afraid of our own blindness than of the plans of our enemy.³ But these are matters for future discussion, when we come to actual operations: for the present, let us discuss these proposals with the answer:—That we will permit the Megarians to use our markets and harbours, if the Lacedæmonians on their side will discontinue their (smaller or) summary expeditions of ourselves and our allies from their own territory—for there is nothing in the truce to prevent either one or the other: That we will leave the Grecian cities autonomous, if we had them as autonomous at the time when the truce was made;—and as soon as the Lacedæmonians shall grant to their allied cities autonomy such as each of them shall freely choose, not such as is convenient to Sparta: That while we are ready to give satisfaction according to the truce, we will not begin war, but will repel those who do begin it. Such is the reply at once just and reliable to the dignity of this city. We ought to make up our minds that war is inevitable: the more cheerfully we accept it, the less vehement shall we find our enemies in their attack; and where the danger is greatest, there also is the final honour greatest, both for a state and for a private citizen. Assuredly our fathers, when they bore up against the

¹ Thucyd. i. 102, 103, 104.

² Thucyd. i. 105, 106—107. *ἄνθρωποι καὶ οἰκίαι καὶ γῆ ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἀκτῶνται, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωποι τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὴν γῆν ἀκτῶνται.*

³ Thucyd. i. 106. *καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο.*

Spots in the island and continent, to supply their wants, while they could in their turn, by means of their navy, ravage the Peloponnesian territories, whose inhabitants had no subsidiary lands to recur to.

Pericles—having no such means as we possess to start from, and even compelled to shun all that they did possess—both repelled the invader and brought matters forward to our actual pitch, more by adroit operation than by good fortune, and by a daring courage greater than their real power. We ought not to fall short of them: we must keep off our enemies in every way, and have an unimpeded power to our success."¹

These animating encouragements of Pericles carried with them the majority of the assembly, so that answer was made to the envoys, such as he recommended, on each of the particular points in debate. It was announced to them, moreover, on the general question of peace or war, that the Athenians were prepared to discuss all the grounds of complaint against them, pursuant to the treaty, by equal and amicable arbitration, but that they would do nothing under authoritative demand.² With this answer the envoys returned to Sparta, and as war was put to negotiation.

It seems evident, from the account of Thucydides, that the Athenian public was not brought to this resolution without much reluctance and great fear of the consequences, especially destruction of property in Attica; and that a considerable minority took opposition on the Megarian decree—the ground steadily held by Sparta for breaking the neutrality of her enemy, and strengthening the party opposed to Pericles. But we may also decidedly infer from the same historian—especially from the proceedings of Corinath and Sparta as he sets them forth—that Athens could not have avoided the war without such an abrogation both of dignity and power as no nation, under any government will ever submit to, and as would even have left her without decent security for her individual rights. To accept the war tendered to her was a matter not merely of prudence but of necessity: the time of action allowed by the Spartan envoys would have rendered

The assembly adopted the measures proposed by Pericles—how well they would apply was to be seen.

Thucydides records the grounds for the war, and proceeds to say that the war was almost inevitable.

¹ Thucyd. 1. 120, 121.

² Thucyd. 1. 121. not only Alexander's language, but the language of his envoys, and of Sparta.

with extraordinary wisdom, which even the Spartans could not dispute.

resolved not to let her stand, as she was at the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce. It was their purpose to attack her and break down her empire, as dangerous, wrongful, and anti-Hellenic. The war was thus partly a contest of principle, involving the popular proclamation of the right of every Grecian state to autonomy, against Athens: partly a contest of power, wherein Sparta and Corinthian coalition was not less conspicuous, and far more aggressive in the beginning, than Athens.

Conformably to what is here said, the first blow of the war was struck, not by Athens, but against her. After the decisive answer given to the Spartan envoys, taken in conjunction with the previous proceedings and the preparations actually going on, among the Peloponnesian confederates, the truce could hardly be said to be still in force, though there was no formal proclamation of rupture. A few weeks passed in restricted and restrained intercourse,* though individuals who passed the borders did not yet think it necessary to take a herald with them, as in time of actual war. Had the excess of ambition been on the side of Athens compared with her enemies, this was the time for her to strike the first blow, carrying with it of course great probability of success, before their preparations were completed. But she remained strictly within the limits of the truce, while the disastrous series of mutual aggressions, destined to tear in pieces the details of Hellen, was opened by her enemy and her neighbour.

The little town of Potamæ, still believed by the neighbouring states over the Persians as well as by the Peloponnesian confederates, resolved from Potamæ, was the scene of this unprovoked enterprise. It stood in Boeotia, immediately north of Eretria; with the borders of Attica on one side, and the Thesian territory (from which it was separated by the river Asopos) on the other: the distance between Potamæ and Thebes being about twenty stadia, or eight miles. Though Boeotia by descent, the Pelopon-

* Thucyd. 1. 118. *ἐπιμνησθέντες δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας* the plea of ignorance of rupture by an enemy, and *ἐπὶ τῇ ἀλλήλοισιν ἀποστασίᾳ* the fact, respectively, of the truce and of the war.

the first blow was struck by the Spartans, and the first war was carried on by Athens, and the first war was carried on by Athens, and the first war was carried on by Athens.

the first blow was struck by the Spartans, and the first war was carried on by Athens, and the first war was carried on by Athens, and the first war was carried on by Athens.

rocked houses, until at length the Thibans became discouraged and broken. That flight was not less difficult than resistance; for they could not find their way out of the city, and even the gate by which they entered, the only one open, had been closed by a Platonic officer, who thrust into it the point of a javelin in place of the peg whereby the bar was commonly held fast. Dispersed about the city and pursued by men who knew every inch of the ground, some ran to the top of the wall, and jumped down on the outside, most of them perishing in the attempt—a few others crept through an unguarded gate, by cutting through the bar with a hatchet which a woman gave to them—while the greater number ran into the open doors of a large house or building in conjunction with the wall, mistaking these doors for an approach to the town-gate. They were here blocked up without a chance of escape, and the Platons at first thought of setting fire to the building. But at length a convention was concluded, whereby they, as well as the other Thibans in the city, agreed to surrender at discretion.¹

Had the reinforcements from Thibon arrived at the expected hour, this disaster would have been averted. But the heavy rain and dark night retarded their whole march, while the river Arlyon was so much swollen as to be with difficulty fordable: so that before they reached the gates of Platon, their numbers within were either slain or captured. Which fate had befallen them, the Thibans without could not tell; but they immediately resolved to seize what they could find, persons as well as property, in the Platonic territory (the precautions having been taken as yet to guard against the perils of war by keeping within the walls), in order that they might have something to exchange for such Thibans as were prisoners. Before this step could be executed, however, a herald came forth from the town to communicate with them upon their unbecomingly in having so flagranty violated the truce, and especially to warn them not to do any wrong without the walls. If they retired without indicating farther mischief, their prisoners

large force
detained to
order from
Thibon to
surrender the
city to the
Platons—
they were
delivered by
the ruler
and the
council of
the Platons
—they
consequently
could have
planned the
Platons
prisoners and
captured the
walls.

¹Thucyd. ii. 3, 4.

within should be given up to them; if otherwise, these prisoners would be slain immediately. A convention having been concluded and even so on this basis, the Thibans retired without any active resistance.

Such at least was the Thibon account of what preceded their retirement. But the Phocians gave a different statement, saying that they had made no categorical promise or even any oath, and affirming that they had engaged for nothing except to suspend any decisive step with regard to the prisoners, until discussion had been entered into to see if a satisfactory agreement could be concluded.

As Thasiphilus repeats both of these statements, without indicating in which of the two he himself gave the preference, we may presume that both of them found credence with respectable persons. The Thibon story is undoubtedly the most probable; but the Phocians appear to have violated the understanding, even upon their own construction of it. For no sooner had the Thibans retired, than they (the Phocians) hastily brought in their citizens and the best of their movable property within the walls, and then slew all their prisoners forthwith, without even entering into the formalities of negotiation. The prisoners thus put to death, among whom was Eurymachus himself, were 180 in number.¹

On the first entrance of the Thibon auxiliaries at night, a messenger had started from Plataeæ to carry the news to Athens:

¹ Thucyd. ii. 45; Diodorus, vii. 10. Demosthenes (Dei. Phocæ, c. 10, p. 137) agrees with Thasiphilus in the statement that the Phocians slew their prisoners. From whom Thasiphilus borrowed his trustworthy story, that the Phocians gave up their prisoners to the Thibans, I cannot tell (Diodorus, vii. 10, 11).

The passage in this Greek, against Xerxes, is also correct, unless it is again what Thasiphilus or some other said to it before him has repeated others in subsequent ages, even the words upon which Thasiphilus in his *Æneid* makes Xerxes speak, viz. Thibans et Phociæ (c. 11, l. 41). Compare Thucyd. ii. 45, which we should join to Herod. ii. 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

of Xerxes, passed the words of Phociæ, that the Phocians only the subject, then Xerxes denied, the word and number of the Phocians in the levy—that the great body of Thibans, who they at last did capture near Plataeæ after the great day in their march, were 12,000; it adds by the way, that the Phocians had captured their prisoners in the river. These three sentences nothing about any convention between the Phocians and the Thibans placed the issue, regarding the Thibon prisoners slain.

In every point in which the account of Thasiphilus differs from that of Demosthenes, the former stands out as the most coherent and credible.

a second messenger followed him to report the victory and capture of the prisoners, as soon as it had been achieved. ^{messengers from Plataea to Athens} The Athenians sent back a herald without delay, ^{—messengers} enjoining the Plataeans to take no step respecting the prisoners until consultation should be had with Athens. Pericles doubtless feared what turned out to be the fact: for the prisoners had been slain before his messenger could arrive. Apart from the terms of the convention, and looking only to the resolved practice of ancient warriors, their destruction could not be denounced as unusually cruel, though the Thesians afterwards, when fortune was in their favour, chose to designate it as such.¹ But impartial contemporaries would notice, and the Athenians in particular would deeply lament, the glaring impolicy of this act.

For Themistocles the best thing of all would of course be to get back her captured citizens forthwith; but next to that, the best evil would be to hear that they had been put to death. In the hands of the Athenians and Plataeans, they would have been the means of obtaining from her much more valuable sacrifices than their lives, considered as a portion of Theban power, were worth: so strong was the feeling of sympathy for imprisoned citizens, several of them men of rank and importance, as may be seen by the past conduct of Athens after the battle of Kynossema, and by that of Sparta (hereafter to be recounted) after the taking of Epidauria. The Plataeans, obeying the simple instinct of wrath and vengeance, threw away this great political advantage, which the more long-sighted Pericles would gladly have turned to account.

At the time when the Athenians sent their herald to Plataea, they also issued orders for seizing all Boeotians who might be found in Attica; while they lost no time in sending heralds to persuade Plataea and placing it on the footing of a garrison town, removing to Athens the old men and sick, with the women and children. No complaint or discussion respecting the recent surprise was thought of by either party. It was evident to both that the war was now actually begun—that nothing was to be thought of except the means of

¹ Another feeling, equally worthy of notice, in the case, was caused by the fact, and while by the attack had been given, at Plataea.

intermediate between Akarnanians and Epirots. Some colonists from Ambrakia, having been admitted as co-residents with the Amphiloekians (inhabitants of this town, presently expelled them, and retained the town with its territory exclusively for themselves. The expelled inhabitants, intervening with their Ekklesia around as well as with the Akarnanians, looked out for the means of redemption, and in order to obtain it invited the assistance of Athens. Accordingly the Athenians sent an expedition of thirty triremes under Phormio, who, joining the Amphiloekians and Akarnanians, attacked and carried Argos, reduced the Ambrakians to slavery, and restored the town to the Amphiloekians and Akarnanians. It was on this occasion that the alliance of the Akarnanians with Athens was first concluded, and that their personal attachment to the Athenian admiral Phormio commenced.¹

The numerous subjects of Athens, whose contributions stood enrolled in the annual tribute, were distributed all over and around the Aegean, including all the islands south of Kista, with the exception of Miletos and Thera.² Moreover the elements of force collected in Athens itself were fully worthy of the metropolis of so great an empire. Perikles could make a report to his countrymen of 200 triremes fit for active service; 1200 horsemen and horse-archers; 1800 bowmen; and the great force of all, not less than 22,000 hoplites—mostly citizens, but in part also mercenaries. The chosen portion of these hoplites, both as to age and as to equipment, were 12,000 in number; while the remaining 10,000, including the older and younger citizens and the mercenaries, did garrison duty on the walls of Athens and Peiræus—on the long line of wall which connected Athens both with Peiræus and Phaleron—and in the various fortified posts both in and out of Attika. In addition to these large military and naval forces, the city possessed in the metropolis an armament

Strength and resources of Athens and her tributary and naval forces—continues.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 95. The time at which this expedition of Phormio and the capture of Argos happened is not precisely marked by Thucydides. But his words seem to imply that it was before the commencement of the war, or before the war. Phormio was sent to Chalkida about October or November, and

ii. 95, 96; and the expedition against Argos probably occurred between that event and the naval conflict at Kynossema and Salamis against Corinthians and Athenians against Corinthians with their allies, Lakedæmonians (included)—which conflict had happened in the preceding spring.

² Thucyd. ii. 9.

total treasure of coined silver amounting to not less than 5000 talents, or about £1,400,000, derived from annual laying by of tribute from the allies and perhaps of other revenue besides. The treasure had at one time been as large as 7000 talents, or about £1,900,000, but the cost of the recent religious and architectural decorations at Athens, as well as the ships of Pericles, had reduced it to 5000. Moreover the *areopagiæ* and the temples throughout the city were rich in votive offerings, deposits, sacred plate, and silver implements for the processions and festivals, &c., to an amount estimated at more than 800 talents, while the great statue of the goddess recently set up by Phidias in the Parthenon, composed of ivory and gold, included a quantity of the latter metal not less than 40 talents in weight—equal in value to more than 400 talents of silver—and all of it so arranged that it could be taken off from the statue at pleasure. In alluding to these sacred valuables among the resources of the state, Pericles spoke of them only as upon to be so applied in case of need, with the firm resolution of replacing them during the first season of prosperity, just as the Corinthians had proposed to borrow from Delphi and Olympia. Besides the hoard thus actually in hand, there came to a large sum and revenue, amounting under the single head of tribute from the subject allies, to 400 talents, equal to about £120,000; besides all other items, making up a general total of at least 1000 talents, or about £280,000.

To this formidable catalogue of means for war were to be added other means not less important, but which did not admit of being weighed and numbered: the untrained martial skill and discipline of the masses—the Democratical sentiment, alike fervent and sanguine, of the general mass of citizens,—and the superior development of directing intelligence. And when we consider that the enemy had relied on his side on *his* land force, but scarcely anything else—for ships, no trained spearmen, no funds, no power of combination or leadership—we may be satisfied that there were ample materials for an orator like Pericles to draw an encouraging picture of the future. He could depict

Amphipolis
greatest city
in the north
strongly
garrisoned
by Pericles
in the north.

¹ Thucyd. II. 13; Xenophon, *Anabasis*, vii. 4.

Athens in holding Peloponnesian under siege by means of her navy and a chain of insular posts;¹ and he could guarantee success² as the war revolved of persevering, orderly, and well-considered exertions, combined with firm endurance under a period of temporary, but unavoidable, suffering; and combined too with another condition hardly less difficult for Athenian temper to comply with—abstinence from seductive speculations of distant enterprise, while their focus was required by the necessities of war near home.³ But such prospects were founded upon a long-sighted calculation, looking beyond immediate loss, and therefore ill-calculated to take hold of the mind of an ordinary citizen—or at any rate likely to be overwhelmed for the moment by the pressure of actual hardship. Moreover, the bait which Pericles could promise was a successful resistance—the unacquired maintenance of that great empire to which Athens had become accustomed; a policy purely conservative, without any stimulus from the hope of positive acquisition—and not only without the sympathy of other states, but with feelings of simple acquiescence on the part of most of her allies—of strong hostility everywhere else.

On all these latter points the position of the Peloponnesian alliance was the more encouraging. No powerful a body of confederates had ever been got together—not even to resist Xerxes. Not only the entire strength of Peloponnesians (except Argives and Achæans, both of whom were neutral at first, though the Achaean town of Pelloni joined even at the beginning, and all the rest subsequently) was brought together, but also the Megarians, Boeotians, Phocians, Opuntian Lokrians, Ambrakiots, Lokkalians, and Anaktorians. Among these, Corinth, Mages, Sikyon, Pelloni, Elia, Argos, &c., and Lokian furnished sometimes force, while the Boeotians, Phocians, and Megarians supplied cavalry. Many of these states however supplied hoplite bodies; but the remainder of the

Position
and power
of Athens
and the
Peloponnesians
the other
states were
not of force
of arms of
the allies
of Athens
against
Xerxes.

¹ Thucyd. 2. 9. In addition to the
Hellenes, Megarians, &c. &c.
and the Boeotians and
Megarians.

² Thucyd. 2. 9. The success of the
and Argives was by the

armies, and also by the navy,
which was the main power
of Athens.

³ Thucyd. 2. 9. In addition to the
armies, and also by the navy,
which was the main power
of Athens.

present to admit any single Athenian ship into their harbours.¹ Besides this, the Lacedæmonians laid their schemes for sending envoys to the Persian king and to other barbaric powers—a remarkable evidence of melancholy revolution in Grecian affairs, when that potentate, whom the common arm of Greece had so hardly repulsed a few years before, was now invoked to bring the Persians fleet again into the Ægean for the purpose of crushing Athens.

The invasion of Attica however without delay was the primary object to be accomplished; and for that the Lacedæmonians issued circular orders immediately after the attempted surprise of Piræus. Though the vote of the allies was requisite to declare any war, yet when that vote had once been passed, the Lacedæmonians took upon themselves to direct all the measures of execution. Two-thirds of the hoplites of each confederate city—apparently two-thirds of a certain assumed rating for which the city was held liable in the books of the confederacy, so that the Spartans and others who furnished cavalry were not constrained to send two-thirds of their entire force of hoplites—were summoned to be present on a certain day at the islehorn of Corinth, with provisions and equipment for an expedition of some length.² On the day named, the entire force was found duly assembled. The Spartan king Archidamus, on taking the command, addressed to the commanders and principal officers from each city a discourse of solemn warning as well as encouragement. His remarks were directed chiefly to state the true of sanguine over-confidence which reigned in the army. After adverting to the magnitude of the occasion, the mighty impulses agitating all Greece, and the general good wishes which accompanied them against an enemy so much hated, he admonished them not to let their great superiority of numbers and bravery subvert them into a spirit of rash disorder. ³ 'We are about to attack the well-known enemy admirably equipped in every way, so that we may expect certainly that they will come out and fight.'

Sketch of the composition of the Persian fleet at the island of Corfu, in the autumn of 480 B.C.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 13. Plutarch says that the Persian and Median allies were summoned to Piræus, 180 triremes (200).
² Thucyd. ii. 13—15.
³ Thucyd. ii. 15. 'We are about to attack the well-known enemy admirably equipped in every way, so that we may expect certainly that they will come out and fight.'

even if they be not now actually on the march to meet us at the border, at least when they see us in their territory ravaging and destroying their property. All men exposed to any unusual indignity become incensed, and not more under passion than under calculation, when it is actually brought under their eyes; much more will the Athenians do so, accustomed as they are to empire, and to invade the territory of others rather than to see their own so treated."

Immediately on the army being assembled, Archidamus sent Mithippus as envoy to Athens to announce the coming invasion, being still in hopes that the Athenians would yield. But a resolution had been already adopted, at the instance of Pericles, to receive neither herald nor envoy from the Lacedæmonians when once their army was on its march: so that Mithippus was sent back without even being permitted to enter the city. He was ordered to quit the territory before sunset, with guides to accompany him and prevent him from addressing a word to any one. On parting from his guides at the border, Mithippus exclaimed, with a solemnity but too accurately justified by the event—"This day will be the beginning of many calamities to the Greeks."

Archidamus, as soon as the reception of his last envoy was made known to him, continued his march from the Peloponnese into Attica—which territory he entered by the road of Olus, the frontier Athenian fortress of Attica towards Boeotia. His march was slow, and he thought it necessary to make a regular attack on the fort of Olus, which had been put into as good a state of defence, that after all the various modes of assault, in which the Lacedæmonians were not skilful, had been tried in vain!—and after a

also dispersed, &c. & other passages, &c. &c. says in 75. 25. Lacedæmonians had captured a son of Cleonides of Athens.

These reports of aggression are of great value in preserving a record of the hostilities and operations of various years from the month of events. What Archidamus so consistently anticipated did not come to pass.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 10.

² Thucyd. ii. 10. after this event.

appears also (Thucyd. ii. 10). The situation of Olus is not exactly agreed upon by antiquaries; but it is generally supposed to be near the modern village of Olus, in the district of the Argolis, and on one of the roads from Olus to the city of Athens. Thucyd. ii. 10. Archidamus marched probably from the Peloponnese over Boeotia, and not into this year in order to receive the junction of the Spartan contingent after it had crossed Boeotia.

delay of several days before the place—he was compelled to renounce the attempt.

The want of confidence on the part of the Spartan king—his multiplied delays, first at the Isthmus, next in the march, and lastly before Oineia—were all offensive to the very impetuosity of the army, who were loud in their murmurs against him. He acted upon the calculation already laid down in his discourse at Sparta—that the highly-cultivated soil of Attica was to be looked upon as a hostage for the pacific dispositions of the Athenians, who would be more likely to yield when devastation, though not yet inflicted, was nevertheless impending and at their doors. In this point of view, a little delay at the border was no disadvantage; and perhaps the parliament of peace at Athens may have encouraged him to hope that it would enable them to prevail.

Nor can we doubt that it was a moment full of difficulty to Perikles at Athens. He had to proclaim to all the proprietors in Attica the painful truth, that they must prepare to see their lands and houses overrun and ruined; and that their persons, families, and movable property must be brought in for safety either to Athens, or to one of the forts in the territory, or carried across to one of the neighbouring islands. It would indeed make a favourable impression when he told them that Archidamus was his own family friend, yet only with such limits as consisted with duty to the city: in case therefore the invaders, while ravaging Attica, should receive instruction to spare his own lands, he would forthwith make them over to the state as public property. Such a case was likely enough to arise, if not from the personal feeling of Archidamus, at least from the delicate jealousy of the Spartans, who would seek thus to set the Athenians public against Perikles, as they had tried to do before by demanding the handiement of the mysterious Alkibiadist men.¹ But though this declaration from Perikles

representation
of a public
man that
Athens
would yield
at the first
invasion
of Perikles to
prevent the
war, when he
declared that
he would
not yield
and would
resist.

¹ Thucyd. i. 101, 102, 103.

² Thucyd. i. 103. ³ *Antiquities* Thucyd. i. 103. ⁴ *Antiquities* Thucyd. i. 103. ⁵ *Antiquities* Thucyd. i. 103. ⁶ *Antiquities* Thucyd. i. 103.

Alkibiades. *Antiquities* Thucyd. i. 103.

⁷ *Antiquities* Thucyd. i. 103. ⁸ *Antiquities* Thucyd. i. 103. ⁹ *Antiquities* Thucyd. i. 103. ¹⁰ *Antiquities* Thucyd. i. 103.

delay of several days before the plan—he was compelled to renounce the attempt.

The want of uniformity on the part of the Spartan king—his multiplied delays, first at the Peloponnese, next in the march, and lastly before Cleon—were all offensive to the fiery impetuosity of the army, who were bent in their measures, against him. He acted upon the calculation already laid down in his discourse at Sparta—that the highly-cultivated soil of Attica was to be looked upon as a hostage for the pacific dispositions of the Athenians, who would be more likely to yield when devastation, though not yet inflicted, was nevertheless impending and at their doors. In this point of view, a little delay at the border was no disadvantage; and perhaps the partisans of peace at Athens may have encouraged him to hope that it would enable them to prevail.

Now can we doubt that it was a moment full of difficulty to Pericles at Athens. He had to proclaim to all the proprietors in Attica the painful truth, that they must prepare to see their lands and houses overrun and ruined; and that their persons, families, and movable property must be brought in for safety either to Athens, or to one of the forts in the territory, or carried across to one of the neighbouring islands. It would indeed make a favourable impression when he told them that Archidamus was his own family friend, yet only within such limits as consisted with duty to the city: in case therefore the invaders, while ravaging Attica, should receive instruction to spare his own lands, he would forthwith make them over to the state as public property. Such a case was likely enough to arise, if not from the personal feeling of Archidamus, at least from the deliberate conspiracy of the Spartans, who would seek thus to set the Athenian public against Pericles, as they had tried to do before by demanding the banishment of the unreligious Alcibiades.¹ But though this declaration from Pericles

expectation of Archidamus that Athens would stand at the first moment—Pericles's policy in preventing the Athenians from abandoning their territory and not to let them prevail.

¹ Thucyd. i. 10; ii. 35.

² Thucyd. ii. 13; compare Thucyd. i. 10. "Ομοῖα, ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἀνθρώπων πλῆθος, ἅπαντες ἑαυτοὺς ἀποκρίνομεν."

simple." Also ii. 35.

Justin affirms that the Spartan senate themselves actually did spare the lands of Pericles' relatives, and that he made them over to the people (ii.

would doubtless provide a heavy cheer, yet the lesson which he had to inculcate—not simply for education as prudent policy, but for actual practice—was one revolving alike to the immediate interest, the dignity, and the sympathies of his countrymen. To see their lands all ravaged, without raising an arm to defend them, to carry away their wives and families, and to desert and dismantle their country residences, as they had done during the Persian invasion—all in the confidence of compensation in other ways and of remote ultimate success—were recommendations which probably no one but Pericles could have hoped to achieve. They were moreover the more painful to execute, inasmuch as the Athenian citizens had very generally retained the habits of residing permanently, not in Athens, but in the various domes of Attica; many of which still preserved their temples, their festivals, their local customs, and their limited municipal autonomy, handed down from the day when they had once been independent of Athens.¹ It was but recently that the flowering, the comforts, and the ornaments, thus distributed over Attica, had been restored from the ruin of the Persian invasion, and brought to a higher pitch of improvement than ever. Yet the fruits of this labour and the scenes of these local affections were now to be again deliberately abandoned to a new aggressor, and exchanged for the vilest privations and discomfort. Aristides might well doubt whether the Athenians would nerve themselves up to the pitch of resolution necessary for this demanding step, when it came to the actual crisis; and whether they would not constrain Pericles against his will to make propositions for peace. His delay on the borders and postponement of actual devastation gave the best chance for such propositions to be made; though, as this calculation was not verified, the army raised plausible complaints against him for having allowed the Athenians time to save so much of their property.

From all parts of Attica the residents flocked within the spacious walls of Athens, which now served as shelter for the homeless, like Salamis forty-nine years before—entire families with all their movable property, and even with the woodwork

¹ Thucydides does not say whether Pegeum, i. 22, the place really concerned; see also Thucyd. ii. 13, 14.

invincible force, not less than 60,000 hoplites, according to the statement of Ptolemy,¹ or of 100,000 according to others. Considering the number of constituent allies, the strong feeling by which they were prompted, and the shortness of the expedition, combined with the chance of plunder, even the largest of these two numbers is not incredibly great, if we take it to include not hoplites only, but cavalry and light-armed men. But since Thucydides, though comparatively full in his account of this march, has stated no general total, we may presume that he had based none upon which he could rely.

As the Athenians had made no movement towards peace, Archidamus anticipated that they would come forth to meet him in the fertile plain of Eleusis and Thessia, which was the best portion of territory that he set down to ravage. Yet no Athenian force appeared to oppose him, except a detachment of cavalry, who were repulsed in a skirmish near the small lake called Elaphi. Having held waste this plain without any serious expedition, Archidamus did not think fit to pursue the straight road which from Thessia conducted directly to Athens across the ridge of Mount Ilissus, but turned off to the eastward, leaving that mountain on his right-hand until he came to Kræpis, where he crossed a portion of the line of Ilissus over to Acharæ.

A detachment
sent from
Athens to
Acharæ,
which
crossed
the line
of Acharæ.

He here about seven miles from Athens, on a declivity sloping down into the plain which stretches westward and north-westward from Athens, and visible from the city walls. Here he encamped, keeping his army in perfect order for battle, but at the same time intending

to damage and ruin the place and its neighbourhood. Acharæ was the largest and most populous of all the towns in Attica, furnishing no less than 3000 hoplites to the national line, and flourishing as well by its corn, vines, and olives, as by its peculiar abundance of charcoal-burning from the forests of ilex on the neighbouring hills. Moreover, if we are to believe Aristophanes, the Acharæan proprietors were not merely sturdy "hogs of oak," but peculiarly vehement and irritable.² It illustrates the

¹ Ptolemy, *Geographia*, v. 11.
Thus the Athenians and Archidamus,
represented in the sixth part of the
Peloponnesian War, v. 11, 12, 13, 14.

² Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

condition of a Greek territory under invasion, when we find this great dome—which could not have contained less than 12,000 free inhabitants of both sexes and all ages, with at least an equal number of slaves—completely deserted. Aristides calculated that when the Athenians actually saw his troops so close to their city, carrying fire and sword over their wealthiest estates, their indignation would become uncontrollable, and they would march off forthwith to battle. The Athenian proprietors especially (he thought), would be foremost in insisting this tempo and insisting upon protection to their own properties—or if the remaining citizens refused to march out along with them, they would, after having been thus left unprotected to ruin, become discontented and indifferent to the general well.²

Though his calculation was not realized, it was nevertheless founded upon most rational grounds. What Aristides anticipated was on the point of happening, and nothing prevented it except the personal escape: decay of Perikles, studied to its very utmost. So long as the invading army was engaged in the Thracian plain, the Athenians had some faint hope that it might (like Phaulkonas fourteen years before) advance no farther into the interior. But when it came to Acharna within sight of the city walls—when the ravagers were actually seen destroying buildings, fresh-trees, and crops, in the plain of Athens, a slight strange to every Athenian eye except to those very old men who recalled the Persian invasion—the cooperation of the general body of citizens rose to a pitch never before known. The Athenians first of all—most the youthful citizens generally—became mostly clamorous for arming and going forth to fight. Knowing well their own great strength, but less correctly informed of the superior strength of the enemy, they felt confident that victory was within their reach. Groups of citizens were everywhere gathered together, eagerly debating the critical question of the moment; while the usual concomitants of excited feeling—rumors and prophecies of diverse tenor, many of them doubtless

known
dispute
within the
walls of
Athens—
arose from
large facts
and sight.

¹Thucyd. II. 16.

²Thucyd. II. 13. says Perikles is
negligent in seeing their later progress.

Thucyd. II. 13, 14; and in
Aristides, 187.

Ekkeha was efficacious in preventing the Ekkeha from being held. The entire body of Athenians was now assembled within the walls, and if he refused to concede the Ekkeha, they might easily have met in the Pnyx without him; for which it would not have been difficult at such a juncture to provide plausible justification. The inviolable respect which the Athenian people manifested on this occasion for the forms of their democratical constitution—attested doubtless by their long-established esteem for Perikles, yet opposed to an excitement alike intense and prevailing, and to a demand apparently reasonable, in so far as regarded the calling of an assembly for discussion—in one of the most remarkable incidents in their history.

While Perikles thus decidedly forbade any general march out for battle, he sought to provide as much employment as possible for the compressed energies of the citizens. The cavalry were sent forth, together with the Thessalian cavalry detachments, for the purpose of restraining the excursions of the enemy's light troops, and protecting the lands near the city from plunder.¹ At the same time he fitted out a powerful expedition, which sailed forth to ravage Peloponnesus, even while the invaders were yet in Attika.² Archidamos, after having remained engaged in the devastation of Attika long enough to satisfy himself that the Athenians would not hazard a battle, turned away from Athens in a north-westerly direction towards the deserts between Mount Hektemor and Mount Paros, on the road passing through Dekheia. The army continued ravaging these districts until their provisions were exhausted, and then quitted Attika by the north-western road near Oropos, which brought them into Boeotia. As the Oropians, though not Athenians, were yet dependant upon Athens, this district of Greece, a portion of their territory, was laid waste; after which the army dispersed and retired back to their respective homes.³ It would seem that they quitted Attika

The Athenians, however, were not to be deterred from their policy, and they sent a large force to ravage Peloponnesus, and to protect the lands near the city from plunder.

¹ Thucyd. i. 92. The general movement of these three Thessalian was among those sent by Perikles near Athens, on the date of the January (Pnyx) i. 92, ii.

² Thucyd. i. 92. It would have been before that the expedition sent out by Perikles, ravaging the Peloponnesus

and, indeed, the Lacedaemonians to leave away their troops out of Attika. Thucydides gives no explanation to this, but it is all possible.

³ Thucyd. i. 92. The meeting of the Athenians at Pnyx, second probably by Thucydides. Pnyx and other along the river, Dr. Smith

towards the end of July, having remained in the country between thirty and forty days.

Meanwhile the Athenian expedition, under Karkinos, Pittias, and Sokrates, joined by fifty Kerkiraean ships and by some other allies, sailed round Peloponnesos, landing in various parts to inflict damage, and among other places at Methide (Methana), on the south-western peninsula of the Laconianian territory.¹ The place, neither strong nor well-garrisoned, would have been carried with little difficulty, had not Brasidas the son of Talle—a gallant Spartan now mentioned for the first time, but destined to great celebrity afterwards—who happened to be on guard at a neighbouring post, thrown himself into it with 180 men by a rapid movement, before the dispersed Athenian troops could be brought together to prevent him. He infused such courage into the defenders of the place that every attack was repelled, and the Athenians were forced to re-embark—an act of prowess which procured for him the first public honours bestowed by the Spartans during this war. Sailing northward along the western coast of Peloponnesos, the Athenians landed again on the coast of Elis, a little south of the promontory called Cape Ichthys: they ravaged the territory for two days, debating both the troops in the neighbourhood and 800 chosen men from the central Elisian territory. Strong winds on a barrenness coast now induced the captains to sail with most of the troops round Cape Ichthys, in order to reach the harbour of Flota on the northern side of it; while the Messenian hoplites, marching by land across the promontory, attacked Flota and carried it by assault. When the fleet arrived, all were re-embarked—the full force of Elis being under march to attack them. They then sailed northward, landing on various other spots to commit devastation, until they reached Solima, a Corinthian settlement on the Coast of Akarnania. They captured this place, which they handed over to the

¹ Methide. There was a small Methide also in the vicinity of Tegea (Aristot. *de Geograph.* lib. 8. *Periplus*—knows this town as an *Alia* town belonging to the *Alia* Peloponnesos; this has been interpreted by Herodotus as an inscription published in *Strabon*

lib. 10. With *Ichthys* the *Alia* was *Alia*, *lib. 10*. *Alia* was not an *Alia* town; the Athenian ships sailing in it were probably carried on *Alia*.

² *Thucyd.* 3. 85; *Plutarch*, *Pericles*, 2. 31; *Alia*, *lib. 10*.

Athenian
fleet is
despatched
to Greece
by the coast
of Peloponnesos
and
sailed
with
the
Kerkiraean
fleet
and
other
allies
to
Methide
on the
south-western
peninsula
of the
Laconianian
territory.
The
place
was
not
strong
nor
well-
garrisoned.
The
Athenians
were
forced
to
re-embark.
An
act
of
prowess
which
procured
for
him
the
first
public
honours
bestowed
by
the
Spartans
during
this
war.

inhabitants of the neighbouring Attic town of Palæra—as well as Astæon, from whence they expelled the Sigei Thuriæ, and enrolled the town as a member of the Athenian alliance. From hence they passed over to Kephalliniæ, which they were fortunate enough also to acquire as an ally of Athens without any opposition,—with its four distinct towns or districts, Palæa, Krani, Eonai, and Pionai. These various operations took up near three months from about the beginning of July, so that they returned to Athens towards the close of September¹—the beginning of the winter half of the year, according to the distribution of Thucydides.

This was not the only maritime expedition of the summer. Thirty more triremes, under Kleopomenos, were sent through the Euripe to the Lokrian coast opposite to the northern part of Eubœa. Some disembarkations were made, whereby the Lokrian towns of Thronion and Algei were sacked, and further devastation inflicted; while a permanent garrison was planted, and a fortified post erected, in the uninhabited island of Athina opposite to the Lokrian coast, in order to restrain pirates from Ogee and the other Lokrian towns in their incursions against Eubœa.² It was further determined to expel the Ægians from Ægina, and to occupy the island with Athenian colonists. This step was partly rendered prudent by the important position of the island midway between Attika and Peloponnesos. But a concurrent motive, and probably the stronger motive, was the gratification of ancient antipathy and revenge against a people who had been among the foremost in provoking the war and in inflicting upon Athens so much suffering. The Ægiæans with their wives and children were all put on shipboard and landed in Peloponnesos—where the Spartans permitted them to occupy the maritime district and town of Thyrea, their last frontier towards Argos: while of them however found shelter in other parts of Greece. The island was made over to a detachment of Athenian *hieraia*, or citizen proprietors sent thither by lot.³

To the sufferings of the Ægiæans, which we shall hereafter

The Athenians expelled the Sigei Thuriæ from Palæra, and enrolled the town as a member of the Athenian alliance. The Sigei Thuriæ, called at Thyrea in Peloponnesos.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 25—26; Strabo. vii. 43, 44.

² Thucyd. ii. 25—26; Strabo. vii. 43.

³ Thucyd. ii. 25.

and still more deplorably aggravated, we have to add those of the
 The aggra-
 nation in-
 vaded and
 ravaged the
 Megarid—
 ravages of the
 Megarians.

Megarians. Both had been most restless in kindling
 the war, but upon none did the distress of war fall so
 heavily. Both probably shared the polemarchs con-
 sideration felt among the Peloponnesian confederacy,
 that Athens could never hold out more than a year or
 two, and were thus inclined to overlook their own
 undefended position against her. Towards the close of September,
 the full force of Athens, citizens and meting, marched into the Megarid,
 under Perikles, and laid waste the greater part of the territory:
 while they were in it, the hundred ships which had been circum-
 navigating Peloponnesos, having arrived at Egina on their return,
 went and joined their fellow-citizens in the Megara, instead of
 going straight home. The junction of the two formed the largest
 Athenian force that had ever yet been seen together: there were
 10,000 citizen hoplites (independent of 3000 others who were
 engaged in the siege of Potidæa), and 2000 mæti hoplites—
 besides a large number of light troops.¹ Against so large a force
 the Megarians could of course make no head, so that their
 territory was all laid waste, even to the city walls. For several
 years of the war, the Athenians inflicted this destruction once,
 and often twice, in the same year. A decree was proposed in the
 Athenian Ekklesia by Chæreas, though perhaps not carried, to
 the effect that the Strategoi every year should swear, as a portion
 of their oath of office,² that they would twice invade and ravage
 the Megarid. As the Athenians at the same time kept the port
 of Nemea blocked up, by means of their superior naval force and
 of the neighbouring coast of Sclania, the privations imposed on
 the Megarians became extreme and intolerable.³ Not merely
 their corn and fruits, but even their garden vegetables near the
 city, were rustled up and destroyed, and their situation seems often
 to have been that of a besieged city hard pressed by famine. Even
 in the time of Pericles, five centuries afterwards, the miseries of

¹ Thucyd. ii. 21; Diodor. xii. 48.

² Plutarch, Perikles, c. 23.

³ Was the working picture in the
Agamemnon of Aeschylus (688—702)
 of the distressed Megarians sitting in
 larger numbers into slavery with their
 own children: see Aeschylus, *Agam.* 682.

The position of Megara, by the city
 of Sparta and enemy of Athens, was
 unsupportable in the same manner
 though not to the same extent. There
 is no doubt in the war which produced
 the battle of Leuctra—more than five years
 after the Peloponnesian war. Diodor. p.
 1367, c. 132.

the town during those years were remembered and communicated to him, being assigned as the reason why one of their most noticeable captives had never been completed.¹

To the various military operations of Athens during the course of this summer, some other measures of moment are to be added. Moreover Thucydides notices an eclipse of the sun, which modern astronomical calculations refer to the third of August: had this eclipse happened three months earlier, immediately before the entrance of the Peloponnesians into Attica, it might probably have been construed as an unfavourable omen, and caused the postponement of the advance.

Exporting a prolonged struggle, the Athenians now made arrangements for placing Attica in a permanent state of defence, both by sea and land. What these arrangements were we are not told in detail, but one of them was sufficiently remarkable to be named particularly. They set apart one thousand talents out of the treasure in the acropolis as an inviolable reserve, not to be touched except on the single contingency—of a hostile naval force about to assault the city, with no other means at hand to defend it. They further enacted that if any citizen should propose, or any magistrate put the question, in the public assembly, to make a different application of this reserve, he should be punishable with death. Moreover they resolved every year to keep back one hundred of their best triremes, and triremes to maintain and equip them, for the most special necessity.² It may be doubted whether this latter provision was placed under the same stringent sanction, or observed with the same rigour, as that concerning the money; which latter was not departed from until the twentieth year of the war, after all the disasters of the Sicilian expedition, and on the terrible news of the revolt of Chios. It was on that occasion that the Athenians, having first repealed the sentence of capital punishment against any proposer of the fortification change, appropriated the money to meet the then imminent peril of the commonwealth.³

Thucydides
refers to
the fact that
the Athenians
had a reserve
of one thousand
talents, which
was not to be
touched except
in case of a
hostile naval
force about to
assault the city.
This reserve
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expedition, and
on the terrible
news of the
revolt of Chios.

¹ Thucyd. I. 88, 8.

² Thucyd. II. 13.

³ Thucyd. II. 13.

The resolution here taken about this sacred reserve, and the Executive as rigorous sentence interdicting contrary propositions, *the same*. Is pronounced by Mr. Milford to be an evidence of the inflexible barbarism of democratical government.¹ But we must recollect, first, that the sentence of capital punishment was one which could hardly by possibility come into execution; for no citizen would be so mad as to make the forbidden proposition, while this law was in force. Whoever desired to make it would first begin by proposing to repeal the prohibitory law, whereby he would incur no danger, whether the assembly decided in the affirmative or negative. If he obtained an affirmative decision, he would then, and then only, proceed to move the re-appropriation of the fund. To speak the language of English parliamentary procedure, he would first move the suspension or abrogation of the standing order whereby the proposition was forbidden.—next, he would move the proposition itself. In fact such was the mode actually pursued, when the thing at last came to be done.² But though the capital sentence could hardly come into effect, the proclamation of it to forever had a very distinct meaning. It expressed the deep and solemn conviction which the people entertained of the importance of their own resolution about the reserve—it forewarned all assemblies and all citizens to come, of the danger of diverting it to any other purpose—it surrounded the reserve with an artificial sanctity, which forced every man who aimed at the re-appropriation to begin with a preliminary proposition formidable on the very face of it, as removing a guarantee which previous assemblies had deemed of immense value, and opening the door to a contingency which they had looked upon as tremendous. The proclamation of a lighter pen-

¹ Milford, Hist. of Greece, &c. &c. vol. I. pt. II. p. 186. "Another vote was taken, which took the place of the law which forbade the vote and Pericles spoke, and while Pericles held the principal sentence to the demonstration, already made both the subsequent sentence and the inflexible barbarism of democratical government, a decree of the people decided that no little resolution was placed in a decree so important, considered only by the general will, of that which would the maintenance of Athens, against a law

expressing, since the deposition of the sacred law, an intention never repeated—the law which forbade the capital punishment was proposed against whomsoever should propose, and whomsoever should come to it any decree for the disposal of that money in any other purpose, or in any other circumstance."

² Thucyd. vol. II. pt. II. p. 186. "The decree, by the people and against whomsoever should propose, after the deposition of the sacred law, was proposed against whomsoever should propose, and whomsoever should come to it any decree for the disposal of that money in any other purpose, or in any other circumstance, and the assembly decided, and the decree was made."

inherent, or a simple prohibition without any definite sanction whatever, would neither have announced the same emphatic conviction nor produced the same deterring effect. The assembly of 421 B.C. could not in any way exact laws which subsequent assemblies could not reverse; but it could so frame its enactments, in cases of peculiar solemnity, as to make its authority strongly felt upon the judgment of its members, and to prevent them from entertaining notions for repeal except under necessity at once urgent and obvious.

Far from thinking that the law now passed at Athens displayed barbarism, either in the end or in the means, I consider it principally remarkable for its caution and long-sighted view of the future—qualifies the exact reverse of barbarism—and worthy of the general character of Perikles, who probably suggested it. Athens was just entering into a war which threatened to be of indefinite length, and was certain to be very costly. To prevent the people from exhausting all their accumulated fund, and to place them under a necessity of reserving something against extreme calamities, was an object of immense importance. Now the particular casualty, which Perikles (assuming him to be the proposer) named as the sole condition of touching this one thousand talents, might be considered as of all others the most improbable, in the year 421 B.C. So immense was then the superiority of the Athenian naval force, that to suppose it defeated, and a Peloponnesian fleet in full sail for Piræus, was a possibility which it required a statesman of extraordinary caution to look forward to, and which it is wonderful that the people generally could have been induced to contemplate. Once tied up to this purpose, however, the fund lay ready for any other terrible emergency. We shall find the actual employment of it treacherously beneficial to Athens, at a moment of the gravest peril, when she could hardly have protected herself without some such special resource. The people would scarcely have sanctioned so *disparat* an economy, had it not been proposed to them at a period so early in the war that their available reserve was still much larger. But it will be for ever to the credit of their foresight as well as consistency that they should first have adopted such a precautionary measure, and afterwards adhered to it for nineteen years, under severe pressure for money, until

at length a case arose which rendered further abstinance really, and not constructively, impossible.

To display their force and take revenge by disembarking and ravaging parts of Peloponnesus was doubtless of much importance to Athens during this first summer of the war: though it might seem that the force so employed was quite as much needed in the conquest of Potidea, which still remained under blockade, and of the neighbouring Chalkidians in Thessaly, still in revolt. It was during the course of this summer that a prospect opened to Athens of subduing these forces, through the assistance of Stablos king of the Olynthian Thracians. That prince had married the sister of Nymphodorus, a citizen of Abdera, who engaged to render him and his son Sadaerus allies of Athens. Sent for to Athens and appointed procurator of Athens at Abdera, which was one of the Athenian subject allies, Nymphodorus made this alliance, and promised in the name of Stablos that a sufficient Thracian force should be sent to aid Athens in the reconquest of her revolted towns: the honour of Athenian citizenship was at the same time conferred upon Sadaerus.¹ Nymphodorus further established a good understanding between Perikles of Macedonia and the Athenians, who were persuaded to restore to him Thessaly, which they had before taken from him. The Athenians had thus the promise of powerful aid against the Chalkidians and Potideans: yet the latter still held out, with little prospect of immediate surrender. Moreover, the town of Abdera in Alkarnania, which the Athenians had captured during the summer in the course of their expedition round Peloponnesus, was recovered during the autumn by the deposed despot Karchinos, assisted by forty Corinthian triremes and 1000 hoplites. This Corinthian armament, after restoring Karchinos, made some unsuccessful descents both upon other parts of Alkarnania and upon the island of Euboea.² In the latter they were entrapped into an ambuscade and obliged to return home with considerable loss.³

It was towards the close of autumn also that Perikles, chosen by the people for the purpose, delivered the funeral oration at

¹ Thucyd. II. 28.

² Thucyd. II. 32.

the public interest of those warriors who had fallen during the campaign. The circumstances of this public token of respect have already been described in a former chapter, on occasion of the conquest of Samos. But that which imparted to the present scene an imperishable interest was the discourse of the chosen statesman and orator ; probably heard by Thucydides himself, and in substance reproduced. A large crowd of citizens and foreigners, of both sexes and all ages, accompanied the funeral procession from Athens to the suburb called the outer Kerameia, where Perikles, mounted upon a lofty stage prepared for the occasion, closed the ceremony with his address. The law of Athens not only provided this public funeral and commemorative discourse, but also assigned maintenance at the public expense to the children of the slain warriors until they attained military age : a practice which was acted on throughout the whole war, though we have only the description and discourse belonging to this single occasion.¹

The eleven chapters of Thucydides which comprise this funeral speech are among the most memorable relics of antiquity ; considering that under the language and arrangement of the historian—always impressive, though sometimes harsh and peculiar, like the workmanship of a powerful mind aided by a bad or an unsatisfactory model—we possess the substance and thoughts of the illustrious statesman. A portion of it, of course, is and must be commonplace, belonging to all discourses composed for a similar occasion. Yet this is true only of a comparatively small portion. Much of it is peculiar, and every way worthy of Perikles—comprehensive, rational, and full not less of sense and substance than of earnest patriotism. It thus forms a strong contrast with the jejune, though elegant, rhetoric of other homages, mostly not con-

¹ Thucyd. ii. 34—41. Somewhere in the school of orators, who had fallen along with her citizens in battle, and a part in the triumph of the public token of respect, stood Perikles, a man.

² The orator, from Demosthenes of Halicarnassus, distinguished, also, for the most part in pronouncing the funeral oration, according to Thucyd.

though, to be not really his. Of those mentioned in Plato and Xenon also, the qualifications have been suggested, though none for his words. The discourse, if it be really the work of Perikles, however, does not add to his fame, but the language of Demos, a man less conspicuous, may well be his, and may perhaps have been really delivered—

posed for actual delivery. And it deserves, in comparison with the funeral discourses remaining to us from Plato, and the pseudo-*Demosthenes*, and even *Lysias*, the honorable distinction which *Thucydides* claims for his own history—an ever-living possession, not a mere show-piece for the moment.

In the context of his speech Pericles distinguishes himself from those who had preceded him in the same fraction of public orator, by dissenting from the exordiums which it had been customary to bestow on the law enjoining these funeral harangues. He thinks that the publicity of the funeral itself, and the general demonstrations of respect and grief by the great body of citizens, tell more emphatically in token of gratitude to the heroes dead, when the orator passes in silence, than when it is translated into the words of a speaker, who may easily offend either by incompetence or by apparent fecklessness, or perhaps even by unaccountable exaggeration. Nevertheless, the custom having been embodied in law, and elected as he has been by the citizens, he comes forward to discharge the duty imposed upon him in the best manner he can.¹

One of the remarkable features in this discourse is its business-like, impersonal character. It is Athens herself who undertakes to commend and decorate her departed sons, as well as to hearten up and admonish the living.

After a few words on the magnitude of the empire and on the glorious efforts as well as sacrifices whereby their forefathers and they had acquired it, Pericles proceeds to sketch the plan

though probably not addressed by him, as he was not a qualified orator.

See the general introduction, in *Demos.* that *Law* *Thucydides*, c. 2, p. 228—229, *Reichl*, on the contents and composition of a funeral discourse—*Lysias* could be fairly supposed correct—*Pericles*, vii. 2, *Demos.* p. 108.

Compare especially the funeral oration of Pericles, in *P. Weber*, *Politeness*, *Staatkunde des Pericles* (Hamburg, 1871); *Westermann*, *Geschichte des Alterthums in Chronologischer und Röm. Zeit*, 2d. ed. 24, 25; *Demos.*, *Pericles* the *Westermann*, p. 108, and in *Reichl*, *ibid.*

Thucydides (*Historien*) *Pericles*, vol. 1, p. 228 seems to state that the original author of Pericles' oration was a large sprinkling of orators

affiliated and elected out of the well-known list of Athenians, such as we now find in the other funeral orations above quoted; but that *Thucydides* himself deliberately left them out in the report. There seems no foundation for this supposition. It is much more consistent to the principle laid of history which rejects them, and all this seems to suggest that the oratorical character of the speech of Pericles was that more than a general recognition, with an intimation that he did not dwell upon them at length because they were well known to his audience—*Thucydides* in *ibid.* of *Pericles* *ibid.* p. 108.

¹ *Thucyd.* ii. 41.

brought to us, so that our enjoyment of foreign-literature is as much our own, and assumed as those which we grow at home. In respect to feeling for war, we differ from our opponents (the Lascassians) on several material points. First, we lay upon our city as a common resort: we apply no sanitary to exclude even an enemy either from any house or any spectacle, the full view of which he may think advantageous to him. For military efficiency, we trust less to manoeuvres and quackery than to our own native bravery. Next, in regard to education, while the Lascassians even from their earliest youth subject themselves to an irksome exercise for the attainment of courage, we with our way habits of life are not less prepared than they to encounter all perils within the measure of our strength. The proof of this is, that the Poliposonians confederates do not attack us one by one, but with their whole united force; while we, when we attack them at home, conspire for the most part all of them who try to defend their own territory. None of our enemies has ever met and contended with our entire force; partly in consequence of our large navy — partly from our disposition in different simultaneous land-expeditions. But when they chance to be engaged with any part of it, if victorious, they pretend to have vanquished us all — if defeated, they pretend to have been vanquished by all.

"Now, if we are willing to leave danger just as much under an intelligent system as under constant toil, and by spontaneous courage as much as under force of law, we are gainers in the end by not taxing ourselves individually with sufferings to come, yet still appearing in the hour of trial, not less daring than those who toil without courage.

¹In other matters too as well as in these carefully chosen admissions. For we combine elegance of taste with simplicity of life, and we pursue knowledge without being mislead; ²we employ wealth not for talking and ostentation, but as a real help to the person

¹Thayer, E. H. *Ichneumonidae* (part) *Ichneumon*, and *Microgaster* from Pakistan: mostly in types (slides and 1 figure shown separately, and 10 slides only). *Ichneumon* part complete, slide of *Microgaster* incomplete.

The first step of the Chinese in Bedford, Mass., may be compared with the loss of this discovery of Fertilizer: the system of Adams and others (both men, as I would have guessed) to restore the valley of Mass.

man; nor is it disgraceful to any man who is poor to confess his poverty, though he may rather turn reproach for not actually keeping himself out of poverty. The magistrate who discharges public trusts tells that domestic duties also—the private citizen, while engaged in professional business, has competent knowledge on public affairs: for we stand alone in regarding the man who keeps silent from these latter not as harmless, but as unwise. Moreover, we always hear and pronounce on public matters, when discussed by our leaders, or perhaps strike out for ourselves correct reasoning about them; for from ascending discussion an impediment to action, we complain only if we are not told what is to be done before it becomes our duty to do it. For in truth we combine in the most reasonable manner these two qualities—extreme boldness in execution, with full debate beforehand on that which we are going about: whereas with others, ignorance alone imparts boldness—debate introduces hesitation. Accordingly those men we properly to be regarded as the stoutest of heart who, knowing most precisely both the terrors of war and the events of peace, are still not the less willing to encounter peril.

"In fine, I affirm that our city, considered as a whole, is the administration of Greece;¹ while viewed individually, we enable the same men to furnish himself out and suffice to himself in the greatest variety of ways and with the most complete grace and refinement. This is no empty boast of the moment, but genuine reality; and the power of the city, acquired through the dispositions just indicated, waits to prove it. Athens alone of all cities stands forth in actual trial greater than her reputation: her enemy when he attacks her will not have his pride wounded by suffering defeat from feeble hands—her subjects will not think themselves degraded as if their obedience were paid to an unworthy superior.² Having therefore forth our power, not uncorroborated, but backed by the most evident proofs, we shall be allowed

¹ Thucyd. ii. 61. *ἡ πόλις ὡς ἅπασα ἡ ἑλλάς ἀδμι-
νιστρεῖται*.—*How, then, can we have made for you
the whole of Greece and have not, actually, to
city as, past popular memory, for citizens
alone it, when citizens participate.*

² The statement would rather be, for those
of the citizens themselves, should be

afford the acquiescence of the citizens
themselves.

² Thucyd. ii. 61. *οὐδὲν ἄλλο οὐδὲν
δυνάμει πείσονται τοὺς πολίτας ὅτι οὐκ
αὐτοὶ αὐτοὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλοι οὐδὲν ἄλλοι
οὐδὲν ἄλλοι οὐδὲν ἄλλοι οὐδὲν ἄλλοι
οὐδὲν ἄλλοι οὐδὲν ἄλλοι οὐδὲν ἄλλοι*

not less by posterity than by our contemporaries. Nor do we stand in need either of Homer or of any other panegyrist, whose words may for the moment please, though the truth if known would rebuke their intended meaning. We have compelled all land and sea to become accessible to our courage, and have planted everywhere imperishable monuments of our kindness as well as of our hostility.

"Such is the city on behalf of which these citizens, resolved that it should not be wrested from them, have nobly fought and died; and on behalf of which all of us have left behind many willingly told. It is for this reason that I have spoken at length concerning the city, at once to draw from it the lesson that the conflict is not for equal motives between us and enemies who possess nothing of the like excellence, and to demonstrate by proofs the truth of my encomium pronounced upon her."

Pericles pursued, at considerable additional length, the same tenor of mixed exhortation to the living and eulogy of the dead; with many special and emphatic observations addressed to the relatives of the latter, who were assembled around, and doubtless very near him. But the extract which I have already made is so long that no further addition would be admissible; yet it was impossible to pass over lightly the picture of the Athenian commonwealth in its glory, as delivered by the ablest citizen of the age. The effect of the democratical constitution, with its diffused and equal citizenship, in calling forth not merely strong attachment, but painful self-sacrifice, on the part of all Athenians, is nowhere more forcibly insisted upon than in the words above cited of Pericles, as well as in others afterwards.—"Contemplating as you do daily before you the actual power of the state, and becoming passionately attached to it, when you perceive its full greatness, reflect that it was all acquired by men during exposure with their deat, and full of an honorable sense of shame in their actions"—such is the association which he pre-

¹Thucyd. ii. 41. καὶ συνέβαινεν αὐτοὺς αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς ποταμοῖς, ἀποκρίναι καὶ ἀποκρίναι αὐτοῖς, ἀποκρίναι αὐτοῖς.

²Thucyd. ii. 41. αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς ποταμοῖς, ἀποκρίναι καὶ ἀποκρίναι αὐτοῖς, ἀποκρίναι αὐτοῖς.

αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀποκρίναι αὐτοῖς, ἀποκρίναι αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίναι αὐτοῖς.

Thucyd. ii. 41. αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς ποταμοῖς, ἀποκρίναι καὶ ἀποκρίναι αὐτοῖς, ἀποκρίναι αὐτοῖς.

ments between the greatness of the state as an object of common passion, and the savings, intelligence, and mutual esteem of individual citizens, as its creating and preserving cause; poor as well as rich being alike interested in the partnership.

But the claims of patriotism, though put forward as essentially and deservedly paramount, are by no means understood to reign exclusively, or to absorb the whole of the democratical activity. Subject to these, and to those laws and maxims which protect both the public and individuals against wrong, it is the pride of Athens to exhibit a rich and varied field of human impulse—an unrestricted play of busy and diversity of private pursuit, coupled with a reciprocity of cheerful intelligence between one individual and another—and an absence even of those "black looks" which so much enliven life, were it they never pass into enmity at last. This portion of the speech of Perikles deserves particular attention, because it serves to correct an error, often for too indiscriminately made, respecting antiquity as contrasted with modern socialism—an assertion that the ancient societies sacrificed the individual to the state, and that only in modern times has individual agency been left free to the proper extent. This is preeminently true of Sparta;—it is also true to a great degree of the ideal societies depicted by Plato and Aristotle: but it is pointedly untrue of the Athenian democracy; nor can we with any confidence predicate it of the major part of the Grecian cities.

I shall hereafter return to this point when I reach the times of the great speculative philosophers: at present I merely bespeak attention to the speech of Perikles as negativing the supposition, that constant interference of the state with individual liberty was universal among the ancient Greek republics. There is no doubt that he has present to his mind a comparison with the extreme narrowness and rigour of Sparta, and that therefore his assertions of the extent of positive liberty at Athens must be understood as partially qualified by such contrast. But even making allowance for this, the stress which he lays upon the liberty of thought and action at Athens, not merely from extensive

Mutual
intelligence of
diversity of
interests and
passions in
Athens.

It is only
true
partially
and in some
measurable
degree
that the
state
interfered
to an
unlimited
degree with
individual
liberty in
Greece.

resistant of law, but also from practical intolerance between man and man, and tyranny of the majority over individual dissenters in tests and perils, deserves serious notice, and helps out one of those points in the national character upon which the intellectual development of the time mainly depended. The national temper was indulgent in a high degree to all the varieties of positive impulse. The peculiar promptings in every individual breast were allowed to manifest themselves and bear fruit, without being suppressed by external opinion or trained into forced conformity with some assumed standard: antiquities against any of them formed no part of the habitual morality of the citizen. While much of the generating causes of human hatred was thus rendered inoperative, and while society was rendered more comfortable, more instructive, and more elevating, all its germs of productive fruitful genius, as rare everywhere, found in such an atmosphere the maximum of encouragement. Within the limits of the law, as rarely as faithfully observed at Athens as anywhere in Greece, individual impulse, taste, and even eccentricity, were accepted with indulgence, instead of being a mark as elsewhere for the intolerance of neighbors or of the public. This remarkable feature in Athenian life will help us in a future chapter to explain the striking career of Socrates, and it further presents to us, under another face, a great part of that which the censures of Athens denounced under the name of "democratic license". The liberty and diversity of individual life in that city were offensive to Xenophanes,¹ Plato, and Aristotle—attached either to the monotonous drill of Sparta, or to some other ideal standard, which, though much better than the Spartan in itself, they were disposed to impose upon society with a heavy-handed uniformity. That liberty of individual action, not merely from the over-restraints of law, but from the tyranny of jealous opinion, such as Pericles deplores in Athens, belongs more naturally to a democracy, where there is no select One or Few to require

Free play of
individual
taste and
impulse in
Athens—
importance
of this
feature
shown in
society.

¹ Compare the sentiment of Xenophanes, the great source of that which is here laid down by Part I. 60, criticizing the rigid discipline of Sparta, and denouncing the liberty of Athenian life (Xenophanes, Memorabilia,

B. I. 11; B. II. 12). It is curious that the sentiment appears in this dialogue as just to the merits of the former. For this Xenophanes son of Teophrastus is a dialogue with Socrates.

workship and not the fashion, than to any other form of government. But it is very rare even in democracies. None of the governments of modern times, democratical, aristocratical, or monarchical, presents anything like the picture of generous tolerance towards mental dissent and spontaneity of individual taste which we read in the speech of the Athenian statesman. In all of them, the intolerance of the national opinion cuts down individual character to one out of a few set types, to which every person, or every family, is constrained to adjust itself, and beyond which all exceptions meet either with hatred or with derision. To impose upon men such restrictions either of law or of opinion as are requisite for the security and comfort of society, but to encourage rather than repress the free play of individual impulses subject to those limits, is an ideal, which, if it was ever approached at Athens, has certainly never been attained, and has indeed comparatively been little studied or cared for, in any modern society.

Connected with this reciprocal indulgence of individual liberty, was not only the hospitable reception of all strangers at Athens, which Pericles contrasts with the cordiality or jealous exclusiveness practised at Sparta, but also the many-sided activity, bodily and mental, requisite in the former, so opposite to that narrow range of thought, exclusive discipline of the body, and never-ending preparation for war, which formed the system of the latter. His assertion that Athens was equal to Sparta even in her own solitary excellence—efficiency on the field of battle—is doubtless undeniable. But not the less impressive is his sketch of that multitude of concurrent impulses which at this same time agitated and impelled the Athenian mind—the strength of one not implying the weakness of the remainder: the relish for all pleasures of art and elegance, and the appetite for intellectual expansion, subsiding in the same bosom with energetic propensities as well as endurance; cheerfulness of receptive spectacles, yet never slacking the cheerfulness of obedience even to the hardest calls of patriotic duty: that combination of reason and courage which encountered danger the more willingly from having discussed and calculated its beforehand: lastly, an unceasing interest, as well as a competence of judgment, in public discussion and public action, common to every citizen

tolerance
and
reciprocal
indulgence
of Athens.

rich and poor, and combined with every man's own private industry. So comprehensive an ideal of many-sided social development, bringing out the capacities for action and endurance, as well as those for enjoyment, would be sufficiently remarkable, even if we supposed it only existing in the imagination of a philosopher; but it becomes still more so when we recollect that the main features of it at least were drawn from the fellow-citizens of the speaker. It must be taken however as belonging particularly to the Athens of Pericles and his contemporaries. It would not have suited either the period of the Persian war fifty years before, or that of Demosthenes seventy years afterwards. At the former period, the art, the letters, and the philosophy, advanced to with pride by Pericles, were as yet backward, while even the native energy and democratical character, though very powerful, had not been worked up to the pitch which they afterwards reached: at the latter period, although the intellectual manifestations of Athens subsist in full or even increased vigour, we shall find the personal enterprise and energetic spirit of her citizens materially abated. As the circumstances, which I have already resorted to, go far to explain the previous upward movement, as those which fill the coming chapters, containing the disaster of the Peloponnesian war, will be found to explain still more completely the declining tendency shortly about to commence. Athens was brought to the brink of entire ruin, from which it is surprising that she recovered at all, but never surprising that she recovered at the expense of a considerable loss of personal energy in the character of her citizens.

And thus the reason at which Pericles delivered his discourse leads to it as an additional and peculiar passion. It was at a time when Athens was as yet erect and at her maximum. For though her real power was doubtless much diminished compared with the period before the Thirty years' truce, yet the great efforts and works of art, achieved since then, tended to compensate that loss, insofar as the sense of greatness was concerned; and no one, either citizen or enemy, considered Athens as having at all declined. It was at the commencement of the great struggle with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the coming barbs of which Pericles never diagnosed either to himself or to his fellow-citizens, though he

Pericles
and
interesting
moment of
which the
discourse
of Pericles
was deliv-
ered.
Athens was
at the height
even of her
power—dis-
tancing every
contending
city of the
world.



CHAPTER XLIX.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND YEAR DOWN
TO THE END OF THE THIRD YEAR OF THE PELO-
PONNESIAN WAR.

At the close of one year after the attempted surprise of Plataeæ
by the Thebans, the belligerent parties in Greece
remained in an unaltered position as to relative
strength. Nothing decisive had been accomplished
on either side, either by the invasion of Attica or by
the spring desecrate round the coast of Peloponnesus.
In spite of material damage inflicted—especially in the greatest
measure upon Attica—no progress was yet made towards the ful-
filment of those objects which had induced the Peloponnesians to
go to war. Especially the most pressing among all their wishes
—the relief of Potidæa—was never advanced; for the Athe-
nians had not found it necessary to relax the blockade of that
city. The result of the first year's operations had thus been to
disappoint the hopes of the Corinthians and the other ardent
instigators of war, while it justified the anticipations both of
Pericles and of Archidamus.

A second devastation of Attica was resolved upon for the com-
mencement of spring; and measures were taken for
carrying it all over that territory, about the settled
policy of Athens not to hazard a battle with the in-
vaders was now ascertained. About the end of March
or beginning of April the entire Peloponnesian force
(two-thirds from each confederate city as before) was
assembled under the command of Archidamus and
marched into Attica. This time they carried the work of sys-
tematic destruction not merely over the Thracian plain and the

see p. 50.
There is an
error in the
original
during the
first year
of war.

second
devastation of
Attica by
the Pelopon-
nesians
—see p. 50.
—see p. 50.
—see p. 50.
—see p. 50.

plain immediately near to Athens, as before, but also to the more southerly portions of Attica, down even as far as the ruins of Lamina. They traversed and ravaged both the eastern and the western coast, remaining not less than forty days in the country. They found the territory deserted as before, all the population having retired within the walls.¹

In regard to this second invasion, Pericles recommended the same defensive policy as he had applied to the first; and apparently the citizens had now come to acquiesce in it, if not willingly, at least with a full conviction of its necessity. But a new visitation had now occurred, diverting their attention from the invaders, though enormously aggravating their sufferings. A few days after Archilochus entered Attica, a pestilence or epidemic sickness broke out unexpectedly at Athens.

It appears that this terrible disaster had been raging for some time throughout the regions round the Mediterranean; having begun, as was believed, in Ethiopia—thence passing into Egypt and Libya, and overrunning a considerable portion of Asia under the Persian government. About sixteen years before, too, there had been a similar calamity in Rome and in various parts of Italy. Recently, it had been felt in Sicily and some other islands of the *Ægean*, yet seemingly not with such intensity as to excite much notice generally in the Grecian world: at length it passed to Athens, and first showed itself in the Piræus. The progress of the disease was as rapid and destructive as its appearance had been sudden; whilst the extraordinary accumulation of people within the city and long walls, in consequence of the presence of the invaders in the country, was but too favourable to every form of contagion. Families crowded together in close cabins and places of temporary shelter²—throughout a city constructed (like most of those in Greece) with little regard to the conditions of salubrity

Commenced
first at the
pestilence,
or epidemic
at Athens.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 27-28.

² Thucyd. ii. 53. Diels, iii. 21; Plutarch, Pericles, c. 14. It is to be remarked that the Athenians, though their persons and movable property were sheltered within the walls, had not driven in their sheep and cattle also, but had transported them over to Salamis and the neighbouring islands (Thucyd. ii. 24. *Salamin, Megaron*).

serious aggravation of their epidemic; for in the accounts of the epidemics which devastated Rome under similar circumstances, verified the representation of great numbers of corpses, along with human beings, deposited as a terrible addition to the already low state of the city (Thucyd. ii. 53. *Salamin, Megaron*; Plutarch, Pericles, c. 14. *Salamin, Megaron*; Plutarch, Pericles, c. 14. *Salamin, Megaron*).

and was religiously aggravated by, these gloomy ideas, propitiations were enacted, and supplications with solemn procession were held at the temples, to appease the divine wrath.¹

When it was found that neither the priest nor the physician could retard the spread, or mitigate the intensity, of the disorder, the Athenians abandoned themselves to despair, and the space within the walls became a scene of desolating misery. Every man attacked with the malady at once lost his courage—a state of depression, itself among the worst features of the case, which made him lie down and die, without any attempt to seek for preservation. And though at first friends and relatives lent their aid to tend the sick with the usual family sympathies, yet so terrible was the number of these attendants who perished, “like sheep,” from such contact, that at length no man would thus expose himself; while the most generous spirits, who persisted longest in the discharge of their duty, were carried off in the greatest numbers.² The patient was then left to die alone and unaided. Sometimes all the inmates of a house were swept away one after the other, no man being willing to go near it: desolation on the one hand, attendance on the other, both tended to aggravate the calamity. There remained only those who, having had the disorder and recovered, were willing to tend the sufferers. These men formed the single exception to the all-pervading misery of the time; for the disorder seldom attacked any one twice, and when it did, the second attack was never fatal. Those with their own escape, they deemed themselves out of the reach of all disease, and were full of sympathetic kindness for others whose sufferings were just beginning. It was from them too that the principal attention in the bodies of deceased victims proceeded: how much was the state of misery and sorrow, that even the nearest relatives neglected the sepulchral duties, sacred beyond all others in the eyes of a Greek. Nor is there any circumstance which conveys to us so vivid an idea of the prevalent agony and despair, as when we read in the words of an eye-witness, that the deaths

¹ Compare Thucyd. vii. 59, who mentions similar propitiations in the Corinthian army, besieged by Demetrius, at Syracuse when it was besieged by during the terrible epidemic with Marcellus and the Roman.

down was realized—before they became plunged in the wide-spread misery which they witnessed around, and which affected indiscriminately the virtuous and the profligate—was all that they looked to enjoy; embracing with avidity the immediate pleasures of sense, as well as such positive gains, however illegitimate, as would be made the means of procuring them, and throwing aside all thought both of honour as of long-sighted advantage. Life and property being alike ephemeral, there was no hope left but to snatch a moment of enjoyment, before the unrelenting hand of destiny should lay waste its victims.

The picture of society under the pressure of a murderous epidemic, with its trails of physical torments, watched, seen, and demoralization, has been drawn by more than one eminent author, but by none with more impressive fidelity and unobscure than by Theodor Döbner,¹ who had no predecessor, nor anything but the reality, to copy from. We may remark that amidst all the redoubtably accompaniments of the time, there are no human machines, such as those offered up at Carthage during pestilence to appease the rage of the gods—there are no cruel persecutions against imaginary authors of the disease, such as those against the Huxari (suspecters of leprosy) in the streets of Milan in 1830.²

Three years altogether did this misery desolate Athens : continuously, during the entire second and third years of the war—after which followed a period of marked abatement for a year and a half : but it then revived again, and lasted for another year, with the same fury as at first. The public law, over and above the private misery, which this unexpected enemy inflicted upon Athens was incalculable. Out of 15000 hearthstones, all among the rich men of the state, 305 died of the epidemic ; besides 4000 hearthstones out of the well furnished poor, and

1 This description in the north book of *Memoriae, Illustratae* and expanded from *Thesaurus*—that of the Palace at Florence in 1544, with which the *Memoriae* of Bologna agree—and that of Tivoli in the history of the Palace in London—are all well known.

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maße, sei auch: gelinge trotzdem die
richtige Einstellung; wenn, dann
möglichst wenig ungewollt, für
sich und für andere. Und wenn
nicht, sei es wenigstens nicht
schon.

But the books respecting the plague of bilious and the Ulcer, and the insupportable smell of Phlegm—Præcordial Spasm—and the distended work of the same author—Stomachicæ Odoris Biliosæ.

number of the poorer population, so great as to defy computation.¹ No efforts of the Peloponnesians could have done so much to ruin Athens, or to bring the war to a termination such as they desired: and the distemper told the more in their favour, as it never spread at all into Peloponnesus, though it passed from Athens to some of the more populous islands.² The Lacedæmonian army, was withdrawn from Attica somewhat earlier than it would otherwise have been, for fear of taking the contagion.³

But it was while the Lacedæmonians were yet in Attica, and during the first feckness of the terrible malady, that Pericles equipped and conducted from Peiræus an armament of 100 triremes and 4000 hoplites to attack the coasts of Peloponnesus: 300 horsemen were also sent to some *harbour-transports*, prepared for the occasion out of old triremes. To diminish the crowd accumulated in the city was disposition of beneficial tendency, and perhaps those who went aboard might consider it as a chance of escape to quit an infected house. But unhappily they carried the infection along with them, which devastated the fleet not less than the city, and crippled all its efforts. Reinforced by fifty ships of war from Chios and Lesbos, the Athenians first landed near Epidaurus in Peloponnesus, ravaging the territory and making an unavailing attempt upon the city: next they made like incursions on the more southern portions of the Argolic peninsula—Trachis, Halisæ, and Hermionæ; and lastly attacked and captured Præse, on the eastern coast of Laconia. On returning to Athens, the armament was immediately conducted under Agæus and Kleopompas to press the siege of Psidium, the blockade of which still continued without any visible progress. On arriving there, an attack was made on the walls by battering engines and by the other aggressive methods then practised; but nothing whatever was achieved. In fact, the armament became inoperative

Athenian armament sent first against Peloponnesus, next against Psidium, which is situated and reduced by the epidemic.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 42. *very ill fitted by the infectious nature. Epidemic within them drove them out.* On triremes and other frigates, which must be greatly hampered by the malady.

² Thucyd. ii. 44. *The latter population*

relatively smaller. He does not specify what places these were, perhaps Chios, but surely Lesbos, wherever the fleet would have been reduced when the result of that island came.

³ Thucyd. ii. 47.

himself publicly against the prevailing sentiment, and recommending perseverance in his line of policy. The speeches made by his opponents, generally very bitter, are not given by Thucydides; but that of Pericles himself is set down at considerable length, and a memorable discourse it is. It strikingly brings into relief both the character of the man and the impress of actual circumstances—an inexpressible calm conscious not only of right purposes but of just and reasonable anticipations, and bearing up with manliness, or even defiance, against the natural difficulty of the case, heightened by an extreme of insupportable misfortune. He had foreseen,¹ while advising the war originally, the probable impatience of his countrymen under its first hardships, but he could not foresee the epidemic by which that impatience had been incorporated into madness, and he now addressed them not merely with unshaken adherence to his own deliberate convictions, but also in a tone of reproachful remonstrance against their unwarranted change of sentiment towards him—seeking at the same time to combat that uncontrolled despair which for the moment overclouded both their pride and their patriotism. Far from harrying himself before the present sentiment, it is at this time that he sets forth his title to their esteem in the most direct and unqualified manner, and claims the continuance of that which they had so long accorded, as something belonging to him by acquired right.

His main object, through this discourse, is to fill the minds of his audience with patriotic sympathy for the weal of the entire city, so as to counterbalance the absorbing sense of private woe. If the collective city flourishes (he argues), private misfortunes may at least be borne; but no amount of private prosperity will avail, if the collective city falls (a proposition literally true in ancient times and under the circumstances of ancient warfare—though less true at present). "Distracted by domestic calamity, ye are now angry both with me who advised you to go to war, and with yourselves who followed the advice. Ye listened to me, considering me superior to others in judgment, in speech, in patriotism, and in incurable probity"

*Athenian
public
assembly—
but speech
of Pericles
could have
scarcely
any effect
against the
public
discontent.*

¹ Thucyd. i. 145.

² Thucyd. ii. 65. *malice, just reproach, deep sympathy, the selfish claims of war.*

deep political or religious, and humanitarian views, disinterestedness and sympathy, equanimity.

—nor ought I now to be treated as culpable for giving such advice, when in point of fact the war was unavoidable, and there would have been still greater danger in shrinking from it. I am the same man, still unchanged; but ye in your misfortune cannot stand to the convictions which ye adopted when yet robust. Extraneous and unknown, indeed, are the sorrows which have fallen upon you; yet inhabiting as ye do a great city, and brought up in dispositions suitable to it, ye must also resolve to bear up against the tinnest pressure of adversity, and never to surrender your dignity. I have often explained to you that ye have no reason to doubt of eventual success in the war, but I will now remind you, more emphatically than before, and even with a degree of animation suitable as a stimulus to your present unaided depression, that your naval force makes you masters not only of your allies, but of the entire sea!—one-half of the visible field for action and employment. Compared with so vast a power as this, the temporary loss of your houses or territory is a mere trifle—an ornamental accessory not worth considering; and this too, if ye preserve your freedom, ye will quickly recover. It was your fathers who first gained this empire, without any of the advantages which ye now enjoy; ye must not disgrace yourselves by losing what they acquired. Delighting as ye all do in the house and empire enjoyed by the city, ye must not shrink from the toils whereby alone that honour is sustained: moreover ye now fight, not merely for freedom instead of slavery, but for empire against loss of empire, with all the perils arising out of imperial unpopularity. It is not safe for you now to abdicate, even if ye choose to do so; for ye hold your empire like a despotism—against perhaps in the original acquisition, but ruinous to part with when once acquired. Be not angry with me, whose advice ye followed in going to war, because the enemy have done such damage as might be expected from them: still less on account of this unknown disaster: I know that this makes me an object of your special present hatred,

I thought, H. M. Suppose it was this, I was fearful not to send anyone before them because they might see in the night, and I was not sure of the result. I thought, however, that I was not sure of the result, and I was not sure of the result, and I was not sure of the result.

Suppose it was this, I was fearful not to send anyone before them because they might see in the night, and I was not sure of the result. I thought, however, that I was not sure of the result, and I was not sure of the result, and I was not sure of the result.

though very unjustly, unless ye will consent to give me credit also for any unexpected good-luck which may come. Our city derives its particular glory from unshaken bearing up against misfortune: her power, her name, her empire of Greece over Greece, are such as have never before been seen: and if we choose to be great, we must take the consequence of that temporary envy and hatred which is the necessary price of permanent renown. Behave ye now in a manner worthy of that glory: display that courage which is essential to protect ye against disaster at present, as well as to guarantee your honour for the future. Send no farther embassy to Sparta, and bear your misfortune without showing symptoms of distress."¹

The inevitable reason, as well as the proud and rustic bearing of this discourse, set forth with an eloquence which it was not possible for Thucydides to reproduce—together with the age and character of Pericles—carried the assent of the assembled people; who when in the Pnyx, and engaged according to habit on public matters, would for a moment forget their private sufferings in consideration of the safety and grandeur of Athens. Possibly indeed, those sufferings, though still continuing, might become somewhat alleviated when the invaders quitted Attica, and when it was no longer indispensable for all the population to confine itself within the walls. Accordingly, the assembly resolved that no further propositions should be made for peace, and that the war should be prosecuted with vigour.

But though the public resolution thus adopted showed the ancient habit of deference to the authority of Pericles, the sentiments of individuals taken separately were still those of anger against him as the author of that system which had brought them into so much distress. His political opponents—Kleón, Demos, or Lakrattidas, perhaps all three in conjunction—took care to provide an opportunity for this prevalent irritation to manifest itself in act, by bringing an accusation against him before the assembly. The accusation is said to have been preferred on the ground of pecuniary malversation, and ended by

Pericles' effect of his address—now resolution shows the system—this was—remember, the discontent against Pericles still continued.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 65-66. I give a general without setting forth its full contents; summary of this memorable speech, and its characteristic words.

his being sentenced to pay a considerable fine, the amount of which is differently reported—fifteen, fifty, or eighty cents—by different authors.¹ The opposing party thus appeared to have carried their point, and to have disgraced, as well as excluded from re-election, the veteran statesman. The event however disappointed their expectations. The imposition of the fine not only satisfied all the irritation of the people against him, but even occasioned a serious reaction in his favor, and brought back as strongly as ever the ancient sentiment of esteem and admiration. It was quickly found that those who had succeeded Perch6 in general neither possessed nor deserved in an equal degree the public confidence. He was accordingly soon re-elected, with as much power and influence as he had ever in his life enjoyed.²

But that life, long, honorable, and useful, had already been prolonged considerably beyond the sixtieth year, and there were but too many circumstances, besides the recent fine, which tended to hasten as well as to embitter its close. At the very moment when

¹Thorp, p. 65; Ellis, Georgia, p. 214, n. 1; Pickens, Perch6, p. 55; Drake, vol. 4, p. 25. John Sherman, as the veteran enemy of Perch6, and Pickens, Indiana, first Congress, p. 20.

Pickens and Sherman both state that Perch6 was not only fined, but also removed from his office of Intendant. Winchell mentions the fine, but not the removal; and his silence leads me to doubt the justice of the latter event altogether. For with such a man as Perch6, a man of natural world-happiness, surely more shrewd and cunning than the like I ever met, removed from office, though capable of being procured by vote of the public assembly, would hardly be induced to pass by the opportunity.

I imagine the events to have passed as follows: The Council, with some other officers of the Government, were changed or re-elected at the beginning of September, the first month of the latter year; that is, somewhere about November. Now the Felicianerian army, breaking upon upon the end of March or beginning of April, and remaining forty days, would leave the country almost the first week in May. Perch6 returned from

his expedition against Felicianerian shortly after they left And6; that is, about the middle of May (Thorp, p. 67). There still remained, therefore, a month or six weeks before his office of Intendant was legally expired, and required removal. It was during this interval (which Thompson expresses by the words *in P. Jurejurato*, p. 10) that he executed the locality and delivered the language recently mentioned.

But when the time for a new election of thinking arrived, the enemies of Perch6 opposed his re-election, and brought a charge against him in that kind of assembly in which every candidate who alleges "was exposed, under his period of office. They alleged against him some official misconduct in reference to the public money—and the charge (which) hit him with a blow. His re-election was thus prevented, and with a man who had been so often re-elected, this might be loosely called "taking away the office of public!"—so that the language of Pickens and Sherman, as well as the silence of Thompson, would on this supposition be justified.

²Thorp, p. 65.

Pericles was preaching to his countrymen, in a time almost unrepentable, the necessity of careful and undivided devotion to the common country, in the midst of private suffering, he was himself among the greatest of sufferers, and most hardly pressed to set the example of observing his own precepts. The epidemic carried off not merely his two sons (the only two legitimate, Xanthippus and Paralus), but also his sister, several other relatives, and his best and most useful political friends. Amidst this train of domestic calamities, and in the funeral obsequies of so many of his dearest friends, he remained master of his grief, and maintained his habitual self-command, until the last misfortune—the death of his favourite son Paralus, which left his house without any legitimate representative to maintain the family and the hereditary sacred rites. On this final blow, though he strove to command himself as before, yet at the obsequies of the young man, when it became his duty to place a wreath on the dead body, his grief became uncontrollable, and he burst out, for the first time in his life, into pious tears and sobbing.¹

In the midst of these several personal trials he received the intimation, through Alcibiades and some other ^{respected} friends, of the restored confidence of the people towards him, and of his re-election to the office of Strategus. But it was not without difficulty that he was persuaded to present himself again at the public assembly, and resume the direction of affairs. The regret of the people was loudly expressed to him for the recent sentence—perhaps indeed the law may have been repaid to him, or some evasion of it permitted, saving the terms of law²—in the present emergency of the city; which was further displayed towards him by the grant of a remarkable exemption from a law of his own original proposition. He had himself, some years before, been the author of that law, whereby the citizenship of Athens was restricted to persons born both of Athenian fathers and Athenian mothers, under which restriction several thousand

¹ Plutarch, Pericles, c. 34.

² See Plutarch, Pericles, c. 37. about the matter of bringing about

such an evasion of a law: compare also the notice of M. Boissac, in *Revue des Etudes Grecques*, (Paris), October, 1876, p. 195.

persons, illegitimate on the mother's side, are said to have been deprived of the citizenship, on occasion of a public distribution of arms. Invidious as it appeared to grant, to Perikles singly, an exemption from a law which had been strictly enforced against so many others, the people were now moved, not less by compassion than by anxiety, to relieve their own previous severity. Without a legitimate heir, the house of Perikles, one branch of the great Alkmeonid Gens by his mother's side, would be left deserted, and the continuity of the family sacred rites would be broken—a misfortune painfully felt by every Athenian family, as calculated to wrong all the deceased members and provoke their posthumous displeasure towards the city. Accordingly, permission was granted to Perikles to legitimate, and to inscribe in his own gens and phratry, his natural son by Aspasia, who bore his own name.¹

It was thus that Perikles was reinstated in his post of Strategos as well as in his ascendancy over the public council—scarcely about August or September, 430 B.C. He lived about one year longer, and seems to have maintained his influence as long as his health permitted. Yet we hear nothing of him after this moment, and he fell a victim, not to the violent symptoms of the epidemic, but to a slow and wasting fever,² which undermined his strength as well as his capacity. To a friend who came to ask after him when in this disease, Perikles replied by showing a charm or amulet which his female relations had hung about his neck—a proof how low he was reduced, and how completely he had become a passive subject in the hands of others. And according to another anecdote which we read, yet more interesting and equally illustrative of his character, it was during his last moments, when he was lying apparently unconscious and insensible, that the friends around his bed were plying in review the acts of his life, and the nine trophies which he had created at different times for so many victories. He heard what they said, though they fancied that he was just hearing, and inter-

¹ Plutarch, Perikles, c. 35.

² Plutarch (Perik. c. 35) treats the slow wasting fever which he suffered as one of the forms of the epidemic;

but this can hardly be correct, when we read the very striking description of the latter, as described by Thucydides.

rupted them by remarking—"What you praise in my life belongs partly to good fortune, and is, at best, common to me with many other generals. But the peculiarity of which I am most proud, you have not noticed—no Athenian has ever put on mourning through any action of mine."¹

Such a course of self-gratulation, doubtless more satisfactory to recall at such a moment than any other, illustrates *gusto*, and that long-sighted calculation, avowed to distant as *character* hazardous enterprise, and economy of the public force, which marked his entire political career: a career long, beyond all parallel in the history of Athens—since he maintained a great influence, gradually swelling into a decisive personal ascendancy, for between thirty and forty years. His character has been presented in very different lights by different authors both ancient and modern, and our materials for striking the balance are not so good as we could wish. But his immense and long-continued supremacy, as well as his unparalleled eloquence, are facts attested not less by his enemies than by his friends—nay, even more forcibly by the former than by the latter. The comic writers, who hated him, and whose trade it was to deride and hunt down every leading political character, exhaust their powers of illustration in setting forth both the one and the other:² Thucydides, Ktesias, Eusebius, Aristophanes, all laurels and all enemies, speak of him like the Olympian Zeus, hurling thunder and lightning: like Herakles and Achilles, as the only speaker on whose lips persuasion met and who left his sting in the minds of his audience; while Plato the philosopher,³ who disapproved of his political working and of the moral effects which he produced upon Athens, nevertheless extols his intellectual and oratorical ascendancy⁴—"his majestic intelligence"—in language not less decisive than Thucydides. There is another point of eulogy, not less valuable, on which the testimony appears uncontradicted: throughout his long career, amidst the hottest political animosities, the conduct of Pericles towards opponents was always

¹ Plutarch, Pericles, c. 32.

² Plutarch, Pericles, c. 4, 5, 12, 13; Eusebius, *Advers. Græc.* c. p. 485, ed. Hübner. Cf. also Theophrast. *El. 18*; Menander, *fr.* 117; and Quintilian *El. 10*,

12; c. 1, 10; cited only as witnesses at *Memorabilia*.

³ Plato, *Republic*, c. 71, p. 591; *Phædrus*, c. 24, p. 275. Regarding the other antiquarians *supra* before Plato, *Memor.* p. 74 B.

wild and liberal.¹ The conscious self-esteem and arrogance of manner, with which the contemporary poet has reproached him,² contrasting it with the unpretending simplicity of his own patron Kineia, though probably unwittingly exaggerated, is doubtless in substance well-founded, and those who read the last speech given above out of Thucydides will at once recognise in it this attribute. His natural taste, his love of philosophical research, and his unwearied application to public affairs, all contributed to alienate him from ordinary familiarity, and to make him careless, perhaps improperly careless, of the lesser means of conciliating public favour.

But admitting this latter reproach to be well-founded, as it seems to be, it helps to negative that greater and graver political crime which has been imputed to him, of sacrificing the permanent well-being and morality of the state to the maintenance of his own political power—of corrupting the people by distributions of the public money. "He gave the reins to the people (in Plutarch's words)³ and shaped his administration for their immediate favour, by always providing at home some public spectacle or festival or procession, thus winning up the city in elegant pleasures, and by sending out every year sixty citizens manned by citizen-soldiers on full pay, who were thus kept in practice and acquired martial skill."

Now the charge here made against Perikles, and supported by allegations in themselves honourable rather than otherwise—of a vicious appetite for immediate popularity, and of improper concessions to the immediate feelings of the people against their permanent interests—is precisely that which Thucydides in the most pointed manner denies; and not merely denies, but contrasts Perikles with his successors in the express circumstance that they

¹ Plutarch, Perikles, c. 16—18.

² Plutarch, Perikles, c. 1.

³ Plutarch, Perikles, c. 11. His old and faithful adherents of whom the writer speaks, is Plutarch's Aristokratia, and, taken in all its sense, means nobility. Aristokratia means also, popularity in terms, and Aristokratia means the opposite of the Aristokratia which is spoken of. Aristokratia means nobility, and Aristokratia means popularity. It is possible the same word means both, as in the case of the

periklesian age and aristocracy the same word is used.

Plutarch, c. 1, where Plutarch says that Perikles, having no other means of contending against the abundant private wealth of his rival Kineia, resorted to the expedient of distributing the public money among the citizens, in order to gain influence, and to this matter upon the advice of his friend Demosthenes, according to the statement of Aristotle.

the opposite qualities—self-judgment, conscious dignity, indifference to immediate popular applause or wrath when set against what was permanently right and useful)—as the special characteristics of that great statesman. A distinction might indeed be possible, and Plutarch pretends to note such distinction, between the earlier and the later part of his long political career. Pericles began (so that biographer says) by corrupting the people in order to acquire power; but having acquired it, he employed it in an independent and patriotic manner, so that the judgment of Thucydides, true respecting the later part of his life, would not be applicable to the earlier. This distinction may be to a certain degree well-founded, inasmuch as the power of opposing a bold and successful resistance to temporary dissensions of the public mind necessarily implies an established influence, and one hardly ever to be extended even by the shrewdest politician, during his years of commencement. He is at that time necessarily the adjunct of some party or tendency which he finds already in operation, and has to stand forward actively and unobtrusively before he can create for himself a separate personal influence. But while we admit the distinction to this extent, there is nothing to warrant us in restricting the mention of Thucydides exclusively to the later life of Pericles, or in representing the earlier life as something in pointed contrast with that mention. Construing fairly what the historian says, he evidently did not so conceive the earlier life of Pericles. Either those political changes which are held by Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and others to demonstrate the corrupting effect of Pericles and his political ascendancy—such as the limitation of the functions of the Areopagus, as well as of the power of the magistrates, the establishment of the numerous and frequent popular *Ekastories* with regular pay, and perhaps also the assignment of pay to those who attended the *Ekklesia*, the expenditure for public works, religious edifice and ornaments, the *Diallaké* (or distribution of two obols per head to the poorer citizens at various festivals, in order that they might be able to pay for their places in the theatre), taking it as it then stood, &c.—did not appear to Thucydides mischievous and corrupting, as these other writers thought them, or else he did not particularly refer them to Pericles.

Both are true, probably, to some extent. The internal political

changes at Athens, respecting the Areopagus and the Ekastotai, took place when Perikles was a young man, and when he cannot be supposed to have yet acquired the immense personal weight which afterwards belonged to him (Perikles is first named in these early days to have been a greater man than Perikles, if we may judge by the fact that he was selected by his political adversaries for assassination)—so that they might with greater propriety be ascribed to the party with which Perikles was connected, rather than to that statesman himself. But next, we have no reason to presume that Thucydides considered these changes as injurious, or as having deteriorated the Athenian character. All that he does say as to the working of Perikles on the sentiment and actions of his countrymen is entirely favourable. He represents the presidency of that statesman as moderate, cautious, conservative, and successful; he describes him as uniformly keeping back the people from rash enterprises, and from attempts to extend their empire—as looking forward to the necessity of a war, and maintaining the moral, military, and financial forces of the state in constant condition to stand it—as calculating, with long-sighted wisdom, the conditions on which ultimate success depended. If we follow the elaborate funeral language of Perikles (which Thucydides, since he professes it at length, probably considered as faithfully illustrating the political point of view of that statesman), we shall discover a conception of democratical equality no less rational than generous; an anxious care for the correction and conduct of the citizens, but no disposition to emancipate them from active obligation, either public or private—and last of all, any idea of dispensing with such activity by abusive largesses out of the general revenue. The whole picture, drawn by Perikles, of Athens “as the schoolmistress of Greece,” implies a prominent development of private industry and commerce not less than of public citizenship and nobility,—of letters, arts, and recreative varieties of taste.

Though Thucydides does not directly censure the mischief and changes effected in Athens under Perikles, yet everything which he does say leads us to believe that he accounted the working of that statesman, upon the whole, on Athenian power, as well as

Assumption
permitted
Perikles of
having cor-
rupted the
Athenian
people—
improbable,
and not
believed
by Thucy-
dides.

an Athenian character, undeniably valuable, and his death as an irreparable loss. And we may thus appeal to the judgment of an historian who is our best witness in every conceivable respect, as a valid reply to the charge against Perikles of having corrupted the Athenian habits, character, and government. If he spent a large amount of the public treasure upon religious edifices and ornaments, and upon stately works for the city, yet the sum which he left unexpended, ready for use at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, was such as to appear more than sufficient for all purposes of defence, or public safety, or military honour. It cannot be shown of Perikles that he ever sacrificed the greater object to the less—the permanent and substantially valuable to the transitory and showy—secured present possessions to the loss of new, distant, or uncertain conquests. If his advice had been listened to, the ruinous which brought on the defeat of the Athenian *Volunté* at *Erkotsis* in *Bosnia* would have been avoided, and Athens might probably have maintained her ascendancy over *Magna* and *Bosnia*, which would have protected her territory from invasion, and given a new turn to the subsequent history. Perikles is not to be treated as the author of the Athenian character: he found it with its very marked positive characteristics and susceptibilities, among which those which he chiefly brought out and improved were the best. The last of expeditions against the *Pontians*, which *Kios* would have pushed into Egypt and Cyprus, he reversed, after it had accomplished all which could be usefully aimed at. The evolution of Athens he moderated rather than encouraged: the democratical movement of Athens he regularised, and worked out into judicial institutions which ranked among the prominent features of Athenian life, and worked, in my judgment, with a very largeness of benefit to the national mind as well as to individual security, in spite of the many defects in their direct character as tribunals. But that point in which there was the greatest difference between Athens, as Perikles found it and as he left it, is unquestionably the poetic and intellectual development—rhetoric, poetry, arts, philosophical research, and narrative writing. To which, if we add great improvement in the cultivation of the Attic soil—extension of *Athanas*, trade—attainment and laborious maintenance of the

tradition of maritime skill (attested by the battles of Salamis)—enlargement of the area of complete security by construction of the Long Walls—lastly, the shielding of Athens in her imperial mantle, by sumptuous architectural and sculptured—no shall make out a case of genuine progress realized during the political life of Pericles, such as the evils imputed to him, he more imaginary than real, will go but a little way to atone. How little, consequently speaking, of the picture drawn by Pericles in his funeral oration of 428 B.C. would have been correct, if the oration had been delivered over those warriors who fell at Tanagra twenty-seven years before!

It has been remarked by M. Roepke,¹ that Pericles sacrificed the landed proprietors of Attica to the maritime interests and empire of Athens. This is of course founded on the destructive invasions of the country during the Peloponnesian war; he does to the commencement of that war the position of Attic cultivators and proprietors was particularly variable; and the course of M. Roepke therefore depends upon the question, how far Pericles contributed to produce, or had it in his power to avert, this melancholy war, in its results as fatal not merely to Athens, but to the entire Grecian race. Now here again, if we follow attentively the narrative of Thucydides, we shall see that, in the judgment of that historian, not only Pericles did not bring on the war, but he could not have averted it without such concessions as Athenian pride as well as Athenian patriotism peremptorily forbade. Moreover we shall see that the calculations on which Pericles grounded his hopes of success if driven to war were (in the opinion of the historian) perfectly sound and safe. We may even go further, and affirm that the administration of Pericles during the fourteen years preceding the war exhibits a "moderation" (to use the words of Thucydides) dictated chiefly by anxiety to avoid rising scenes of war. If in the narrative immediately preceding

Pericles is
imputed blame
for the Pelopon-
nesian
war.

¹ Roepke, *Peptide Economy of Athens*, p. 33, ch. iv. p. 33, Eng. Trans.

Roepke, in the second language to his justice, Pericles did not contribute to the war. He only contributed to the loss of certain elements of Pericles, from twenty different sources, English, French, and German. That of Per-

icles is the best of the collection, though even he appears to think that Pericles is to blame for having introduced a set of institutions which none but himself could work well.

Thucyd. p. 33, ch. iv. p. 33, Eng. Trans. I am, then, of the opinion that, even if the Pericles, whom it is said to have, depended on himself.

the breaking out of the war, after the conflict of the Corinthians at Potidaea, and the resolutions of the congress at Sparta, he resisted strenuously all compliance with special demands from Sparta, we must recollect that these were demands essentially insecure, in which partial compliance would have lowered the dignity of Athens without securing peace. The stories about Perikles, Aspasia, and the Megarians, even if we should grant that there is some truth at the bottom of them, must, according to Thucydides, be looked upon as what is conventional and pretence, rather than as real causes, of the war; though modern authors in speaking of Perikles are but too apt to use expressions which tacitly assume those stories to be well-founded.

Seeing then that Perikles did not bring on, and could not have averted, the Peloponnesian war—that he steered his course in reference to that event with the long-sighted prudence of one who knew that the safety and the dignity of imperial Athens were essentially interwoven—we have no right to throw upon him the blame of sacrificing the landed proprietors of Attika. These proprietors might indeed be excused for complaining, where they suffered so ruinously. But the impartial historian, looking at the whole of the case, cannot admit their complaints as a ground for censuring the Athenian statesman.

The relation of Athens to her allies, the weak point of her position, it was beyond the power of Perikles seriously to amend; probably also beyond his will, since the idea of political incorporation, as well as that of providing a common and equal confederate bond sustained by effective federal authority, between different cities, was rarely entertained even by the best Greek minds.¹ We hear that he tried to summon at Athens a congress of deputies from all cities of Greece, the allies of Athens included;² but the scheme could not be brought to head, in consequence of the reluctance, never surprising of the Peloponnesians. Practically, the allies were not badly treated during his administration; and if among the other bad consequences of the prolonged war,

¹ Thucydides (2. 125) mentions that proposals to the Congress of the twelve Greek cities to join by Congress, Thucydides had advised them to incorporate themselves all into one single city-government at Salamis, and to submit the subject to the vote of the citizens of each city.

Thucydides mentions that the Athenians proposed to the allies to join them, and that the allies refused. It is remarkable to observe that Thucydides himself ignores the suggested confederation on this line.

² Thucydides, Perikles, c. 17.

they as well as Athens and all other Greeks seem to suffer more and more, this depends upon causes with which he is not chargeable, and upon proceedings which departed altogether from his wise and sober calculations. Taking him altogether, with his powers of thought, speech, and action—his competence civil and military, in the council as well as in the field—his vigorous and cultivated intellect, and his comprehensive ideas of a community in public and many-sided development—his incorruptible public morality, justice, and firmness, in a country where all those qualities were rare, and the union of them in the same individual of course much rarer—we shall find him without a parallel throughout the whole course of Grecian history.

Under the great mortality and pressure of sickness at Athens, operations of war naturally languished; while the mercenaries, though more active, had but little success.

A fleet of 180 triremes, with 1000 hoplites on board, was sent by the Lacedæmonians under Knemon to attack Eubœa, but accomplished nothing beyond devastation of the open parts of the island, and then returned home. And it was shortly after this, towards the month of September, that the Athenians made an attack upon the Argolidian town called Argæ, situated on the western coast of the Gulf of Argolis; which town, as has been

Operations of war languished under the pressure of the epidemic which at the same time ravaged Athens. Pericles is said to have expressed to the Athenians

recounted in the preceding chapter, had been wrested from them two years before by the Athenians under Phæro and restored to the Argolidians and Akarnanians. The Argolidians, as colonies and allies of Corinth, were at the same time animated by active enmity to the Athenian influence in Akarnania, and by desire to regain the lost town of Argæ. Procuring aid from the Chæoniens and some other Epiriote tribes, they marched against Argæ, and after laying waste the territory, undertook to take the town by assault, but were repulsed and obliged to retire.¹ This expedition appears to have improved the Athenians with the necessity of a standing force to protect their interests in those parts; so that in the autumn Phæro was sent with a squadron of twenty triremes to occupy

¹ Thucyd. ii. 94.

Mulhender. He was further directed to ensure the collection of the military tribute from Athenian subject-cities, and probably to raise such contributions as he could elsewhere. In the prosecution of this latter duty, he undertook an expedition from the coast against one of the Elykian towns in the interior, but his attack was repelled with loss, and he himself slain.¹

An opportunity soon afforded itself to the Athenians of retaliating on Sparta for this cruel treatment of the maritime prisoners. In execution of the idea projected at the commencement of the war, the Lacedæmonians sent Ariston and two others as envoys to Persia, for the purpose of soliciting from the Great King aids of money and troops against Athens: the dissensions among the Greeks thus gradually paving the way for him to regain his ascendancy in the *Ægean*. *Thimpeus of Tegea*, together with an Argian named Pollis without any formal mission from his city, and the Corinthian Ariston, accompanied them. As the sea was in the power of Athens, they travelled overland through Thessaly to the Hellespont. Ariston, eager to learn nothing untidied for the relief of Potidea, prevailed upon them to make application to Stababiz, king of the Olynthian Thracians. That prince was then in alliance with Athens, and his son Salsabiz had even received the grant of Athenian citizenship. Yet the envoys thought it possible not only to detach him from the Athenian alliance, but even to obtain from him an army to act against the Athenians and raise the blockade of Potidea. On being refused, they lastly applied to him for a safe escort to the banks of the Hellespont, in their way towards Persia. But Learchus and Aristonides, then Athenian residents near the person of Stababiz, had influence enough not only to cause rejection of these requests, but also to induce Salsabiz, as a testimony of zeal in his new character of Athenian citizen, to assist them in seizing the persons of Ariston and his companions in their journey through Thessaly. Accordingly the whole party were seized and conducted as prisoners to Athens, where they were forthwith put to death, without trial or permission to

Aristonides and Thimpeus were induced in their way to Persia and Pollis made by the Athenians.

¹ *Thucyd.* ii. 95.

speech, and their bodies cast into rocky chasms, as a reprisal for the captured seamen slain by the Lerdemondians.¹

Such revenge against Arizans, the instigator of the revolt of Faidon, relieved the Athians from a dangerous enemy; and that blockaded city was now left to its fate. About midwinter it capitulated, after a blockade of two years, and after going through the extremes of suffering from famine to such a degree that some of those who died were even eaten by the survivors. In spite of such intolerable distress, the Athian generals, Xenopides, son of Eusepiades, and his two colleagues submitted them to favorable terms of capitulation—allowing

¹Thucyd. ii. 27. Dr. Thirlwall gives (Greece, vol. ii. ch. 55, p. 120) says that "the events were mentioned simply to give a distant object to the freedom" of killing Arizans, from whom the Athenians feared revenge, and, in consequence of the dying and angry spirit. I do not think this to be fairly consistent in the words of Thucydides. His aim in the paragraph of Athenian motives, doubtless, was that the Athenians, weary of Arizans, but if they had been the only enemy, the Athenians would probably have slain him simply with out the rest; that would hardly have been necessary, possibly the Athenians would have done so "in the way that Dr. Thirlwall suggests. Thucydides seems to express the feeling of the Athenians against Arizans (in my judgment) chiefly in order to explain the extreme leniency of the Athenian sentence of execution-without-captivity, etc.; they were using the influence of captured motives—fear, revenge, retaliation.

The events here stated were none of Eusepiades and Xenopides, because Arizans himself was dead, and so it is hardly of use to state their names as if they were the principal motives of the Athenians in killing the people of Faidon. Xenopides, however, was not, as Dr. Thirlwall says of Thucydides (the Greek paragraph of the family of Xenopides, as Eusepiades' son) and is not mentioned by the death of those two men was slain by the Athenians. The fact that the two generals were slain, were none of those two Eusepiades and Xenopides who had

particularly gone to town to tender their lives, to obtain all in a "mercenary and brutal independence". But there seems to me very little to wonder at. The families of Xenopides and Eusepiades were the survivors of a particular war or family; they fought themselves who to give the war a finish. Now when the Lerdemondians, at the beginning of this Periclean war, were looking out for the members of the Thucydides family to send up to them, upon whom would they so naturally fix as upon the sons of Xenopides, two men who had been in their hands? There was but doubtless found their fathers had a great deal about it—probably with business and education, since they received good news from the unexpected side of their lives in government. There was a particular reason why these two men should be chosen, in preference to any other family, to fill this dangerous position; and doubtless when they returned to it, the relatives and friends of the Lerdemondians would stir up all the evils of the war, as a representation of the policies pursued by Eusepiades in his days of power. (Thucyd. ii. 27—see Thucyd. ii. 27.)

It appears that Arizans, the head of the clan, had distinguished himself previously in that capacity of interest in the fight of Periclean war by the Lerdemondians, for which the Athenians were now releasing (Thucyd. ii. 27). Though this passage of Xenopides is not clear, yet the sense here put upon it is the natural one—and shows the importance of the fact that Xenopides, who was previously a general of the Lerdemondians, was now a general of the Athenians, ii. p. 120.

the whole population and the Corinthian allies to retire freely, with a specified sum of money per head, as well as with one garment for each man and two for each woman—so that they found shelter among the Chalkidic townships in the neighbourhood. These terms were singularly favourable, considering the desperate state of the city, which must very soon have surrendered at discretion. But the hardships of the army without, in the cold of winter, were very severe, and they had become thoroughly tired both of the duration and the expense of the siege. The cost to Athens had been not less than 3000 talents; since the auxiliary force had never been lower than 3000 hoplites during the entire two years of the siege, and for a portion of the time considerably greater—each hoplite receiving two drachmas per diem. The Athenians at home, when they learnt the terms of the capitulation, were displeased with the generals for the indulgent shows,—since a little additional patience would have constrained the city to surrender at discretion; in which case the expense would have been partly made good by selling the prisoners as slaves, and Athenian vengeance probably gratified by putting the warriors to death.¹ A body of 1000 soldiers was sent from Athens to occupy Potidæa and its nearest territory.²

Two full years had now elapsed since the actual commencement of war by the attack of the Tholians on Potidæa. Yet the Peloponnesians had accomplished as part of what they expected. They had not recaptured Potidæa, nor had their twice-repeated invasion, although assisted by the unexpected disaster arising from the epidemic, as yet brought Athens to any sufficient humiliation—though perhaps the ravage which she had sent during the foregoing summer with propositions for peace (contrary to the advice of Periklēs) may have produced an impression that she could not hold out long. At the same time, the Peloponnesian allies had on their side suffered little damage, since the ravages inflicted by the Athenian fleet on their coast may have been nearly compensated by the booty which their

¹ Thucydides, B. IV. 81, 82. Xenophon was appointed to command the expedition, the object of which was to attack the Corinthians in the ensuing year.
² Doubtless all of them.

invading troops gained in Attica. Probably by this time the public opinion in Greece had contracted an unhappy familiarity with the state of war, so that nothing but some decisive loss and humiliation on one side at least, if not on both, would suffice to terminate it. In this third spring, the Peloponnesians did not repeat their annual march into Attica—deferred partly, we may suppose, by fear of the epidemics yet raging there, but still more by the strong desire of the Thebans to take their revenge on Plataea.

To this ill-fated city Archidamus marched forthwith at the head of the confederate army. No sooner had he entered and begun to lay waste the territory than the Plataeans beside came forth to arrest his hand, and accosted him in the following terms:—"Archidamus, and ye men of Lacedaemon, ye act wrong and in a manner neither worthy of yourselves nor of your fathers in thus invading the territory of Plataea. For the Lacedaemonian Pericles, son of Kleonarchos, after he had liberated Greece from the Persians, in conjunction with those Greeks who stood forward to bear their share of the danger, offered sacrifices to Zeus Eleutherios in the marketplace of Plataea; and there, in presence of all the allies, assigned to the Plataeans their own city and territory to hold in full autonomy, so that none should invade them wrongfully or with a view to enslave them: should such invasion occur, the allies present pledged themselves to stand forward with all their force as protectors. While your fathers made to us this grant in consideration of our valour and forwardness in that perilous emergency, ye are now doing the precise contrary: ye are come along with our worst enemies, the Thebans, to enslave us. And we on our side now adjure you, calling to witness the gods who sanctioned that gift, as well as your paternal and our local gods, not to violate the oath by doing wrong to the Plataeans territory, but to let us live on in that autonomy which Pericles guaranteed."¹

Whereunto Archidamus replied—"Ye speak fairly, men of Plataea, if your conduct shall be in harmony with your words.

¹ Thucyd. II. 71, 11.

Remain autonomous yourselves, as Pericles granted, and help us to liberate those other Greeks, who, after having shared in the same dangers and even the same death along with you, have now been enslaved by the Athenians. It is for their liberation and that of the other Greeks that this formidable outfit of war has been brought forth. Paramount to your oaths, ye ought by rights, and we now invite you, to take active part in this object. But if ye cannot act then, at least remain quiet, conformably to the summons which we have already sent to you. Enjoy your own territory, and remain neutral—resolving both parties as friends, but neither party for warlike purposes. With this we shall be satisfied."

The reply of Archidamus discloses by allusion a circumstance which the historians had not before directly mentioned: that the Lacedæmonians had sent a formal summons to the Platons to renounce their alliance with Athens and remain neutral. At what time this took place,¹ we know not, but it marks the peculiar sentiment attaching to the town. But the Platons did not comply with the invitation thus repeated. The heralds, having returned for instructions into the city, brought back for answer that compliance was impossible, without the consent of the Athenians, since their wives and families were now harboured at Athens; besides, if they should profess neutrality, and admit both parties as friends, the Thebans might again make an attempt to surprise their city. In reply to their scruples, Archidamus again addressed them—"Well, then, hand over your city and houses to us Lacedæmonians: mark out the boundaries of your territory; specify the number of your fruit-trees, and all your other property which admits of being numbered; and then retire whithersoever ye choose, as long as the war continues. As soon as it is over, we will restore to you all that we have received; in the interim we will hold it in trust, and keep it in cultivation, and pay you such an allowance as shall suffice for your wants."²

The proposition now made was so fair and tempting, that the general body of the Platons were at first inclined to accept it, provided the Athenians would acquiesce. They obtained from

¹ This previous summons is again alluded to afterwards, on account of the daughter of the Platons prisoner

221. 222; *ibid.* vol. iv. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 852. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859. 860. 861. 862. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 869. 870. 871. 872. 873. 874. 875. 876. 877. 878. 879. 880. 881. 882. 883. 884. 885. 886. 887. 888. 889. 890. 891. 892. 893. 894. 895. 896. 897. 898. 899. 900. 901. 902. 903. 904. 905. 906. 907. 908. 909. 910. 911. 912. 913. 914. 915. 916. 917. 918. 919. 920. 921. 922. 923. 924. 925. 926. 927. 928. 929. 930. 931. 932. 933. 934. 935. 936. 937. 938. 939. 940. 941. 942. 943. 944. 945. 946. 947. 948. 949. 950. 951. 952. 953. 954. 955. 956. 957. 958. 959. 960. 961. 962. 963. 964. 965. 966. 967. 968. 969. 970. 971. 972. 973. 974. 975. 976. 977. 978. 979. 980. 981. 982. 983. 984. 985. 986. 987. 988. 989. 990. 991. 992. 993. 994. 995. 996. 997. 998. 999. 1000.

Archidamus a trace long enough to enable them to send envoys to Athens. After communication with the Athenian assembly, the envoys returned to Platae bearing the following answer:—
 "Men of Platae, the Athenians say they have never yet permitted you to be wronged since the alliance first began; nor will they now betray you, but will help you to the best of their power. And they adjure you, by the oaths which your fathers swore to them, not to depart in any way from the alliance."

This message awakened in the bosoms of the Plataeans the full force of ancient and tenacious sentiment. They resolved to maintain, at all cost, and even to the extreme of ruin, if necessity should require it, their union with Athens. It was indeed impossible that they could do otherwise (considering the position of their wives and families) without the consent of the Athenians. Though we cannot wonder that the latter refused consent, we may yet remark, that, in their situation, a perfectly generous ally might well have granted it. For the forces of Greece counted for little as a portion of the aggregate strength of Athens; nor could the Athenians possibly protect it against the superior land force of enemies. In fact, so hopeless was the attempt, that they never even tried throughout the whole course of the long subsequent blockade.

The final refusal of the Plataeans was proclaimed to Archidamus by word of mouth from the walls, since it was not thought safe to send out any messenger. As soon as the Spartan prince heard the answer, he prepared for host's operations,—apparently with very slender resistance, attested in the following irrotation emphatically pronounced:—

"Ye Gods and Heroes, who hold the Platæan territory, be ye my witnesses, that we have not in the least instance wrongfully—not until these Plataeans have first renounced the oaths binding on all of us—invaded this territory, in which our fathers defeated the Persians after prayers to you, and which ye granted as propitiations for Greeks to fight in; nor shall we count wrong in what we may do further, for we have taken pains to tender reasonable terms, but without success. Be ye now consenting parties: may those who are beginning the wrong receive punishment for it—

Irrotation and answer of Archidamus on hearing the refusal of the Plataeans.

may those who are aiming to inflict penalty *righteously* obtain their object.¹

It was thus that Archidamus, in language delivered probably under the walls, and within hearing of the citizens who remained there, endeavored to convince the gods and heroes of that town which he was about to ruin and depopulate. The whole of this preliminary debate,² so strikingly and dramatically set forth by Thucydides, illustrates the respectful reluctance with which the Lacedæmonians first brought themselves to assail this mine of the glories of their fathers. What deserves remark is, their direct sentiment attaches itself, not at all to the Platæan people, but only to the Platæan territory. It is purely local, though it becomes partially transferred to the people, as towards this spot, by secondary association. We see, indeed, that nothing but the long-standing antipathy of the Thebans induced Archidamus to undertake the enterprise; for the conquest of Platæa was of no avail towards the main objects of the war, though the exposed situation of the town caused it to be crushed between the two great contending forces in Greece.

Archidamus now commenced the siege forthwith, in full hope, that his numerous army, the entire strength of the Peloponnesian confederacy, would soon capture a Commander-in-chief of the army of Platæa. place, of no great size, and probably not very well fortified—yet defended by a motley garrison of 400

native citizens, with eighty Athenians.³ There was no one else in the town, except 120 female slaves for cooking. The fruit-trees, cut down in laying waste the cultivated land, sufficed to form a strong palisade all round the town, so as completely to enclose the inhabitants. Next, Archidamus, having abundance of timber near at hand in the forests of Kithiraus, began to erect a mound against a portion of the town wall, so as to be able to scale it by an inclined plane, and thereafter the place by assault. Fowl, stones, and earth were piled up in a vast heap—rows palings of wood being carried on each side of it, in parallel lines at right angles to the town wall, for the purpose of keeping the loose mass of materials between them together. For seventy days and as many nights did the army labour at this work, without any

¹ Thucyd. ii. 75—76.

² Thucyd. ii. 80.

intermission, taking turns for food and repose; and through such transmitting *scintilla* the mound approached near to the height of the town wall. But as it gradually mounted up, the Plataeans were not idle on their side: they constructed an additional wall of wood, which they planted on the top of their own town wall, so as to heighten the part in contact with the enemy's mound; sustaining it by brickwork lashed, for which the neighbouring houses furnished materials. Hides, raw as well as dressed, were suspended in front of it, in order to protect the workmen against missiles, and the woodwork against fire-carrying arrows.¹ And as the besiegers still continued heaping up materials, to raise their mound to the height even of this recent addition, the Plataeans next done by breaking a hole in the lower part of their town wall, and pulling in the earth from the lower portion of the mound, which then fell in at the top, and left a vacant space near the wall. This the besiegers filled up by heaving down quantities of stiff clay rolled up in wadded reeds, which could not be pulled away in the same manner. Again, the Plataeans dug a subterraneous passage from the interior of their town to the ground immediately under the mound, and then carried away unseen its earthly foundation; so that the besiegers saw their mound continually sinking down, in spite of fresh additions at the top, yet without knowing the reason. Nevertheless it was plain that these stratagems would be in the end ineffectual, and the Plataeans accordingly built a new portion of town wall in the interior, in the shape of a crescent, taking its start from the old town wall on each side of the mound. The besiegers were thus deprived of all benefit from the mound, assuming it to be successfully completed; where, when they had marched over it, there stood in front of them a new town wall requiring to be carried in like manner.

But was this the only method of attack employed. Archibuteus, *captain of spears and defence*—the besiegers made no progress, but they obliged to retreat to the stocks. further brought up battering engines, one of which greatly shook and endangered the additional height of wall built by the Plataeans against the mound; while others were brought to bear on different portions of the circuit of the town wall. Against these new assaults various means of defence were used. The defenders on the walls let down ropes, got hold of

¹ Thucyd. 2. 18.

the head of the approaching engine, and pulled it by main force out of the right line, either upwards or sideways; or they prepared heavy wooden beams on the wall, each attached at both ends by long iron chains to two poles projecting at right angles from the wall, by means of which poles it was raised and held aloft; so that at the proper moment, when the battering machine approached the wall, the chain was suddenly let go, and the beam fell down with great violence directly upon the engine, breaking off its projecting beak.³ However rude these defensive processes may seem, they were found effective against the besiegers, who saw themselves, at the close of three months' unavailing efforts, obliged to renounce the idea of taking the town in any other way than by the process of blockade and famine—a process alike tedious and costly.⁴

Before they would incur so much inconvenience, however, they had recourse to one farther stratagem—that of trying to set the town on fire. From the height of their moat they threw down large quantities of logs, partly into the space between the second and the newly-built crescent wall—partly, as far as they could reach, into other parts of the city: pitch and other combustibles were next added, and the whole mass set on fire. The conflagration was tremendous, such as had never been before seen: a large portion of the town became unapproachable, and the whole of it narrowly escaped destruction. Nothing could have preserved it, had the wind been rather more favourable. There was indeed a farther story of an opportune thunder-storm coming to extinguish the flames, which Theophrastus does not seem to credit.⁵ In spite of much partial damage, the town remained still defensible and the spirit of the inhabitants unabated.

There now remained no other resource except to build a wall of circumvallation round Platon, and trust to the slow process of famine. The task was distributed in suitable fractions among the various confederate cities, and completed about the middle of September, a little before the autumnal equinox.⁶ Two distinct

³ The various expedients, such as those here described, employed both for offence and defence in the present siege, are noticed and discussed in the *Annales Ptolemæens.* v. 36, seq.

⁴ Theophr. l. vi.

⁵ Theophr. l. vi.

⁶ Theophr. l. vi. and Josephus also describes and discusses the same. See, at the period of the year when the star *Arcturus* rises immediately before sunrise—that is, some time between

walls were constructed, with narrow foot of intermediate space all covered in, so as to look like one very thick wall. There were moreover two ditches, out of which the bricks for the wall had been taken—one on the inside towards Plataeæ, and the other on the outside against any foreign relieving force. The interior covered space between the walls was intended to serve as permanent quarters for the troops left on guard, consisting half of Boeotians and half of Peloponnesians.¹

At the same time that Archidamus began the siege of Plataeæ, the Athenians on their side despatched a force of 5000 hoplites and 1000 horsemen to the Chalkidic peninsula, under Xenophon, son of Erastides (with two colleagues, the same who had granted so recently the capitulation of Pericles). It was necessary dispatch them to survey and establish the new colonies who were about to occupy the deserted site of Pericles. Moreover, the general had acquired some knowledge of the position and parties of the Chalkidic towns, and hoped to be able to act against them with effect. He first invaded the territory belonging to the Boeotian town of Spindias, not without hopes that the city itself would be betrayed to him by intelligence within. But this was prevented by the arrival of an additional force from Olynthus, partly hoplites, partly peltasts. Such peltasts, a species of troops between heavy-armed and light-armed, furnished with a pelta (or light shield) and short spear or javelin, appear to have taken their rise among these Chalkidic Greeks, being equipped in a manner half Greek and half Thracian: we shall find them hereafter much improved and turned to account

the 18th and 19th of September: the ordinary date of the autumn. Xenophon does not allow that any bold man to distinguish the various parties of the war, as we had here done. The Greek armies were all heavy troops, or hoplites as the Romans called them, as well as the Persians. The word *hoplite* is really the common name for any soldier, as that of Thucydides had pointed out the use of the Latin word *infanteria* instead of specifying the thing as *legionem* or *cohortem*. This word was Italian, many of the modern words

not being distinctly different from *infanteria* also, is indicative of this for modern languages, whence the agreement of Aristotle and other philosophers.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 79, 85, 86. From this description of the works, walls and ditches, gardens, &c., which were constructed at Plataeæ, we may understand the advantage of similar works. The peltasts had a double wall in the first year's blockade of Pericles, and their numbers to guard an army's baggage in the Peloponnese. see a large page above.

by some of the ablest Greek generals. The Chalkidic hoplites are generally of inferior merit: on the other hand, their cavalry and their peltasts are very good. In the action which now took place under the walls of Sphactia, the Athenian hoplites defeated those of the enemy, but their cavalry and their light troops were completely routed by the Chalkidic. These latter, still further strengthened by the arrival of fresh peltasts from Olynthus, ventured even to attack the Athenian hoplites, who thought it prudent to fall back upon the two companies left in reserve to guard the baggage. During this retreat they were harassed by the Chalkidic horse and light-armed, who retired when the Athenians turned upon them, but attacked them on all sides when on their march, and employed mischief so effectively that the retreating hoplites could no longer maintain a steady order, but took to flight and sought refuge at Potidea. Four hundred and thirty hoplites, near one-fourth of the whole force, together with all three generals, perished in this defeat, while the expedition returned in dishonour to Athens.¹

In the western parts of Greece, the arms of Athens and her allies were more successful. The Amphibolians, disappointed by their repulse from the Amphibolians Argos, during the preceding year, had been induced to conceive new and larger plans of aggression against both the Achaean and Athenians. In concert with their mother-city Corinth, where they obtained warm support, they prevailed upon the Lacedaemonians to take part in a simultaneous attack of Achaean, by land as well as by sea, which would prevent the Achaean from concentrating their forces in any one point, and would put each of their townships upon an isolated self-defence; so that all of them might be overpowered in succession, and detached, together with Kephallenia and Zakynthos (Zante), from the Athenian alliance. The fleet of Phormio at Naupaktos, consisting only of twenty triremes, was recruited incompetent to cope with a Peloponnesian fleet such as might be fitted out at Corinth. There was even some hope that the important station at Naupaktos might itself be taken, so as to expel the Athenians completely from those parts.

Operations
of the army
of Athens
against
Amphibolians
by land and
sea, from
Naupaktos,
against the
Amphibolians
and Peloponnesians.

¹ Thucyd. 2. 78.

The scheme of operations now projected was far more comprehensive than anything which the war had yet afforded. The land force of the Amphibolians, together with their neighbours and fellow-colonists the Leukadian and Anaktorian, assembled near their own city; while their maritime force was collected at Larkas, on the Akarnanian coast. The force at Anaktoria was joined, not only by Kolmas, the Lokolomeneian admiral, with 1000 Peloponnesian hoplites, who found means to cross over from Peloponnesos, during the vigilance of Phortas, but also by a numerous body of Epirotic and Macedonian auxiliaries, collected even from the distant and northernmost tribes. A thousand Chaulians were present, under the command of Phortas and Nibnos, two annual chiefs chosen from the royal gens. Neither this tribe, nor the Theropontians who came along with them, acknowledged any hereditary king. The Molossians and Atintarchi, who also joined the force, were under Salykarkas, regent on behalf of the young prince Tharypas. There came, besides, the Parant, from the banks of the river Alos, under their king Orachas, together with 1000 Orontis, a tribe rather Macedonian than Epirotic, sent by their king Antiochos. Even king Perdikkas, though then usually in alliance with Athens, sent 1000 of his Macedonian subjects, who however proved too late to be of any use.* This large and diverse body of Epirotic invaders, a new phenomenon in Grecian history, and yet together doubtless by the hopes of plunder, possess the extensive relations of the tribes of the interior with the city of Anaktoria—a city destined to become in later days the capital of the Epirotic king Pyrrhos.

It had been concerted that the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth should join that already assembled[†] at Larkas, and set upon the coast of Akarnania at the same time that the land force marched into that territory. But Kolmas, finding the land force united and ready near Anaktoria, deemed it unnecessary to await the fleet from Corinth, and marched straight into Akarnania, through Likman, a frontier village territory belonging to the Amphibolians Argos. He directed his

*Assemblage
of the
Amphibolians,
Molossians, Peloponnesians,
and Epirotic
auxiliaries—
of Phortas
of Kolmas.*

*They march
up to Larkas.
The Peloponnesian
fleet comes
of Corinth.*

* Thucyd. ii. 10.

march upon Stratus—an interior town, the chief place in Akarnania—the capture of which would be likely to carry with it the surrender of the rest; especially as the Akarnanians, distracted by the presence of the ships at Leukas, and alarmed by the large body of invaders on their frontier, did not dare to leave their own separate houses, so that Stratus was left altogether to its own defence. Now was Phœrodes, though they sent an urgent message to him, in any condition to help them; since he could not leave Naupaktos unprotected, when the large fleet from Corinth was known to be approaching. Under such circumstances, Kalanos and his army indulged confident hopes of overpowering Stratus without difficulty. They marched in three divisions: the Epirotes in the centre—the Lokhaians and Amakharians on the right—the Peloponnesians and Aitolians, together with Kalanos himself, on the left. So little expectation was entertained of resistance, that these three divisions took no pains to keep near, or even in sight of, each other. Both the Greek divisions, indeed, maintained a good order of march, and kept proper scouts on the lookout; but the Epirotes advanced without any plan or order, especially the Chaoniens, who formed the van. These men, accounted the most warlike of all the Epirotic tribes, were so full of conceit and rashness, that when they approached near to Stratus, they would not halt to encamp and assault the place conjointly with the Greeks, but marched along with the other Epirotes right forward to the town, intending to attack it single-handed, and confident that they should carry it at the first assault before the Greeks came up, so that the entire glory would be theirs. The Statians watched and profited by this and repaid their impudence. Planting ambuscades in convenient places, and suffering the Epirotes to approach without suspicion near to the gates, they then suddenly sallied out and attacked them, while the troops in ambuscade rose up and assailed them at the same time. The Chaoniens who formed the van, thus completely surprised, were routed with great slaughter; while the other Epirotes fled, after but little resistance. So much had they hurried forward in advance of their Greek allies, that neither the right nor the left division was aware of the battle, until the flying barbarians, hotly pursued by the Akarnanians, made it known to them. The two divisions then joined, protected the

Weakness of the Epirotes—*especially* and *especially* of the *Chaoniens*.

fugitives, and restrained further pursuit—the Spartans declining to come to hand-combat with them until the other Athenians should arrive. They seriously annoyed the forces of Kalama, however, by distant slanging, in which the Athenians were pre-eminently skilful. Kalama did not choose to persist in his attack under such disadvantageous circumstances. As even night arrived, so that there was no longer any fear of slanging, he retreated to the river Anapau, a distance of between nine and ten miles. Well aware that the news of the victory would attract other Athenian forces immediately to the aid of Sparta, he took advantage of the arrival of his own Athenian allies from Eretria (the only town in the country which was attached to the Lacedæmonian interest) and sought shelter near their city. From thence his troops dispersed, and returned to their respective homes.²

The Peloponnesians first came from Corinth to Akarnania—were made of the Peloponnesians to oppose it.

been destined to co-operate with Kalama off the coast of Akarnania, had found difficulties in its passage alike unexpected and insuperable. Mustering forty-seven triremes of Corinth, Sikyon, and other places, with a body of soldiers on board and with accompanying store-vessels, it departed from the harbour of Corinth and made its way along the northern coast of Akhæia.

Its commanders, not intending to meddle with Phormio and his twenty ships at Naupaktos, never imagined that he would venture to attack a number so greatly superior. The triremes were accordingly fitted out more as transports for numerous soldiers than with any view to naval combat, and with little attention to the choice of skilful rowers.³

Except in the combat near Korkyra, and there only partially, the Peloponnesians had never yet made actual trial of Athenian maritime efficiency, at the point of excellence which it had now reached. Themselves retaining the old unimproved mode of fighting and of working ships at sea, they had no practical idea of the degree to which it had been superseded by Athenian training. Among the Athenians, on the contrary, not only the seamen

² Thucyd. ii. 99; Pindar, iii. 48.

³ Thucyd. ii. 99, single derivations. The modification of the vessels is stated separately and supererogatory: compare the speech of Kalama, i. 87.

modified in, 94.

signed. He moved swiftly round the Peloponnesian circle, tearing the crews of their ships as slowly as he could, and making constant assurance of being about to come to blows. Partly from the intimidating effect of this maneuver, altogether moved to the Peloponnesians—partly from the natural difficulty, well known to Flaccus, of keeping every ship in its exact stationary position—the order of the circle, both within and without, presently became disturbed. It was not long before a new ally came to his aid, an ally he calculated, postponing his actual attack until this favorable incident occurred. The strong land breeze out of the Gulf of Corinth, always wont to begin shortly after daylight, came down upon the Peloponnesian fleet with its usual vehemence, at a moment when the steadiness of their order was already somewhat giving way; and forced their ships more than ever out of proper relation one to the other. The triremes began to run foul of each other, or became entangled with the store-vessels; so that in every ship the men on board were obliged to keep pushing off their neighbors on each side with poles—not without loud clamor and mutual reproaches, which prevented both the orders of the captains, and the cheering sound or song whereby the helmsmen animated the crews and kept them to time from being audible. Moreover, the fresh breeze had condensed such a veil, that those crews, unskilful under all circumstances, could not get their own clear of the water, and the pilots were lost upward over their vessels.¹ The

¹ The Dr. Assembly note upon this passage of Thucydides recording the Peloponnesians and the Athenians in the passage which he indicates as follows: "I will add two more of Plutarch, *Marcellus*, c. 11, and *Antony*, c. 1, if."

When we observe the structure of an ancient trireme, we find at once, first, how essential the helmsmen was to keep the vessel in her proper order; next, how necessary the different rowers must have been before, middle, and aftermost rows. The helmsmen and, next, the rowers distributed her three lines. The upper line, called *Thalamis*, were rowed two by two, or triremes on each side; the middle line, or *Epithamis*, as well as the lower line, or *Hypothamis*, were each fifty-two

by twenty, or twenty-two on each side. Besides these there were helmsmen to make known a certain number, probably about thirty, of oarsmen; very odd crews, we find, to be used by the antiquaries writing, coming on board, by way of proving being killed or not killed. And, too, of course was distributed along the whole length of the vessel, from head to stern, as at present, the greater part of it, but the ends of the ship they were not placed in the same proportion for the stern the lower. Of course the men of the *Thalamis*, or *epithamis* that were the largest, those of the *Hypothamis*, or *hypothamis*, the smallest; those of the *Thalamis*, or *epithamis*, the largest between the two. Each one was forced only

critical moment was now come, and Pharnao gave the signal for attack. He first drove against and disabled one of the admiral's ships—his comrades next assailed others with equal success—so that the Plopopconestians, unprepared and terrified, attempted hardly any resistance, but broke their order and sought safety in flight. They fled partly to Patra, partly to Dynd, in Achaia, pursued by the Achaeans; who with scarcely the loss of a man, captured twelve triremes, carried away almost the entire crew, and sailed off with these to Molyvion or Astirion, the northern cape at the narrow mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, opposite to the corresponding cape called Ithion in Achaia. Having erected at Astirion a trophy for the victory, dedicating one of the captive triremes to Poseidon, they returned to Naupactus; while the Plopopconestian ships sailed along the shore from Patra to Kyllis, the principal port in the territory of Elis. They were here soon afterwards joined by Kallima, who passed over with his squadron from Leukia.

These two incidents, just recounted, with their details—the

by sea men. The triremes, as having the trapping done, were most heavily worked and most highly paid. What the length of the sails was, belonging to either set, we do not know; but secured the extraordinary and proper to have been about fifteen feet in length.

What is here stated appears to be pretty well confirmed, chiefly from the description discovered at Athens a few years ago, so full of information respecting the Athenian marine, and from the instructive commentary appended to these inscriptions by H. Bechtel, *Monum. des Athénien*, &c. &c. pp. 24, 25, 121. But there is a great deal still remaining for the purposes of an accurate historical interpretation and description.

Now there was nothing but the voice of the Admiral to keep them. He wears all to good that with their oarsmen. With three different lengths, and so many crews, they must have been in great order; and apparently were capable, when the reverse was wanted, to sail backward. The difference between those who were on deck and those who were not need have been enormous. *Plutarch*, *Pericles*, *Themistocles*, &c. &c. We may imagine the difference between

the ships of Pharnao and those of his enemies, and the difficulty of the latter in combating with the power of the sea, when we read this description of the ancient trireme.

About the year, that is to say, 300 years ago, the triremes, which were used by the Athenians, were not only the largest, but the strongest, and the most numerous of any ships of the ancient world. They were built of the best timber, and were covered with iron plates, and were armed with a great number of bronze weapons. They were also very fast, and were able to sail in any weather. The triremes were the mainstay of the Athenian navy, and were the only ships of the line of the ancient world. They were built on a keel, and were propelled by three rows of oarsmen. The triremes were the most powerful ships of the ancient world, and were the only ships of the line of the ancient world.

The Venetian galleys, in the fifteenth century, were armed by about the same number of men. The galleys Venetian, &c. were the Phoenician vessels, the ancient galley was not very different from the modern, at 11 o'clock. The Venetian galley was armed with 1000 men, and was the only ship of the line of the ancient world. They were built on a keel, and were propelled by three rows of oarsmen. The triremes were the most powerful ships of the ancient world, and were the only ships of the line of the ancient world.

¹ Thucyd. 2. 22.

Nausikles attended him, and served on land. But he kept on the outside of the Gulf, anxious to fight in a large and open breadth of sea, which was essential to Athenian manœuvring; while his adversaries on their side remained on the inside of the Ægean cape, from the corresponding reason—feeling that to them the narrow sea was advantageous, as making the naval battle like to a land battle, affording all superiority of nautical skill.¹ If we revert back to the occasion of the battle of Salamis, we find that narrowness of space was at that time accounted the best of all protection for a smaller fleet against a larger. Yet such had been the complete change of feeling, occasioned by the system of manœuvring introduced since that period in the Athenian navy, that magnitude of numbers is now not less counted by Phaullos than dreaded by his enemies. The improved practice of Athens had introduced a revolution in naval warfare.

For six or seven days successively the two fleets were drawn out against each other—Phaullos trying to entice the Peloponnesians to the outside of the Gulf, while they on their side did what they could to bring him within it.² To him every day's postponement was gain, since it gave him a new chance of his reinforcements arriving: for that very reason, the Peloponnesian commanders were eager to accelerate an action, and at length resorted to a well-laid plan for forcing it on.

But in spite of immense numerical superiority, such was the discouragement and resistance prevailing among their ranks—many of whom had been actual sufferers in the recent defeat—that Kallias and Brasidas had to employ emphatic exhortations. They insisted on the favourable prospect before them—pointing out that the late battle had been lost only by mismanagement and imprudence, which would be for the future corrected—and appealing to the inherent bravery of the Peloponnesian warrior. They concluded by a hint, that while those who behaved well in the coming battle would receive due honours, the lagards would naturally be punished:³ a topic rarely touched

¹ Thucyd. II. 95-96: compare 94. H. & G.

² Thucyd. II. 95.

³ Thucyd. II. 95. The 3d sentence appears to prepare the encouragement given

exhortations, and the Peloponnesian exhortations joined and combined: to do so has not exactly advantage: all necessary parts of it should, perhaps, not significantly differ in length.

upon by ancient generals in their homages on the eve of battle, and demonstrating complacently the reluctance of many of the Peloponnesian women, who had been brought to this second engagement chiefly by the ascendancy and strenuous counsels of Sparta. To such reluctance Plutarch pointedly alluded, in the encouraging exhortations which he on his side addressed to his men; for they too, in spite of their habitual confidence at sea, strengthened by the recent victory, were dispirited by the weakness of their numbers. He reminded them of their long practice and rational conviction of superiority at sea, such as no augmentation of numbers, especially with an enemy conscious of his own weakness, could overthrow. He called upon them to show their habitual discipline and quick apprehensions of orders, and above all to perform their regular movements in perfect silence during the actual battle—useful in all customs of war, and essential to the proper conduct of a sea-fight. The idea of strict silence on board the Athenian ships while a sea-fight was going on is not only striking as a feature in the picture, but is also one of the most powerful evidences of the force of self-control and military habits among these officers-seamen.

The habitual position of the Palaeopannian fleet off Panormus was within the strait, but nearly drowning the breadth of it—opposite to Phormia, who lay on the outer side of the strait, as well as off the opposite cape: in the Palaeopannian line, therefore, the right wing occupied the north or north-east side towards Naxos. Estus and Brachus now resolved to make a forward movement up the Gulf, as if against that town, which was the main Athenian station. Knowing that Phormia would be under the necessity of coming to the defense of the place, they hoped to pin him up and force him to action close under the land, where Athenian reinforcements would be wanted. Accordingly they commenced this movement early in the morning, sailing in line of four abreast towards the northern coast of the inner Gulf. The right squadron, under De Leontopannian Thucydides, was in the van, according to its natural position.

¹ Thompson, R. H., and de Wit, A. W. 1962. The effects of temperature and photoperiod on the development of the housefly, *Musca domestica* L., and the fruit fly, *Drosophila melanogaster* Meigen. *Ann. Entomol. Soc. Am.* 55: 61-67.

more like you. Besides the fact that
you were, I'm sure that the newspaper
would not have been so kind to you.
I am sure that you are a very good
person and that you are a very good
person.

and care had been taken to place in it twenty of the best-sailing ships, since the success of the plan of action was known beforehand to depend upon their swiftness. As they had foreseen, Plarico, the moment he saw their movement, put his men on shipboard, and rowed into the interior of the strait, though with the greatest reluctance; for the Mameucians were on land alongside of him, and he knew that Nupakton, with their wives and families, and a long dread of war,¹ was utterly unprepared. He ranged his ships in line of battle ahead, probably his own the leading ship, and sailed close along the land toward Nupakton, while the Mameucians marching ashore kept near to him.

Both fleets were then moving in the same direction, and towards the same point — the Athenians close along shore, the Peloponnesians somewhat farther off.² The latter had now got Phormio into the position which they wished, pinned up against the land, with no room for tactics. On a sudden the signal was given, and the whole Peloponnesian fleet, facing to the left, changed from column into line, and instead of continuing to move along the coast, moved rapidly with their bows shoreward to come to close quarters with the Athenians. The right squadron of the Peloponnesians, occupying the side toward Harpates, was especially charged with the duty of cutting off the Athenians from all possibility of escaping thither, the best ships having been placed on the right for that important object. As far as the commanders were concerned, the plan of action completely succeeded: the Athenians were caught in a situation where resistance was impossible, and had no chance of escape except in flight. But no superior were they in rapid movement even in the best Peloponnesian, that eleven ships, the headmost out of the rearmost, just found means to run by,³ before the right wing of the enemy closed in upon the shore, and made the best of

Just please: though it is to be noted, noted that a vulgar, low street, which crossed into this, became too close.

1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

The reference to the identification of this movement, see the Appendix to the present chapter, with the Peace movement.

¹Thompson, 21, 22. These surveys show that the effect was as marked in the nonwhite

Site Selection:—the 20 factors are along
system. It is a good year. It also
the characteristics and the knowledge,
in the environment.

The vineyards of the Synagogue are not unlike that of the Colossians in the matter of Synthesis, and the systems of the flowering year. Here, illustrate this article of the Column, and upon the base of Phidias (1790, p. 10).

their way to Megasthenes. The remaining nine ships were caught and driven ashore with serious damage—their crews being partly slain, partly escaping by swimming. The Peloponnesians towed off one trireme with its entire crew, and some others empty. But more than one of them was rescued by the bravery of the Mianian hoplites, who, in spite of their heavy panoply, rushed into the water and got aboard them, fighting from the decks and driving off the enemy soon after the rope had been actually made fast, and the process of towing off had begun.¹

The victory of the Peloponnesians seemed assured. While their left and centre were thus occupied, the twenty ships of their right wing joined company with the rest, in order to pursue the eleven fugitive Athenian ships which they had killed in cutting off. Ten of these got clear away into the harbour of Megasthenes, and there posted themselves in an attitude of defence near the temple of Apollo, before any of the pursuers could come near; while the eleventh, somewhat less swift, was chased by the Lacedæmonian admiral, who on board a Leucæan trireme pushed greatly ahead of his comrades, in hopes of overtaking at least this one prey. There happened to be moored a merchant-vessel, at the entrance of the harbour of Megasthenes. The Athenian captain in his flight, observing that the Lacedæmonian pursuit was for the moment alone, seized the opportunity for a bold and rapid movement. He pulled swiftly round the trader-vessel, directed his trireme so as to meet the advancing Lacedæmonian, and drove his bow against her, astilike, with an impact as violent as to disable her at once. Her commander, the Lacedæmonian admiral Timonides, was so struck with anguish at this unexpected catastrophe, that he threw himself forthwith, and fell overboard into the harbour.² The pursuing vessels coming up behind, too, were so astounded and dismayed by it, that the men, dropping their oars, held water, and ceased to advance; while some even found themselves half asunder, from ignorance of the coast. On the other hand, the ten Athenian triremes in the harbour were beyond measure elated by the incident, so that a single word

The Peloponnesians took at first no account, but afterwards selected.

¹ Compare the like bravery on the part of the Lacedæmonian hoplites at Epidaure, *ibid.* 14.

from Phormio sufficed to put them in active forward motion, and to make them strenuously attack the embarrassed enemy, whose ships, disordered by the heat of pursuit, and having been just suddenly stopped, could not be quickly got again under way, and expected nothing less than reversed attack. First, the Athenians broke the twenty pursuing ships on their right wing, next they pursued their advantage against the left and centre, who had probably veered to the right; so that after a short resistance the whole were completely routed, and fled across the Gulf to their original station at *Perormos*.¹ Not only did the eleven Athenian ships thus break, turnify, and drive away the entire host of the enemy, with the capture of six of the nearest *Poloponnesean* triremes, but they also rescued those ships of their own which had been driven ashore and taken in the early part of the action. Moreover the *Poloponnesean* crews sustained a considerable loss both in killed and in prisoners.

This is spite not only of the prodigious disparity of numbers, but also of the disastrous blow which the Athenians had sustained at first. Phormio ended by gaining a complete victory: a victory, to which even the *Lacedæmonians* were forced to bear testimony, since they were obliged to ask a truce for burying and collecting their dead, while the Athenians on their part picked up the bodies of their own warriors. The defeated party, however, still thought themselves entitled, in token of their success in the early part of the action, to erect a trophy on the *Hilum* of *Asbata*, where they also dedicated the single *Athenian* trireme which they had been able to carry off. Yet they were so completely disheartened—and further so much in fear of the expected reinforcement from *Athens*—that they took advantage of the night to retire, and sail into the Gulf

Retirement
of the
defeated
Poloponnesean
fleet. Phormio is
embarrassed—
his superior
force is
Athenian.
—*Lacedæmonians*
to *Athens*.

¹ Thucyd. II. 94. It is sufficiently evident that the Athenians defeated and drove off not only the twenty *Poloponnesean* ships of the right or pursuing wing, but also the left and centre, believing they would not have been able to withstand those *Athenian* ships which had been told of the beginning of the battle. Thucydides indeed does not expressly mention the *Poloponnesean* left, and seems to be leaving the right in their pursuit

towards *Naupactus*. But we may suppose that they probably did so, probably supposing of their order, as being at first under the impression that the victory was gained. They were probably however driven into confusion without much difficulty, when the twenty ships of the right were broken and driven back upon them—yet though the victorious *Athenian* triremes were no more than eleven in number.

to Corinth; all except the Leukadian, who returned to their own home.

Presently the reinforcement arrived, after that untoward detection which had well-nigh exposed Pharasus and his whole fleet to ruin. It confirmed his mastery of the entrance of the Gulf and of the coast of Akarnania, where the Peloponnesians had now no naval force at all. To establish more fully the Athenian influence in Akarnania, he undertook during the course of the autumn an expedition, landing at Astakos, and marching into the Akarnanian inland country with 400 Athenian hoplites and 400 Macedonians. Some of the leading men of Stratus and Koroonta, who were attached to the Peloponnesian interest, he caused to be sent into exile, while a chief named Kyras, of Koroonta, who seems to have been hitherto in exile, was re-established in his native town. The great object was to besiege and take the powerful town of Otranto, near the mouth of the Astakos, a town at variance with the other Akarnanians, and attached to the Peloponnesians. But as the great spread of the waters of the Astakos rendered this siege impracticable during the winter, Pharasus returned to the station at Naupaktos. From hence he departed to Athens towards the end of the winter, carrying home both his prize-ships and such of his prisoners as were freemen. The latter were exchanged men for men against Athenian prisoners in the hands of Sparta.¹

After abandoning the naval contest at Ektum, and retiring to Corinth, Kallias and Brasidas were prevailed upon by the Megarians, before the fleet dispersed, to try the bold experiment of a sudden inroad upon Piræus. Such was the confessed superiority of the Athenians at sea, that while they guarded snugly the coasts of Attica against privateers, they never imagined the possibility of an attack upon their own main harbour. Accordingly, Piræus was not only unprotected by any ships across the entrance, but destitute even of any regular guard-ships manned and ready. The crews of the retiring Peloponnesian armament, on reaching Corinth, were immediately disembarked and marched, first across the isthmus, next to Megara—each man

attempts of
Kallias
and
Brasidas to
surprise
Piræus,
leading
from
Corinth.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 104, 105.

carrying his watch-dog,¹ and his cow, together with the loop whereby the cow was fastened to the cow-hold in the side, and thus prevented from slipping.

Thus by forty triremes in Salamis, the harbour of Megara, which, though old and out of condition, were sufficient for so short a try; and the women, immediately on arriving, branched these and got aboard. Yet such was the care maintained of Athens and her power, that when the scheme came really to be executed, the courage of the Peloponnesians failed, though there was nothing to hinder them from actually reaching Pelopona. Pretending that the wind was adverse, they confined themselves with passing across to the station of Eretria, to the opposite Athenian island of Salamis, where they surprised and seized the three guard-ships which habitually blockaded the harbour of Megara, and then landed upon the island. They spread themselves over a large part of Salamis, ravaged the properties, and seized men as well as goods. Five signals immediately made known this unforeseen aggression, both at Pelopona and at Athens, constituting in both the extreme of astonishment and alarm; for the Athenians at Athens, not conceiving distinctly the meaning of the signals, feared that Pelopona itself had fallen into the hands of the enemy. The whole population rushed down to the Pelopona at break of day, and put to sea with all the triremes that were ready. But the Peloponnesians, aware of the danger which threatened them, made haste to quit Salamis with their booty and the three captured guard-ships. The losses was solitary to the Athenians: from henceforward Pelopona was furnished with a chain across the mouth, and a regular guard, down to the end of the war.² Forty years afterwards, however,

¹ Thucyd. II. 23. *Alon, 23* letters the people learned the alarm, and its direction, and the aggression, &c. The third words there is an interesting notice of the Athenians' published by the opportunity to the Athenian Thucydides, &c. 1. His remarks upon this point are more satisfactory than those of any other ancient writer. Whether the alarm was given by the use of a trumpet, or by a signal on the ground, or by a trumpet, was in the city's mind, there must be both many and many different stories to come to have had nothing like what

Dr. Hutton gives, and a thing to give it to them, dipping down, breaking the water, especially with the noise of the trumpet or upon the use of drums, who pulled up as great an attention immediately spreading alarm that would. The history of the invasion of Athens is told in the next of a book, and one to that of a trumpet. Dr. Hutton shows that the explanation of the meaning of the trumpet, given by the Athenians, is not the true one. *Thucyd. II. 24.*

we shall find it just as vigorously watched, and surprised with weak more brilliant and courtesy by the Lacedæmonian captain, 'Telestas.'

As, during the summer of this year the Argæiots had brought down a numerous host of Epilætic tribes to the invasion of Akarnania, in conjunction with the Peloponnesians, so during the autumn the Achaïans obtained aid against the Chalkidians of Thessaly from the powerful barbaric¹ prince before mentioned, *Stathlos*, king of the Olympean Thracians.

Amidst the numerous tribes between the Danube and the *Ægean* sea—who all bore the generic name of Thracians, though each had a special name besides—the Olympean were at this time the most warlike and powerful. The Olympean king, *Thilo*, father of *Stathlos*, had made use of this power to subdue² and render tributary a great number of these different tribes, especially those whose residence was in the plain rather than in the mountains. His dominion, the largest extending between the Ionian sea and the Buxine, extended from *Aithia* or the mouth of the *Hebrus* in the *Ægean* sea to the mouth of the Danube in the Buxine; though it seems that this must be understood with deductions, since many intervening tribes, especially mountain tribes, did not acknowledge his authority. *Stathlos* himself had invaded and conquered some of the Pæonian tribes who joined the Thracians on the west, between the *Arim* and the *Strymon*.³ Doubtless, in the name of the Olympean king, great tribute, presents, and military force were required. With the two former, at least, we may conclude that he was amply supplied, since his nephew and successor *Parthia* (under whom the revenues increased and attained its maximum) received 400 talents annually in gold and silver as tribute, and the like sum in various presents, over and above many other presents of manufactured articles and ornaments. These latter came from the Grecian colonies on the coast, which contributed moreover largely to the tribute, though in what proportions we are not informed. Even Grecian cities, not in Thracia, sent presents to forward their trading objects, as purchases for the produce, the

Assessors
of the
Assessors
with the
Olympean
tribes.

¹ Xenophon, *Hæc.* v. 7, 34.

² Thucyd. ii. 10, 25, 26.

³ Thucyd. ii. 10.

plunder, and the slaves acquired by Thracian chiefs or tribes.¹ The residence of the Odrysians properly so called, and of the princes of that tribe now ruling over so many of the remaining tribes, appears to have been about twelve days' journey inland from Byzantium,² in the upper regions of the Illyria and Scythia, south of Mount Haemus, and north-east of Rhodope. The Odrysian chiefs were connected by relationship more or less distant with those of the subordinate tribes, and by marriage even with the Scythian princes south of the Danube: the Scythian prince *Asiopeltis*³ had married the daughter of the Odrysian Tiber, the first who extended the dominion of his tribe over any considerable portion of Thrace.

The natural state of the Thracian tribes—in the judgment of Herodotus, permanent and incorrigible—was that of dissension and incapacity of political association: were such association possible (he says), they would be strong enough to vanquish every other nation—though Thucydides considers them as far inferior to the Scythians. The Odrysian dominion had probably not reached, at the period when Herodotus made his inquiries, the same development which Thucydides describes in the third year of the Peloponnesian war, and which imparted to these tribes a union, partial indeed and temporary, but such as they never reached either before or afterwards. It has been already mentioned that the Odrysian prince Sitalkes had taken for his wife (or rather for one of his wives) the sister of Nymphodorus, a Greek of Abdera; by whose mediation he had been made the ally, and his son Sakobas even a citizen, of Abdera. He had further been induced to promise that he would reconquer the Chalkidians of Thrace for the benefit of the Athenians,⁴—his ancient Kinsman, according to the myth of

¹ See Herodotus, *Antiquities* vii. 2, 3, 11; 4, 5. Herodotus tells us, that the revenues of Sitalkes are more than 1000 talents annually. This sum is not materially different from that which Thucydides states to be the annual revenue of Nymphodorus, successor of Sitalkes—various property so called, and possessed with other legations.

² Thucyd. *Third Year*, in the Asiatic march of the Peloponnesians, describing those who come with presents to the Ody-

sian King Sitalkes (Xenophon, *vi* *supra*).

³ Xenoph. *Anabasis* i. 2.

⁴ Herodot. *ii*. 64.

⁵ Xenophon, *Anabasis* vii. 2, 3, 11; Thucyd. *3. 30*. Xenophon, *Annals*, 100. Thucydides goes out of his way to relate this curious tale!—a curious exaggeration of ancient legend applied to the convenience of present politics.

Thrace as interpreted by both parties. At the same time, Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, had offended him by refusing to perform a promise made of giving him his sister in marriage—a promise made in consideration for the interference of Stenobolus and Nymphodorus in procuring for Perdiccas peace with Athens, at a moment when he was much embarrassed by civil dissensions with his brother Philip. The latter prince, ruling in his own name (and seemingly independent of Perdiccas) over a portion of the Macedonians along the upper course of the Axios, had been expelled by his more powerful brother, and taken refuge with Stenobolus. He was now apparently dead, but his son Amyntas received from the Cyprian prince the promise of restoration. The Athenians, though they had ambassadors resident with Stenobolus, nevertheless sent Agnon as special envoy to concert arrangements for his march against the Chalkidians, with which an Athenian armament was destined to co-operate. In treating with Stenobolus, it was necessary to be liberal in presents both to himself and to the subordinate chieftains who held power dependent upon him. Nothing could be accomplished among the Thracians except by the aid of bribes,² and the Athenians were more anxious to secure this assistance than any other

1. The
 2. The
 3. The
 4. The
 5. The
 6. The
 7. The
 8. The
 9. The
 10. The

[illegible]

This universal necessity of protection and refuge may be seen illustrated in the dealings of Jonathan and the Gideon army with the Thabites when the latter, deceived by the Amalekites,

chapter ; and S. Haysden that were at that time (as, viz) the Georgian divines, Ralph & I had passed through Massachusetts and had been graciously welcomed, and conducted home to the university of Cambridge. In considering upon the "utility of the Christian, and Politician, in a current discussion with the very thoughtful and in a plain way about the 25 letters printed here and in the "Penny". The Editor here tells us that the passage in the time as to public affairs, in the Roman empire, was long and tedious; of which part of the Roman empire, however, we do not know ; perhaps about 1000

The material which Theodinus here draws between the Thracians and the Persians is illustrated by what Kappeler was reporting, the burial of the Younger Turk (Antony 1, 2, 3):

...one day the remains of the Cyropolis, 191, 14, 15, 16.

sons of Philip, induced some of the fortified places, Gortyna, Aitolia, and others, to open their gates without resistance, while Melomedes was taken by storm, and Koroneia in vain attacked. From hence he passed still farther northward into Lower Macedonia, the kingdom of Perdikas, ravaging the territory on both sides of the Axius even to the neighbourhood of the towns Pella and Kymbra, and apparently down as far south as the mouth of the river and the head of the Thermaic Gulf. Further south than this he did not go, but spread his force over the districts between the left bank of the Axius and the head of the Strymonic Gulf—Mygdonia, Kresia, and Anthemone—while a portion of his army was detached to overrun the territory of the Chalkidians and Bottians. The Macedonians under Perdikas, renouncing all idea of contending on foot against an overwhelming host, either fled or shut themselves up in the small number of fortified places which the country presented. The cavalry from Upper Macedonia, indeed, well-armed and confident, made some orderly and successful charges against the Thracians, lightly armed with javelins, short swords, and the pelta or small shield; but it was presently shot in, harrowed on all sides by superior numbers, and compelled to think only of retreat and extinction.¹

Luckily for the success of the Olynthian king, his march was not made until the beginning of winter—seemingly about November or December. We may be sure that the Athenians, when they concerted with him the joint attack upon the Chalkidians, intended that it should be in a better time of the year. Having probably waited to hear that his army was in motion, and waited long in vain, they began to despair of his coming at all, and thought it not worth while to dispatch any force of their own to the spot.² Some envoys and presents only were sent as compliments, instead of the co-operating armament. And this disappointment, coupled with the severity of the weather, the sickness of the country, and the privations of his army at that season, induced Sitalces soon to enter into negotia-

He is forced to retire by the severity of the season and want of Athenian co-operation.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 100; Kresia, the modern Kresna, in Bulgaria.

² Thucyd. ii. 100. Doubtful if Athens.

at Athens only sends, despatching no force of their own.

ties with Periklēs; who moreover gained over Sitalkēs, nephew of the Olynthian prince, by promising his sister Streptoklē marriage, together with a sum of money, on condition that the Thracian host should be speedily withdrawn. This was accordingly done, after it had been distributed for thirty days over Macedonia, during eight of which days his detachment had ravaged the Chalkidian lands. But the interval had been quite long enough to diffuse terror all around. Such a host of fierce barbarians had never before been brought together, and no one knew in what direction they might be disposed to carry their incursions. The independent Thracian tribes (Pionē, Odomantes, Dril, and Dorei) in the plains on the north-east of the Strymon, and near Mount Pangaea, not far from Amphipolis, were the first to feel alarm; but Sitalkēs should take the opportunity of trying to engage them. On the other side, the Thesalians, Magnesians, and other Greeks north of Thermopylæ, apprehensive that he would carry his invasion further south, began to organise means for resisting him. Even the general Peloponnesian confederacy heard with astonishment of this new ally whom Athens was bringing into the field, perhaps against them. All such alarms were dispated, when Sitalkēs, after remaining thirty days, returned by the way he came, and the formidable evulser was thus seen to melt away. The faithless Periklēs, on this occasion, performed his promise to Sitalkēs, having drawn upon himself much censure by violating his previous similar promise to Sitalkēs.²

²Chap. II. §§.

APPENDIX

Παραρ. 8. 39. ΟΙ ΔΕ ΠΙΣΤΟΛΟΓΟΥΝΤΕΣ, ΔΕΔΩΚΕ ΑΝΕΛΕΙ ΟΙ 'ΑΓΓΕΛΟΙ
ΕΙΝΑ ΔΕΔΩΚΑΝ ΕΝ ΤΗ ΕΚΚΛΗΣΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΟΙΚΟΙΣ, ΣΤΕΛΛΟΜΕΝΟΙ ΔΟΥΤΕΣ ΤΩ
ΠΡΟΪΚΡΑΤΩ ΑΝΕΛΕΙ, ΔΟΥΛΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΞ ΕΡΕΘΕΙΑΣ, ΔΕΙΝΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΕΡΓΟΙ ΚΑΤΕ-
ΛΕΒΟΝ ΤΗΝ ΖΩΗΝ, ΔΕΙΝΟΙ ΕΝ ΔΕΔΩΚΕΙ ΓΥΝΑΙΚΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΑΝΔΡΑΣΙ.
ΟΙΣΤΙΝ ΑΝΕΡ ΘΥΡΑΝΟΙ, ΔΟΥΤΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΟΥΛΟΙ· ΔΕΙΝΟΙ ΑΝΕΡ ΑΝΕΛΕΙ ΕΝΕΡ-
ΓΟΙ ΤΩΝ ΕΡΓΩΝ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΟΙ, ΔΟΥΤΕ, ΟΙ ΕΞ ΕΝΕΡΓΙΑΣ ΔΕΙΝΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΣ.
ΑΝΕΛΕ ΔΕ ΘΥΡΑΝΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΕΛΕ ΔΕΔΩΚΕΤΕ ΤΟΥΣ ΣΥΝΕΛΕΒΟΝΤΕΣ, ΜΗ ΔΕΔΩ-
ΚΕΤΕ ΑΝΕΛΕΙΝΑ ΤΗΝ ΔΕΔΩΚΕΝ ΕΝΕΛΕΙ ΟΙ 'ΑΓΓΕΛΟΙ ΤΩ ΕΝΕΛΕΙ ΔΕΔΩΚΕΝ
ΕΝΕΛΕΙ, ΔΕΙΝΟΙ ΑΝΕΛΕ ΟΙ ΕΝΕΡΓΟΙ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΟΙ.

The above passage forms the main authority for my description (given above) of the movement of the Filipiniana fleet, previous to the second battle against Florida. The assumed plan will enable my readership to be understood.

The main question for consideration here is, What is the meaning of *yip de-wai-yip*? Does it mean the head of the Peloponnesians, north of the Gulf, or the head of the Athenians, north of the Gulf? The commentators affirm that it must mean the former. I thought that it might mean the latter: and in my previous edition I adduced several examples of the use of the proverb *tsai-tai*, tending to justify that opinion.

Finding that on this question of orthodoxy my opinion is opposed to the best authorities, I no longer insist upon it, nor do I now reprint the illustrative passages. As to the facts, however, my conclusion remains unchanged. The land here designated by Thucydides must be "the land of the Sicilians north of the Strait"; it cannot be "the land of the Peloponnesians south of the Strait". The promontory *Isule* must therefore be wrong, and ought to be altered into *isole*, as Mr. Hinsdale proposes, or *island*.

The Schoolist says that *del nje nje* is more equivalent to *enah nje nje*. Dr. Arnold, thoroughly approving the description of Miford, who states that the Polynesianes East were "moving westward along the *delah's coast*," says: "The Schoolist says that *del* is here used for *west*. It would be better to say that it has a mixed derivation."

motion towards a place and neighbourhood to it: expressing that the Philoponemians sailed towards their own land (i.e. towards Corinth, Sigeon, and Pellis), to which places the greater number of the ships belonged, instead of standing over to the opposite coast belonging to their enemies; and at the same time kept close upon their own land, in the sense of *dei* with a dative case."

To discuss this interpretation first with reference to the verbal construction. Surely the meaning which the Scholiast puts upon *dei rîp yîp* is one which cannot be admitted, without examples to justify it. No two prepositions can be more distinct than the two, *σκάει dei rîp yîp*, and *σκάει σκαπ rîp yîp*. The Philoponemian fleet, before it made any movement, was already moored close upon its own land—at the headland Rhion, near Patroon, where its land force stood (Thucyd. ii. 10). In this position, if it moved at all, it must either sail away from the Philoponemian coast or along the Philoponemian coast; and neither of these movements would be expressed by Thucydides under the words *σκάει dei rîp λανδα yîp*.

To strike this difficulty, while the Scholiast changes the meaning of *dei*, Dr. Arnold changes that of *rîp λανδα yîp*; which words, according to him, denote, not the Philoponemian coast as opposed to the northern shore occupied by Patroon, but Corinth, Sigeon, and Pellis; to which places the navy the greater number of the ships belonged. But I submit that this is a sense altogether unnatural. Corinth and Sigeon are so far off, that any allusion to them here is most improbable. Thucydides is describing the operations of two hostile fleets, one occupying the coast northward, the other the coast southward, of the Strait. The own land of the Philoponemians was that northern line of coast which they occupied and on which their land force was encamped: it is distinguished from the enemy's land, on the opposite side of the Strait. If Thucydides had wished to denote that the Philoponemian fleet sailed in the direction of Corinth and Sigeon, he would hardly have used such words as *σκάει dei rîp λανδα yîp*.

Professor Drexler (in an article among the *Critical Remarks* annexed to the third edition of his *Greek and English Lexicon*) has contested my interpretation of this passage of Thucydides. He says: "The Philoponemian fleet must have proceeded along their own coast—*dei rîp λανδα yîp* *δεν dei καὶ αὐτοῖς*. In this passage we find *dei* with two uses: the first with the accusative, the other with the dative. The first appears to me to indicate the locality to which they were sailing; and that evidently was the headland on the Acroian coast, nearly opposite Neapacton."

The headland to which Mr. Denham alludes, will be seen on the annexed plan, marked *Draperum*. It is sufficiently near not to be open to the objection which I have urged against Dr. Arnold's hypothesis of Carthage and Syden. But still I contend that it cannot be indicated by the words as they stand in *Thucydides*. On Mr Denham's interpretation, the Peloponnesians must have moved from one point of their own land to another point of their own land. Now, if *Thucydides* had meant to affirm this, he surely would not have used such words as *ἐκ τῆς ἑλίου ἰσθμῶς ἤντιν*. He would either have specified by name the particular point of land (as in a *Μεγαλειότητις ἑλίου τῆς Πύκας*)—or if he had desired to bring to our view that "they proceeded along their own coast," he would have said *κατὰ τῆς ἑλίου* instead of *ἐκ*.

Thus far I have been discussing simply the verbal interpretation of *ἐκ τῆς ἑλίου ἰσθμῶς ἤντιν*, for the purpose of showing that though these words be admitted to mean the land of the Peloponnesians, still, in order to reconcile such meaning with the facts, the commentators are obliged to advance suppositions highly impossible, and even to identify *ἐκ* with *κατὰ*. I now turn from the verbal construction to the facts, in order to show that the real movement of the Peloponnesians does not seem here towards the Athenian coast and towards Naupactus. Therefore, since *ἰσθμῶς* cannot have that meaning, *ἐκ* must be an error of the text.

The purpose of the Peloponnesians in effecting the movement was to make *Phormio* believe that they were going to attack *Naupactus*; to constrain him to come within the Gulf with a view of protecting that place; and at the same time, if *Phormio* did come within the Gulf, to attack him in a narrow space where his ships would have no room for manœuvring. This was what the Peloponnesians not only intended, but actually accomplished.

Now, I ask how this purpose could be accomplished by a movement along the coast of Peloponnesus from the headland of *Idium* to the headland of *Draperum*, which last point the reader will see on the plan annexed? How could such movement induce *Phormio* to think that the Peloponnesians were going to attack *Naupactus*, or drive him into alarm for the safety of that place? When arrived at *Draperum*, they would hardly be nearer to *Naupactus* than they were at *Idium*: they would still have the whole breadth of the Gulf to cross. Let us, however, suppose that their movement towards *Draperum* did really induce *Phormio* to come into the Gulf for the protection of *Naupactus*. If they attempted to cross the breadth of the Gulf from *Draperum* towards *Naupactus*, they would expose themselves to be attacked by *Phormio* midway in the open sea; the

very contingency which he desired, and which they were manoeuvring to avoid.

Again, let us approach the question from another point of view. It is certain, from the description of Thucydides, that the second attack of the Peloponnesians upon *Floraëa*, in which they cut off nine out of his twenty ships, took place on the northern coast of the Gulf, at some spot between the headland *Arcturion* and *Thapoleia*; somewhere near the spot which I have indicated on the annexed plan. The presence of the *Minotaur* soldiers (who had come out from *Naupactus* to assist *Floraëa*, and who rushed into the water to save the captured ships) would of itself place this beyond a doubt—it, indeed, any doubt could arise. It is further certain that when the Peloponnesians first wheeled from column into line to attack *Floraëa*, they were so near to this northern head that *Floraëa* was in the greatest danger of having his whole squadron driven ashore: only eleven out of his twenty ships could escape. The plan will illustrate what is here said.

Now, I ask how these facts are to be reconciled with the supposition that the Peloponnesians then, on quitting their moorings at *Elision*, sailed along their own head towards *Drepanon*? If they did so, how did they afterwards get across the Gulf, to the place where the battle was fought? Every point that they moved in the direction of *Drepanon* only tended to widen the breadth of open gulf to be crossed afterwards. With the purpose which they had in view, to move from *Elision* along their own coast in the direction of *Drepanon* would have been absurd. Supposing, however, that they did so, it could only have been preliminary to a second movement, in another direction, across the Gulf. But of this second movement, Thucydides says not one word. All that he tells us about the course of the Peloponnesians is contained in this phrase—*hōlos de tōi dactylō tōi lōi del rōi olōnos, hōlos eipō hōlos tōi lōi del rōi olōnos*. If these words really designate a movement along the northern coast, we must assume, first, that the *Minotaur* has left unmentioned the second movement across the Gulf, which nevertheless must have followed; next, that the Peloponnesians made a first move for no purpose except to increase the distance and difficulty of the second.

Considering, therefore, the facts of the case, the localities and the purposes of the Peloponnesians, all of which are here clear, I ventured that *hōlos de tōi dactylō tōi lōi del rōi olōnos* must denote a movement of the Peloponnesians first towards the head of the *Arcturion*, on the northern shore of the Gulf; and that as *hōlos* will not bear that sense, it must be altered to *olōlos* or *olōnos*.

It remains to explain *lōi del rōi olōnos*, which has a very

distinct and important meaning. The land of the Athenians, on the northern side of the Strait, comprises the headland of Antirrhion, with both the lines of coast, which there terminate and make an angle; that is, one line of coast *fronting inwards* towards the Corinthian Gulf—the other, *fronting outwards* towards the Gulf of Patras. The reader who looks at the annexed plan will see this at a glance. Now, when Thucydides says that the Peloponnesians sailed "upon the land of the Athenians towards *fronting the Gulf*," these last words are essential to make us understand towards which of the two Athenian lines of coast the movement was turned. We learn from the words that the Peloponnesians did not sail towards that outer side of the headland where Phormio was posted, but towards the inner side of it, on the line which conducted to Nauplia.

CHAPTER I.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FOURTH YEAR
OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR DOWN TO THE RE-
VOLUNTARY COMMOTIONS AT KORKYRA.

THE second and third years of the war had both been years of great suffering with the Athenians, from the continuance of the epidemic, which did not materially relax until the winter of the third year (B.C. 429—428). It is no wonder that under the pressure of such a calamity their military efforts were enfeebled, although the victories of Phormio had placed their maritime reputation at a higher point than ever. To their misfortune, the destructive effects of this epidemic—effects still felt, although the disorder itself was suspended during the fourth year of the war—effected material assistance as well as encouragement to persevere. The Peloponnesians, under Archidamus, again repeated during this year their invasion and ravage of Attica, which had been interrupted during the year preceding. As before, they met with no serious resistance. Entering the country about the beginning of May, they continued the process of devastation until their provisions were exhausted.¹ To this damage the Athenians had probably now accustomed themselves; but they speedily received, even while the invaders were in their country, intelligence of an event far more embarrassing and formidable—the revolt of Mitylenæ and of the greater part of Lesbos.

This revolt, indeed, did not come even upon the Athenians wholly unawares. Yet the idea of a war of longer standing than they expected, for the Mitylenæan oligarchy had projected it

¹ Thucyd. ii. 1.

before the war and had made secret application to Sparta for aid, but without success. Some time after hostilities broke out, they resumed the design, which was warmly promoted by the Thracians, kinsmen of the Lesbians in *Melle Ranges* and district. The Mitylenæan leaders appear to have finally determined on march during the prevailing autumn or winter. But they thought it prudent to make ample preparations before they declared themselves openly; and moreover they took measures for concentrating three other towns in Lesbos,—Astina, Ermos, and Pyrrha,—to share their fortunes, to manage their own separate governments, and to become incorporated with Mitylæa. Methymna, the second town in Lesbos, situated on the north of the island, was decidedly opposed to them and attached to Athens. The Mitylenæans built new ships,—put their walls in an improved state of defence,—excavated a mole in order to narrow the entrance of their harbour and render it capable of being closed with a chain,—despatched emissaries to hire Boeotian bowmen and purchase corn in the Euxine,—and took such other measures as were necessary for an effective resistance.

Though the oligarchical character of their government gave them much means of secrecy, and shrewdly disguised with the necessity of consulting the people beforehand, still measures of such importance could not be taken without provoking attention. Intimation was sent to the Athenians by various Mitylenæan citizens, partly from private feeling, partly in their capacity of pæneer (or *news*, to use a modern word which approaches to the meaning) for Athens—especially by a Mitylenæan named Democles, licensed with the government for having disapproved his two sons of marriage with two orphan heiresses.¹ Not less communicative were the Islanders of Tenos, animated by ancient neighbourly jealousy towards Mitylæa; so that the Athenians

¹ *Antiqu. Politi.* v. l. l. The last respecting Democles has been noted to be stated by Aristotle, and there is no reason to question his truth. But Aristotle states it in illustration of a general position, that the private interests of political officials are often the cause of great misfortune to the commonwealth. He represents Democles and his private quarrel as

having brought upon Mitylæa the vengeance of the Athenians and the war with Athens—*καταστροφή*—but the evidence, and position only *ἀποδοχή*, sufficient for his effect.

Having the account of Thucydides before us, we are enabled to say that this is an incorrect assumption, as far as it appears the signs of the war—though the fact in itself may be quite true.

*see also,
Speech of
Mitylæan
and words
said at the
Synodion
Athens.*

were thus forewarned both of the intrigue between Mitylæa and the Spartans, and of her certain impending revolt unless they immediately intervened.¹

This news seems to have become certain about February or March, 428 B.C. But such was then the dispirited condition of the Athenians—arising from two years' suffering under the epidemic, and no longer counteracted by the wholesome remonstrances of Pericles—that they could not at first bring themselves to believe what they were so much afraid to find true. Lædas, like Chios, was their ally upon an equal footing, still remaining under those conditions which had been at first common to all the members of the confederacy of Delos. Mitylæa paid no tribute to Athens: it retained its walls, its large naval force, and its extensive local possessions on the opposite Asiatic continent: its government was oligarchical, administering all internal affairs without reference to Athens. Its obligations as usually were, that in case of war it was held bound to furnish armed ships, whether in determinate number or not we do not know. It would undoubtedly be restrained from making war upon Tenos, or any other subject-ally of Athens; and its government or its citizens would probably be held liable to answer before the Athenian dikasteries, in case of any complaint of injury from the government or citizens of Tenos or of any other ally of Athens—these latter being themselves also accountable before the same tribunals under like complaints from Mitylæa. That city was thus in practice all but independent, and so extremely powerful that the Athenians, fearful of saying with it in their actual state of depression, were loth to believe the slandering intelligence which reached them. They sent envoys with a friendly message to persuade the Mitylæans to surrender their possessions, and it was only when these envoys returned without success that they saw the necessity of stronger measures. Ten Mitylæan triremes, serving as contingent in the Athenian fleet, were seized, and their crews placed under guard; while Kleopidæ, then on the point of starting (along with two colleagues) to conduct a fleet of forty triremes round Pelopon-

¹ Thucyd. iv. 2.

where, was directed to alter his destination and to proceed forthwith to Mitylene.¹ It was expected that he would reach that town about the time of the approaching festival of Apollo Malaea, celebrated in its neighbourhood—on which occasion the whole Mitylæan population was in the habit of going forth to the temple; so that the town, while thus deserted, might easily be surprised and seized by the fleet. In case this calculation should be disappointed, Kleippidas was instructed to require that the Mitylæans should surrender their ships of war and man their fortifications, and in the event of refusal to attack them immediately.

But the probability of debate at Athens was far too great to allow such a scheme to succeed. The Mitylæans had their spies in the city, and the moment the resolution was taken, one of them set off to communicate it at Mitylene. Crossing over to Gerasteia in Eubœa, and getting aboard a merchantman on the point of departure, he reached Mitylene with a favourable wind on the third day from Athens; so that when Kleippidas arrived shortly afterwards, he found the festival adjourned and the government prepared for him. The requisition which he sent in was refused, and the Mitylæan fleet even came forth from the harbour to assail him, but was beaten back with little difficulty: upon which the Mitylæans looked, finding themselves attacked before their preparations were completed, and desiring still to gain time, opened negotiations with Kleippidas, and prevailed on him to suspend hostilities until ambassadors could be sent to Athens, protesting that they had no serious intention of revolting. This appears to have been about the middle of May, soon after the Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica.

Kleippidas was, indeed, not very prudent, in admitting this proposition, under the impression that his argument was not sufficient to cope with a city and island so powerful. He remained moored off the harbour at the north of Mitylene until the envoys (among whom was included one of the very citizens of Mitylene who had sent to betray the intended revolt, but who had since changed his opinion) should return from Athens.

Kleippidas
sails to
Mitylene
on the
third day
from
Athens.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 2.
2—10

Meanwhile the Mitylenean government, unknown to Kleippolis, and well aware that the embassy would prove fruitless, took advantage of the truce to send secret envoys to Sparta imploring immediate aid. And on the arrival of the Lacemonian Nibos and the Thuban Hermacondas (who had been despatched to Mityléné earlier, but had only come in by stealth since the arrival of Kleippolis), a second truce was sent along with them, carrying additional envoys to solicit the solicitation. These articles and despatches were carried on without the knowledge of the Athenian admiral; chiefly in consequence of the peculiar site of the town, which had originally been placed upon a little islet divided from Lachon by a narrow channel or straits, and had subsequently been extended across into the main island—the Spruce and so many other Goodian settlements. It had consequently two harbours, one north, the other south, of the town: Kleippolis was anchored off the former, but the latter remained unguarded.¹

During the absence of the Mitylenean envoys at Athens, reinforcements reached the Athenian admiral from Linnos, Imbros, and some other allies, as well as from the Lesbian town of Methymna; so that when the envoys returned, as they presently did with an unfavourable reply, war was resumed with increased vigour. The Mityleneans, having made a general rally with their full military force, gained some advantage in the battle; yet not feeling bold enough to maintain the field, they retreated back behind their walls. The news of their revolt, when first spread abroad, had created an impression unfavourable to the stability of the Athenian empire. But when it was seen that their conduct was irrevocable and their achievements disproportionate to their supposed power, a reaction of feeling took place. The Othians and other allies came in with increased zeal, in obedience to the summons of Athens for reinforcements. Kleippolis soon found his armament large enough

¹ Thucyd. iii. 8, 4; compare Strabo, *op. cit.* p. 417; and Ptolemy, *loc. cit.* p. 13-14.

Thucydides speaks of the spot at the mouth of this northern harbour as being called *Stenos*, which was also collectively the name of the south-

ernmost promontory of Lachon. We must therefore presume that there were two places on the southern of Lachon which bore this name.

The settlement of the two southern promontories of Polopopolis was also called Cape Melas.

to establish two separate camps, markets for provision, and naval stations, north and south of the town, so as to watch and block up both the harbours at once.¹ But he commanded little beyond the area of his camp, and was unable to invest the city by land; especially as the Mitylenæans had received reinforcements from Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eretria, the other towns of Lesbos which acted with them. They were even sufficiently strong to march against Mitylene, in hopes that it would be betrayed to them by a party within. But this expectation was not realised, nor could they do more than strengthen the fortifications, and confirm the Mitylenæan supremacy, in the other three subordinate towns; in such manner that the Mitylenæans, who soon afterwards attacked Antissa, were repulsed with considerable loss. In this undisturbed condition the island continued, until (somewhere about the month of August, *i.e.* 428) the Athenians sent Paches to take the command, with a reinforcement of 3000 hoplites, who rowed themselves farther in to reinforce. The Athenians were now in force enough not only to keep the Mitylenæans within their walls, but also to surround the city with a single wall of circumvallation, strengthened by separate forts in suitable positions. By the beginning of October Mitylene was thus completely blockaded, by land as well as by sea.²

Meanwhile the Mitylenæan escape, after a troublesome voyage, had reached Sparta a little before the Olympic festival, about the middle of June. The Spartans directed them to come to Olympia at the festival, where all the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy would naturally be present, and there to set forth their requests, after the festival was concluded, in presence of all.³

Thucydides has given us, at some length, his version of the speech wherewith this was done—a speech not a little remarkable. Framed, as it was, by men who had just arrived from Athens, having the strongest interest to raise indignation against her as well as sympathy for themselves—and before an audience exclusively composed of the enemies of Athens, all willing to hear, and none present to refute, the interest

The Mitylenæan speech which themselves to the Spartans at the Olympic festival, in 428 *b.c.*

¹ Thucyd. II. 1.

² Thucyd. II. 12.

³ Thucyd. II. 2.

parties to a war for the sake of maintaining an empire essentially offensive to Greek political instincts.

In both these two reasons there is force; and both touch the sore point of the Athenian empire. That empire undoubtedly contradicted one of the fundamental instincts of the Greek mind—the right of every separate town to administer its own political affairs apart from external control. The Peloponnesian alliance recognised this autonomy in theory, by the general accord and equal voting of all the members at Sparta, on important concerns; though it was quite true¹ (as Perikles urged at Athens) that in practice nothing more was enjoyed than an autonomy confined by Spartan leading-strings—and though Sparta held in permanent custody hostages for the fidelity of her Achaean allies, summoning their military contingents without acquainting them whether they were destined to march. But Athens proclaimed herself a despot, affecting the autonomy of her allies not less in theory than in practice. Far from being disposed to cultivate in them any sense of a real common interest with herself, she did not even cheat them with those forms and notions which so often appear discontent in the absence of realities. Doubtless the nature of her empire, at once widely extended, maritime, and unconnected (or only partially connected) with kindred of race, rendered the forms of periodical deliberation difficult to keep up; at the same time that it gave to her, as naval chief, an ascendancy much more despotic than could have been exercised by any chief on land. It is doubtful whether she could have overcome—it is certain that she did not try to overcome—these political difficulties; so that her empire stood confessed as a despotism, opposed to the political instinct of the Greek mind; and the revolts against it, like this of Mitylene,—in so far as they represented a genuine feeling, and were not merely movements of an oligarchical party against their own democracy,—were revolts of this offended instinct, much more than consequences of actual oppression. The Mitylenæans might certainly affirm that they had no security against being one day reduced to the common

¹ Thucyd. i. 124. and four editions. The Lacedæmonians rule upon their fellow citizens, as cities: *polis auton basileuein* *hellenikon* *akroton* *politeion*, *hellen* *akroton* *basileuein*.

So *basileuein*. About the hostages detained by Sparta for the fidelity of her allies, see Thucyd. v. 24, 25.

condition of subject-allies like the rest. Yet an Athenian speaker, had he been here present, might have made no more reply to this portion of their reasoning. He would have urged that had Athens felt any disposition towards such a scheme, she would have taken advantage of the fourteen years' truce to execute it; and he would have shown that the degradation of the allies by Athens, and the change in her position from president to despot, had been far less intentional and systematic than the Mythraean would afford.

To the Peloponnesian solicitors, however, the speech of the latter proved completely satisfactory. The Lacedæmonians were declared members of the Peloponnesian alliance, and a second attack upon Attica was decreed. The Lacedæmonians, foremost in the movement, summoned contingents from their various allies, and were early in arriving with their own at the Isthmus. They there began to prepare carriages or triads, for dragging across the isthmus the triremes which had fought against Phœnix, from the harbour of Lochæus into the Saronic Gulf, in order to employ them against Athens. But the remaining allies did not answer to the summons, remaining at home occupied with their harvest; while the Lacedæmonians, sufficiently disappointed with this languor and disaffection, were still further confounded by the unexpected presence of 100 Athenian triremes off the coast of the Isthmus.

The Peloponnesians promise an alliance to Mythra, on condition of the Mythraians' recognition of the Athenians.

The Athenians, though their own presence at the Olympic festival was forbidden by the war, had doubtless learned more or less thoroughly the proceedings which had taken place there respecting Mythra. Perceiving the general belief entertained of their depressed and helpless condition, they determined to counteract this by a great and instant effort. They accordingly manned forthwith 100 triremes, requiring the personal service of all men, citizens as well as natives, and occupying only the two richest classes of the Salaminians—*i.e.*, the Pentakosiomedonai, and the Hippiæ or Horsemen. With this prodigious fleet they made a demonstration along the isthmus in view of the Lacedæmonians, and landed in various parts of the Peloponnesian coast to inflict damage. At the same time, thirty other Athenian triremes, despatched some time previously to

Akarnania under Asopos, son of Phormios, landed at different openings to Ionia for the same purpose. This move reached the Leontades at the bottom, while the other great Athenian fleet was pursuing before their eyes.¹ Amazed at an unexpected demonstration of strength, they began to feel how much they had been misled respecting the exhaustion of Athens, and how incompetent they were, especially without the presence of their allies, to undertake any joint offensive movement by sea and land against Ionia. They, therefore, returned home, resolving to send an expedition of forty triremes, under Alkidas, to the relief of Mitylene itself—at the same time transmitting requisitions to their various allies, in order that these triremes might be furnished.²

Meanwhile Asopos, with his thirty triremes, had arrived in Akarnania, from whence all the ships except twelve returned home. He had been nominated commander as the son of Phormios, who appears either to have died, or to have become unfit for service, since his victories of the preceding year. The Akarnanians had preferred a special request that a son, or at least some relative, of Phormios, should be invested with the command of the squadron, so beloved was his name and character among them. Asopos, however, accomplished nothing of importance, though he again undertook, conjointly with the Akarnanians, a fruitless march against Clisela. Ultimately he was defeated and slain, in attempting a disembarkation on the territory of Leukia.³

The surprise announcement made by the Mitylenians at Olympia, that Athens was rendered helpless by the epidemic, had, indeed, been strikingly contradicted by her recent display; and, taking numbers and equipment together, the maritime force which she had put forth this summer, gauged as it was by a higher class of vessels, surpassed all former years; although, in point of number only, it was inferior to the 200 triremes which she had sent out during the first summer of the war.⁴ But the

¹ Thucyd. ii. 7-11.

² Thucyd. ii. 12, 13.

³ Thucyd. ii. 17.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 17. and especially compare column 16 of this volume, to with column

16, to show the strictly superior nature of the Athenian fleet, and the inferiority of the Persian fleet. The 17 ships 'Arcton' and 'Ephesus' and 'Spartan' (the 'Spartan' being a trireme) and 'Spartan' (the 'Spartan' being a trireme) are mentioned in column 16 of this volume.

the neighbourhood, and slain with a considerable number of his men.²

While the Athenians thus held Elaphion under siege, their faithful friends the Platæans had remained closely blockaded by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians more than a year, without any possibility of relief. At length provisions began to fail, and the general Euxenipides, backed by the prophet Themistocles (these prophets³ were often among the boldest soldiers in the army), persuaded the garrison to adopt the daring, but seemingly desperate, resolution of breaking out over the blockading wall and in spite of its guards. So desperate, indeed, did the project seem, that at the moment of execution one-half of the garrison shrunk from it as equivalent to certain death; the other half, about 115 in number, persisted and escaped. Happy would it have been for the remainder had they even persisted in the attempt, and thus forestalled the more melancholy fate in store for them.

It has been already stated that the circumvallation of Platæa was accomplished by a double wall and a double ditch, one ditch without the enclosing walls, another between them and the town; the two walls being sixteen feet apart, joined together, and roofed all round, so as to look like one thick wall, and to afford covered quarters for the besiegers. Both the outer and inner circumference were furnished with battlements, and after every ten battlements came a roofed tower, covering the whole breadth of the double wall—allowing a free passage inside, but none outside. In general, the entire circuit of the roofed wall was kept under watch night and day; but on two nights the besiegers had so fortified their vigilance as to retire under cover of the *stagers*, leaving the intermediate spaces unguarded; and it was upon this occasion that the plan of escape was framed. The Platæans prepared ladders of a proper height to scale the blockading double wall, ascertaining its height by repeatedly counting the ranges of bricks, which were near enough for them to discern, and not effectually covered with whitewash. On a cold and dark

² Thucyd. iii. 18.

³ Thucyd. iii. 70. Compare Xen.

Plato, Hellen. p. 4. 31; Herodot. iv.

17; Plutarch, Themist. c. 30.

December night, amidst rain, frost, and a roaring wind, they marched forth from the gates, lightly armed, some few with shields and spears, but most of them with breastplates, javelins, and bows and arrows. The right foot was raised, but the left foot slid, so as to give to it a more assured footing on the muddy ground.¹ Taking care to rally out with the wind in their faces and at such a distance from each other as to prevent any clattering of arms, they crossed the inner ditch and reached the foot of the wall without being discovered. The ladders, borne in the van, were immediately planted, and Armand son of Kormoran, followed by eleven others armed only with a short sword and breastplate, mounted the wall: others armed with spears followed him, their shields being carried and handed to them when on the top by comrades behind. It was the duty of this first company to manœuvr and maintain the two towers right and left, so as to keep the intermediate space free for passing over. This was successfully done, the guards in both towers being surprised and slain, without alarming the remaining besiegers. Many of the Platemans had already reached the top of the wall, when the noise of a tile accidentally knocked down by one of them betrayed what was passing. Immediately a general alarm was raised, alarm was given, and the awakened garrison rushed up from beneath to the top of the wall, yet not knowing where the enemy was to be found; a perplexity further increased by the Platemans in the town, who took this opportunity of making a false attack on the opposite side. Amidst such confusion and darkness, the blockading detachment could not tell where to direct their blows, and all remained at their posts, except a reserve of 300 men, kept constantly in readiness for special emergencies, who marched out and patrolled the outside of the ditch to intercept any fugitives from within. At the same time, fire-signals were raised to warn their allies at Thion. But here

¹ Thucyd. II. 85. Dr. Arnold, in his note, mentions this passage as if the right or left foot were the least likely to slip in the mud, and the left or right foot the most likely. The Rhineland and Moselle maintain the opposite opinion, which is certainly the more obvious sense of the text, though the sense of Dr.

Arnold would also be intelligible. The raised foot is very liable to slip in the mud, and might easily be rendered less liable, by means of covering peculiarly adapted to that purpose. Besides, Thuc. remarks justly, that the soldiers who in the right or left are required to have the left foot firmly planted.

upon the Platons in the town had foreseen and prepared fire-signals on their part, which they hoisted forthwith in order to deprive this telegraphic communication of all special meaning.¹

Meanwhile the escaping Platons, masters of the two adjoining towns—on the the top of which some of them mounted, while others held the doorway through, so as to repel with spears and darts all approach of the blockaders—protected their flight without interruption over the space between, showing down the ladders in order to make it more level and plant a greater number of ladders. In this manner they all immediately got over and crossed the water ditch. Every man, immediately after crossing, stood ready on the outer bank with bow and javelin to repel assaults and maintain safe passage for his comrades in the rear. At length when all had descended, there remained the last and greatest difficulty—the escape of those who occupied the two towers and kept the intermediate portion of wall free; yet even this was accomplished successfully and without loss. The outer ditch was found unharassing—so full of water from the rain as to be hardly fordable, yet with thin ice on it also, from a previous frost; for the storm, which in other respects was the main help to their escape, here retarded their passage of the ditch by an unusual accumulation of water. It was not however until all had crossed except the defenders of the towers—who were yet descending and scrambling through—that the Philopowichian reserve of 300 were seen approaching the spot with torches. Their unobscured right side being turned towards the ditch, the Platons, already across and standing on the bank, immediately assailed them with arrows and javelins—in which the tower

¹ Thiers, M. St. showed to Thiers a red ribbon system, viz. 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140, 150, 160, 170, 180, 190, 200, 210, 220, 230, 240, 250, 260, 270, 280, 290, 300, 310, 320, 330, 340, 350, 360, 370, 380, 390, 400, 410, 420, 430, 440, 450, 460, 470, 480, 490, 500, 510, 520, 530, 540, 550, 560, 570, 580, 590, 600, 610, 620, 630, 640, 650, 660, 670, 680, 690, 700, 710, 720, 730, 740, 750, 760, 770, 780, 790, 800, 810, 820, 830, 840, 850, 860, 870, 880, 890, 900, 910, 920, 930, 940, 950, 960, 970, 980, 990, 1000, 1010, 1020, 1030, 1040, 1050, 1060, 1070, 1080, 1090, 1100, 1110, 1120, 1130, 1140, 1150, 1160, 1170, 1180, 1190, 1200, 1210, 1220, 1230, 1240, 1250, 1260, 1270, 1280, 1290, 1300, 1310, 1320, 1330, 1340, 1350, 1360, 1370, 1380, 1390, 1400, 1410, 1420, 1430, 1440, 1450, 1460, 1470, 1480, 1490, 1500, 1510, 1520, 1530, 1540, 1550, 1560, 1570, 1580, 1590, 1600, 1610, 1620, 1630, 1640, 1650, 1660, 1670, 1680, 1690, 1700, 1710, 1720, 1730, 1740, 1750, 1760, 1770, 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5100, 5110, 5120, 5130, 5140, 5150, 5160, 5170, 5180, 5190, 5200, 5210, 5220, 5230, 5240, 5250, 5260, 5270, 5280, 5290, 5300, 5310, 5320, 5330, 5340, 5350, 5360, 5370, 5380, 5390, 5400, 5410, 5420, 5430, 5440, 5450, 5460, 5470, 5480, 5490, 5500, 5510, 5520, 5530, 5540, 5550, 5560, 5570, 5580, 5590, 5600, 5610, 5620, 5630, 5640, 5650, 5660, 5670, 5680, 5690, 5700, 5710, 5720, 5730, 5740, 5750, 5760, 5770, 5780, 5790, 5800, 5810, 5820, 5830, 5840, 5850, 5860, 5870, 5880, 5890, 5900, 5910, 5920, 5930, 5940, 5950, 5960, 5970, 5980, 5990, 6000, 6010, 6020, 6030, 6040, 6050, 6060, 6070, 6080, 6090, 6100, 6110, 6120, 6130, 6140, 6150, 6160, 6170, 6180, 6190, 6200, 6210, 6220, 6230, 6240, 6250, 6260, 6270, 6280, 6290, 6300, 6310, 6320, 6330, 6340, 6350, 6360, 6370, 6380, 6390, 6400, 6410, 6420, 6430, 6440, 6450, 6460, 6470, 6480, 6490, 6500, 6510, 6520, 6530, 6540, 6550, 6560, 6570, 6580, 6590, 6600, 6610, 6620, 6630, 6640, 6650, 6660, 6670, 6680, 6690, 6700, 6710, 6720, 6730, 6740, 6750, 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8420, 8430, 8440, 8450, 8460, 8470, 8480, 8490, 8500, 8510, 8520, 8530, 8540, 8550, 8560, 8570, 8580, 8590, 8600, 8610, 8620, 8630, 8640, 8650, 8660, 8670, 8680, 8690, 8700, 8710, 8720, 8730, 8740, 8750, 8760, 8770, 8780, 8790, 8800, 8810, 8820, 8830, 8840, 8850, 8860, 8870, 8880, 8890, 8900, 8910, 8920, 8930, 8940, 8950, 8960, 8970, 8980, 8990, 9000, 9010, 9020, 9030, 9040, 9050, 9060, 9070, 9080, 9090, 9100, 9110, 9120, 9130, 9140, 9150, 9160, 9170, 9180, 9190, 9200, 9210, 9220, 9230, 9240, 9250, 9260, 9270, 9280, 9290, 9300, 9310, 9320, 9330, 9340, 9350, 9360, 9370, 9380, 9390, 9400, 9410, 9420, 9430, 9440, 9450, 9460, 9470, 9480, 9490, 9500, 9510, 9520, 9530, 9540, 9550, 9560, 9570, 9580, 9590, 9600, 9610, 9620, 9630, 9640, 9650, 9660, 9670, 9680, 9690, 9700, 9710, 9720, 9730, 9740, 9750, 9760, 9770, 9780, 9790, 9800, 9810, 9820, 9830, 9840, 9850, 9860, 9870, 9880, 9890, 9900, 9910, 9920, 9930, 9940, 9950, 9960, 9970, 9980, 9990, 10000.

would be helped, as so is certified by Thiers—Thiers could not make it.

² Thiers, M. St. I agree with the general opinion about the 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140, 150, 160, 170, 180, 190, 200, 210, 220, 230, 240, 250, 260, 270, 280, 290, 300, 310, 320, 330, 340, 350, 360, 370, 380, 390, 400, 410, 420, 430, 440, 450, 460, 470, 480, 490, 500, 510, 520, 530, 540, 550, 560, 570, 580, 590, 600, 610, 620, 630, 640, 650, 660, 670, 680, 690, 700, 710, 720, 730, 740, 750, 760, 770, 780, 790, 800, 810, 820, 830, 840, 850, 860, 870, 880, 890, 900, 910, 920, 930, 940, 950, 960, 970, 980, 990, 1000, 1010, 1020, 1030, 1040, 1050, 1060, 1070, 1080, 1090, 1100, 1110, 1120, 1130, 1140, 1150, 1160, 1170, 1180, 1190, 1200, 1210, 1220, 1230, 1240, 1250, 1260, 1270, 1280, 1290, 1300, 1310, 1320, 1330, 1340, 1350, 1360, 1370, 1380, 1390, 1400, 1410, 1420, 1430, 1440, 1450, 1460, 1470, 1480, 1490, 1500, 1510, 1520, 1530, 1540, 1550, 1560, 1570, 1580, 1590, 1600, 1610, 1620, 1630, 1640, 1650, 1660, 1670, 1680, 1690, 1700, 1710, 1720, 1730, 1740, 1750, 1760, 1770, 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3440, 3450, 3460, 3470, 3480, 3490, 3500, 3510, 3520, 3530, 3540, 3550, 3560, 3570, 3580, 3590, 3600, 3610, 3620, 3630, 3640, 3650, 3660, 3670, 3680, 3690, 3700, 3710, 3720, 3730, 3740, 3750, 3760, 3770, 3780, 3790, 3800, 3810, 3820, 3830, 3840, 3850, 3860, 3870, 3880, 3890, 3900, 3910, 3920, 3930, 3940, 3950, 3960, 3970, 3980, 3990, 4000, 4010, 4020, 4030, 4040, 4050, 4060, 4070, 4080, 4090, 4100, 4110, 4120, 4130, 4140, 4150, 4160, 4170, 4180, 4190, 4200, 4210, 4220, 4230, 4240, 4250, 4260, 4270, 4280, 4290, 4300, 4310, 4320, 4330, 4340, 4350, 4360, 4370, 4380, 4390, 4400, 4410, 4420, 4430, 4440, 4450, 4460, 4470, 4480, 4490, 4500, 4510, 4520, 4530, 4540, 4550, 4560, 4570, 4580, 4590, 4600, 4610, 4620, 4630, 4640, 4650, 4660, 4670, 4680, 4690, 4700, 4710, 4720, 4730, 4740, 4750, 4760, 4770, 4780, 4790, 4800, 4810, 4820, 4830, 4840, 4850, 4860, 4870, 4880, 4890, 4900, 4910, 4920, 4930, 4940, 4950, 4960, 4970, 4980, 4990, 5000, 5010, 5020, 5030, 5040, 5050, 5060, 5070, 5080, 5090, 5100, 5110, 5120, 5130, 5140, 5150, 5160, 5170, 5180, 5190, 5200, 5210, 5220, 5230, 5240, 5250, 5260, 5270, 5280, 5290, 5300, 5310, 5320, 5330, 5340, 5350, 5360, 5370, 5380, 5390, 5400, 5410, 5420, 5430, 5440, 5450, 5460, 5470, 5480, 5490, 5500, 5510, 5520, 5530, 5540, 5550, 5560, 5570, 5580, 5590, 5600, 5610, 5620, 5630, 5640, 5650, 5660, 5670, 5680, 5690, 5700, 5710, 5720, 5730, 5740, 5750, 5760, 5770, 5780, 5790, 5800, 5810, 5820, 5830, 5840, 5850, 5860, 5870, 5880, 5890, 5900, 5910, 5920, 5930, 5940, 5950, 5960, 5970, 5980, 5990, 6000, 6010, 6020, 6030, 6040, 6050, 6060, 6070, 6080, 6090, 6100, 6110, 6120, 6130, 6140, 6150, 6160, 6170, 6180, 6190, 6200, 6210, 6220, 6230, 6240, 6250, 6260, 6270, 6280, 6290, 6300, 6310, 6320, 6330, 6340, 6350, 6360, 6370, 6380, 6390, 6400, 6410, 6420, 6430, 6440, 6450, 6460, 6470, 6480, 6490, 6500, 6510, 6520, 6530, 6540, 6550, 6560, 6570, 6580, 6590, 6600, 6610, 6620, 6630, 6640, 6650, 6660, 6670, 6680, 6690, 6700, 6710, 6720, 6730, 6740, 6750, 6760, 6770, 6780, 6790, 6800, 6810, 6820, 6830, 6840, 6850, 6860, 6870, 6880, 6890, 6900, 6910, 6920, 6930, 6940, 6950, 6960, 6970, 6980, 6990, 7000, 7010, 7020, 7030, 7040, 7050, 7060, 7070, 7080, 7090, 7100, 7110, 7120, 7130, 7140, 7150, 7160, 7170, 7180, 7190, 7200, 7210, 7220, 7230, 7240, 7250, 7260, 7270, 7280, 7290, 7300, 7310, 7320, 7330, 7340, 7350, 7360, 7370, 7380, 7390, 7400, 7410, 7420, 7430, 7440, 7450, 7460, 7470, 7480, 7490, 7500, 7510, 7520, 7530, 7540, 7550, 7560, 7570, 7580, 7590, 7600, 7610, 7620, 7630, 7640, 7650, 7660, 7670, 7680, 7690, 7700, 7710, 7720, 7730, 7740, 7750, 7760, 7770, 7780, 7790, 7800, 7810, 7820, 7830, 7840, 7850, 7860, 7870, 7880, 7890, 7900, 7910, 7920, 7930, 7940, 7950, 7960, 7970, 7980, 7990, 8000, 8010, 8020, 8030, 8040, 8050, 8060, 8070, 8080, 8090, 8100, 8110, 8120, 8130, 8140, 8150, 8160, 8170, 8180, 8190, 8200, 8210, 8220, 8230, 8240, 8250, 8260, 8270, 8280, 8290, 8300, 8310, 8320, 8330, 8340, 8350, 8360, 8370, 8380, 8390, 8400, 8410, 8420, 8430, 8440, 8450, 8460, 8470, 8480, 8490, 8500, 8510, 8520, 8530, 8540, 8550, 8560, 8570, 8580, 8590, 8600, 8610, 8620, 8630, 8640, 8650, 8660, 8670, 8680, 8690, 8700, 8710, 8720, 8730, 8740, 8750, 8760, 8770, 8780, 8790, 8800, 8810, 8820, 8830, 8840, 8850, 8860, 8870, 8880, 8890, 8900, 8910, 8920, 8930, 8940, 8950, 8960, 8970, 8980, 8990, 9000, 9010, 9020, 9030, 9040, 9050, 9060, 9070, 9080, 9090, 9100, 9110, 9120, 9130, 9140, 9150, 9160, 9170, 9180, 9190, 9200, 9210, 9220, 9230, 9240, 9250, 9260, 9270, 9280, 9290, 9300, 9310, 9320, 9330, 9340, 9350, 9360, 9370, 9380, 9390, 9400, 9410, 9420, 9430, 9440, 9450, 9460, 9470, 9480, 9490, 9500, 9510, 9520, 9530, 9540, 9550, 9560, 9570, 9580, 9590, 9600, 9610, 9620, 9630, 9640, 9650, 9660, 9670, 9680, 9690, 9700, 9710, 9720, 9730, 9740, 9750, 9760, 9770, 9780, 9790, 9800, 9

enabled them to take tolerable aim, while the Peloponnesians on their side could not distinguish their enemies in the dark, and had no previous knowledge of their position. They were then held in check until the rearmost Placidas had enumerated the difficulties of the passage; after which the whole body stole off as quickly as they could, taking at first the road towards Tiflis, while their pursuers were seen with their torch-lights following the opposite direction, on the road which led by the heights called Dryas-Kephala to Athens.¹ After having marched about three-quarters of a mile on the road to Tiflis (passing the chapel of the Holy Andreaskirche on their right hand), the fugitives quitted it, and striking to the eastward towards Erythra and Hyria, soon found themselves in safety among the mountains which separate Boeotia from Attica at that point: from whence they passed into the glad harbour and refuge of Athens.²

Two hundred and twelve brave men thus emerged to life and liberty, breaking loose from that imposing line which too soon overtook the mercenaries, and preserving for future times the genuine blood and honourable traditions of Placida. One man alone was taken prisoner at the brink of the outer ditch, while a few, who had enrolled themselves originally for the enterprise, lost courage and returned in despair even from the foot of the inner wall, telling their comrades within that the whole band had perished. Accordingly, at daybreak, the Placidas within sent out a herald to solicit a truce for burial of the dead bodies, and it was only by the surer made to this request that they learnt the actual truth. The description of this memorable encounter exhibits not less daring in the execution than skill and foresight in the design, and is the more interesting, inasmuch as the men who thus worked out their salvation were precisely the lowest men, who best deserved it.

Meanwhile Pyllos and the Athenians kept Mitylene closely blockaded up: the provisions were nearly exhausted, and the besieged were already beginning to think of capitulation, when their spirits were raised by the arrival of the Lacodæmonian envoy Salsutha, who had landed at Pyrrha on the west of Lesbos, and contrived to steal in through a rivine which obstructed

¹Thucyd. II. 95. Diodorus (xii. 37) gives a brief summary of these facts, without either severity or tenderness.

the continuity of the blockading wall (about February, 427 B.C.).

B.C. 427.
Blockade of
Mitylene
caused
suspect-
ion by the
Athenians
general
Pericles—
the Mity-
lenians are
encouraged
to hold out
by the Laco-
demonians.
The wall
difficult
to construct.

He encouraged the Mitylenians to hold out, asserting that a Peloponnesian fleet under Alcidas was on the point of setting out to assist them, and that Attica would be forthwith invaded by the general Peloponnesian army. His own arrival, also, and his stay in the town, was in itself no small encourage-ment: we shall see hereafter, when we come to the siege of Syracuse by the Athenians, how much might depend upon the presence of one single Spartan. All thought of surrender was accordingly abandoned, and the Mitylenians waited with impatience the arrival of Alcidas, who started from Peloponnesus

at the beginning of April, with forty-two triremes; while the Lacedæmonian army at the same time invaded Attica, in order to keep the attention of Athens fully employed. Their ravages on this occasion were more diligent, searching, and destructive to the country than before, and were continued the longer because they waited the arrival of news from Lesbos. But as news reached them, their stock of provisions was exhausted, and the army was obliged to break up.¹

The tidings which at length arrived proved very unsatisfactory.

Salonæ and the Mitylenians had held out until their provi-

Salonæ
held out
till pro-
visions are
exhausted.
—Pericles
wants all the
strength of
the fleet
to be present
with—the
people
of the
city—the
city is
entrusted
to Alcidas at
discretion.

sions were completely exhausted, but neither relief nor encouragement reached them from Peloponnesus. At length even Salonæ became convinced that no relief would come: he projected, therefore, as a last hope, a desperate attack upon the Athenians and their wall of blockade. For this purpose he distributed full prizes among the men of the people, or commons, who had hitherto been without them, having at best nothing more than *hore* or *justice*.²

But he had not sufficiently calculated the conse-quences of this important step. The Mitylenian multitude, living under an oligarchical government, had no interest in the present contest, which had been under-

¹ Thucyd. II. 25, 26.

² Thucyd. II. 27. Alcidas, and Alcidas's men, Alcidas, and Alcidas's men, Alcidas, and Alcidas's men.

taken without any appeal to their opinion. They had no reason for aversion to Athens, seeing that they suffered no practical grievance from the Athenian alliance; and (to repeat what has been remarked in the early portion of this volume) we find that even among the subject allies (to say nothing of a privileged ally like Mitylene), the bulk of the citizens were never forward, sometimes positively reluctant, to revolt. The Mityleanan oligarchy had revolted, in spite of the absence of practical wrongs, because they desired an uncontrolled town-autocracy as well as security for its continuance. But this was a feeling to which the people were naturally strangers, having no share in the government of their own town, and being kept dumb and passive, as it was the interest of the oligarchy that they should be, in respect to political sentiment. A Grecian oligarchy might obtain from its people quiet submission under ordinary circumstances; but if ever it required energetic effort, the genuine devotion, under which alone such effort could be given was found wanting. The Mityleanan Demos, as soon as they found themselves strengthened and enabled by the possession of heavy weapons, refused obedience to the orders of Salamis for marching out and imperilling their lives in a desperate struggle. They were under the belief—not unnatural under the mystery of public affairs habitually practiced by an oligarchy, but which secured the Athenian Demos would have been too well-informed to entertain—that their government were starving them, and had concealed stores of provisions for themselves. Accordingly, the first use which they made of their arms was to demand that these concealed stores should be brought out and fairly apportioned to all; threatening, unless their demand was complied with at once, to enter into negotiations with the Athenians and surrender the city. The ruling Mityleanans, unable to prevent this, but foreseeing that it would be their inevitable ruin, preferred the chance of negotiating themselves for a capitulation. It was agreed with Pericles that the Athenian government should enter into possession of Mitylene; that the fate of its people and city should be left to the Athenian assembly, and that the Mityleanans should send envoys to Athens to plead their cause: until the return of those envoys, Pericles engaged that no one should be either killed, or put in chains, or sold into slavery.

Nothing was said about Salamina, who hid himself as well as he could in the city. In spite of the guarantee received from Pacheia, so great was the alarm of those Mityleneans who had chiefly instigated the revolt, that when he actually took possession of the city, they threw themselves as suppliants upon the altar for protection. But being induced by his assurances to quit their sanctuary, they were placed in the island of Tenos, until answer should be received from Athens.¹

Having thus secured possession of Mitylène, Pacheia sent word some reference to the other side of the island, and easily captured Antissa. But before he had time to reduce the two remaining towns of Pyrrha and Ereos, he received news which forced him to turn his attention elsewhere.

To the astonishment of every one, the Peloponnesian fleet of Alcibiades was seen on the coast of Ionia. It ought to have been there much earlier; and had Alcibiades been a man of energy, it would have reached Mitylène even before the surrender of the city. But the Peloponnesians, when about to advance into the Athenian waters and leave the Athenian fleet, were under the same impression of conscious weakness and timidity (especially since the victories of Phormio in the preceding year) as that which kept land troops when marching up to attack the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed.² Alcibiades, though unobstructed by the Athenians, who were not aware of his departure—though pressed to hasten forward by Lesbian and Ionian exiles on board, and aided by expert pilots from those Spartan exiles who had established themselves at Areea³ on the Asiatic continent, and acted as zealous enemies of Athens—nevertheless, instead of sailing straight to Lesbos, lingered first near Peloponnesus, next at the island of Chios, making capture of private vessels with their crews; until at length, on reaching the islands of Icarus and Mykonos, he heard the unwelcome tidings that the besieged town had capitulated. Not at first crediting the report, he sailed onward to Eubœa, in the Erythrean territory, on the coast of Asia Minor, where he found the news confirmed. As only seven days had elapsed since the

¹ Thucyd. II. 36.

² Thucyd. I. 10. of policy defective.

also, in the Lacedæmonian.

³ Thucyd. II. 75.

speculation had been concluded, Themistophles, an Elean captain in the fleet, strenuously urged the daring project of sailing on forthwith, and surprising Mytilénæ by night in its existing unfortified condition: no preparations would have been made for receiving them, and there was good chance that the Athenians might be suddenly overpowered, the Mytilénæans again armed, and the town recovered.

Such a proposition, which was indeed something more than daring, did not suit the temper of Alkibiades. Nor could he be induced by the solicitation of the sailors to fix and fortify himself either in any port of Ionia or in the Æolic town of Erythræ, so as to afford support and maintenance to such subjects of the Athenian empire as were disposed to revolt; though he was confidently assured that many of them would revolt on his proclamation, and that the many Pisistratids of Samos would help him to defray the expenses. Having been sent for the express purpose of relieving Mytilénæ, Alkibiades believed himself interdicted from any other project. He determined to return to Peloponnesus at once, dreading nothing so much as the pursuit of Paches and the Athenian fleet. From Karstos accordingly he started on his return, coasting southward along Asia Minor as far as Ephesus. But the prisoners taken in his voyage were now an embarrassment to his flight; and their number was not inconsiderable, since all the merchant vessels in his route had approached the fleet without suspicion, believing it to be Athenian: a Peloponnesian fleet near the coast of Ionia was as yet something unheard of and incredible. To get rid of his prisoners, Alkibiades stopped at Myonandæ near Teos, and there put to death the greater number of them—a barbarous proceeding which excited lively indignation among the neighboring Ionic cities to which they belonged; inasmuch that when he reached Ephesus, the Samian officer dwelling at Arnes, who had come forward so actively to help him, sent him a spirited remonstrance, reminding him that the slaughter of men neither engaged in war, nor enemies, nor even contested with Athens except by contract, was disgraceful to one who came forth as the liberator of Greece, and that if he persisted he would convert his friends into enemies, not his enemies into friends. So keenly did Alkibiades feel this animadversion, that he at once threatened the remainder

of his prisoners, several of them Chians, and then departed from Ephesus, taking his course across sea towards Eritæ and Peloponnesus. After much delay off the coast of Eritæ from stormy weather, which harried and dispersed his fleet, he at length reached in safety the harbour of Kyllinæ in Elis, where his scattered ships were ultimately reunited.¹

Thus inglorious was the voyage of the first Peloponnesian admiral who dared to enter that Mare clausum which passed for a portion of the territory of Athens.² But though he achieved little, his mere presence excited everywhere not less alarm than astonishment: for the Ionic towns were all unfortified, and Alcibiades might take and sack any one of them by sudden assault, even though unable to hold it permanently. Pressing messages reached Pausan from Erythra and from several other places, while the Athenian tyrants called Pausan and Solonida (the privileged vessels which usually carried public and sacred deputations) had themselves seen the Peloponnesian fleet anchored at Ikarus, and brought him the same intelligence. Pausan, having his hands now free by the capture of Mitylenæ, set forth immediately in pursuit of the intruder, whom he chased as far as the island of Patmos. It was there ascertained that Alcibiades had finally disappeared from the eastern waters, and the Athenian admiral, though he would have rejoiced to meet the Peloponnesian fleet in the open sea, accounted it fortunate that they had not taken up a position in some Asiatic harbour—in which case it would have been necessary for him to undertake a troublesome and tedious blockade;³ besides all the dangers of revolt among the Athenian dependencies. We shall see how much, in this respect, depended upon the personal character of the Lacedæmonian commander, when we come hereafter to the expedition of Evonides.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 22, 23—25.

² Thucyd. v. 26. "Against P. Asiatic sea" signifies frontier in comparison with the Asiatic sea, which was not accessible to the Peloponnesians, even at the remotest point, where, even Peloponnesian fleets, could not penetrate (Hædæricus).

We see that the sea, which reckoned as a portion of the Athenian territory; and even the portion of sea near to Peloponnesus, much more than the coast of Asia.

³ Thucyd. vi. 22.

On his return from Patras to Mitylénê, Pachia was induced to stop at Notium by the solicitations of some allies. Notium was the port of Kolophôn, from which it was at some little distance, as Patras was from Athens.¹

Pachia's position—
he captures
the place—
he sends
his family
to Patras
leaving
himself
the master
of the
garrison.

About three years before, a violent internal dissension had taken place in Kolophôn, and one of the parties, invoking the aid of the Persian Emperor (probably one of the generals of the empire Pisistratus), had placed him in possession of the town; whereupon the opposite party, forced to retire, had established itself separately and independently at Notium. But the Kolophoniens who remained in the town soon contrived to procure a party in Notium, whither they were enabled to regain possession of it, through the aid of a body of Arcadian mercenaries in the service of Pisistratus. These Arcadians formed a standing garrison at Notium, in which they occupied a separate Citadel or fortified space, while the town became again attached as harbour to Kolophôn. A considerable body of allies, however, expelled on that occasion, now invoked the aid of Pachia to restrain them, and to expel the Arcadians. On reaching the place, the Athenian general presented upon Hippasus the Arcadian captain to come forth to a parley, under the promise that, if nothing mutually satisfactory could be settled he would again replace him "safe and sound" in the fortification. But no sooner had the Arcadian come forth to this parley, than Pachia, causing him to be detained under guard, but without fetters or ill-treatment, immediately attacked the fortification while the garrison were relying on the armistice, carried it by storm, and put to death both the Arcadians and the Persians who were found within. Having got possession of the fortification, he next brought Hippasus into it—"safe and sound," according to the terms of the convention, which was thus literally performed—and then immediately afterwards caused him to be shot with arrows and javelins. Of this species of fraud, founded on illegal performance and real violation of an agreement, there are various examples in Grecian history; but nowhere do we read of a more flagitious combination of deceit and cruelty than the behaviour of Pachia at Notium. How it was noticed at

¹ The dissensions between Notium and Kolophôn are noticed by *Antisth.* *Pachia*, c. 4, l.

Athens, we do not know; yet we remark, not without surprise, that Thucydides recounts it plainly and calmly, without a single word of comment.¹

Notium was now separated from Kolophôn, and placed in possession of those Kolophonians who were opposed to the Persian supremacy in the upper town. But as it had been, down to this time, a mere appendage of Kolophôn and not a separate town, the Athenians soon afterwards sent *Gleôn*, and performed for it the ceremonies of colonization according to their own laws and customs, inviting from every quarter the remaining exiles of Kolophôn.² Whether any new settlers went from Athens itself does not appear. But the step was intended to confer a sort of Hellenic citizenship and recognized collective personality on the new-born town of Notium; without which neither its Thespy or solemn deputation would have been admitted to offer public sacrifices, nor its private citizens to contend for the prizes at Olympic and other great festivals.

Having cleared the Asiatic waters from the menaces of Athens, Paches returned to Lesbos, reduced the towns of Pyrrha and Erana, and soon found himself an omni-potently master both of Mitylênê and the whole island as to be able to send home the larger part of his forces; carrying with them as prisoners those Mitylênæans who had been deposited in Tenos, as well as others prominently implicated in the late revolt, to the number altogether of rather more than a thousand. The Lacedæmonian *Eklektas*, being recently detected in his place of concealment, was included among the prisoners transmitted.

Upon the fate of these prisoners the *Athensians* had now to pronounce. They entered upon the discussion in a temper of ardent wrath and vengeance. As to *Eklektas*, their resolution to put him to death was unanimous and immediate. They turned a deaf ear to his promises, usually delusive, of terminating the blockade of *Pharos*, in case his life were spared.

Notium
understood
from
Athens as
a separate
town.

Paches
sends to
Athens
about a
thousand
Mitylênæan
prisoners,
the greater
number
convinced
in the late
revolt, for
acting with
Eklektas.

Important
debate
in the
Athenian
assembly
upon the
punishment
of the
prisoners.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 24.
² Thucyd. ii. 25; G. A. Pertz, *Kolophonien*, p. 70. (Hildesheim, 1849.)

advantages were decidedly only auxiliary, carrying a man up to a certain point of influence, but leaving him to achieve the rest by his own personal qualities and capacity. But their effect was nevertheless very real, and those who, without possessing them, met and buffeted him in the public assembly, contended against great disadvantages. A person of such low or middling station obtained no favourable presumptions or indulgence on the part of the public to meet him half-way; nor did he possess established connections to encourage first successes, or help him out of early scrapes. He found others already in possession of ascendancy, and well-disposed to keep down new competitors; so that he had to win his own way unaided, from the first step to the last, by qualities personal to himself; by *swiftness of attendance*—by acquaintance with business—by power of striking speech—and aided by unflinching audacity, indispensable to enable him to bear up against that opposition and enmity which he would incur from the high-born politicians and organized party-chiefs, as soon as he appeared to be rising into importance.

The free march of political and judicial affairs rushed up around such men, during the years beginning and immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. Even during the lifetime of Pericles, they appear to have risen in greater or less numbers. But the personal ascendancy of that great man—who combined an aristocratical position with a strong and genuine democratical sentiment, and an enlarged intellect rarely found attached to either—impressed a peculiar character on Athenian politics. The Athenian world was divided into his partisans and his opponents, among each of whom there were individuals high-born and low-born—though the aristocratical party properly so-called, the majority of wealthy and high-born Athenians, either opposed or disliked him. It is about two years after his death that we begin to hear of a new class of politicians—Eckrasts, the rope-seller—Ekleis, the leather-seller—Lysikles, the sheep-seller—Hyporichos, the lamp-maker:¹ the two first of whom must, however, have been already well known as speakers in the Ekklesia even during

¹ *Antiquarian Researches*, 134 seq. and *Recherches Comptes de l'Etat d'Athènes*, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

the lifetime of Periklēs. Among them all the most-distinguished was Klein, son of Klermostos.

Klein acquired his first importance among the speakers against Periklēs, so that he would thus obtain the chance himself, during his early political career, the command of the numerous and aristocratic anti-Perikleians. He is described by Thucydides in general terms as a person of the most violent temper and character in Athens—as being dishonest in his relations, and violent in his invective and accusation.¹ Aristophanes, in his comedy of the Knights, reproduces those features with others new and distinct, as well as with exaggerated details, comic, satirical, and contemptuous. His comedy depicts Klein in the point of view in which he would appear to the knights of Athens—a leather-dresser, swilling of the tax-purse—a low-bred knave, terrifying opponents by the violence of his accusations, the hoarseness of his voice, the impudence of his gestures—moreover as venal in his politics—threatening men with accusations and then revelling money to withdraw them—a robber of the public treasury—permeating merit as well as rank—and securing the favour of the assembly by the bribe and most guilty cajolery. The general attributes set forth by Thucydides (apart from Aristophanes, who does not profess to write history), we may reasonably accept—the powerful and violent invective of Klein, often dishonest—together with his self-confidence and audacity in the public assembly. Men of the middling class, like Klein and Hyperbolos, who persevered in addressing the public assembly and trying to take a leading part in it, against persons of greater family pretensions than themselves, were pretty sure to be men of more than usual audacity. Without this quality, they would never have encountered the opposition made to them. It is probable enough that they had it to a disconcerting excess—and even if they had not, the same measure of self-assumption, which in Alcibiades would be tolerated from his rank and station, would in them pass for

¹ Thucyd. II. 65. Klein—de est in rebus dissolutus et iniquus, ut in rebus magnis et in rebus minoribus.

His other associates Klein, a, stood there very prominently, but in some which also seem to imply a long time.

And Klein—etiam si aliter de rebus et dissolutus, et iniquus, ut in rebus magnis et in rebus minoribus.

II. 65. Klein, a, stood there very prominently, but in some which also seem to imply a long time.

insupportable impudence. Unhappily we have no specimens to enable us to appreciate the invective of Kleon. We cannot determine whether it was more virulent than that of Demosthenes and Aeschines, seventy years afterwards; such of these eminent orators inquiring to the other the greatest impudence, calumny, perjury, corruption, bad taste, and revolting audacity of manner, in language which Kleon can hardly have surpassed in intensity of vituperation, though he doubtless fell immeasurably short of it in classical finish. Nor can we even tell in what degree Kleon's denunciations of the veterans Perikles were keener than those memorable invectives against the old age of Sir Robert Walpole, with which Lord Chatham's political career opened. The talent for invective possessed by Kleon, employed that against Perikles, would be counted as great impudence by the partisans of that illustrious statesman, as well as by impartial and judicious citizens. But among the numerous enemies of Perikles it would be applauded as a burst of patriotic indignation, and would procure for the orator that extraordinary support at first, which would sustain him until he acquired his personal hold on the public assembly.¹

By what degrees or through what causes that hold was gradually increased, we do not know. At the time when the question of *Mitilene* came on for discussion, it had grown into a sort of ascendancy which Thucydides describes by saying that Kleon was "at that time by far the most persuasive speaker in the eyes of the people". The fact of Kleon's great power of speech and his capacity of handling public business in a popular manner is better attested than anything else respecting him, because it depends upon two witnesses both hostile to him—Thucydides and Aristophanes. The assembly and the *dikastery* were Kleon's theatre and holding-ground; for the Athenian people taken collectively in their place of meeting, and the Athenian people taken individually, were not always the same person and had not the same mode of judgment: Demos sitting in the *Pnyx* was a different man from Demos sitting at home. The lofty combination of qualities possessed by Perikles exercised

¹ Thucydides, Perikles, p. 22. *Impetior* is not Kleon's, but that who after delivers himself only moderate expressions on the *Mytileneans*.

Perikles was Aristotle's *Alpheus* Kleon— in the words of the comic author *Herakles*.

² Aristophanes, *Equus*, 700.

influence over both one and the other; but Klein ranged considerably the former, without standing high in the esteem of the latter.

When the fate of Mitylene was to be decided was to the Athenian assembly, Kleon took the lead in the discussion. There never was a theme more perfectly suited to his violent temperament and power of forceful invective. Taken collectively, the case of Mitylene presented a revolt as inextinguishable and aggravated as any revolt could be. Indeed we have only to read the grounds of it, as set forth by the Mitylenæan speakers themselves before the Peloponnesians at Olympia, to be satisfied that such a proceeding, when looked at from the Athenian point of view, would be supposed to justify, and even to require, the very highest pitch of indignation. The Mitylenæans admit not only that they have no grounds of complaint against Athens, but that they have been well and honorably treated by her, with special privileges. But they fear that she may oppress them in future: they hate the very principle of her empire, and eagerly instigate, as well as aid, her enemies to subvert her: they select the precise moment in which she has been worn down by a fearful pestilence, invasion, and cost of war. Nothing more than this would be required to kindle the most intense wrath in the bosom of an Athenian patriot. But there was yet another point which weighed as much as the rest, if not more. The revolution had been the first to invite a Peloponnesian fleet across the Ægean, and the first to proclaim, both to Athens and her allies, the permanent tenure of her empire.¹ The violent Kleon would on this occasion find in the assembly an audience hardly less violent than himself, and would easily be able to satisfy them that anything like mercy to the Mitylenæans was treason to Athens. He proposed to apply to the captive city the penalties tolerated by the custom of war, in their hardest and fullest measure: to kill the whole Mitylenæan male population of military age, probably about 6000 persons, and to sell as slaves all the women and children.² The

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¹ Through 1990, approximately 100,000 people were employed in the U.S. garment industry.

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proposition, though strongly opposed by Diotimus and others, was sanctioned and passed by the assembly, and a trirème was forthwith despatched to Mitylène, enjoining Paches to put it in execution.¹

Such a sentence was, in principle, nothing more than a very rigorous application of the received laws of war. Not merely the vanquished rebel, but even the palatour of war (apart from any special convention) was at the mercy of his conqueror to be slain, sold, or admitted to ransom. We shall find the Lacedæmonians carrying out the maxim without the smallest abatement towards the Platæan prisoners in the course of a very short time. And doubtless the Athenian people—so long as they remained in assembly, under that shortening temporary intensification of the common and predominant sentiment which springs from the mere fact of multitude—and so long as they were discussing the principle of the case,—What had Mitylène deserved?—thought only of this view. Less than the most rigorous measure of war (they would reserve) would be inadequate to the wrong done by the Mitylæans.

But when the assembly broke up—when the citizens, no longer wound up by sympathizing comparisons and animated speakers in the Pnyx, sublated into the comparative quietness of individual life—when the talk came to be, not about the propriety of passing such a resolution, but about the details of executing it—a sensible change and marked repentance became presently visible. We must also recollect—and it is a principle of no small moment in human affairs, especially among a democratical people like the Athenians, who stand charged with so many resolutions passed and afterwards unexecuted—that the statement of wrath against the Mitylæans had been really in part discharged by the mere passing of the sentence, quite apart from its execution; just as a furious man relieves himself from overboiling anger by imprecations against others, which he would himself shrink from afterwards realising. The Athenians, on the whole the most humane people in Greece (though humanity, according to our

¹ The total of triremes on order of 100— six times this number.
 lay ago need have been 100 triremes. — Thucyd. II. 28.

Repentance
 of the
 Athenians
 after the
 decree is
 passed. A
 fresh
 assembly is
 convened to
 reconsider
 the decree.

idea, cannot be professed of any Greek), because sensible that they had sustained a cruel and frightful wrong. Even the captains and crews,¹ to whom it was given to carry, set forth on their voyage with unfeigned repentance. The Mitylenæan envoys present in Athens (who had probably been allowed to speak in the assembly and plead their own cause), together with those Athenians who had been present and friends of Mitylène, and the minority generally of the previous assembly, were dismissed, and did their best to foster, this repentance; which became during the course of the same evening so powerful as well as so wide-spread, that the *ekklesia* acceded to the paper of the envoys, and convoked a fresh assembly for the morrow to reconsider the proceeding. By so doing, they committed an illegality, and exposed themselves to the chance of impeachment. But the change of feeling among the people was so manifest as to counteract any such scruples.²

Though Thucydides has given us only a short summary, without any specimen, of what passed in the first assembly,—yet as to this second assembly, he gives us at length the speeches both of Kleon and Diodotos—the two principal orators of the first also. We may be sure that this second assembly was in all points one of the most interesting and anxious of the whole war; and though we cannot certainly determine what were the circumstances which determined Thucydides in his selection of speeches, yet this cause, as well as the signal defeat of Kleon, whom he disliked, may probably be presumed to have influenced him here.

That orator, coming forward to defend his proposition, passed on the preceding day, denounced in terms of indignation the unwise tenderness and scruples of the people, who could not bear to trust their subject-allies, according to the plain reality, as men held only by naked fear. He dwelt upon the mischief and folly of

Account of
the second
assembly
given by
Thucydides
—specimen of
Kleon's
speeches of
this evening.
This assembly
passed.

¹ Thucyd. II. 24. and yet strangely overlooking the efforts by which the Mitylenæan envoys, under the leadership and patronage of the other Mitylenæan garrison of at very many.

The feelings of the assembly, in the address appointed to carry the order of acquiescence, and a striking point of evidence in this case: viz. speeches were

on evening standing the speaker Diodotos, see Ch. III. 25.

² Thucyd. II. 24. As to the illegality, see Thucyd. II. 15.—which I think is good evidence to prove that there was illegality. I agree with Hutchinson on this point, in spite of the doubts of Dr. Arnold.

discreet of this sentiment as plain, downright, honest, sense and patriotism—while the opponents, speaking against the reigning sentiment, and therefore driven to collateral argument, circumlocution, and more or less of misnomers, might be represented as mere clever sophists, showing their talents in making the worse appear the better reason—if not actually misled, at least unprincipled and without any sincere moral conviction. As this is a mode of dealing with questions, both of public concern and of private morality, not less common at present than it was in the time of the Palipannassian war—to seize upon some strong and tolerably well-spread sentiment among the public, to treat the dictates of that sentiment as plain common sense and obvious right, and then to shut out all rational estimate of coming good and evil as if it were unholy or immoral, or at best mere unworldly subtlety—we may well notice a case in which Klein employs it to support a proposition now justly regarded as heinous.

Applying our modern views to this proposition, indeed, the prevalent sentiment would not only not be in favour of Klein, but would be immediately in favour of his opponents. To put to death in cold blood some six thousand persons would no revolt modern feelings, as to overbalance all considerations of past misconduct in the persons to be condemned. Nevertheless the speech of Hittachee, who opposed and opposed Klein, not only contains no appeal to any such merciful predispositions, but even positively disclaims appealing to them: the orator deprecates, not less than Klein, the influence of compassionate sentiment, or of a spirit of mere compassion and moderation.

Speech of
Hittachee in
opposition
to Klein—
second
speech
concerning
the same.

* *Thought, II. 41* compares the speech of Klein, in the same manner, to the speech of the orator, who says, "I have done what I could, and I am now at rest." The orator, in the same manner, says, "I have done what I could, and I am now at rest." The orator, in the same manner, says, "I have done what I could, and I am now at rest."

The orator distinguishes clearly between the speech of Klein, and the speech of the orator, who says, "I have done what I could, and I am now at rest." The orator, in the same manner, says, "I have done what I could, and I am now at rest." The orator, in the same manner, says, "I have done what I could, and I am now at rest."

certainly in itself just, and deeply interesting, but the meaning conveyed to it by the orator, in the same manner, is a different meaning. The orator, in the same manner, says, "I have done what I could, and I am now at rest." The orator, in the same manner, says, "I have done what I could, and I am now at rest." The orator, in the same manner, says, "I have done what I could, and I am now at rest."

The trireme carrying the first vote had started the day before, and was already twenty-four hours on its way to Mytilene. A second trireme was immediately put to sea bearing the new decree; yet nothing short of superhuman exertions could enable it to reach the beleaguered city before the terrific sentence now on its way might be actually in course of execution. The Mytilenean crews stored the vessel well with provisions, promising large rewards to the crew if they arrived in time. An intensity of effort was manifested without parallel in the history of Athenian seamanship. The war was never once relaxed between Athens and Mytilene—the crews merely taking turns for short intervals of rest, with refreshment of barley-meal, steeped in wine and oil, swallowed on their seats. Luckily there was no unfavourable wind to retard them; but the object would have been defeated, if it had not happened that the crew of the first trireme were as slow and averse to the transmission of their rigorous mandate, as those of the second were eager for the delivery of the express in time. And after all it came only just in time. The first trireme had arrived, the order for execution was actually in the hands of Pache, and his measures were already preparing. So near was the Mytilenean population to this wholesale destruction;¹ so near was Athens to the actual perpetration of an severity which would have raised against her throughout Greece a sentiment of execration more deadly than that which she afterwards incurred even from the proceedings at Milet, Skios, and elsewhere. Had the execution been realised, the persons who would have suffered most by it, and most deservedly, would have been the proposer Kleon. For if the reaction in Athenian sentiment was so immediate and sensible after the mere passing of the sentence, far more violent would it have been when they learnt that the deed had been irreversibly done, and when all its painful details were presented to their imaginations; and Kleon would have been held responsible as the author of that which had so disgraced them in their own eyes. As the

rapid
velocity of
the trireme
which
carried
the second
decree to
Mytilene—
it arrived
just in
time to
prevent the
execution of
the first.

These Mytilenean
triremes
which
Pache had
sent to
Athens are
put to death
—executed
at Mytilene
by the
Athenians.

see this expedition, chapters 7 & 8 vol. 2. Thucyd. III. 48. rapid translation into
English.

1 Mytilene 440 B.C.

was turned out, he was fortunate enough to escape this danger ; and his proposition, to put to death those Mytilæans whom Paikis had sent home as the active working party, was afterwards adopted and executed. It doubtless appeared as moderate, after the previous decree passed, but concluded, as it is to be adopted with little resistance, and to provide no after-repentance ; yet the men so slain were rather more than one thousand in number.¹

Besides this sentence of execution, the Athenians razed the fortifications of Mytilæa, and took possession of all her ships of war. In lieu of tribute, they further established a new permanent distribution of the land of the island ; all except Methymna, which had remained faithful to them. They distributed it into 3000 lots, of which 800 were reserved for consecration to the gods, and the remainder assigned to Athenian hierarchæ, or proprietary settlers, chosen by lot among the citizens ; the Lesbian proprietors still remaining on the land as cultivating tenants, and paying to the Athenian hierarchy an annual rent of two minæ (about seven pounds sixteen shillings sterling) for each lot. We should have been glad to learn more about this new land-settlement than the few words of the Maccasian writer to explain. It would seem that 2700 Athenian citizens with their families must have gone to reside, for the time at least, in Lesbos, or hierarchy ; that is, without relinquishing their rights as Athenian citizens, and without being exempted either from Athenian taxation or from personal military service. But it seems certain that these men did not continue long to reside in Lesbos. We may even suspect that the hierarchic allotment of the island must have been subsequently disrupted. There was a strip on the opposite mainland of Asia, which had hitherto belonged to Mytilæa : this was now separated from that spot, and henceforward enrolled among the tributary subjects of Athens.²

¹ Thucyd. ii. 37.

² Thucyd. ii. 37, 38, 39, 40. About the Lesbian hierarchy, see Strabo, *Geogr. lib. 13*, c. 10, § 21. *Strabo*, *lib. 13*, c. 10, § 21. *Strabo*, *lib. 13*, c. 10, § 21. These hierarchæ must originally have been settlers on a province, as St. Paul's countrymen, and may possibly have come back, either as a rule, when called for military service at home,

and when it was ascertained that the island might be kept without them. Still, however, there is much to be said in this arrangement. It seems probable that the Athenians, at a time when their unexhausted resources had been exhausted and when they were beginning to pay direct contributions from their subjects' property, should number 3000 slaves (or slaves)

capture by force and by capitulation, not admissible in modern diplomacy, was afterwards found to tell against the Lacedæmonians quite as much as in their favour.¹ Acting upon these orders, the Lacedæmonian commander sent in a herald, summoning the Plataeans to surrender voluntarily, and submit themselves to the Lacedæmonians as judges—with a stipulation "that the wrong-doers² should be punished, but that none should be punished unjustly". To the herald, in their state of hopeless starvation, all terms were nearly alike, and they accordingly surrendered the city. After a few days' interval, during which they received nourishment from the blockading army, five persons arrived from Sparta to sit in judgment upon their fate—*one* Aristomenides, a Herakleid of the royal family.³

The five Spartans having taken their seat as judges, *doctores* in full process of the blockading army, and especially with the Thebans, the great enemies of Plataea, by their side, the prisoners taken (100 Plataeans and twenty-five Athenians) were brought up for trial or sentence. No accusation was preferred against them by any one; but the simple question was put to them by the judges—"Have you during the present war rendered any service to the Lacedæmonians or to their allies?" The Plataeans were confounded at a question alike unexpected and preposterous. It admitted but of one answer, but before returning any categorical answer at all, they entreated permission to plead their case at length. In spite of the opposition of the Thebans,⁴ their request was granted. *Antemachus* and *Lakon* (the latter, prisoner of Sparta at Plataea) were appointed to speak on behalf of the body. Possibly both these delegates may have spoken: if so, *Thucydides* has blended the two speeches into one.

A more desperate position cannot be imagined. The interrogatory was expressly so framed as to exclude allusion to any facts preceding the Peloponnesian war. But the speakers, though fully conscious how slight was their chance of success, disre-

¹ *Thucyd.* i. 12.

² *Thucyd.* iii. 55. *ἀπονομήνους* "of which various persons, of various conditions, who either had been or were Athenians, and who were not judges, but were all of them citizens, with no other condition."

regard their 55 citizens.

² *Thucyd.* iii. 55. 1.

³ *Thucyd.* iii. 55. *ἄλλοι* and *ἄλλοις* "except you alone who are all of the same condition as those who are not judges, but who are all of them citizens, with no other condition than the fact that they are all of the same condition."

the Platæans.¹ The Platæan territory was let out for ten years, as public property belonging to Thebes, and was hired by private Theban colonists.

Such was the miserable fate of Platæa, after sustaining a blockade of about two years.² Its identity and local traditions were extinguished, and the sacrifices in honour of the deceased victors who had fought under Theban auspices, which the Platæan speakers had urged upon the Lacedæmonians as an impiety not to be tolerated,³ and which perhaps the latter would hardly have consented to under any other circumstances, except from an anxious desire of consolidating the Thebans in their present animosity. It is in this way that Thucydides explains the conduct of Sparta, which he pronounces to have been rigorous in the extreme.⁴ And in truth it was more rigorous, considering only the principle of the war, and apart from the number of victims, than even the first unexecuted sentence of Athens against the Mitylenæans. For neither Sparta, nor even Thebes, had any fair pretence for considering Platæa as a revolted town, whereas Mitylênæ was a city which had revolted under circumstances possibly offensive to Athens. Moreover, Sparta promised trial and justice to the Platæans on their surrender: Pausanias promised nothing to the Mitylenæans except that their fate should be reserved for the decision of the Athenian people. This little

¹ Thucyd. ii. 36.

² Thucydides, in the caution against Agesias in 189, c. 10, says that the blockade of Platæa was continued for six years before it surrendered — certainly seven being more accurately than six. That the real duration of the blockade was only six years is most certain: accordingly, several ancient critics — Valerius, Plutarch, Diodorus, Thucyd. Agesias, &c. — all with the same confidence begin to correct the text of Thucydides from this to six. "Sparta Menoribus," says Valerius.

I have before pointed out several instances of the text of ancient authors grounded upon the error upon all these points that is obvious and so notorious; and I must again reserve the present here. It shows how little the principles of historical cri-

ticism have been reflected upon, when critics can thus venture in having discovered witnesses here, there, and in substantiating a true statement of their own in place of an erroneous statement which one of those witnesses gives them. And in the present instance, the principle adopted by these critics, in the last instance, because the Platæan Thucydides introduces a great many other errors and inaccuracies respecting Platæa besides his mistake about the duration of the siege. The ten power days of Thebes certainly possess in the imagination of these literary clerics,

³ Thucyd. ii. 35.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 36, against 41, c. 10, 42, 43, 44, and 45, and Thucyd. ii. 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

ally-interesting from its Hellenic patriotism, its grateful and tenacious attachments, and its unexampled suffering—now existed only in the persons of its citizens harboured at Athens. We shall find it hereafter restored, destroyed again, and finally again restored; so required was the fate of a little Grecian state swept away by the contending politics of greater neighbours. The slaughter of the twenty-five Athenian prisoners, like that of Salamis by the Athenians, was not beyond the rigour admitted and tolerated, though not always practised, on both sides towards prisoners of war.

We have now gone through the circumstances, painfully illustrating the manners of the age, which followed on the surrender of Mikyal and Platon. We next pass to the west of Greece—the island of Korkyra—where we shall find scenes not less bloody, and even more revolting.

It has been already mentioned,¹ that in the naval combat between the Corinthians and Korkyreans during the year before the Peloponnesian war, the former had captured 350 Korkyran prisoners, men of the first rank and consequence in the island. Instead of following the impulse of blind hatred in slaughtering their prisoners, the Corinthians displayed, if not greater humanity, at least a more long-sighted calculation. They had treated the prisoners well, and made every effort to gain them over, with a view of employing them on the first opportunity to effect a revolution in the island—to bring it into alliance with Corinth,² and dismember it from Athens.

Such an opportunity appears not to have occurred during the winter or spring of the present year, while both Mikyal and Platon were under blockade, probably about the time when Alcibiades departed for Ionia, and when it was hoped that not only Mikyal would be relieved, but the neighbouring dependencies of Athens excited to revolt, and her whole attention thus occupied in that quarter. Accordingly the Korkyrean prisoners were then sent home from Corinth, nominally under a heavy ransom of 500 talents, for which these Korkyrean allies who acted as

From
surrender of
Korkyra—
the
Korkyrean
captives are
sent back
from
Corinth,
under
agreement
to effect a
revolution
in the
island, and
bring
it into
alliance
with Corinth.

¹ See above, chap. xiv.

² Thucyd. i. 25.

pretend to Corinths such themselves responsible.¹ The pretence, leading themselves thus to the deception, was *double* participation in the entire design.

But it was now, now in what form the ransom was really to be paid. The new-comers, probably at first heartily welcomed after so long a detention, employed all their influence, combined with the most active personal services, to bring about a complete rupture of alliance with Athens. Intimation being sent to Athens of what was going on, an Athenian trireme arrived with envoys to try and defeat these measures; while a Corinthian trireme also brought envoys from Corinths to aid the views of the opposite party. The mere presence of Corinthian envoys indicated a change in the political feeling of the island. But still more conspicuous did this change become, when a formal public assembly, after hearing both envoys, decided that Eorkyra would maintain her alliance with Athens according to the limited terms of simple mutual defence originally stipulated;² but would at the same time be in relations of friendship with the Peloponnesians, as she had been before the Epidaurian quarrel. Since that event, however, the alliance between Athens and Eorkyra had become practically more intimate, and the Eorkyran fleet had aided the Athenians in the invasion of Peloponnesus.³ Accordingly, the resolution now adopted abandoned the present to go back to the past—and to a past which could not be restored.

Looking to the war then raging between Athens and the Peloponnesians, such a declaration was self-contradictory. It was intended by the oligarchical party only as a step to a more complete revolution, both foreign and domestic. They followed it up by a political prosecution against Peisides, the citizen of greatest personal influence among the people, who acted by his own choice as proximate to the Athenians. They accused him of practising to bring Eorkyra into slavery to Athens. What were the judicial institutions of the island under which he was tried we do not know; but he was acquitted of the charge. He then revenged himself by accusing in his turn five

¹ Thucyd. II. 70, compare Thucyd. III. 21. ² Thucyd. I. 24. ³ Thucyd. II. 12.

These
charges to
bring
about a
revolution—
that
prosecute
the oligarchical
party
Peisides—
for pro-
cessing
five of them
in revenge—
they are
acquitted
him.

They immediately Pothides and several other exiles, and with them went the most important persons of the government—they carried money, they made speeches, they were called upon to advise.
 Formed by the reasons first upon the five persons condemned, as well as by the fear that Pothides might carry his point and then completely defeat their project of Chrethian alliance, the oligarchical party resolved to carry their point by violence and murder. They collected a party armed with daggers, burst suddenly into the senate-house during full sitting, and there slew Pothides with sixty other persons, partly senators, partly private individuals. Some others of his friends escaped the same fate by getting aboard the Attic triremes which had brought the envoys, and which was still in the harbour, but now departed forthwith to Athens. These measures, under the fresh terror arising from their recent act, convoked an assembly, affirmed that what they had done was unavoidable to guard Euboea against being made the slave of Athens, and proposed a resolution of full neutrality both towards Athens and towards the Peloponnesians—permitting no visit from either of the belligerents, except of a pacific character, and with one single ship at a time. And this resolution the assembly was constrained to pass: it probably was not very numerous, and the oligarchical partisans were at hand in arms.¹ At the same time they sent envoys to Athens, to communicate the recent events with such colouring as suited their views, and to dissuade the fugitive partisans of Pothides from provoking any armed Athenian intervention, such as might occasion a counter-revolution in the island.² With some of the fugitives, representations of this sort, or perhaps the fear of compromising their own families left behind, prevailed. But most of them, and the Athenians along with them, appreciated better both what had been done and what was likely to follow. The oligarchical envoys, together with such of the fugitives as had been induced to adopt their views, were seized by the Athenians as conspirators, and placed in detention at Egina; while a fleet of sixty Athenian triremes under Eurymachos was immediately fitted out to sail for Euboea, for which there was the greater necessity, as the Lacedæmonians

¹ Thucyd. II. 65. In 56 days, not more than a fortnight after the yearning.

² Thucyd. II. 71. and notes last note, regarding exiles, and the Athenian expedition, sent off to the opposite extremity.

fleet under Alcibiades, lately crushed at Kyllinis after its return from Ionia, was understood to be on the point of sailing thither.¹

But the oligarchical leaders at Korkyra, having little faith in the chances of this mission to Athens, proceeded in the execution of their conspiracy with that rapidity which was best calculated to ensure its success. On the arrival of a Corinthian trireme—which brought ambassadors from Sparta, and probably also brought news that the fleet of Alcibiades would shortly appear—they organised their force, and attacked the people and the democratical authorities. The Korkyraean Demos were at first vanquished and dispersed. But during the night they collected together and fortified themselves in the upper parts of the town near the acropolis, and from thence down to the Hyliaic harbour—one of the two harbours which the town possessed; while the other harbour and the chief arsenal, lying on the mainland of Epieia, was held by the oligarchical party, together with the market-place near to it, in and around which the wealthier Korkyraeans chiefly resided. In this divided state the town remained throughout the evening day, during which the Demos sent ambassadors round the territory soliciting aid from the working slaves, and promising to them emancipation as a reward; while the oligarchy also hired and procured 800 Epirotic mercenaries from the mainland. Reinforced by the slaves, who flocked in as the call received, the Demos renewed the struggle on the morrow more furiously than before. Both in position and numbers they had the advantage over the oligarchy, and the intense resolution with which they fought compensated itself even to the women, who, leaving danger and tumult, took active part in the combat, especially by flinging tiles from the house-tops. Towards the afternoon the people became decidedly victorious, and were even on the point of carrying by assault the lower town, together with the neighbouring arsenal. The oligarchy had no other chance of safety except the desperate resource of setting fire to that part of the town, with the market-place, houses, and buildings all around it, their own among the rest. This proceeding drove

The oligarchical party at Korkyra attack the people—democratical party in the city—victory of the people—control of the arsenal shared by Korkyraeans.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 100.

back the assailants, but destroyed much property belonging to merchants in the warehouses, together with a large part of the town: indeed, had the wind been favourable, the entire town would have been consumed. The people being then victorious, the Corinthian trireme, together with most of the Egeatic mercenaries, thought it safer to leave the island; while the victors were still further strengthened on the ensuing morning by the arrival of the Athenian admiral Nikostratus with twelve triremes from Sphakteria,¹ and 800 Maseian hoplites.

Nikostratus did his best to allay the furious excitement prevailing, and to persuade the people to use their victory with moderation. Under his auspices a convention of amnesty and peace was concluded between the contending parties, save only ten pro-damned individuals, the most violent oligarchs, who were to be tried as ringleaders. These men of course soon disappeared, so that there would have been no trial at all, which seems to have been what Nikostratus desired. At the same time an alliance offensive and defensive was established between Kerkyra and Athens, and the Athenian admiral was then on the point of departing, when the Kerkyræan leaders entreated him to leave with them, for greater safety, five ships out of his little fleet of twelve—offering him five of their own triremes instead. Notwithstanding the peril of this proposition to himself, Nikostratus acceded to it; and the Kerkyræans, preparing the five ships to be sent along with him, began to sail among the crews the names of their principal enemies. To the latter this presented the appearance of sending them to Athens, which they accounted a sentence of death. Under such impressions they took refuge as supplicants in the temple of the Diskhori, where Nikostratus went to visit them, and tried to reassure them by the promise that nothing was intended against their personal safety. But he found it impossible to satisfy them, and as they persisted in refusing to serve, the Kerkyræan Demos began to suspect treachery. They took arms again, searched the houses of the remnants for arms, and were bent on putting some of them to death, if Nikostratus had not taken

¹ Thucyd. iii. 84, 85.

them under his protection. The principal men of the defeated party, to the number of about 400, now took sanctuary in the temple and sacred ground of *Ilithy*; upon which the leaders of the people, afraid that in this inviolable position they might still cause further insurrection in the city, opened a negotiation and prevailed upon them to be ferried across to the little island immediately opposite to the *Hebeon*, where they were kept under watch, with provisions regularly transmitted across to them, for four days.¹

At the end of these four days, while the excitement of the popular leaders still continued, and Nikostratus still adjourned his departure, a new phase opened in this melancholy drama. The Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas arrived at the head of *Sylota* on the opposite mainland—fifty-three triremes in number, since the forty triremes brought back from *Ion* had been reinforced by thirteen more from *Lebanos* and *Androsia*. Moreover, the Lacedæmonians had sent down Brasidas as advising companion—himself worth more than the new thirteen triremes, if he had been sent to supersede Alkidas, instead of bringing nothing but authority to advise.² Despite the small squadron of Nikostratus, then at *Naupaktos*, the Spartans were only anxious to deal with *Korkyra* before reinforcements should arrive from *Athen*; but the repairs necessary for the ships of Alkidas, after their disastrous voyage home, occasioned an unfortunate delay. When the Peloponnesian fleet was seen, approaching from *Sylota* at break of day, the confusion in *Korkyra* was unpeppable. The *Damos* and the newly emancipated slaves were agitated alike by the late terrible conflict and by fear of the invaders—the oligarchical party, though defeated, was still present, forming a considerable minority—and the town was half-burnt. Amidst such elements of trouble, there was little authority to command, and still less confidence or willingness to obey. Fifty of triremes were indeed at hand, and orders were given to man sixty of them forthwith; while Nikostratus, the only man who preserved the cool courage necessary for effective resistance, recruited the *Korkyreans*

greatest of the Lacedæmonian navy—Alkidas, at the head of 53 triremes, of which 40 were reinforcements, and 13 were the ships of the Peloponnesian fleet.

¹ Thucyd. II. 95, 96.

² Thucyd. II. 96—98.

leaders to proceed with regularity, and to wait till all were ranged, so as to sail forth from the harbour in a body. He offered himself with his twelve Athenian triremes to go forth first alone, and occupy the Peloponnesian fleet until the Korkyraean sixty triremes could all come out in full array to support him. He accordingly went forth with his squadron, but the Korkyreans, instead of following his advice, sent their ships out one by one, and without any selection of crews. Two of them deserted forthwith to the enemy, while others presented the spectacle of crews fighting among themselves: even those which actually joined battle came up by single ships, without the least order or concert.

The Peloponnesians, soon seeing that they had little to fear from such numbers, thought it sufficient to set twenty of their ships against the Korkyreans, while with the remaining thirty-three they moved forward to contend with the twelve Athenians. Nikostratos, having plenty of sea-room, was not afraid of this numerical superiority; the more so as two of his twelve triremes were the picked vessels of the Athenian navy—the *Salamina* and the *Paralos*¹. He took care to avoid entangling himself with the centre of the enemy, and to keep rowing about their flanks; and as he presently contrived to disable one of their ships by a fortunate blow with the beak of one of his vessels, the Peloponnesians, instead of attacking him with their superior numbers, formed themselves into a circle and stood on the defensive, as they had done in the first combat with Phormio in the middle of the Gulf at Ekhion. Nikostratos (like Phormio) rowed round this circle, trying to cause confusion by feigned approach, and waiting to see some of the ships lose their place or run foul of each other, so as to afford him an opening for attack. And he might perhaps have succeeded, if the remaining twenty Peloponnesian ships, seeing the proceeding and recollecting with dismay the success of a similar manœuvre in the former battle, had not quitted the Korkyrean ships, whose disorderly condition they despised, and hastened to join their comrades. The whole fleet

¹ These two triremes had been with Phormio at Ekhion (Chap. II. 25); immediately on returning from thence,

they must have been sent round to join Nikostratos at Naxos. We see in what constant service they were kept.

of fifty-three triremes now again took the aggressive, and advanced to attack Nikostratos, who retreated before them, but backing astern and keeping the head of his ships towards the enemy. In this manner he succeeded in drawing them away from the town, so as to leave to most of the Korkyraean ships opportunity for getting back to the harbour; while such was the superior manœuvring of the Athenian triremes, that the Peloponnesians were never able to come up with him or force him to action. They returned back in the evening to Sybota, with no greater triumph than their success against the Korkyraean *phalanx* of whose triremes they carried away six prizes.*

It was the expectation in Korkyra that they would on the morrow make a direct attack (which could hardly have failed of success) on the town and harbour. We may easily believe (what report afterwards stated) that Brasidas advised Alkidas to this decisive proceeding. The Korkyraean leaders, more terrified than ever, first removed their prisoners from the little island to the Harmaia, and then tried to come to a compromise with the oligarchical party generally for the purpose of organizing some effective and united defence. Thirty triremes were made ready and manned, whereas some even of the oligarchical Korkyraeans were persuaded to form part of the crew.

But the darkness of Alkidas proved their best defence. Instead of coming straight to the town, he contented himself with landing in the island at some distance from it, on the promontory of Leukisand: after ravaging the neighbouring lands for some hours, he returned to his station at Sybota. He had lost an opportunity which never again returned; for on the very same night the five signals of Leukis telegraphed to him the approach of the fleet under Eurymedon from Athens—sixty triremes. His only thought was now for the escape of the Peloponnesian fleet, which was, in fact, saved by this telegraphic notice. Advantage was taken of the darkness to retire close along the land as far as the isthmus which separates Leukis from the mainland—across which isthmus the ships were dragged by

Coastguard
and
Peloponnesian
galleys of
Korkyra—
and then
dragged to
safety to
the island
of
Alkidas.
But under
the guidance
of night at
Sybota.

* Thucyd. III. 77, 78, 79.
2—12

legal, as well as moral, restraints sustained during the week of Eurymedes's stay—a period long enough to estimate the force sentiment out of 'which it came,' yet without any apparent effort on his part to soften the victors or protect the vanquished. We shall see further reason hereafter to appreciate the baseness and want of humanity in his character. Had Nikostratos remained in command, we may fairly presume, judging by what he had done in the earlier part of the expedition, with very inferior force, that he would have set much earlier limits to the Korkyraen boundary; unfortunately, Theophrastos tells us nothing at all about Nikostratos after the naval battle of the preceding day.¹

We should have been glad to hear something about the steps taken in the way of restitution or looking after the latest of numerous fury, in which doubtless the newly-emancipated slaves were not the most backward—and after the departure of Eurymedes. But here again Theophrastos disappoints our curiosity. We only hear from him that the oligarchical exiles who had escaped to the mainland were strong enough to get possession of the forts and most part of the territory there belonging to Korkyra; just as the exiles from Samos and Mitylene became more or less completely masters of the Paros or mainland possessions belonging to those islands. They even sent envoys to Corinth and Sparta, in hope of procuring aid to accomplish their restitution by force; but

¹ Theophr. H. H. c. 64, p. 416, and the other Hellenistic sources for this early history of ancient Korkyra, &c.

² In compiling the account of the conduct of Nikostratos, as well as that of Eurymedes in the naval tactics of the preceding summer, we consulted a certain Hellenic document full of them. Theophrastos does not seem to have anticipated that his account would tell such a tale in the minds of the readers, otherwise he certainly would have mentioned something to justify it. Regarding Theophr. H. H. c. 64, p. 416, and the other Hellenistic sources for this early history of ancient Korkyra, &c.

The Hellenistic sources for this early history of ancient Korkyra, &c. Theophr. H. H. c. 64, p. 416, and the other Hellenistic sources for this early history of ancient Korkyra, &c. Theophr. H. H. c. 64, p. 416, and the other Hellenistic sources for this early history of ancient Korkyra, &c.

Compare Theophr. H. H. c. 64, p. 416, and the other Hellenistic sources for this early history of ancient Korkyra, &c. Theophr. H. H. c. 64, p. 416, and the other Hellenistic sources for this early history of ancient Korkyra, &c.

intervention of foreign enemies—the mutual fears between political rivals, where each thinks that the other will forestall him in striking a mortal blow, and where constitutional maxims have ceased to carry authority either as restraint or as protection—the superior popularity of the man who is most forward with the sword, or who runs down his enemies in the most unmeasured language, coupled with the disposition to treat both preference in action and candour in speech as if it were nothing but treachery or corruption—the exclusive regard to party ends, with the reckless adoption, and even admiring preference, of fraud or violence as the most effectual means—the loss of respect for legal authority as well as of confidence in private agreement, and the surrender even of blood and friendship to the overriding ascendancy of party-ties—the perversion of ordinary morality, bringing with it altered significance of all the common words importing blame or approbation—the unnatural predominance of the ambitious and contentious passions, overpowering in men's minds all real public objects, and equalising for the time the better and the worse causes, by taking hold of democracy on one side and aristocracy on the other, as mere pretences to sanctify personal triumph—all these gloomy social phenomena, here indicated by the historian, have their causes deeply seated in the human mind, and are likely, unless the bases of constitutional morality shall come to be laid more surely and truly than they have hitherto been, to recur from time to time, under diverse modifications, "so long as human nature shall be the same as it is now," to use the language of Thucydides himself.¹ He has described, with fidelity not inferior to his sketch of the pastimes at Athens, the symptoms of a certain morbid political condition, wherein the vehemence of intestine conflict, instead of being kept within such limits as coincide with the maintenance of one society among the contending parties, breeds for the time inflamed and poisoned with all the unscrupulous hostility of foreign war, chiefly from actual alliance between parties within the state and foreigners without. In following the impressive

¹ Thucyd. II. 35. *ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑσπερίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις οὐδὲν ἄλλο διαφέρει, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑσπερίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις οὐδὲν ἄλλο διαφέρει, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑσπερίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις οὐδὲν ἄλλο διαφέρει, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑσπερίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις οὐδὲν ἄλλο διαφέρει.*

the of construction which pervades these passages, it is evident that the historian is alluding to all members of the Thucydidean class, and not to the Thucydidean class alone. The Thucydidean class is a class of men who are not only Thucydidean, but who are also Thucydidean, and who are also Thucydidean, and who are also Thucydidean.

description of the Korkyran, we have to keep in mind the general state of manners in his time, especially the cruelties tolerated by the laws of war, as compared with that greater humanity and respect for life which has grown up during the last two centuries in modern Europe. And we have further to recollect that if he had been describing the effects of political fury among Carthaginians and Jews, instead of among his contemporary Greeks, he would have added, to his list of horrors, mutilation, crucifixion, and other refinements on simple murder.

The language of Thucydides is to be taken rather as a generalization and concentration of phenomena which he had observed among different communities, than as belonging altogether to any one of them. I do not believe—that a superficial reading of his opening words might at first suggest—that the bloodshed in Korkyra was only the earliest, but by no means the worst, of a series of similar horrors spread over the Greek world. The facts stated in his own history suffice to show that though the same causes, which worked upon this unfortunate island, became disseminated and produced analogous mischiefs throughout many other communities, yet the case of Korkyra, as it was the first, so it was also the worst and most aggravated in point of intensity. Fortunately the account of Thucydides enables us to understand it from beginning to end, and to appreciate the degree of guilt of the various parties implicated, which we can seldom do with certainty; because when once the interchange of violence has begun, the feelings arising out of the contest itself presently overpower in the minds of both parties the original cause of dispute, as well as all scruples as to fitness of means. Unjustifiable acts in abundance are committed by both, and in comparing the two we are often obliged to employ the scrupulous language which Tacitus uses respecting Otho and Vitellius—"Atroxiorum fero, quicquid viciorum"—of two bad men all that the Roman world could foresee was, that the victor, whichever he was, would prove the worst.

But in regard to the Korkyran revolution, we can arrive at a more discriminating criticism. We see that it is from the beginning the work of a selfish oligarchical party, playing the game of a foreign money, and the worst and most violent money, of

The political character of Korkyra was the worst that occurred in the whole war.

the island—aiming to subvert the existing democracy and acquire power for themselves—and ready to employ any measure of fraud or violence for the attainment of these objects. While the democracy which they attack is purely defensive and conservative, the oligarchical members, having tried fair means in vain, are the first to employ foul means, which latter they find resorted with greater effect against themselves. They set the example of judicial persecution against Peithias, for the destruction of a political antagonist; in the use of this same weapon he proves more than a match for them, and employs it to their ruin. Next, they pass to the use of the dagger in the senate-house against him and his immediate followers, and to the vindictive application of the sword against the democracy generally. The Kerkyræne women are then thrown upon the defensive. Instead of the affections of ordinary life, all the most intense anti-social sentiments—hatred, pugnacity, hatred, vengeance—obtain unqualified possession of their bosoms; exaggerated too through the fluctuations of victory and defeat successively brought by Nibokrates, Alkides, and Eurymedon. Their conduct as victors is such as we should expect under such exalting circumstances, from persons men mingled with Thracian slaves. It is vindictive and murderous in the extreme, yet without faithful touch of sentiment given. But we must remember that they are driven to stand upon their defence, and that all their energies are indispensable to make that defence successful. They are provoked by an aggression no less guilty in the end than in the means—an aggression, too, the more gratifying, because, if we look at the state of the island at the time when the oligarchical negatives were restored from Coriath, there was no pretence for affirming that if left unaided, or was suffering, any loss, hardship, or disgrace, from its alliance with Athens. These oligarchical tyrants find the island in a state of security and tranquillity—since the war imposed upon it little necessity for effort. They plunge it into a sea of blood, with starvation as well as suffering on both sides, which end at length in their own complete extermination. Our compassion for their final misery must not hinder us from appreciating the behaviour whereby it was earned.

How these
conservative
tyrants and
democratic
opponents
of the
existing
order.

In the course of a few years from this time we shall have occasion to recount two political movements in Athens similar in principle and general result to this Kerkira revolution; exhibiting oligarchical conspirators against an existing and conservative democracy—with this conspiracy at last successful, but afterwards put down, and the Demos again restored. The contrast between Athens and Kerkira under such circumstances will be found highly instructive, especially in regard to the Demos both in the hours of defeat and in those of victory. It will then be seen how much the habit of active participation in political and judicial affairs—of open, conflicting discussion, discharging the malignant passions by way of speech, and followed by appeal to the vote—of having constantly present to the mind of every citizen, in his character of *Dikast* or *Ekklesiast*, the conditions of a pacific society, and the permanent authority of a constitutional majority—how much all these circumstances, brought home as they were at Athens more than in any other democracy to the feelings of individuals, contributed to subvert the instincts of intestine violence and revenge, even under very great provocation.

But the case of Kerkira, as well as that of Athens, different in so many respects, supplies to illustrate another truth, of much importance in Grecian history. Both of them show how false and impotent were the pretensions set up by the rich and great men of the various Grecian cities to superior morality, superior intelligence, and greater fitness for using honourably and beneficially the powers of government, as compared with the mass of the citizens. Though the Grecian oligarchies, exercising powerful sway over faction, and more especially over the meaning of words, bestowed upon themselves the appellation of "the best men, the honourable and good, the elegant, the superior," &c., and attached to those without their own deeds epithets of a contrary tenor, implying low moral attributes, no such difference will be found borne out by the facts of Grecian history.¹ Abundance of infamy, with occasional bad passions, was doubt-

Contrast between the democracy of Kerkira and the oligarchy of Athens.

Contrast between the oligarchy of the rich and great men of the various Grecian cities.

¹ See the valuable preliminary discourse, prefixed to Webster's edition of Thucydides, page viii. vol. i. cap.

less liable to work upon the people generally, often corrupting and misguiding even the Athenian democracy, the best, apparently, of all the democracies in Greece. But after all, the rich and great men were only a part of the people, and taking them as a class (apart from honorable individual exceptions) by no means the best part. If exempted by their position from some of the vices which beset smaller and poorer men, they labored from that same position an unmeasured self-importance, and an excess of personal ambition, as well as of personal appetites, peculiar to themselves, not less anti-social in tendency, and operating upon a much grander scale. To the prejudices and superstitions belonging to the age they were no less superior, considering them as a class; while their animosities among one another, virulent and unscrupulous, were among the foremost causes of misfortune in Greek commonwealths. Indeed many of the most exceptional acts committed by the democracies consisted in their allowing themselves to be made the tools of one aristocrat for the ruin of another. Of the intense party-elfishness which characterized them as a body, sometimes exaggerated into the strongest anti-popular antipathy, as we see in the famous oligarchical oath cited by Aristotle,¹ we shall find many illustrations as we advance in the history, but none more striking than this Kerkyræan revolution.

¹ *Aristot. Politic.* i. 2, 38. Ed. of the Loeb edition, trans. and introd. by E. V. Rieu.

CHAPTER II.

FROM THE TROUBLES IN EGEYRA IN THE FIFTH YEAR
OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR DOWN TO THE END
OF THE SIXTH YEAR.

Amos the same time as the troubles of Egeyra continued, Nicias, the Athenian general, conducted an expedition against the rocky island of Minda, which lay at the mouth of the harbour of Megara, and was occupied by a Megarian fortress garrison. The narrow channel, which separated it from the Megarian port of Rhene and formed the entrance of the harbour, was defended by two towers projecting out from Rhene, which Nicias attacked and destroyed by means of battering machines from his ships. He thus cut off Minda from communication on that side with the Megarians, and fortified it on the other side, where it communicated with the mainland by a lagoon bridged over with a causeway. Minda, thus becoming thoroughly insulated, was more completely fortified and made an Athenian possession; since it was extremely convenient to keep up an effective blockade against the Megarian harbours, which the Athenians had hitherto done only from the opposite shore of Salamis.¹

Capture of
Minda,
situated
between
Megara
and the
Attic coast
under
Rhene.

Though Nicias, son of Niceratus, had been for some time conspicuous in public life, and is said to have been more than once Strategus along with Pericles, this is the first occasion on which Thucydides introduces him to our notice. He was now one of the Strategoi or generals of the commonwealth, and appears to have enjoyed, on the whole, a greater and more constant personal esteem than any citizen of Athens, from the present time down to his death. In

Thucydides
first intro-
duction,
prominent
character.

¹ Thucyd. II. 2. See the note of which however cannot be an island, by Aristotle, and the place mentioned in and is a hill on the mainland near the bay, for the topography of Minda, above.

wealth and in family he ranked among the first class of Athenians; in political character, Aristotle placed him, together with Thucydides, son of Melesias, and Thucydides, above all other names in Athenian history—scarcely even above Pericles.¹

Such a criticism, from Aristotle, deserves respectful attention,

Very
strong
evidence
and
confirmation
of the
disparaging
party at
Athens.

though the facts before us completely belie so lofty an estimate. It marks, however, the position occupied by Nikias in Athenian politics, as the principal person of what may be called the oligarchical party, succeeding Kimon and Thucydides, and preceding Thucydides. In looking to the conditions under

which this party continued to exist, we shall see that during the interval between Thucydides (son of Melesias) and Nikias, the democratical forces had acquired such confirmed ascendancy, that it would not have suited the purpose of any politician, to betray evidence of positive hostility to them, prior to the Sicilian expedition and the great enhancement in the foreign relations of Athens which arose out of that disaster. After that change, the Athenian oligarchs became emboldened and aggressive, so that we shall find Thucydides among the chief conspirators in the revolution of the Four Hundred. But Nikias represents the oligarchical party in its previous state of quiescence and torpidity, accommodating itself to a sovereign democracy, and acting in the form of common sentiment rather than of common purpose. And it is a remarkable illustration of the real temper of the Athenian people, that a man of this character, known as an oligarch, but not hated as such, and doing his duty sincerely to the democracy, should have remained until his death the most esteemed and influential man in the city.

Nikias was a man of even mediocrity, in intellect, in education, and in energy: forward to his military duties, and not only personally courageous in the field, but habitually found competent as a general, under ordinary circumstances; zealous, too, in the discharge of all political duties at home, especially in the part of

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 2, 3.

² Kimon, from his weakness in old years, gave Nikias in the Athenian assembly, Thucyd. c. 61, c. 62. Kimon's influence was so great that he was called the 'father of the people'.

³ Nikias was not only a general, but a statesman, and a politician.

⁴ The whole political of Nikias before Syracuse, under the most trying circumstances, more than bears out this point.

Strategos or one of the ten generals of the state, to which he was frequently chosen and re-chosen. Of the many valuable qualities combined in his predecessor Perikles, the recollection of whom was yet fresh in the Athenian mind, Nicias possessed two, in which, most of all, his influence rested,—though, properly speaking, that influence belongs to the sum total of his character, and not to any special attributes in it: First, he was thoroughly incorruptible as to pecuniary gain—a quality as rare in Greek public men of all the cities, that when a man once became notorious for possessing it, he acquired a greater degree of trust than any superiority of intellect could have bestowed upon him; next, he adopted the Periklean view, as to the necessity of a conservative or stationary foreign policy for Athens, avoiding new acquisitions at a distance, adventurous risks, or provocations to fresh enemies. With this important point of analogy there were at the same time material differences between them even in regard to foreign policy. Perikles was a conservative, resolute against submitting to loss or abstraction of empire, but at the same time refusing from aggrandizement; Nicias was in policy heart-hearted, avowed to energetic effort for any purpose whatever, and disposed not only to maintain peace, but even to purchase it by considerable sacrifices. Nevertheless, he was the leading champion of the conservative party of his day, always powerful at Athens; and as he was constantly familiar with the details and actual course of public affairs, capable of giving full effect to the cautious and prudential point of view, and enjoying unqualified credit for honest purposes, his value as a permanent counsellor was steadily recognised, even though in particular cases his counsel might not be followed.

Besides these two main points, which Nicias had in common with Perikles, he was perfect in the use of minor and collateral modes of standing well with the people, which that great man had taken but little pains to practise. While Perikles attached himself to Aspasia, whose splendid qualities did not reflect in the eyes of the public either her foreign origin or her unsexiness, the domestic habits of Nicias appear to have been strictly conformable to the rules of Athenian decorum. Perikles was surrounded by philanglans, Nicias by

Care of
Nicias to
satisfy his
people
and not
giving
credit;
the very
relation
character.

where he let out for work in them, receiving a fixed sum per head for each. The superintending slaves who managed the details of this business were men of great ability and high pecuniary value.¹ Most of the wealth of Nikias was held in this form, and not in landed property. Judging by what remains to us of the comic authors, this must have been considered as a perfectly gentlemanlike way of making money; for while they showed with derision of the leather-dresser Kleis, the lamp-oiler Hyperbolos, and the vegetable-seller mother to whom Euripides owes his birth, we hear nothing from them in disparagement of the distributor Nikias.

The degree to which the latter was thus occupied with the care of his private fortune, together with the general moderation of his temper, made him often wish to abstract himself from public duty. But such transitory reflections, rare among the public men of the day, rather made the Athenians more anxious to put him forward and retain his services. In the eyes of the Periclean multitude and the Hippia, the two richest classes in Athens, he was one of themselves, and on the whole the best man, as being so little open to reproach or calumny, whom they could oppose to the better-dressed and lump-makers, who often out-talked them in the public assembly. The hoplites, who despised Kleon, and did not much regard even the brave, hardy, and soldier-like Lamachos, because he happened to be poor, respected in Nikias the union of wealth and family with honesty, courage, and usefulness in command. The merchants and trading multitude esteemed him as a discreet, honest, religious gentleman, who gave splendid examples, treated the poorest men with consideration, and never turned the public service into a job for his own profit; who, moreover, if he possessed no commanding qualities, so as to give to his advice imperative and irresistible authority, was yet always worthy of being consulted, and a steady safeguard against public mischief. Before the fatal Sicilian expedition, he had never commanded on any very serious or difficult enterprise: but what he had done had been

1. *Camponotus*, *Myrmica*, *C. N. T.*
Camponotus, *Myrmica*, *C. N. T.*
Camponotus, *Myrmica*, *C. N. T.*
Camponotus, *Myrmica*, *C. N. T.*

We shall see in the coming chapter how he became as it were promoted, partly by his own superior penetration, partly by the dishonest artifice and misjudgment of Nicias and other opponents, in the office of *Epistates*. But his vocation was now to find fault, to censure, to disapprove; his theatre of action was the senate, the public assembly, the *ekklesia*; his principal talent was that of speech, in which he most unquestionably have surpassed all his contemporaries. The two gifts which had been united in Pericles—superior capacity for speech, as well as for action—were now severed, and had fallen, though both in greatly inferior degree, the one to Nicias, the other to Kleon. As an *oppositor-in-chief*, fierce and violent in temper, Kleon was extremely formidable to all acting functionaries; and from his influence in the public assembly, he was doubtless the author of many important positive measures, thus going beyond the functions belonging to what is called opposition. But though the most effective speaker in the public assembly, he was not by that means the most influential person in the democracy. His powers of speech in fact stood out the more prominently, because they were forced apart from that station and those qualities which were considered, even at Athens, all but essential to make a man a leader in political life.

To understand the political conditions of Athens at this time, it has been necessary to take this comparison between Nicias and Kleon, and to remark, that though the latter might be a more victorious speaker, the former was the more guiding and influential leader. The power gained by Kleon was all noisy and palpable, sometimes however, without doubt, of considerable moment; but the course of affairs was much more under the direction of Nicias.

It was during the summer of this year (the fifth of the war—B.C. 427), that the Athenians began operations on a small scale in Sicily; probably contrary to the advice

both of Nicias and Kleon, neither of them seemingly favourable to these distant undertakings. I cannot however the series of Athenian measures in Sicily—which afterwards became the turning-point of the fortunes of the state—for a department by themselves. I shall take them up separately, and bring them

not feeling sufficiently moved as to the way in which she would deal with them, they joined with the Dorians in claiming aid from Sparta: in fact, it does not appear that Athens, possessing naval superiority only and being inferior on land, could have given them effective aid.

The Lacedæmonians, eagerly embracing the opportunity, determined to plant a strong colony in this tempting situation. There was wood in the neighbouring regions for ship-building,¹ so that they might hope to acquire a moral position for attacking the neighbouring island of Eubœa, while the passage of troops against the subject-allies of Athens in Thrace would also be facilitated; the impossibility of such passage had forced them, three years before, to leave Pericles to his fate. A considerable body of colonists, Spartans and Lacedæmonian Perioeci, was assembled under the conduct of three Spartans (Rhio—Loon, Demagras, and Alkidas; the latter two are so prominent, though Thucydides does not say so) the same colonists who had met with such little success in Ionia and at Eubœa. Proclamation was further made to invite the junction of all other Greeks as colonists, excepting by name Ionians, Achæans, and some other tribes not here specified. Probably the distinct exclusion of the Achæans must have been rather the continuance of ancient sentiment than dictated by any present reasons, since the Achæans were not now pronounced enemies of Sparta. A number of colonists, stated as not less than 12,000, flocked to the place, having confidence in the stability of the colony under the powerful protection of Sparta. The new town, of large extent, was built and fortified under the name of Herakleia;² not far from the site of Trachis, about two miles east a quarter from the nearest point of the Maline Gulf, and about double that distance from the strait of Thermopylæ. Near to the latter, and for the purpose of keeping effective possession of it, a port with dock and accommodation for ship-ping was constructed.

A populous city, established under Lacedæmonian protection in this important post, alarmed the Achæans, and created much

¹ Regarding this abundance of the Spartan ships, but the whole wood, as well as the site of Herakleia, were actually, according to Livy, given to

² Thucyd. viii. 26. Not exactly was there connected with this, as the Herakleia the mythical progenitor of the Dorians of the Peloponnese by Heracles.

expectation in every part of Greece. But the Lacedæmonian Officers were harsh and unskillful in their management; while the Thebians, to whom the Trachinian territory was tributary, considered the colony as an encroachment upon their soil. Anxious to prevent its increase, they harassed it with hostilities from the first moment. The Grecian auxiliaries were also active enemies; so that Heracleia, thus pressed from without and misgoverned within, dwindled down from its original numbers and promise, barely maintaining its existence.¹ We shall find it in later times, however, revived, and becoming a place of considerable importance.

The main Athenian argument of this summer, consisting of sixty triremes under Nicias, undertook an expedition against the island of Miles. Miles and Thera, both inhabited by ancient colonies from Lacedæmon, had never been from the beginning, and still refused to be, members of the Athenian alliance or subjects of the Athenian empire. They thus stood out as exceptions to all the other islands in the *Ægean*, and the Athenians thought themselves authorized to resort to constraint and conquest; believing themselves entitled to command over all the islands. They might indeed argue, and with considerable plausibility, that the Milesians now enjoyed their share of the protection of the *Ægean* from piracy, without contributing to the cost of it; but considering the obstinate resistance and strong philo-Lacedæmonian propensities of the Milesians, who had taken no part in the war and given no ground of offence to Athens, the attempt to conquer them by force could hardly be justified even as a calculation of gain and loss, and was a mere gratification to the pride of power in carrying out what, in modern days, we should call the principle of maritime Empire. Miles and Thera turned outward currents, which defaced the symmetry of a great propeller's field,² and the harbor ultimately settled upon Athens the bearing of all losses—a deed of blood which deeply dishonoured her arms. On this occasion, Nicias visited the island with his fleet, and after vainly attempting the inhabitants, ravaged the beach, but

¹ Thucyd. ii. 95, 96; Diodor. xi. 49.

² Id. 95.

³ *Ibid.* iii. 8, 9.

⁴ It is singular the
freestone vessels, and still denotes
captivity!

retired without undertaking a siege. He then sailed away, and came to Ortygia, on the north-east frontier of Attica, landing on Boeotia. The hoplites on board his ships, landing in the night, marched into the interior of Boeotia to the vicinity of Tanagra. They were here met, according to signal raised, by a military force from Athens, which marched thither by land; and the joint Athenian army ravaged the Tanagran territory, gaining an insignificant advantage over its defenders. On retiring, Nikias re-assembled his armament, sailed northward along the coast of Lokris with the usual ravages, and returned home without effecting anything further.¹

About the same time that he started, thirty other Athenian triremes, under Demosthenes and Pothida, had been sent round Peloponnesus to act upon the coast of Akarnania. In conjunction with the whole Akarnanian force, except the men of Ghelede—with fifteen triremes from Korkyra and some troops from Kephallenia and Zakynthos—they ravaged the whole territory of Lokias, both within and without the Isthmus, and confined the inhabitants to their towns, which was too strong to be taken by anything but a wall of brass and iron and a tedious blockade. And the Akarnanians, to whom the city was especially hostile, were urgent with Demosthenes to undertake this measure forthwith, since the opportunity might not again occur, and success was nearly certain.

But this enterprising officer committed the grave imprudence of offending them on a matter of great importance, in order to attack a country of all others the most impracticable—the interior of Akolia. The Messenians of Naupaktos, who suffered from the depredations of the neighbouring Akolian tribes, inflamed his imagination by suggesting to him a grand scheme of operations,² more worthy of the large force which he commanded than the mere reduction of Lokias. The various tribes of Akoliens—robo, leare, native, predatory, and untrilled in the use of the javelin, which they rarely laid out of their hands—stretched across the

¹ Thucyd. II. 25.

² Thucyd. II. 26. Apparently I have misread, and the Greek native has

Messenians in order also expressly recorded (Thucyd. II. 26).

country from between Paros and Oia to the eastern base of the Aekleion. The scheme suggested by the Boeotians was that Demosthenes should attack the great central Attic tribes—the Apollai, Ophianes, and Eretrians: if they were conquered, all the remaining continental tribes between the Ambakian Gulf and Mount Paros might be invited or forced into the alliance of Athens—the Akarnanians being already included in it. Having thus got the command of a large continental force,¹ Demosthenes contemplated the ulterior scheme of marching at the head of it, on the west of Paros, through the territory of the Ovidian Lokrians—inhabiting the north of the Corinthian Gulf, friendly to Athens, and envious to the Atticans, whom they resembled both in their habits and in their fighting—until he arrived at Khytium in Boia, in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephissos. He would then easily descend that valley into the territory of the Pichians, who were likely to join the Athenians if a favourable opportunity occurred, but who might at any rate be constrained to do so. From Pichia, the scheme was to invade from the northwest the continental territory of Boia, the great enemy of Athens; which might thus perhaps be completely subdued, if assailed at the same time from Attica. Any Athenian general who could have executed this comprehensive scheme would have acquired at home a high and well-merited celebrity. But Demosthenes had been ill-informed both as to the invincible barbarians, and the pathless country, comprehended under the name of Attika. Some of the tribes spoke a language scarcely intelligible to Greeks, and even ate their meat raw; while the country has ever down to the present time remained not only unconquered, but untraversed by an enemy in arms.

Demosthenes accordingly retired from Lokha, in spite of the remonstrance of the Akarnanians, who not only could not be induced to accompany him, but went home in visible disgust. He then sailed with his other forces—Messenians, Kephallenians,

¹ Thucyd. II. 27. At this time, as we are told, some of the tribes properly called Boians would be comprised in this expedition; the name however it bears a general sense, not a proper name, as Pappo and Dr. Arnold

remark. Demosthenes would stimulate his sailing under his wings the Akarnanians, the Eretrians, and some other tribes besides, but what other tribes, is hard to say; perhaps the Argives, east of Amphiochia, among them.

and Salpyrrhiana—to Cilicia in the territory of the Cordian Lakiana, a maritime township on the Cordian Gulf, not far westward of Marpathion—where his army was disembarked, together with 300 epistates (or marines) from the triremes—inclading on this occasion, what was not uncommonly the case on disembark,¹ some of the chosen hoplites, selected all from young men of the same age, on the Athenian muster-roll. Having passed the night in the sacred precinct of Zeus Hekaton at Cilicon, memorable as the spot where the poet Hesiod was said to have been slain, he marched early in the morning, under the guidance of the Mossanian Chironos, into Rhodia. On the first day he took Totitania, on the second Krokybion, on the third Totitania—all of these villages unfortified and uninfenced, for the inhabitants abandoned them and fled to the mountains above. He was here inclined to halt and await the junction of the Cordian Lakrian, who had engaged to invade Rhodia at the same time, and were almost indispensable to his success, from their familiarity with Rhodian warfare, and their similarity of weapons. But the Mossanians again persuaded him to advance without delay into the interior, in order that the villages might be separately attacked and taken before any collective force could be gathered together; and Demosthenes was so encouraged by having as yet encountered no resistance, that he advanced to Epistion, which he also found deserted, and captured without opposition.

¹ Thucyd. II. 9. The Epistates, or disembarking marines, were more usually taken from the Thetes, or the poorest class of citizens, drafted by the state with a purpose for service, and from the hoplite-hoplites or the wealthiest. Maritime warfare is therefore usually spoken of as involving *epistates*; the *proton* *phalanx* of heavy-armed men, on foot, in the field of an expedition, however, are drawn from the Thucyd. II. 9.

Amongst the Epistates, however, the Lakian mercenaries might well have numbered that class of the Cordian village-yeomanry, Thucyd. I. 20.

The Athenian Epistates, though not forming a corps permanently drilled, were placed in function to the English Yeomanry, who were to have been that

detachment permanently sent after disembarkation about the year 1864. "It having been found necessary in many occasions to collect a portion of soldiers on board war-ships of war, and these detachments being at that extremely undisciplined & first, most busy and best instructed in Britain, it is a great measure unnecessary.—It will at length induce expedient to appoint certain regiments for that service, who were looked in the different ranks of the Army, and the whole would be more efficient, than now it is."—*Journal of the House of Commons*, a great many bills were introduced, Thence, from the nature of their duty were (originally) to be distinguished from the regular soldiers or footmen.—*House of Commons Journals of the House of Commons*, vol. I. p. 129. (London, 1784.)

Here however was the turn of his good fortune. The mountains round *Algitium* were occupied not only by the inhabitants of that village, but also by the entire force of *Atolia*, collected even from the distant tribes *Romili* and *Kallibi*, who bordered on the *Malis* Gulf. The invasion of *Demosthenes* had become known beforehand to the *Atolians*, who not only forwarded all their own tribes of the approaching enemy, but also sent embassies to *Sparta* and *Corinth* to ask for aid.¹ However they showed themselves fully capable of defending their own territory without foreign aid. *Demosthenes* found himself hemmed in his position at *Algitium*, on all sides at once, by these active highlanders armed with javelins, pouring down from the neighbouring hills. Not engaging in any close combat, they retreated when the *Athenians* advanced forward to charge them, resuming their aggression the moment that the pursuers, who could never advance far in consequence of the ruggedness of the ground, began to return to the main body. The small number of bowmen along with *Demosthenes* at some time kept their unshotted arrows at bay. But the other surrounding the bowmen was properly slain; the stock of arrows became nearly exhausted; and what was still worse, *Chreonas* the *Messenian*, the only man who knew the country and could serve as guide, was slain also. The bowmen became thus either ineffective or dispersed; while the hoplites exhausted themselves in vain attempts to pursue and beat off an active enemy, who always returned upon them and in every successive onset defeated and distressed them more and more. At length the force of *Demosthenes* was completely broken and compelled to take flight; without beaten roads, without guides, and in a country not only strange to them, but impervious, from continual

Atolians
probably
Scythians and
others by
their side
here.

¹ Thucyd. II. 10. *ἀποδείκνυσθαι* speaks to us of *Algitium* and its details, even without calling them *Atolians*, which speaks for *Demosthenes* as the sole Athenian leader.

It is not true, as I think the *Greek* and the *Latin* suppose, that the *Atolians* sent word to *Lacedæmon* before there was any talk or thought of the invasion of *Atolia*, simply in preparation of the standing embassy which they bore to *Sparta*

and *Corinth*; but that they had not word immediately when they heard of the preparations for invading *Atolia*—not before the invasion already took place. The words *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄλλοις* rather decisively show that this is the meaning.

The word *ἄλλοις* is rightly interpreted by *Thucyd.* *ἄλλοις* the *Atolians*—“because the *Naxosians* were belonging to the *Atolians* to invade *Atolia*.”

mountains, rock, and forest. Many of them were slain in the flight by pursuers, superior not less in rapidity of movement than in knowledge of the country; some even lost themselves in the forest, and perished miserably in flames kindled around them by the *Stolians*. The fugitives were at length reassembled at *Olous* near the sea, with the loss of *Perikles* the colleague of *Demosthenes* in command, as well as of 120 hoplites, among the best armed and most vigorous in the Athenian muster-roll.¹ The remaining force was soon transported back from *Naxos* to *Athens*, but *Demosthenes* remained behind, being too much afraid of the displeasure of his countrymen to return at such a moment. It is certain that his conduct was such as justly to incur their displeasure; and that the expedition against *Skia*, alienating an established ally and provoking a new enemy, had been conceived with a degree of rashness which nothing but the unexpected favour of fortune could have counterbalanced.

The success of the new enemy, whom his unsuccessful attack had raised into activity, soon made itself felt. The *Skian* enemy, who had been dispatched to *Sparta* and *Corinth*, found it easy to obtain the promise of a considerable force to join them in an expedition against *Naxos*. About the month of September, a body of 8000 *Peloponnesian* hoplites, including 500 from the newly founded colony of *Herakleia*, was assembled at *Delphi*, under the command of *Eurykleus*, *Makarius*, and *Mimandrus*. Their road of march to *Naxos* lay through the territory of the *Oreus Lokrians*, whom they proposed either to gain over or to subdue. With *Amphion*, the largest Lokrian township, and in the immediate neighbourhood of *Delphi*, they had little difficulty; for the *Amphionians* were in a state of feud with their neighbours on the other side of *Parasmani*, and were afraid that the new arrangement might become the instrument of *Phokian* antipathy against them. On the first application they joined the *Spartan* alliance, and gave hostages for their fidelity to it: moreover they persuaded many other Lokrian petty villages—among others the *Myrmæis*, who were masters of the most difficult pass on the road—so to do the same. *Eurykleus* received from these various townships reinforcements for his

Attack of
Skia and
the *Stolians*
propagated
under
Eurykleus
and *Mimandrus*.

array, as well as hostages for their fidelity, whom he deposited at Kyrtium in Doris; and he was then enabled to march through all the territory of the Oaulian Lakrians without resistance, except from Olsson and Eupation, both which places he took by force. Having arrived in the territory of Nasapktos, he was there joined by the full force of the *Alolians*. Their joint efforts, after laying waste all the neighbourhood, captured the Corinthian colony of Molyrtion, which had become subject to the Athenian empire.¹

Nasapktos, with a large circuit of wall and thirty defended, was in the greatest danger, and would certainly have been taken, had it not been saved by the efforts of the Athenian Demosthenes, who had remained there ever since the unfortunate *Alolian* expedition. Apprised of the coming march of Berytachos, he went personally to the Akarnanians, and persuaded them to send a force to aid in the defence of Nasapktos. For a long time they turned a deaf ear to his solicitations in consequence of the refusal to blockade Loukos, but they were at length induced to consent. At the head of 1000 Akarnanian hoplites, Demosthenes threw himself into Nasapktos, and Berytachos, seeing that the town had been thus placed out of the reach of attack, abandoned all his designs upon it—marching farther westward in the neighbouring territories of *Alolia*—*Ealyria*, *Pleuron*, and *Proachiana*, near the *Achæliæ* and the borders of Akarnania.

The *Alolians*, who had come down to join him for the common purpose of attacking Nasapktos, here abandoned him, and retired to their respective homes. But the *Ambrakiots*, rejoiced to find so considerable a Peloponnesian force in their neighbourhood, pressed upon him to assist them in attacking the *Amphilochian Argos* as well as Akarnania; assuring him that there was now a fair prospect of bringing the whole of the population of the mainland, between the *Ambrakian* and *Corinthian* Gulfs, under the supremacy of Loukos. Having persuaded Berytachos thus to keep his forces together and ready, they themselves, with 2000 *Ambrakiot* hoplites, invaded the territory of the *Amphilochian Argos*, and captured the

Nasapktos
is saved by
Demosthenes
and the Akarnanians.

Berytachos,
repulsed
from
Nasapktos,
consents
with the
Ambrakiots
to attack
the Argos.

¹ Thucyd. II. 107, 108.

fortified hill of Olpe immediately bordering on the Acheronian Gulf, about three miles from Argos itself; a hill employed in former days by the Akarnanians as a place for public judicial congress of the whole nation.¹

This enterprise, unannounced hitherto to Eurylochus, was the signal for movement on both sides. The Akarnanians, marching with their whole force to the protection of Argos, occupied a post called Krivan in the Amphiloehian territory, to prevent Eurylochus from effecting his junction with the Aitolians at Olpe. They at the same time sent urgent messages to Demosthenes at Naupaktos, and to the Athenian guard-squadron of twenty triremes under Adistobolus and Euryphion, entreating their aid in the present need, and inviting Demosthenes to act as their commander. They had forgotten their displeasure against him arising out of his recent refusal to blockade at Lechaia, for which they probably thought that he had been sufficiently punished by his disgrace at Rhodia; while they knew and esteemed his military capacity. In fact, the enemies whom he had been destined at Naupaktos now worked strenuously for them as well as for him. It occurred to them a commander whom all of them respected, elevating the jealousy among their own numerous petty townships; it procured for him the means of restoring his own reputation at Athens. Demosthenes, not backward in seizing this golden opportunity, came quickly into the Acheronian Gulf with the twenty triremes, collecting 800 Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian bowmen. Finding the whole Akarnanian force concentrated at the Amphiloehian Argos, he was named general, actually along with the Akarnanian generals, but in reality enjoying the whole direction of operations.

He found also the whole of the enemy's force, both the 3000 Aitolian hoplites and the Peloponnesian division under Eurylochus, already united and in position at Olpe, about three miles off. For Eurylochus, as soon as he was apprised that the Aitolians had reached Olpe, broke up hitherto his camp at Prædion in Rhodia, knowing that his best chance of traversing the hostile

force
which
came
from
Akarnania,
as well as
the Athenian
squadron,
sent to the
protection
of Argos.

March of
Eurylochus
against
Akarnania
to join the
Aitolian
force.

¹ Thucyd. II. 202-203.

territory of Akarnania consisted in safety; the whole Akarnanian force, however, had already gone to Argos, so that his march was unopposed through that country. He crossed the Achelous, marched westward of Stratos, through the Akarnanian townships of Phytia, Maleson, and Limnos; then quitting both Akarnania and the direct road from Akarnania to Argos, he struck rather outward into the mountainous district of Tigræna in the territory of the Agræans, who were enemies of the Akarnanians. From hence he descended at night into the territory of Argos, and passed unobserved, under cover of the darkness, between Argos itself and the Akarnanian force at Kræna, so as to join in safety the 3000 Achaïans at Olpe, to their great joy. They had feared that the army of Argos and Kræna would have arrested his passage; and believing their force inadequate to contend alone, they had sent pressing messages home to demand large reinforcements for themselves and their own protection.¹

Demosthenes, thus finding a united and formidable enemy, superior in number to himself at Olpe, conducted his troops from Argos and Kræna to attack them. The ground was rugged and mountainous, and between the two armies lay a steep ravine, which neither Thod to be the first to pass; so that they lay for five days inactive. If Herodotus had been our historian, he would probably have ascribed this delay to unfavourable omens (which may indeed have been the case), and would have given us interesting anecdotes respecting the prophets on both sides; but the more positive practical genius of Thucydides merely suggests us, that on the sixth day both armies put themselves in order of battle—both probably tired of waiting. The ground being favourable for ambushes, Demosthenes hid in a rocky dell 400 hoplites and light-armed, so that they might spring up suddenly in the midst of the action upon the Peloponnesians left, which weakened his right. He was himself on the right with the Boeotians and some Athenians, opposed to Baryllides on the left of the enemy; the Akarnanians, with the Amphilocheians or darters, occupied his left, opposed to the Achaïan hoplites. Achaïans and Peloponnesians were,

Their
infantry
is situated
by Thucyd.
in the
ravine on
Olpe—
a
very
dark
place.

¹ Thucyd. II. 104, 105, 106.

however, internixed in the line of Eurylochus, and it was only the Mantineans who maintained a separate station of their own towards the left centre. The battle accordingly began, and Eurylochus with his superior numbers was proceeding to surround Demosthenes, when on a sudden the men in ambush ran up and set upon his rear. A panic seized his men, who made no resistance worthy of their Peloponnesian reputation: they broke and fled, while Eurylochus, doubtless exposing himself with peculiar bravery in order to restore the battle, was early slain. Demosthenes, having sent him his best troops, pressed them vigorously, and their panic communicated itself to the troops in the centre, so that all were put to flight and pursued to Olus. On the right of the line of Eurylochus, the Andrakiotæ, the most warlike Greeks in the Epitroic region, completely defeated the Akarnanians opposed to them, and carried their pursuit even as far as Argos. So complete, however, was the victory gained by Demosthenes over the remaining troops, that these Andrakiotæ had great difficulty in fighting their way back to Olus, which was not accomplished without severe loss, and late in the evening. Among all the beaten troops, the Mantineans were those who best maintained their retreating order.¹ The loss in the army of Demosthenes was about 300; that of the opponents much greater, but the number is not specified.

Of the three Spartan commanders, two, Eurylochus and Makarias, had been slain; the third, Manoleas, found himself beleaguered both by sea and land, the Athenian squadron being on guard along the coast. It would seem, indeed, that he might have fought his way to Andrakia, especially as he would have met the Andrakiot reinforcement coming from the city. But whether this were possible or not, the commander, too much dispirited to attempt it, took advantage of the customary truce granted for burying the dead, to open negotiations with Demosthenes and the Akarnanian generals, for the purpose of obtaining an unobscured retreat. This was presumptuously refused; but Demosthenes (with the consent of the Akarnanian leaders) severely intimated to the Spartan commander and those immediately around him, together

The surviving Spartan commander makes a desperate resistance but is killed by the Peloponnesians. Demosthenes, having slain the Andrakiotæ.

Akarnanian generals, for the purpose of obtaining an unobscured retreat. This was presumptuously refused; but Demosthenes (with the consent of the Akarnanian leaders) severely intimated to the Spartan commander and those immediately around him, together

¹ Thucyd. vi. 106, 109: compare Polyænus, ii. 1.

with the Mantineans and other Peloponnesian troops, that if they chose to make a separate and unprovoked retreat, abandoning their comrades, no opposition would be offered. He designed by this means not merely to isolate the Aristocrats, the great numbers of Argos and Akarnania, along with the body of miscellaneous mercenaries who had come under Eurylochos, but also to obtain the more permanent advantage of disgrading the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the eyes of the Epicletic Greeks as cowards and unfits to military fellowship. The very reason which prompted Demosthenes to grant a separate facility of escape ought to have been imperative with Meneleus and the Peloponnesians around him, to make them spare it with indignation. Yet such was their anxiety for personal safety, that this disgraceful convention was accepted, ratified, and carried into effect forthwith. It stands alone in Grecian history, as an example of separate treason in officers to purchase safety for themselves and their immediate comrades, by abandoning the general body under their command. Had the officers been Athenians, it would have been doubtless quoted as evidence of the pretended infirmities of democracy. But as it was the act of a Spartan commander in conjunction with many leading Peloponnesians, we will only venture to remark upon it as a further manifestation of that intra-Peloponnesian selfishness, and carlessness of obligation towards extra-Peloponnesian Greeks, which we found so lamentably prevalent during the invasion of Xerxes; in this case indeed heightened by the fact, that the men deserted were fellow-Greeks and fellow-soldiers who had just fought in the same ranks.

As soon as the ceremony of burying the dead had been completed, Meneleus, and the Peloponnesians who were protected by this secret convention, stole away sily and in small bands under pretence of collecting wood and vegetables. On getting to a little distance, they quitted their pans and made off—much to the dismay of the Aristocrats, who ran after them trying to overtake them. The Akarnanians pursued, and their leaders had much difficulty in explaining to them the secret convention just concluded. It was not without some suspicions of treachery, and even personal hazard from their own troops, that they at length caused the

The Aristocrats now saw this would lead to their retreat.

fugitive Palenquenses is to be respected; while the Ambrakiots, the most numerous of the two to Ahuatemán falling, were pursued without any reserve, and 300 of them were slain before they could escape into the friendly territory of the Agaveus.¹ To distinguish Ambrakiots from Palenquenses, similar in race and dialect, was however no easy task. Much dispute arose in individual cases.

Unhappily on this late fell upon Ambrakia, a far more severe calamity was yet in store for her. The large reinforcement from the city, which had been urgently invoked by the detachment at Ojipe, started in due course as soon as they could be got ready, and entered the territory of Amphilochia about the time when the battle of Ojipe was fought; but ignorant of that reinforcement, and hoping to arrive soon enough to stand by their friends. Their march was made known to Demosthenis, on the day after the battle, by the Amphilochians, who at the same time indicated to him the best way of surprising them in the rugged and mountainous road along which they had to march, at the two conspicuous peaks called *El Monte*, immediately above a narrow pass leading further on to Ojipe. It was known beforehand, by the late march of the Ambrakiots, that they would rest for the night at the lower of these two peaks, ready to march through the pass on the next morning. On that same night a detachment of Amphilochians, under direction from Demosthenis, seized the higher of the two peaks; while that commander himself, dividing his forces into two divisions, started from his position at Ojipe in the evening after supper. One of these divisions, having the advantage of Amphilochian guides in their own country, marched by an unfrequented mountain road to *El Monte*; the other, under Demosthenis himself, went directly through the pass leading from *El Monte* to Ojipe. After marching all night, they reached the camp of the Ambrakiots a little before day-break—Demosthenis himself with his Mexicans in the van. The surprise was complete. The Ambrakiots were found still lying down and asleep, while even the sentinels, undisturbed of the recent battle—having themselves assumed in the Doric dialect by the

Another large body of Ambrakiots, coming from the city on a reinforcement, is indicated by Demosthenis at *El Monte*, and not to *El Monte*.

¹ *Obispo* 33, 34.

Macedonians, whom Demosthenes had placed in front for that express purpose—and not seeing very clearly in the morning twilight—mistook them for some of their own fellow-citizens coming back from the other camp. The Abernaciens and Macedonians thus fell among the Amphibolians sleeping and unarmed, and without any possibility of resistance. Large numbers of them were destroyed on the spot, and the remainder fled in all directions among the neighbouring mountains, some knowing the roads and the country. It was the country of the Amphibolians—subjects of Amphibia, but subjects aware to their condition, and now making use of their perfect local knowledge and light-armed equipment, to inflict a terrible revenge on their masters. Some of the Amphibolians became entangled in ravines—others fell into ambuscades laid by the Amphibolians. Others again, drawing most of all to fall into the hands of the Amphibolians—before it was as well as intensely hostile to fighting—and seeing no other possibility of escaping them—even off to the Athenian ships arriving along the shore. There were but a small proportion of them who survived to return to Amphibia.¹

The complete victory of Edmund, admirably prepared by Demosthenes, was achieved with scarce any loss. The Abernaciens, after securing their trophy and despoiling the enemy's dead, prepared to carry off the news thus taken to Argos.

On the morrow, however, before this was done, they were visited by a herald, coming from those Amphibolians who had fled into the Argosian territory, after the battle of Olynx and the subsequent pursuit. He came with the customary request from defeated soldiers, for permission to bury their dead who had fallen in that pursuit. Neither he, nor those from whom he came, knew anything of the destruction of their brethren at Momani—just as these latter had been ignorant of the defeat at Olynx; while, on the other hand, the Abernaciens in the camp, whose minds were full of the more recent and capital advantage at Momani, supposed that the message referred to the war slain in that engagement. The numerous pyreplaces just acquired at Momani lay piled up in the camp, and the herald on seeing

Remains
of the
Amphibolians
killed, on
seeing
the great
number of
shells.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 78.

them, was struck with amazement at the size of the herd, so much exceeding the number of those who were missing in his own detachment. An Akarnanian present asked the reason of his surprise, and inquired how many of his comrades had been slain—meaning to refer to the slain at Idomenei. "About two hundred," the herald replied.—"Yet these were here slain, not that number, but more than a thousand men."—"Then they are not the arms of those who fought with us?"—"Nay—but they are—if ye were the persons who fought yesterday at Idomenei."—"We fought with no one yesterday: it was the day before yesterday, in the retreat."—"Oh, then—ye have to learn, that we were engaged yesterday with those others, who were on their march as reinforcement from the city of Ambrakia."

The unfortunate herald now learnt for the first time that the large reinforcement from his city had been cut to pieces. So acute was his feeling of mingled anguish and surprise, that he raised a loud cry of woe, and hurried away at once, without saying another word: not even presenting his request about the burial of the dead bodies—which appears on this final occasion to have been neglected.*

His grief was justified by the prodigious magnitude of the calamity, which Theophrastos considers to have been the greatest that afflicted any Grecian city during the whole war prior to the peace of Nikaia: so incredibly great, indeed, that though he had learnt the number slain, he declines to set it down, from fear of not being believed—a scruple which we, his readers, have much reason to regret. It appears that nearly the whole whole military population of Ambrakia was destroyed, and Demodochos was urgent with the Akarnanians to march thither at once. Had they consented, Theophrastos believes positively that the city would have surrendered without a blow.† But they refused to undertake the enterprise,

* Theophr. iii. 11.

† Theophr. iii. 12. whether this refers to the whole Peloponnesian force, or to the army of the Akarnanians, is not clear. But it appears that Demodochos was desirous of making Akarnanians march to the relief of Ambrakia, as he is speaking of sending a messenger to inform the city of the Akarnanians' intention to march to the relief of Ambrakia.

directed to their city by Demodochos, at the request of the Akarnanians, who were sent to the relief of Ambrakia.

It may be said, that the expression sent the Akarnanians to the relief of Ambrakia is not the first instance of this kind in the history of the Peloponnesian war, which ended with the peace of Nikaia.

fearing (according to the historians) that the Achæians at Amphiklos would be more troublesome neighbours to them than the Ambrakians. That this reason was operative we need not doubt: but it can hardly have been either the single, or even the chief reason; for had it been so, they would have been equally afraid of Athenian co-operation in the blockade of Leukas, which they had strenuously solicited from Demosthenes, and had quarrelled with him for refusing. Ambrakia was less near to them than Lakia, and in its present educated state inspired less fear; but the displeasure arising from the former refusal of Demosthenes had probably never been altogether appeased, nor were they sorry to find an opportunity of mortifying him in a similar manner.

In the distribution of the spoil, three hundred panoplies were first set apart as the property of Demosthenes; ^{amounting to} the remainder were then distributed, one-third ^{to estimate the loss of the Ambrakians} among the Achæians, the other two-thirds among the Ambrakian townships. The immense treasure personally appropriated to Demosthenes enables us to make some vague conjecture as to the total loss of Ambrakia. The fraction of one-third, assigned to the Achæian people, must have been, we may imagine, six times as great, and perhaps even in larger proportion, than the reserve of the general. For the latter was at that time under the displeasure of the people, and anxious above all things to regain their favour—an object which would be frustrated rather than promoted, if his personal share of the arms were not greatly disproportionate to the collective claim of the city. Assuming upon this supposition, the panoplies assigned to Athens would be 3000, and the total of Ambrakian slain whose arms became public property would be

In a recent dissertation, by Franz Völkner, *Ueber die griechische Geschichte in der Zeit der Perserkriege*, it is made to appear that the fleet, vessels, and their crews, with the third part of the spoils, were captured during the blockade between the years of 426 and the beginning of the last year of the war, called the Peloponnesian war, allowing for two passages in these early books which must have been subsequently corrected.

The 3000 panoplies are to have been taken up by the people as a separate

work, containing the trophies. And a sum of 100 talents is given for them in 426, which is not referred to Demosthenes' property, 426, 20. It is in 426 that we find that the first taken on the day peculiar to that of capturing the ships were given to him as his personal property, and the remainder was for the public treasury. Thucydides, *lib. 2, c. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100*.

Of course, it is not certain what the 100 talents is, but it is certain that it was given to the state of Athens.

rean confederacy, the Akarnanians with Athens. It was stipulated that the Akarnanians should not be required to assist the Amphibolians against Athens, nor the Amphibolians to assist the Akarnanians against the Peloponnesian league; but against all other enemies, each engaged to lend aid to the other.¹

To Demosthenes personally, the events on the coast of the Androsian Gulf proved a signal good fortune, well-earned indeed by the skill which he had displayed. He was enabled to atone for his imprudence in the *Boeotian* expedition, and to re-establish himself in the favour of the Athenian people. He sailed home in triumph to Athens during the course of the winter, with his reserved portion of 300 panoplies, which acquired additional value from the accident, that the larger number of panoplies, reserved out of the spoil for the Athenian people, were captured at sea, and never reached Athens. Accordingly, those brought by Demosthenes were the only trophy of the victory, and as such were deposited in the Athenian temples, where Theophrastus mentions them as still existing at the time when he wrote.²

It was in this same autumn that the Athenians were induced by an oracle to undertake the more complete purification of the sacred island of Delos. This step was probably taken to propitiate Apollo, since they were under the persuasion that the terrible visitation of the epidemic was owing to his wrath. And as it was about this period that the second attack of the epidemic, after having lasted a year, disappeared, many of them probably ascribed this relief to the effect of their pious cure at Delos. All the tombs in the island were opened; the dead bodies were then exhumed and re-interred in the neighbouring island of Rhenea; and orders were given that for the future neither deaths nor births should take place in the sacred island. Moreover, the ancient Delian festival—once the common point of meeting and solemnity for the whole Ionic race, and celebrated for its sacred contests, before the Lydian and Persian conquests had subverted the freedom and prosperity

Porter of
Demosthenes in
triumph to
Athens.

Purification
of Delos
by the
Athenians.
Described in
the Epica
written
with
pencil
epigraphic.

¹ Thucyd. II. 20.

² Thucyd. II. 26. Ταύτην οὖν ἀνέλαβον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ χειμῶνος, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐκέρχοντο τὰς ἀνὰ τὴν ἑσπέρην θάλασσαν, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐκέρχοντο τὰς ἀνὰ τὴν ἑσπέρην θάλασσαν, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐκέρχοντο τὰς ἀνὰ τὴν ἑσπέρην θάλασσαν.

of Ionia—was now renewed. The Athenians celebrated the festival with its accompanying matches, even the chariot-race, in a manner more splendid than had ever been known in former times. They appointed a similar festival to be celebrated every fourth year. At this period they were excluded both from the Olympic and the Pythian games, which probably made the revival of the Delian festival more gratifying to them. The religious zeal and magnificence of Xerxes were strikingly displayed at Delos.¹

¹ Thucyd. iii. 104 ; Plutarch, Xerxes, c. 4, 5. Diodor. xii. 68.

CHAPTER LII.

SEVENTH YEAR OF THE WAR—CAPTURE OF SPHAKTERIA.

THE invasion of Attika by the Lacedæmonians had now become an ordinary enterprise, undertaken in every year of the war except the third and sixth, and then limited only from accidental causes; though the same hopes were no longer entertained from it as at the commencement of the war. During the present spring Agis, king of Sparta, conducted the Peloponnesian army into the territory, seemingly about the end of April, and repeated the usual ravages.

It seemed, however, as if Korkyra was about to become the principal scene of the year's military operations. For the exiles of the oligarchical party, having come back to the island and fortified themselves on Mount Ithaki, carried on war with as much activity against the Korkyreans in the city, that citizens and even families engaged them. Sixty Peloponnesian triremes were sent thither to assist the aggressors. As soon as it became known at Athens how hardly the Korkyreans in the city were pressed, orders were given to an Athenian fleet of forty triremes, about to sail for Sicily under Eurymedon and Sophokles, to halt in their voyage at Korkyra, and to lend whatever aid might be needed.¹ But during the course of this voyage, an incident occurred elsewhere, neither foreseen nor imagined by any one, which gave a new character and promise to the whole war, illustrating

through
year of
the war
invasion of
Attika.
B.C. 429.

distress in
Korkyra
from the
aid of
of the
oligarchical
party. 1.
Pelopon-
nesian fleet
sent to
Korkyra
B.C. 429.
both sides
suffered.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 2, 3.

hardly the observations of Pericles and Archidamus before its commencement, on the impossibility of calculating what turn events might take.¹

So high did Democleides stand in the favour of his countrymen after his brilliant success in the Australian Gulf, that they granted him permission at his own request to go abroad and to employ the best in any descent which he might think expedient on the coast of Polynesiania. The attachment of this native officer to the Mænesians at Nauapokina inspired him with the idea of planting a detachment of them on some well-chosen maritime point in the western Mænesian territory, from whence they would be able permanently to harass the Læodemæonians and provoke revolt among the Hæbæ—the more so from their analogy of race and dialect. The Mænesians, active in privateering and doubtless well acquainted with the points of this coast, all of which had formerly belonged to their ancestors, had probably indicated to him Pylos on the south-western shore.

That ancient and Hæmic name was applied specially and properly to denote the promontory which forms the northern termination of the eastern bay of Naratzo opposite to the island of Sphagia or Sphakroia; though in vague language the whole neighbouring district seems also to have been called Pylos. Accordingly, in circumnavigating Læonia, Democleides requested that the fleet might be detained at this spot long enough to enable him to fortify it, engaging himself to stay afterwards and maintain it with a garrison. It was an unlaboured promontory—about forty-five miles from Sparta, that is, as far distant as any portion of her territory—presenting rugged cliffs, and steep of access both by sea and land. But its great additional recommendation, with reference to the maritime power of Achaia, consisted in its overhanging the quagmire and swamp lands now called the bay of Naratzo. That basin was fringed and protected by the islet called Sphakroia or Sphagia, untroubled, unencumbered, and full of wood, which stretched along the coast for about a mile and three quarters, leaving only two narrow entrances; one at its northern end, opposite to the position fixed

¹ Thucyd. i. 102; ii. 12.

Democleides
sent the
fleet to the
offence
that with a
superior
armament.

the fleet
upon Pylos
in Læonia
the western
of the bay
Læonia of
Pylos and
Sphakroia.

But Eurytomos and Epipheides distinctly rejected all proposition of delay; and with much reason, since they had been informed (though seemingly without truth) that the Peloponnesians had actually reached Korkyra. They might well have remembered the mistake which had caused three years before, from the delay of the reinforcements sent to Piræus in some auxiliary operations on the coast of Kolia. The fleet accordingly passed by Pylos without stopping; but a terrible storm drove them back and forced them to seek shelter in the very harbour which Demosthenes had died upon—the only harbour anywhere near. That officer took advantage of this accident to answer his proposition, which however appeared to the commanders disavowed. There were plenty of deeps open round Peloponnesus (they said), if he chose to waste the resources of the city in occupying them.* They remained unmoved by his reasons in reply. Finding himself thus unsuccessful, Demosthenes pressed upon the unlimited permission granted to him by the Athenian people, to address himself first to the soldiers, last of all to the taxarchs or inferior officers, and to persuade them to second his project, even against the will of the commanders. Much inconvenience might well have arisen from such clashing of authority: but it happened, that both the soldiers and the taxarchs took the same view of the case as their commanders, and refused compliance. Nor can we be surprised at such resistance, when we reflect upon the seeming improbability

any kind—Epipheides, without any other force to rely upon, for he was surrounded by the Athenian fleet under the command of Brasidas, and having possession of that city, was enabled to cut off every supply to the fleet at Pylos. Besides, the fleet of Sparta, with the aid of some Athenian vessels, if the Athenians had been willing to hinder them from acting on Pylos, could—for some distance now—be reduced from 25 to 10. The accounts of 1799, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, show that there were not always all Pylos, unless we suppose with Herodotus that two of them were more rocks, against as was transmitted with the mistake of Herodotus.

I think that there is no alternative except to suppose that a great storm

had taken place in the two passages which surround Sparta from the Peloponnesus during the interval of two years when resistance was first made at Pylos. The account in the story of Brasidas would have been much more than it is now in the ancient portion of Sparta, with the ancient passage that would have been then both narrower and deeper. To suppose change in the configuration of the coast to this extent seems very extraordinary; nor other hypothesis which may be stated will be found founded in more popular tradition.

† Herod. 1. 2. The account, although strange and incredible, given by Herodotus of these interesting events at Pylos and Sparta, will be found in Books vii. 21—25.

of being able to maintain such a post against the great wall, and still greater, supposed, superiority of Lacedæmonian land force. It happened however that the fleet was detained there for some days by stormy weather; so that the soldiers, having nothing to do, were seized with the spontaneous impulse of occupying themselves with the fortification, and crowded around to examine it with all the emulation of eager volunteers. Having contemplated nothing of the kind on starting from Athens, they had neither tools for cutting stone, nor tools for carrying mortar.¹ Accordingly they were compelled to build their wall by collecting such pieces of rock or stones as they found, and putting them together as each happened to fit in: whenever mortar was needed, they brought it up on their loaded backs, with hands joined behind them to prevent it from slipping away. Such defences were made up, however, partly by the unbounded ardour of the soldiers, partly by the natural difficulties of the ground, which hardly required fortification except at particular points; the work was completed in a rough way in six days, and Demostheles was left in garrison with five ships, while Eurymedon with the main fleet sailed away to Kerkyra. The crews of the five ships (two of which, however, were sent away to man Eurymedon afterwards) would amount to about 1000 men in all. But there presently arrived two armed Mæonian prisoners, from which Demostheles obtained a reinforcement of forty Mæonian hoplites, together with a supply of victual shields, though more fit for show than for use, wherewith to arm his recruits. Altogether, it appears that he must have had about 900 hoplites, besides the half-armed men.²

Intelligence of this attempt to plant, even upon the Lacedæmonian territory, the anarchy and breach of a hostile post, was soon transmitted to Sparta. Yet no immediate measures were taken to march to the spot; as well from the natural slowness of the Spartan character, strengthened by a festival which happened to be then

Demostheles
himself
surveys the
place.
Demostheles,
the
commander
and of the
army.
He is
there with
a garrison
while the
fleet goes
up to
Kerkyra.

How much
of the fort-
ification
is purely
Greek.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 2.

² Thucyd. iv. 2. Demostheles placed
the Greek vessels under the policy of his
half-trained men.

and selected only of those to send
them to the walls. This implies a
fleet which was likely to lose their
best.

going on, as from the confidence entertained that, whenever attacked, the expulsion of the enemy was certain. A stronger impression however was made by the news upon the Lacedæmonian army invading Attica, who were at the same time suffering from want of provisions (the ears not being yet ripe), and from an unusually cold spring : accordingly Agis marched them back to Sparta, and the fortification of Pylos thus produced the effect of shortening the invasion to the unusually short period of fifteen days. It operated in this manner to the protection of Karkyra : for the Peloponnesian fleet, recently arrived thither or still on its way, resolved unless immediately to return for the attack of Pylos. Having avoided the Athenian fleet by transporting the ships across the isthmus at Lædas, it reached Pylos about the same time as the Lacedæmonian land force from Sparta, composed of the Spartans themselves and the neighbouring Perioeci. For the more distant Perioeci, as well as the Peloponnesian allies, being just returned from Attica, though summoned to come as soon as they could, did not accompany this last march.*

At the last moment before the Peloponnesian fleet came in and occupied the harbours, Demosthenes detached two out of his five triremes to warn Euryancton and the main fleet, and to entreat immediate succour : the remaining ships he beached ashore under the fortification, protecting them by palisades planted in front, and prepared to defend himself in the best manner he could. Having posted the larger portion of his force—some of them were armed without arms, and many only half-armed—round the available points of the fortification, to resist attacks from the land force, he himself, with sixty chosen hoplites and a few bowmen, marched out of the fortification down to the sea-shore. It was on that side that the wall was weakest, for the Athenians, confident in their naval superiority, had given themselves little trouble to provide against an assailant fleet. Accordingly, Demosthenes forebore that the great stress of the attack would lie on the sea-side. His only safety consisted in preventing the enemy from landing : a purpose, seconded by the rocky and perilous shore, which left no possibility of approach for ships except on a narrow space immediately under the fortification. It was here that he took post, on

* Thucyd. iv. 2.

Preparations
made by Pe-
loponnesians
to defend
Pylos
against
them.

the water's edge, addressing a few words of encouragement to his men, and warning them that it was useless now to display seamanship in swimming up gulleys which were but too obvious, and that the only chance of escape lay in boldly manœuvring the enemy before they could set foot ashore : the difficulty of effecting a landing from ships in the face of resistance being better known to Athenian mariners than to any one else.¹

With a fleet of forty-three triremes under Themistocles, and a powerful land force, simultaneously attacking, the Lacedæmonians had good hopes of storming it were a rock as hastily converted into a military post. But as they feared that the first attack might possibly fail, and that the fleet of Eurymachus would probably return, they resolved to occupy first with the island of Sphækturia, the natural place where the Athenian fleet would take station for the purpose of watching the garrison ashore. The neighbouring coast on the mainland of Peloponnese was both barren and hostile, so that there was no other spot near where they could take station. And the Lacedæmonian commanders reckoned upon being able to step up, as it were mechanically, both the two entrances into the harbour, by triremes lashed together from the island to the mainland, with their prows pointing outwards ; so that they would be able at any rate, occupying the island as well as the two channels, to keep off the Athenian fleet, and to hold Demosthenes closely blocked up² on the rock of Pylos, where his provisions would quickly fail him.

With these views they drafted off by lot some hundred men each of the Spartan hold, accompanied as usual by Helots, and sent them across to Sphækturia ; while their land force and their fleet approached at once to attack the fortification.

Of the success on the land-side we hear little. The Lacedæmonians were proverbially unskilful in the attack of anything like a fortified place, and they appear now to have made little impression. But the chief stress and vigour of the attack came on the sea-side, as Demosthenes had foreseen. The landing-place, even where practicable, was still rocky and difficult, and so

Preparations of the Lacedæmonians were—they sent a detachment to occupy the island of Sphækturia, opposite Pylos.

Themistocles saw that he must be quick and bold—sent a detachment of his ships to the attack on Sphækturia.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 14.

² Thucyd. iii. 15. *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνὶ τῇ νηὶ τροχὸς ἀνέσταναι*—*it is not possible to rise up in the ship.*

landing on their own shore. The Athenians, in honour of their success, created a trophy, the chief ornament of which was the shield of Demolias, cast ashore by the waves.

On the third day, the Lacedæmonians did not repeat their attack, but sent some of their vessels round to Asidæ in the Messenian Gulf for timber to construct battering machines; which they intended to employ against the wall of Demosthenes on the side towards the harbour, where it was higher, and could not be assailed without machines, but where at the same time there was great facility in landing—for their previous attack had been made on the side fronting the sea, where the wall was lower, but the difficulties of landing insuperable.¹

But before these ships came back, the face of affairs was seriously changed by the unexpected return of the Athenian fleet from Zakynthos under Eurymedon, reinforced by four Chian ships and some of the guard-ships at Nauplia, so as now to number fifty sail. The Athenian admiral, finding the strength fleet in possession of the harbour, and seeing both the island of Sphakteria occupied, and the opposite shore covered with Lacedæmonian hoplites²—for the allies from all parts of Peloponnesus had now arrived—looked around in vain for a place to land. He could find no other right station except the uninhabited island of Ptole, not very far distant. From hence he called forth in the morning to Pylos, prepared for a naval engagement—hoping that perhaps the Lacedæmonians might come out to fight him in the open sea, but resolved, if this did not happen, to force his way in and attack the fleet in the harbour; the breadth of sea between Sphakteria and the mainland being sufficient to admit of manœuvring.³ The Lacedæmonian admiral, instantly collected

Return of
Eurymedon
and the
Athenian
fleet to
Pylos.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 23. *ἀνέβησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ὀλίγοι πλοῖα καὶ ὕλην, ἡνέκα δὲ μηχανὰς ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ δαμόθενος ἀκροῦς, ἧς ἔκρηται ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ πύλῳ.*

² Thucyd. ii. 23. *Ἡ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἀντιπρόσωπος, ὡς ἔκρηται καὶ, ὡς ἐν ῥέει ἔκρηται ἔκρηται ἐπὶ τῇ πύλῳ.*

³ *Ἡ ἀπορία.* "The harbour which was not small," he describes. His question, *ἦν δὲ τῆς πύλης, ὡς ἔκρηται* much resembles *ἦν δὲ τῆς πύλης* and

Dr. Arnold, and was, indeed, one of the reasons which induced the latter to suppose that the harbour meant by Thucydides was the harbour of Nauplia, but the neighbouring lake of Corinth.

I have already observed that navigation is a former note; but in reference to the operation of manœuvring, I observe, first, that the sea is much to be considered in every part; the note, *ἦν δὲ τῆς πύλης*, is the ordinary manner of Thucydides.

by the speed of the Athenian fleet in rounding back, never thought of sailing out of the harbour to fight, nor did they even consider their scheme of blocking up the two entrances of the harbour with triremes closely locked together. Leaving both entrances open, they determined to defend themselves within; but even here, so defective were their preparations, that several of their triremes were put in order, and the crews not fully accord, when the Athenian admiral sailed in by both entrances at once to attack them. Most of the Lacedæmonian triremes,

To defeat the Lacedæmonian fleet in the harbour of Pylos.

afloat and in fighting trim, resisted the attack for a certain time, but were at length vanquished and driven back to the shore, many of them with serious injury.³

Few of them were captured and towed off, one with all her crew afloat. The Athenians, vigorously pursuing their success, drove against such as took refuge on the shore, as well as those which were not engaged at the moment when the attack began, and had not been able to get afloat or into action. Some of the vanquished triremes being deserted by their crews, who jumped out upon the land, the Athenians were proceeding to tow them off, when the Lacedæmonian hoplites on the shore opposed a new and strenuous resistance. Exalted to the utmost pitch by witnessing the disgraceful defeat of their fleet, and aware of the cruel consequences which turned upon it, they marched all armed into the water, aimed the ships to prevent them from being dragged off, and engaged in a desperate conflict to haffle the assailants. We have already seen a similar act of bravery, two years before, on the part of the Mæonian hoplites accompanying the fleet of Phœnix near Naupactus.⁴ Extraordinary courage and valour was here displayed on both sides, in the attack as well as in the defence, and such was the clamour and confusion, that neither the land-skill of the Lacedæmonians nor the sea-skill of the Athenians was of much avail: the contest was one of personal valour and considerable suffering on both sides. At length

³ But further, I have stated in a previous note that it is indifferently, in my judgment, to suppose the island of Pylos, to have touched the mainland much more closely in the time of Thucydides than it does now. At that time, however, very probably the length of the strait was not so large as we now find it.

⁴ Thucyd. lib. ii. § 29. *ἀνὰ πῶς ἑκαστὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἔθετο.* We cannot in English speak of committing a life, though the Greeks would in both Greek and Latin, to represent the hero killed by the imploding bank of an enemy's ship.

⁵ See above in this history, chap. xlii.

the Lacedæmonians moved their point, and moved all the ships ashore; none being moved away except those at first captured. Both parties thus separated: the Athenians retired to the harbour at Pylos, where they were doubtless hailed with overflowing joy by their comrades, and where they erected a trophy for their victory—giving up the enemy's dead for burial, and picking up the floating wrecks and plaves.¹

But the great prize of the victory was neither in the five ships captured nor in the relief afforded to the besieged at Pylos. It lay in the hoplites occupying the island of Sphakteria, who were now cut off from the mainland, as well as from all supplies. The Athenians, sailing round it in triumph, already looked upon them as their prisoners; while the Lacedæmonians on the opposite mainland, deeply distressed but not knowing what to do, sent to Sparta for advice. So grave was the emergency, that the Ephors came in person to the spot forthwith. Since they could still muster sixty triremes, a greater number than the Athenians—besides a large force on land, and the whole command of the resources of the country,—while the Athenians had no footing on shore except the contracted promontory of Pylos, we might have imagined that a strenuous effort to carry off the imprisoned detachment across the narrow strait to the mainland would have had a fair chance of success. And probably, if either Demosthenes or Brasidas had been in command, such an effort would have been made. But Lacedæmonian courage was rather staid and unyielding than adventurous. Moreover the Athenian superiority at sea insured a sort of fascination over men's minds analogous to that of the Spartans themselves on land; so that the Ephors, on reaching Pylos, took a despairing view of their position, and sent a herald to the Athenian generals to propose an armistice, in order to allow time for envoys to go to Athens and treat for peace.

To this Brasidas and Demosthenes assented, and an armistice was concluded on the following terms. The Lacedæmonians agreed to surrender not only all their triremes now in the harbour, but also all the rest in their ports, altogether to the number of sixty; also to abstain from all attack upon the fortress

The Lacedæmonian detachment is thought to be the same as the Athenians sent to the island of Sphakteria.—See note on Sphakteria at Pylos.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 23, 24.

at Pylos either by land or sea, for each time as should be necessary for the mission of envoys to Athens as well as for their return, both to be effected in an Athenian trireme provided for the purpose. The Athenians on their side engaged to abstain from all hostilities during the lito interval; but it was agreed that they should keep strict and unrelenting watch over the island, yet without landing upon it. For the subsistence of the detachment in the island the Lacedæmonians were permitted to send over every day two chalanæ of barley-meal in calves ready baked, two kotyles of wine,¹ and some meat for each hoplite, together with half that quantity for each of the attendant Hæbæ; but this was all to be done under the supervision of the Athenians, with corresponding obligations to send no more additional supplies. It was moreover expressly stipulated that if any one provision of the armistice, small or great, were violated, the whole should be considered as null and void. Lastly, the Athenians engaged, on the return of the envoys from Athens, to restore the triremes in the same condition as they received them.

Such terms sufficiently attest the hesitancy and anxiety of the Lacedæmonians; while the surrender of their entire naval force, to the number of sixty triremes, which was forthwith carried into effect, demonstrates at the same time that they sincerely believed in the possibility of obtaining peace. Well woe that they were themselves the original beginners of the war, at a time when the Athenians desired peace—and that the latter had besides made truceless coercion while under the pressure of the epidemic—they perceived that the same disposition still prevailed at Athens, and that their present pacific wishes would be as gladly welcomed as to procure without difficulty the rising sickness of the prisoners in Ephyraia.²

The Lacedæmonian envoys, conveyed to Athens in an Athenian trireme, appeared before the public assembly to set forth their

¹ Thucyd. iv. 12. The Chalanæ was accustomed to admit two grains, English dry measure; it was considered of the equal daily subsistence for a man. Some Lacedæmonians, whether just or otherwise, doubt of this daily allowance, because much is weight and quantity not specified; but that this quantity of food is not specified seems to

show that they did not fear close to this term.

The Kotyle contained about half a pint, English wine measure; with Lacedæmonian barley-bread therefore a pint of wine daily. It was always the custom in Greece to drink the wine with a large admixture of water.

² Thucyd. iv. 11; completed ed. 12.

minion, according to custom prefacing their address with some apology for that brevity of speech which belonged to their country. Their proposition was in substance a very simple one—"Give up to us the men in the island, and accept, in exchange for this deliverance, peace, with the alliance of Sparta". They enforced their cause by appeals, well-turned and conciliatory, partly indeed to the generosity, but still more to the prudential calculation, of Athens; explicitly admitting the high and glorious vantage-ground on which she was now placed, as well as their own humbled dignity and inferior position.¹ They, the Lacedæmonians, the first and greatest power in Greece, were written by adverse fortune of war—and that too without misconduct of their own—as that they were for the first time obliged to solicit an enemy for peace, which Athens had the previous opportunity of granting, not merely with honour to herself, but also in such manner as to create in their minds an irrefragable friendship. And it became Athens to make use of her present good fortune while she had it,—not to rely upon its permanence nor to shun it by exorbitant demands. Her own imperial pretensions, as well as the present circumstances of the Spartans, might teach her how unexpectedly the most disastrous calamities occurred. By granting what was now asked, she might make a power which would be far more desirable than if it were founded on the expected compliances of a weakened enemy, because it would rest on Spartan honour and gratitude: the greater the previous enmity, the stronger would be such reactionary sentiment.² But if Athens should now refuse, and if, in the further prosecution of the war, the men in Sphakteria should perish, a new and insupportable ground of quarrel,³ peculiar to Sparta herself, would be added to those

¹ Thucyd. ix. 15. *ὅτι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐκ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ἀπολογούμεθα.*

² Thucyd. ix. 15.

³ Thucyd. ix. 16. *ὅτι καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἀποφυγῆς, καὶ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ἀπολογούμεθα.*

⁴ Thucyd. ix. 16. *ὅτι καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἀποφυγῆς, καὶ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ἀπολογούμεθα.*

whole war had been begun, in consequence of the compliance of the Lacedæmonians after, and of wrongs alleged to have been done to them, by Athens; Sparta herself had no ground of quarrel—nothing of which she desired redress.

Dr. Arnold translates thus: "We shall have you not only indebted for the vessel, you will have indebted on Sparta; but also indebtedly because all sorts of us will have lost our most substantial base point of friendship." "The Spartan ambassador he would want that is a personal wound to him at once

again into the assembly to hear it. On being informed of the resolution, they made no comment on its substance, but invited the Athenians to name one missioner, who might discuss with them freely and dispassionately suitable terms for a pacification. Here however Klein burst upon them with an indignant rebuke. He had thought from the first (he said) that they came with dishonest purposes, but now the thing was clear—nothing else could be meant by this desire to treat with some few men apart from the general public. If they had really any fair proposition to make, he called upon them to proclaim it openly to all. But this the envoys could not bring themselves to do. They had probably come with authority to make certain concessions; but to announce these concessions forthwith, would have rendered negotiation impossible, besides dishonouring them in the face of their allies. Such dishonour would be incurred, too, without any advantage, if the Athenians should after all reject the terms, which the temper of the assembly before them rendered but too probable. Moreover, they were totally unpractised in the talents for dealing with a public assembly, such discussions being so rare as to be practically unknown in the Lacedæmonian system. To reply to the denunciation of a vehement speaker like Klein required readiness of elocution, dexterity, and self-command, which they had had no opportunity of acquiring. They remained silent—shocked by the speaker and intimidated by the temper of the assembly. Their mission was thus terminated, and they were reconcealed in the triforms to Pylus.¹

It is probable that if these envoys had been able to make an effective reply to Klein, and to defend their proposition against his charge of fraudulent purpose, they would have been sustained by Nicias and a certain number of leading Athenians, so that the assembly might have been brought at least to try the issue of a private discussion between diplomatic agents on both sides. But the case was one in which it was absolutely necessary that the envoys should stand forward with some defence for themselves, which Nicias might effectively second, but could not originate ;

¹ Thucyd. ii. 22.

and as they were incompetent to this task, the whole affair broke down. We shall hereafter find other examples, in which the incapacity of Lacedæmonian envoys to meet the open debate of Athenian political life is productive of disastrous results. In this case, the proposition of the envoys to enter into treaty with select commissioners was not only quite reasonable, but afforded the only possibility (though doubtless not a certainty) of some ultimate pacification; and the measures whereby Kleon discredited it was a grave stain of publicity—not unknown in warlike, though more frequent in ancient, political life. Kleon probably thought that if commissioners were named, Nikias, Lachis, and other politicians of the same rank and colour would be the persons selected; persons whose anxiety for peace and alliance with Sparta would make them over-indulgent and careless in securing the interests of Athens. It will be seen, when we come to describe the conduct of Nikias four years afterwards, that this suspicion was not ill-grounded.

Unfortunately Thucydides, in describing the proceedings of this assembly, so important in its consequences because it interrupted a promising opening for peace, is brief as usual—telling us only what was said by Kleon and what was decided by the assembly. But though nothing is positively stated respecting Nikias and his partisans, we learn from other sources, and we may infer from what afterwards occurred, that they vehemently opposed Kleon, and that they looked coldly on the subsequent enterprise against Spilakteria as upon his peculiar measure.¹

It has been common to treat the dismissal of the Lacedæmonian envoys on this occasion as a peculiar specimen of democratical folly. Yet over-estimation of the prospective dangers arising out of success, to a degree more extravagant than that of which Athens was now guilty, is by no means peculiar to democracy. Other governments, opposed to democracy not less in temper than in form—an able despot like the Emperor Napoleon, and a powerful aristocracy like that of England²—have failed success

¹ Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 7; *Philokles*, *Frags.* 126, 24, 248a.

² Let us recall some remarks of Mr. Baines in the *House of Commons* during the American war.

"For remember that in the beginning of this American war you were

greatly divided, and a very strong body, it was the strongest, opposed itself to the measures which would not and every power was employed to render popular. In order that the views of the cabinet might be put in the general discussion of the nation. This opposition con-

exchange for Sphakteria. Nay, even if such acquisition had been found impracticable, still the Athenians would have been able to effect some arrangement which would have widened the breach and destroyed the confidence between Sparta and her allies—a point of great moment for them to accomplish. There was therefore every reason for trying what could be done by negotiation, under the present temper of Sparta; and the step by which Kleon abruptly broke off such hopes was decidedly unwise.

On the return of the envoys without success to Pylos,¹ twenty days after their departure from that place, the armistice immediately terminated; and the Lacedæmonians re-demanded the triremes which they had surrendered. But Euryonides refused compliance with this demand, alleging that the Lacedæmonians had during the truce made a fruitless attempt to surprise the rock of Pylos, and had violated the stipulations in other ways besides; while it stood expressly stipulated in the truce, that the violation by either side even of the least among its conditions should cancel all obligation on both sides. Thucydides, without distinctly giving his opinion, seems rather to imply that there was no just ground for the refusal; though if any accidental want of vigilance had presented to the Lacedæmonians an opportunity for surprising Pylos, they would be likely enough to avail themselves of it, seeing that they would thereby drive off the Athenian fleet from its only landing-place, and render the continued blockade of Sphakteria impracticable. However the truth may be, Euryonides persisted in his refusal, in spite of loud protests of the Lacedæmonians against his perfidy. Hostilities were energetically resumed: the Lacedæmonian army on land began again to attack the fortifications of Pylos, while the Athenian fleet became doubly watchful in the blockade of Sphakteria, in which they were reinforced by twenty fresh ships from Athens, making a fleet of seventy triremes in all. Two ships were perpetually sailing round the island, in opposite directions, throughout the whole day; while at night the whole fleet was kept on watch, except on the sea-side of the island in stormy weather.²

The armistice is terminated, and war resumed at Pylos. Euryonides keeps possession of the Lacedæmonian fleet.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 25.

² Thucyd. iv. 26.

to every Haïti who succeeded in reaching the island with a supply. Though the Athenians redoubled their vigilance, and interrupted many of these daring struggles, still there were others who eluded them. Moreover the nations supplied to the island by stipulation during the absence of the convoys in their journey to Athens had been so ample, that Epistates the commander had been able to economise, and thus to make the stock hold out longer. Week after week passed without any symptoms of surrender. The Athenians not only felt the present sufferings of their own position, but also became apprehensive for their own supplies, all brought by sea round Peloponnesus to this distant and naked shore. They began even to mistrust the possibility of those indefinitely continuing the blockade, against the contingency of such violent weather as would probably cause at the close of summer. In this state of restlessness and uncertainty, the active Demosthenes began to organise a descent upon the island, with the view of carrying it by force. He not only sent for forces from the neighbouring allies, Euboeians and Kipsokians, but also transmitted an urgent request to Athens that reinforcements might be furnished to him for the purpose—making known explicitly both the uncomfortable condition of the argument and the uncertain chances of a siege blockade.

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4. 2) Die folgende Aufgabe betrifft die folgenden Aussagen und die Aussagen, die daraus resultieren. Die Aussagen sind:

Environ. Health Perspect. 1990;91:111-114.

4. 24: The 15 ascending variables are a linear combination of the variables after the chain association. \square

[illegible]

That these portions of Appalachians and Appalachians were always and have been and the other 100,000 people at Fyke, in regard to the following assembly, I cannot with a good conscience. The Atlantic

[illegible]

and delighted to have caught his political enemy in a trap, stood forward in person and pressed him to set about the enterprise without delay; intimating the willingness of himself and his colleagues to grant him any portion of the military force of the city which he chose to ask for.

Kleon at first dined with this proposition, believing it to be a mere stratagem of debate and not seriously intended. But so soon as he saw that what was said was really meant, he tried to back out, and observed to Nikias—"It is your place to call; you are general, not I?" Nikias only replied by repeating his exhortation, remonstrating formally the command against Sphakteria, and calling upon the Athenians to reflect what Kleon had said, as well as to hold him to his engagement. The more Kleon tried to evade the duty, the louder and more strenuous did the cry of the assembly become that Nikias should surrender it to him, and that he should undertake it. At last, seeing that there was no possibility of revoking, Kleon reluctantly accepted the charge, and came forward to announce his intention in a resolute address—"I am not at all afraid of the Lacedæmonians (he said): I shall sail without even taking with me any of the hoplites from the regular Athenian muster-roll, but only the Lemnians and Imbrians hoplites who are now here (that is, Athenian Lemnians or out-citizens who had properties in Lemnos and Imbros, and habitually resided there), together with some pelopons brought from Akos in Thracæ, and 400 bowmen. With this force, added to what is already at Pylos, I engage in the space of twenty days either to bring the Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria either as prisoners, or to kill them in the island." The Athenians [*phoroiis Thymelidh*] laughed somewhat at Kleon's assurance of tongue; but prudent men had pleasure in reflecting that one or other of the two advantages was now certain: either they would get rid of Kleon, which they anticipated as the issue at once most probable and most desirable—or if mistaken on this point, the

[Thucyd. iv. 22. & 23. (Kleon) at the public assembly where (Kleon) being asked whether he would be present at the first expeditionary departure, and also whether he would sail in person, he answered that he would sail in person, and also be commander of the expeditionary departure. After this Nikias proposed that he should sail in person, and also be commander of the expeditionary departure.]

[Kleon, at the public assembly where he was asked whether he would be present at the first expeditionary departure, and also whether he would sail in person, he answered that he would sail in person, and also be commander of the expeditionary departure. After this Nikias proposed that he should sail in person, and also be commander of the expeditionary departure.]

nothing at all—as having cunningly put himself into the shoes of Demosthenes, and stolen away from that general the glory of taking Sphakteria, after all the difficulties of the enterprise had been already got over, and “the risk nearly taken”—to use the phrase of the comic poet. Both of the poets are exaggerations in opposite directions; but the last in order of time, if it be good at all against Klein, is a galling weapon against those who derided Klein as an extravagant boaster.

If we intend fairly to compare the behaviour of Klein with that of his political adversaries, we must distinguish between the two occasions: first, that in which he had frustrated the pacific mission of the Lacedæmonian envoys; next, the subsequent delay and dilemma which has been recently described. On the first occasion, his advice appears to have been mistaken in policy, as well as offensive in manner. His opponents, proposing a discussion by special commissioners as a fair chance for honourable terms of peace, took a juster view of the public interests. But the case was entirely altered when the mission for peace (wisely or unwisely) had been broken up, and when the fate of Sphakteria had been committed to the chances of war. There were then imperative reasons for prosecuting the war vigorously, and for employing all the force requisite to ensure the capture of that island. And looking to this end, we shall find that there was nothing in the conduct of Klein either to blame or to deride; while his political adversaries (Nikias among them) are deplorably timid, ignorant, and selfish of the public interest, seeking only to turn the existing disappointment and dilemma into a party opportunity for ruining him.

To grant the reinforcement asked for by Demosthenes was obviously the proper measure, and Klein saw that the people would go along with him in proposing it. But he had at the same time good grounds for reproaching Nikias and the other Strategæ, whose duty it was to signify that proposition, with their backwardness in remaining silent, and in leaving the matter to go by default, as if it were Klein's affair and not theirs. His taunt—“This is what *I* would have done, if *I* were

could to avoid the point, and was only how little the poets of Aristophanes derived taste, is by the address of his own, he takes to any evidence of his conduct. It is important to notice verbal reality.

general¹—was a mere phrase of the heat of debate, such as must have been very often used without any idea on the part of the hearers of construing it as a pledge which the speaker was bound to realise. It was no disgrace to Kleon to decline a charge which he had never sought, and to confess his incompetence to command. The reason why he was forced into the post, in spite of his own unaffected reluctance, was not (as some historians would have us believe) because the Athenian people loved a joke, but from two feelings, both perfectly serious, which divided the assembly—feelings opposite in their nature, but misfailing on this occasion to the same result. His enemies loudly urged him forward, anticipating that the enterprise under him would miscarry and that he would then be released; his friends, perceiving this manoeuvre, but not sharing in such anticipations, and ascribing his reluctance to modesty, pronounced themselves so much the more vehemently on behalf of their leader, and repaid the scornful cheer by cheers of sincere encouragement. "Why do not you try your hand at this enterprise, Kleon, if you think it so easy? You will soon find that it is too much for you"—was the cry of his enemies: to which his friends would reply—"Yes, to be sure, try, Kleon; by all means, try; do not be backward; we warrant that you will come honourably out of it, and we will stand by you". Such cheer and counter-cheer is precisely in the temper of an animated multitude (as Thucydides² states it) divided in feeling. Friends as well as enemies thus conspired to impose upon Kleon a compulsion not to be eluded. Of all the parties here concerned, those whose conduct in the most unpardonably disgraceful are Nikias and his oligarchical supporters, who show a political enmity into the supreme extremity against his own strenuous protest, persuaded that he will fail, as as to compensate the lives of many soldiers, and the depletion of the state in an important emergency, but satisfying themselves with the idea that they shall bring him to disgrace and ruin.

It is to be remarked that Nikias and his fellow Statists were backward on this occasion, partly because they were really afraid of the duty. They anticipated a resistance to the death at Sphakteria, such as that at Thermopylae; in which case, through

¹ Thucyd. iv. 102. after slight pause *ἀνέστη*, *ἔειπεν*.

victory might perhaps be won by a superior auxiliary force, it would not be won without much bloodshed and peril, besides an insupportable quarrel with Sparta. If Kleon took a more correct measure of the chances, he ought to have credit for it as one "benevolum rursus confutorem". And it seems probable that if he had not been thus forward in supporting the request of Demosthenes for reinforcement—or rather, if he had not been so placed that he was compelled to be forward—Stikias and his friends would have laid aside the enterprise, and re-opened negotiations for peace under circumstances neither honorable nor advantageous to Athens. Kleon was in this matter one main author of the most important success which Athens obtained throughout the whole war.

On joining Demosthenes with his reinforcement, Kleon found every preparation for attack made by that general, and the soldiers at Pylos eager to commence such aggressive measures as would relieve them from the tedium of a blockade. Sphakteria had become recently more open to assault in consequence of an accidental conflagration of the wood, arising from a fire kindled by the Athenian screens, while landing at the skirt of the island and cooking their food. Under the influence of a strong wind, most of the wood in the island had thus caught fire and been destroyed. To Demosthenes this was an accident especially welcome; for the painful experience of his defeat in the forest-covered hills of Skellis had taught him how difficult it was for assailants to cope with an enemy whom they could not see, and who knew all the good points of defence in the country.¹ The island being thus stripped of its wood, he was enabled to survey the garrison, to count their number, and to lay his plan of attack on certain data. He now, too, for the first time discovered that he had undervalued their real number, having before supposed that the Laconians had sent in numbers for a greater total than was actually there. The island was occupied altogether by six Laconian hoplites, out of whom more than 120 were native Spartans, belonging to the first families in the city. The commander Epistadas, with the main body, occupied the centre of the island, near the only spring

Kleon goes to Pylos with a reinforcement—resolves on the taking of Sphakteria—expedition and conditions of the Lacedæmonians to it.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 66.
§—17

of water which it afforded.¹ An advanced guard of thirty hoplites was posted not far from the southeast in the end of the island furthest from Pylæ; while the end immediately fronting Pylæ, peculiarly steep and rugged, and containing even a rude circuit of stones of unknown origin, which served as a sort of defence, was held as a post of reserve.²

Such was the party which Kleon and Demosthenes were anxious to grasp. On the very day of the arrival of the losses, they sent a herald to the Lacedæmonian generals on the mainland, inviting the surrender of the hoplites on the island on condition of being simply detained under guard without any hardship, until a final pacification should take place. Of course the summons was refused; after which, leaving only one day for repose, the two generals took advantage of the night to put all their hoplites aboard a few triremes, making shore as if they were merely commencing the ordinary nocturnal circumnavigation, so as to excite no suspicion in the occupants of the island. The entire body of Athenian hoplites, 800 in number, were thus disembarked in two divisions, one on each side of the island, a little before daybreak; the outposts, consisting of thirty Lacedæmonians, completely unprepared, were surprised even in their sleep, and all slain.³ At the point of day the entire remaining force from the seventy-two triremes was also disembarked, leaving on board none but the thalamsi, or lowest tier of oarsmen, and reserving only a sufficient number to man the walls of Pylæ. Altogether there could not have been less than 10,000 troops employed in the attack of the island, men of all arms—800 hoplites, 800 peltasts, 800 bowmen; the rest armed with javelins, slings, and stones. Demosthenes kept his hoplites in one compact body, but distributed the light-armed into separate companies of about 800 men each, with orders to occupy the rising grounds all round, and harass the flanks and rear of the Lacedæmonians.⁴

To resist this large force, the Lacedæmonian commander Nysithea had only 800 hoplites armed him; for his outlying

¹ Cleomedes speaks of the mountainous character of these positions in the vicinity of the island, which may very well be ascribed to rocks in general.

² Luc. l. p. 329.

³ Cleomed. l. p. 32.

⁴ Cleomed. l. p. 32.

⁵ Thucyd. l. p. 32.

company of thirty men had been slain, and as many more must have been held in reserve to guard the rocky station in his rear. Of the Helots who were with him Thucydides says nothing during the whole course of the action. As soon as he saw the numbers and disposition of his enemies, Epitadas placed his men in battle array, and advanced to encounter the main body of hoplites whom he saw before him. But the Spartan march was habitually slow : moreover, the ground was rough and uneven, obstructed with clumps, and overlaid with dead and fallen from the recently burnt wood, so that a march at once rapid and orderly was hardly possible. He had to traverse the whole intermediate space, since the Athenian hoplites remained immovable in their position. No sooner had his march commenced than he found himself assailed both in rear and flanks, especially in the right or unshielded flank, by the numerous companies of light-armed.¹ Notwithstanding their extraordinary superiority of number, these men were at first overthrown at falling themselves in actual contact with Lacedæmonian hoplites.² Still they began the fight, poured in their missile weapons, and so annoyed the march that the hoplites were obliged to halt, while Epitadas ordered the most active among them to spring out of their ranks and repel the assailants. But pursuers with spear and shield had little chance of overtaking men lightly clad and armed, who always retired in whatever direction the pursuit was commenced, had the advantage of difficult ground, collected their annoyance against the rear of the pursuers, as soon as the latter retreated to resume their place in the ranks, and always took care to get round to the rear of the hoplites.

After some experience of the inefficiency of Lacedæmonian pursuit, the light-armed, becoming far bolder than at first, closed upon them, nearer and more universally, with arrows, javelins, and stones,—raising shouts and clamour that rent the air, rendering the word of command inaudible by the Lacedæmonian soldiers,

Masses of light troops of Athenian hoplites employed against the Lacedæmonians in Megarides.

Strategy of the Lacedæmonians — their heavy and long shield-march.

¹ Thucyd. i. 7.

² Thucyd. ix. 32.

³ Thucyd. ix. 32. Shows the nature of the march of a heavy and unshielded force of the Lacedæmonians, &c.

helpless for aggression, without being able to approach at all nearer to the Athenian hoplites. At length the Lacedæmonian commander, seeing that his position grew worse and worse, gave orders to draw the ranks and retreat to the last retreat in the rear. But this movement was not accomplished without difficulty, for the light-armed auxiliaries became so disordered and forward, that many wounded men, unable to move, or at least to keep in rank, were overtaken and slain.¹

A diminished remnant, however, reached the last post in safety. Here they were in comparative protection, since the ground was so rocky and impracticable that their enemies could attack them neither in flank nor rear; though the position at any rate could not have been long tenable separately, inasmuch as the only spring of water in the island was in the centre, which they had just been compelled to abandon. The light-armed being now less available, Demosthenes and Kleon brought up their 800 Athenian hoplites, who had not before been engaged. But the Lacedæmonians were here at home² with their weapons, and enabled to display their well-known superiority against opposing hoplites, especially as they had the vantage-ground against enemies charging from beneath. Although the Athenians were double in numbers, and wilder yet unmechanical, they were repulsed in many successive attacks. The besieged maintained their ground in spite of all previous fatigue and suffering, harder to be borne from the scanty diet on which they had recently subsisted. The struggle lasted so long that heat and thirst began to tell even upon the auxiliaries, when the commander of the Mænesians came to Kleon and Demosthenes, and intimated that they were now labouring in vain; promising at the same time that if they would confide to him a detachment of light troops and bowmen, he would find his way round to the higher cliffs in the rear of the auxiliaries.³ He accordingly stole away unobserved from the rear, scrambling round over pathless crags, and by an almost imperceptible footing on the brink of the sea, through approaches which the Lacedæmonians had left unguarded, never imagining that they could be isolated in that direction. He

They retreat
to this last
retreat at
the very
edge of the
island.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 84.

² Thucyd. iv. 85. cf. *Antiquities* i. 10, 11.

³ *Antiquities*, ib.

⁴ Thucyd. iv. 85.

suddenly appeared with his detachment on the higher post above them, so that their position was thus commanded, and they found themselves, as at Thermopylae, between two fires, without any hope of escape. Their numbers in front, encouraged by the success of the Messenians, pressed forward with increased ardour, until at length the courage of the Lacedæmonians gave way, and the position was carried.¹

A few moments more, and they would have been all overpowered and slain,—when Kleon and Demosthenes, anxious to carry them as prisoners to Athens, constrained their men to halt, and proclaimed by herald an invitation to surrender, on condition of delivering up their arms, and being held at the disposal of the Athenians. Most of them, incapable of further effort, closed with the proposition forthwith, signifying compliance by dropping their shields and waving their hands above their heads. The battle being thus ended, Sipyrae, the commander—originally only third in command, but now chief; since Epitadeus had been slain, and the second in command, Hippagretis, was lying disabled by wounds on the field—entered into conference with Kleon and Demosthenes, and entreated permission to send across for orders to the Lacedæmonians on the mainland. The Athenian commanders, though refusing this request, sent a messenger of their own, inviting Lacedæmonian heralds over from the mainland, through whom communications were exchanged twice or three times between Sipyrae and the chief Lacedæmonian authorities. At length the final message came:—"The Lacedæmonians direct you to take counsel for yourselves, but to do nothing disgraceful."² Their counsel was quickly taken; they surrendered themselves and delivered up their arms: 554 in number, the survivors of the original total of 480. And out of these no less than 136 were native Spartans, some of them belonging to the first families in the city.³ They were kept under guard during that night, and distributed on the morrow among the Athenian triremes to be conveyed as prisoners to Athens; while a truce was granted to the Lacedæmonians on shore, in order that they

¹ Thucyd. ix. 37.

² Thucyd. ix. 38. of Lacedæmonian usage.

³ Thucyd. ix. 38. of Lacedæmonian usage.

while Sipyrae, with a single re-

³ Thucyd. ix. 38; i. 12.

might carry across the dead bodies for burial. So careful had Epikles been in husbanding the provisions, that some food was yet found in the island; though the garrison had subsisted for fifty-two days upon usual supplies, aided by such economies as had been laid by during the twenty days of the armistice, when food of a stipulated quantity was regularly furnished. Seventy-two days had thus elapsed, from the first impetachment in the island to the hour of their surrender.¹

The best troops in modern times would neither incur reproach, nor occasion sympathy, by surrendering, under circumstances in all respects similar to this gallant moment in Epiklectica. Yet in Greece the astonishment was prodigious and universal, when it was learnt that the Lacedæmonians had consented to become prisoners.² For the terror inspired by their name and the deep-stroke impression of Thermopylae had created a belief that they would endure any extremity of hardship, and perish in the midst of any superiority of hostile force, rather than dream of giving up their arms and surviving as captives. The events of Epiklectica, shocking as they did this preconceived idea, discredited the military prowess of Sparta in the eyes of all Greece, and especially in those of her own allies. Even in Sparta itself, too, the same feeling prevailed—partially revealed in the career transmitted to Nymphon from the generals on shore, who did not venture to feign surrender, yet discomfited it by implication. It is certain that the Spartans would have lost less by their death than by their surrender. But we read with disgust the spiteful taunt of one of the allies of Athens (not an Athenian) engaged in the affair, addressed in the form of a question to one of the prisoners—"Have you lost men then less all alike?" The reply conveyed an intimation of the standing contempt entertained by the Lacedæmonians for the law and its chance-strokes in the line—"That would be a capital arrow which would single out the best man." The language which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Demaratus, composed in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, attests this same belief in Spartan valor—"The Lacedæmonians die, but never sur-

ARMISTICE.
Food issued
throughout
Greece by
the applica-
tion of Lacedæ-
monian
hospitality—
continued
issue of
Epiklectica
arms.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 95.

² Thucyd. ii. 95. *most prodigious* in 95.

gallantry also used the Peloponnesian rule

Herodotus Epiklectica, 95.

leader?" Such impression was from henceforward, not indeed effaced, but sensibly softened, nor was it ever again restored to its full former pitch.

But the general judgment of the Greeks respecting the capture of Sphakteria, remarkable as it is to commemorate, is far less surprising than that pronounced by Thucydides himself. Kleon and Demosthenes, returning with a part of the squadron and carrying all the prisoners, started from Sphakteria on the next day but one after the action, and reached Athens within twenty days after Kleon had left it. Thus "the promise of Kleon, issued as it was, came true," observes the historian.¹

¹ To admit a phrase, the counter-part of that which has been ascribed to the Gallic chiefs of the Emperor Augustus's army: *comperit mendacem*.
 10. 109.

² Thucyd. iv. 86, and 91. Kleon's conduct according to the former passage is still more reprehensible than the former.

Mr. Mitford, in recounting these incidents, after having said respecting Kleon, "In a very extraordinary mode of management which betrayed an impetuosity and an ignorance of the state of matters we may see that he was wonderfully deceived, his—
 opinion is shown, two pages farther—

"It however soon appeared, that though he was like them, returned in military conquest, the understanding was weak and the language pretentious. Accordingly, afterwards, on the business was not so important as it was in the general assembly imagined; and in fact the fall of the Athenian people, in committing such a trust to such a man, far exceeded that of the war himself, whose importance seldom started into beyond the control of his weakness. He had received intelligence that Demosthenes had already formed the plan and was preparing for the attack, with the boats upon the spot and in the neighbourhood. Hence his impetuous resolution to be seconded by troops, which he justifiably recommended to the qualifications of the Athenian people. By sending to require new Athenians, he further showed his judgment, when the device was to be proved, which was finally to defeat the expedition, by a repeat

which was easily granted, that Demosthenes might be joined with him in the command." (Mitford, Hist. of Greece, vol. III. ch. vi. sect. vi. 109, 110—111.)

It appears as if no historian could write down the name of Kleon without attaching to it some disparaging epithet or allusion. We are here told in the same sentence that Kleon was an impetuous temper for promoting the capture of the enterprise, and yet that the enterprise itself was poorly judged. We are told in one sentence that he was rash and culpable for pursuing this, viewed as to war in military conquest, a far wiser than that, we are informed, that he impetuously repeated that the most important aim to be found, Demosthenes, which he stated his colleague. We are told in the same sentence of Kleon, and that Kleon had received intelligence from Demosthenes—that it was over some private communication to himself, that Demosthenes had said no more to Kleon, nor did Kleon have anything, which was not equally known to every man in the assembly. The folly of the people in committing the trust to Kleon is commended—as if Kleon had sought it himself, or as if the people had been the first to propose it for him. If the folly of the people was then great, what was we to say of the levity of the distinguished party, with Kleon at their head, who implied the people was the folly, for the purpose of getting a political advantage, and who forced Kleon into the fight against his own most unqualified resistance? Against the measures of the oligarchical party, neither Mr. Mitford

Men with arms in their hands have always the option between death and imprisonment, and Greek opinion was only mistaken in assuming as a certainty that the Lacedæmonians would choose the former. But Kleon had never promised to bring them home as prisoners: his promise was disjunctive—that they should be either so brought home, or slain, within twenty days. No sentence throughout the whole of Thucydides intimates me so much as that in which he signifies such an expectation as "insane". Here are 400 Lacedæmonian hoplites, without any other description of troops to aid them—without the possibility of being reinforced—without any regular fortification—without any narrow pass such as that of Thermopylæ—without either a sufficient or a certain supply of food—cramped up in a small open island less than two miles in length. Against them are brought 10,000 troops of diverse arms, including 800 fresh hoplites from Athens, and marshalled by Demosthenes, a man alike enterprising and experienced. For the talents as well as the presence and preparations of Demosthenes are a part of the data of the case, and the personal competence of Kleon is concerned alone in foreign to the calculation. Now if, under such circumstances, Kleon suggested that this forlorn company of brave men should be either slain or taken prisoners, how could he be looked upon, I will not say as indulging in an insane boast, but even as contemplating a serious and untrusting estimate of probability? Even to doubt of this result, much more to pronounce such an opinion as that of Thucydides, implies an idea not only of superhuman power in the Lacedæmonian hoplites, but a disgraceful incapacity on the part of Demosthenes and the auxiliaries. The interval of twenty days, named by Kleon, was not extrinsically narrow, considering the distance of Athens from Tylea. For the attack of this petty island could not possibly occupy

any other historian says a word. When Kleon makes circumstances rightly, as Mr. Milner shows that he did in this case, he has credit for nothing better than guessing.

The truth is that the people credited no help to approaching Kleon, for he justified the last appearance of his island. But Milner and the friends somewhat great success in preparing it, since they fully believed that he would fail.

And even upon Mr. Milner's statement of the case, the opinion of Thucydides which stands at the beginning of this book is thoroughly unjustifiable: not less unjustifiable than the language of the modern historians about the "extraordinary circumstances" and the way in which Kleon was "trounced by fortune". Not a single incident can be quoted in the narrative to bear out these fortuitous assertions.

part of general, did the very best which could be done in his situation—he selected Demosthenes as colleague and heartily seconded his operations. Through the military attack of Sphakteria, one of the ablest specimens of generalship in the whole war, and distinguished not less by the skilful employment of different descriptions of troops than by care to spare the lives of the assailants, belongs altogether to Demosthenes, yet if Kleon had not been competent to stand up in the Athenian assembly and defy those gloomy predictions which we are attested in Thucydides, Demosthenes would never have been reinforced nor placed in condition to land on the island. The glory of the enterprise therefore belongs jointly to both. Kleon, far from stealing away the laurels of Demosthenes (as Aristophanes represents in his comedy of the Knights), was really the man of placing them on his head, though he at the same time deservedly shared them. It has hitherto been the practice to look at Kleon only from the point of view of his opponents, through whose testimony we know him. But the real fact is that this history of the events of Sphakteria, when properly conveyed, is a standing diploma to those opponents, and no inconsiderable honour to him; exhibiting them as ill-instructed in political foresight and of straightforward patriotism—as sacrificing the opportunities of war, along with the lives of their fellow-citizens and soldiers, for the purpose of raising a political quarry. It was the duty of Nikias, as Strategos, to prepare, and undertake in person if necessary, the reduction of Sphakteria. If he thought the enterprise dangerous, that was a good reason for resigning it to a larger military force, as we shall find him afterwards remonstrating about the Sicilian expedition, but not for letting it slip or throwing it off upon others.¹

The return of Kleon and Demosthenes to Athens, within the twenty days promised, bringing with them near 300 Lacedæmonian prisoners, must have been by far the most triumphant and exhilarating event which had occurred to the Athenians throughout the whole war. It at once changed the prospects, position, and feelings of both the contending parties. Such a number of Lacedæmonian prisoners, especially 180 Spartans, was a source of almost

1849
 equivalent at
 Athens to
 the capture
 of the Lacedæ-
 monian
 prisoners.

¹ *Philarch. Nikias*, c. 4; *Thucyd.* v. 1.

valuable and unknown, because usually shared, but such disclosures should spread through the country. Reluctant as they were to afford obvious evidence of their embarrassments, they nevertheless brought themselves (probably under the pressure of the friends and relatives of the Epialtians captives) to send to Athens several missions for peace; but all proved abortive.¹ We are not told what they offered, but it did not come up to the expectations which the Athenians thought themselves entitled to indulge.

We, who now review these facts with a knowledge of the subsequent history, see that the Athenians could have concluded a better bargain with the Lacedæmonians during the six or eight months succeeding the capture of Epialtioria, than it was ever open to them to make afterwards; and they had reason to regret letting slip the opportunity. Perhaps indeed Pericles, had he been still alive, might have taken a more prudent measure of the future, and might have had ascendancy enough over his countrymen to be able to arrest the tide of success at its highest point, before it began to ebb again.

But if we put ourselves back into the situation of Athens during the autumn which succeeded the return of Kleon and Demosthenes from Epialtioria, we shall easily enter into the feelings under which the war was continued. The actual possession of the captives now placed Athens in a far better position than she had occupied when they were only blocked up in Epialtioria, and when the Lacedæmonian convey first arrived to ask for peace. She was now certain of being able to command peace with Sparta on terms at least tolerable, whenever she chose to invite it—she had also a fair certainty of escaping the hardship of invasion. Next—and this was perhaps the most important feature of the case—the apprehension of Lacedæmonian power was now greatly lowered, and the prospects of success to Athens considered as prodigiously improved,² even in the estimation of impartial Greeks, much more in the eyes of the Athenians themselves. Moreover the idea of a tide of good fortune—of the favour of the gods now begun and likely to continue—of future

Some also
suppose the
policy of
Athens—
her chance
was now
apparently
bettered to
be made
favourable
to peace—
during the
war.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 12; compare Aristophanes, *Equiti* 345, with Schol.

² Thucyd. ii. 13.

known as a corollary from past—was one which powerfully affected Greek calculations generally. Why not push the present good fortune and try to regain the most important points lost before and by the Thirty years' truce, especially in Megara and Boeotia—points which Sparta could not concede by negotiation, since they were not in her possession? Though these speculations failed (as we shall see in the coming chapter), yet there was nothing unreasonable in acting upon them. Probably the deepest universal sentiment of Athens was at this moment warlike. Even Nikias, humiliated as he must have been by the success in Sphakteria, would forget his usual caution in the desire of retrieving his own personal credit by some military exploit. That Demosthenes, now in full measure of manhood, would be eager to prosecute the war, with which his prospects of personal glory were essentially associated (just as Thucydides' observance about Brasidas on the *Lamachusian* side), can admit of no doubt. The comedy of Aristophanes called the "*Acharnians*" was acted about six months before the affair of Sphakteria, when no one could possibly look forward to such an event—the comedy of the "*Knights*" about six months after it.¹ Now there is this remarkable difference between the two—that while the former breathes the greatest sickness of war, and presses in every possible way the importance of making peace, although at that time Athens had no opportunity of coming even to a decent accommodation—the latter running down the general character of Kleon with unmeasured scorn and ridicule, takes in one or two places only of the hardships of war, and drops altogether that emphasis and repetition with which peace had been dwelt upon in the "*Acharnians*"—although coming out at a moment when peace was within the reach of the Athenians.

To understand properly the history of this period, therefore, we must distinguish various conditions which are often confounded. At the moment when Sphakteria was first blockaded, and when the *Lamachusians* first sent to solicit peace, there was a considerable party at Athens disposed to entertain the offer. The

¹ Thucyd. v. 26.

² The *Acharnians* was performed at the festival of the *Lagna* at Athens—January, 428, B.C.; the *Knights* at the same festival in the coming year, 427, B.C.

old, &c.

Thucydides' *Sphakteria* took place about July, B.C. 425; between the two dates above, see Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, ad ann.

anxiety of Kleon was one of the main causes why it was rejected. But after the captives were brought home from Epikleria, the influence of Kleon, though positively greater than it had been before, was no longer required to procure the dismissal of Lachesmonian pacific officers and the continuance of the war. The general temper of Athens was then warlike, and there were very few to contend strenuously for an opposite policy. During the ensuing year, however, the chances of war turned out mostly unfavourable to Athens, so that by the end of that year she had become much more disposed to peace.¹ The truce for one year was then concluded. But even after that truce was expired, Kleon still continued eager (and on good grounds, as will be shown hereafter) for renewing the war in Thrace, at a time when a large proportion of the Athenian public had grown weary of it. He was one of the main causes of that resumption of warlike operations, which ended in the battle of Amphipolis, fatal both to himself and to Brasidas. There were thus two distinct occasions on which the personal influence and sanguine character of Kleon seems to have been of service in determining the Athenian public to war instead of peace. But at the moment which we have now reached—that is, the year immediately following the capture of Epikleria—the Athenians were sufficiently warlike without him; probably Nikias himself as well as the rest.

It was one of the earliest proceedings of Nikias, immediately after the inglorious exhibition which he had made in reference to Epikleria, to conduct an expedition, in conjunction with two colleagues, against the Corinthian territory. He took with him 60 triremes, 2000 Athenian hoplites, 500 horsemen aboard of some horse transports, and some additional hoplites from Miletos, Andros, and Karystos.² Starting from Piræus in the evening, he arrived a little before daybreak on a beach at the foot of the hill and village of Salypgia,³ about seven miles from Corinth, and two or three miles south of

Thucyd.
1. 102. 1.
2. 102. 1.
3. 102. 1.
4. 102. 1.
5. 102. 1.
6. 102. 1.
7. 102. 1.
8. 102. 1.
9. 102. 1.
10. 102. 1.

¹ Thucyd. 1. 102. 1. 11.

² Thucyd. 1. 102. 1. 12. and 1. 102. 1. 13.

³ See the geographical illustrations

at this descent in Dr. Arnold's plan and notes appended to the second volume of his Thucydides—and in General Leake's Travels in Greece, etc. vol. i. p. 102; vol. ii. p. 102.

the Isthmus. The Corinthian troops, from all the territory of Corinth within the Isthmus, were already assembled at the Isthmus itself to repel him: for intelligence of the intended expedition had reached Corinth some time before from Argos, with which latter place the scheme of the expedition may have been in some way connected. The Athenians having touched the coast during the darkness, the Corinthians were only apprised of the fact by fire-signals from Solymia. Not being able to hinder the landing, they despatched forthwith half their force, under Batus and Lythophron, to repel the invader, while the remaining half were left at the harbour of Kanchron, on the northern side of Mount Ocalus, to guard the port of Ereosmyon (outside of the Isthmus), in case it should be attacked by sea. Batus with one lochos of hoplites threw himself into the village of Solymia, which was unfortified, while Lythophron conducted the remaining troops to attack the Athenians. The battle was first engaged on the Athenian right, almost immediately after its landing, on the point called Charnoneia. Here the Athenian hoplites, together with their Karyatian allies, repelled the Corinthian attack, after a stout and warmly-disputed hand-to-hand combat of spear and shield. Nevertheless the Corinthians, retreating up to a higher point of ground, returned to the charge, and with the aid of a fresh lochos, drove the Athenians back to the shore and to their ships: from hence the latter again turned, and again recovered a partial advantage.¹ The battle was no less severe on the left wing of the Athenians. But here, after a contest of some length, the latter gained a more decided victory, greatly by the aid of their cavalry—pushing the Corinthians, who fell in some disorder to a neighbouring hill, and there took up a position.² The Athenians were thus victorious throughout the whole line, with the loss of about forty-seven men, while the Corinthians had lost 212, together with the general Lythophron. The victors erected their trophy, stripped the dead hoplites, and buried their own dead. The Corinthian detachment left at Kanchron could not see the battle, in consequence of the intervening ridge of Mount Ocalus; but it

¹ Thucyd. iv. 45.

² Thucyd. iv. 42. There is here an expression which Dr. Arnold explains, "to take up a position, in sense 'taking the town';" I do not think much an explanation is correct, even having much less in several other places to which he alludes. See a note on the simile of Pelion by the Thebans, immediately before the Peloponnesian war.

was at last made known to them by the death of the fugitives, and they forthwith hastened to afford help. Reinforcements also came both from Corinth and from Kenchreæ, and, as it seems too, from the neighbouring Peloponnesian cities—so that Nicias thought it prudent to retire on board of his ships, and halt upon some neighbouring islands. It was here first discovered that two of the Athenians slain had not been picked up for burial; upon which he immediately sent a herald to solicit a truce, in order to procure these two missing bodies. We have here a remarkable proof of the exactly attended to that duty; for the very sending of the herald was tantamount to confession of defeat.¹

From hence Nicias sailed to Krænona, where after ravaging the neighbourhood for a few hours he rested for the night. On the next day he re-embarked, sailed along the coast of Epidaurea, upon which he inflicted some damage by passing, and stopped at last on the peninsula of Methana, between Epidaurea and Troezen.² On this peninsula he established a permanent garrison, drawing a fortification across the narrow neck of land which joined it to the Epidaurean peninsula. This was his last exploit. He then sailed home; but the post at Methana long remained as a centre for pillaging the neighbouring regions of Epidaurea, Troezen, and Salamis.

While Nicias was engaged in this expedition, Euryclides and Sophokles had sailed forward from Pylos with a considerable portion of that fleet which had been engaged in the capture of Sphakteria, to the island of Korkyra. It has been already stated that the democratical government at Korkyra had been suffering severe pressure and privation from the oligarchical fugitives, who had come back into the island with a body of barbaric auxiliaries, and established themselves upon Mount Ithakē not far from the city.³ Euryclides and the Athenians, joining the Korkyreans in the city, attacked and stormed the post on Mount Ithakē; while the vanquished, retreating first to a lofty and inaccessible peak, were forced to surrender themselves on terms to the Athenians. Abandoning altogether their mercenary auxiliaries, they only stipulated that they should them-

He re-embarked—
sailed along
Epidaurea
—staid
before a post
on the
peninsula of
Methana.

Euryclides
with the
Athenians
first went to
Korkyra,
thence and
captivity of
the oligarchical
auxiliaries in
the island.

¹ Plutarch, Nicias, c. 6.

² Thucyd. iv. 46.
Euseb. 14.

³ Thucyd. iv. 8-11.

advice be sent to Athens, and left to the discretion of the Athenian people. Euryneon, according to these terms, deposited the disarmed prisoners in the neighbouring islet of Pnychia, under the strictest condition, that if a single man tried to escape, the whole expedition should be null and void.¹

Unfortunately for these men, the orders given to Euryneon carried him onward straight to Skilly. It was unknown therefore to him to send away a detachment of his squadron to convey prisoners to Athens; where the honours of delivering them would be reaped, not by himself, but by the officer to whom they might be consigned. And the Korkyrans in the city, on their part, were equally anxious that the men should not be sent to Athens. Their animosity against them being bitter to the extreme, they were afraid that the Athenians might spare their lives, so that their hostility against the island might be again renewed. And thus a mean jealousy on the part of Euryneon, combined with revengings and insecurity on the part of the victorious Korkyrans, brought about a cruel catastrophe, paralleled nowhere else in Greece, though too well in keeping with the previous acts of the bloody drama enacted in this island.

The Korkyrans leaders, meaningly not without the privity of Euryneon, sent across to Pnychia fraudulent emissaries under the guise of friends to the prisoners. These emissaries—assuring the prisoners that the Athenian commissioners, in spite of the contrivance signed, were about to hand them over to the Korkyrans people for destruction—induced some of them to attempt escape in a boat prepared for the purpose. By concert, the boat was seized in the act of escaping, so that the terms of the capitulation were really violated: upon which Euryneon handed over the prisoners to their enemies in the island, who imprisoned them altogether in one vast building, under guard of hoplites. From this building they were driven out in companies of twenty men each, chained together in couples, and compelled to march between two lines of hoplites marshalled on each side of the road. Those who lagged in the march were hurried on by whips from behind: as they advanced, their private enemies on both sides singled them out, striking and piercing them with

¹ Thucyd. iv. 82.

at length they miserably perished. Three successive companies were thus destroyed, and the remaining prisoners in the building, who thought merely that their place of detention was about to be changed, suspected what was passing. As soon as they found it out, one and all refused either to quit the building or to permit any one else to enter. They at the same time pitiously implored the intervention of the Athenians, if it were only to kill them and thus preserve them from the cruelties of their merciless countrymen. The latter, obtaining from attempts to force the door of the building, made an aperture in the roof, from whence they shot down arrows, and poured showers of fire upon the prisoners within, who sought at first to protect themselves, but at length abandoned themselves to despair, and assisted with their own hands in the work of destruction. Some of them placed their throats with the arrows shot down from the roof; others hung themselves, either with cords from some building which happened to be in the building, or with strips torn and twisted from their own garments. Night came on, but the work of destruction, both from above and within, was continued without intermission, so that before morning all these wretched men had perished, either by the hands of their enemies or by their own. At daybreak the Eockyrians entered the building, piled up the dead bodies on carts, and transported them out of the city: the exact number we are not told, but seemingly it cannot have been less than 300. The women who had been taken at Lefke along with these prisoners were all sold as slaves.¹

Thus failed the bloody dimensions in this ill-fated island; for the oligarchical party were completely annihilated, the democracy was victorious, and there were no further violence throughout the whole war.² It will be recollected that these deadly feuds began with the return of the oligarchical prisoners from Cortafra, bringing along with them projects both of treason and of revolution. They ended with the annihilation of that party, in the manner above described; the interval being filled by mutual atrocities and revolutions, wherein of course the victors had most opportunity of gratifying their vindictive passions. Eurynechos, after the termination of these events, proceeded

¹ Thucyd. iv. 47, 48.

² Thucyd. iv. 48.

advanced with the Athenian squadron to Sicily. What he did there will be described in a future chapter devoted to Sicilian affairs exclusively.

The complete prostration of Amphibia during the campaign of the preceding year had left Anaktoria without any defense against the Akarnanians and Athenian squadrons from Naupaktos. They besieged and took it during the course of the present summer,¹ expelling the Corinthian proprietors, and re-peopling the town and its territory with Akarnanian settlers from all the townships in the country.

Throughout the maritime empire of Athens nations continued perfectly tranquil, except that the inhabitants of Chios, during the course of the winter, incurred the suspicion of the Athenians from having recently built a new wall to their city, as if it were done with the intention of taking the first opportunity to revolt.² They strenuously protested their innocence of any such designs, but the Athenians were not satisfied without wanting the destruction of the obnoxious wall. The presence on the opposite continent of an active band of Mithridatian exiles, who captured both Rhodians and Antiochians during the ensuing spring, probably made the Athenians more anxious and vigilant on the subject of Chios.³

The Athenian regular tribute-gathering squadron, cruising among the maritime subjects, captured, during the course of the present summer, a prisoner of some importance and singularity. It was a Persian ambassador, Artaphernes, seized at Eion on the Bityria, in his way to Sparta with despatches from the Great King. He was brought to Athens, where his despatches, which were at some length and written in the Assyrian character, were translated and made public. The Great King told the Lacedæmonians, in substance, that he could not comprehend what they meant; for that among the numerous envoys whom they had sent, no two told the same story. Accordingly he desired them, if they wished to make themselves understood, to send some envoys with fresh and plain instructions

¹ Thucyd. ix. 42.

² Thucyd. ix. 44.

³ Thucyd. ix. 45.

to accompany Artaphrones.¹ Such was the substance of the despatch, conveying a remarkable testimony as to the march of the Lacedæmonian government in its foreign policy. Had any similar testimony existed respecting Athens, demonstrating that her foreign policy was conducted with half as much astuteness and stupidity, ample instances would have been drawn from it to the discredit of democracy. But there has been no motive generally to discredit Lacedæmonian institutions, which included kingship in double measure—two parallel lines of hereditary kings, together with an entire exemption from everything like popular discussion. The extreme defects in the foreign management of Sparta, revealed by the despatch of Artaphrones, seem traceable partly to an habitual infirmness often noted in the Lacedæmonian character—partly to the usual change of Ephors, as frequently bringing into power men who strive to undo what had been done by their predecessors—and still more to the absence of everything like discussion or census of public measures among the citizens. We shall find more than one example, in the history about to follow, of this disposition on the part of Ephors not merely to change the policy of their predecessors, but even to subvert treaties sworn and concluded by them. Such was the habitual secrecy of Spartan public business, that in doing this they had neither criticism nor discussion to fear. Brasidas, when he started from Sparta on the expedition which will be described in the coming chapter, could not trust the assistance of the Lacedæmonian narrative without binding them by the most solemn oaths.²

The Athenians sent back Artaphrones in a triseme to Ephesus, and availed themselves of this opportunity for procuring access to the Great King. They sent envoys AC 63. along with him, with the intention that they should accompany him up to Susa; but on reaching Asia, the news met them that King Artabanus had recently died. Under such circumstances, it was not judged expedient to prosecute the mission, and the Athenians dropped their design.³

¹ Thucyd. ix. 20. Such a testimony respecting Sparta is of great value, as it is the only instance of a Spartan despatch to a foreign power, and it is the only instance of a Spartan despatch to a foreign power.

² Thucyd. ix. 20. Such a testimony respecting Sparta is of great value, as it is the only instance of a Spartan despatch to a foreign power, and it is the only instance of a Spartan despatch to a foreign power.

³ Thucyd. ix. 20. Such a testimony respecting Sparta is of great value, as it is the only instance of a Spartan despatch to a foreign power, and it is the only instance of a Spartan despatch to a foreign power.

⁴ Thucyd. ix. 20. Such a testimony respecting Sparta is of great value, as it is the only instance of a Spartan despatch to a foreign power, and it is the only instance of a Spartan despatch to a foreign power.

Respecting the great monarchy of Persia, during this long interval of fifty-four years since the capture of Xerxes from Greece, we have little information before us except the names of the successive kings. In the year 485 B.C., Xerxes was succeeded by Artabanus and Mithridates, through one of those plots of great household affairs, so frequent in Oriental palaces. He left two sons, or at least two sons present and conspicuous among a greater number, Darius and Artaxerxes. But Artabanus persuaded Artaxerxes that Darius had been the murderer of Xerxes, and thus prevailed upon him to avenge his father's death by becoming an accomplice in killing his brother Darius: he next tried to seduce Artaxerxes himself, and to appropriate the crown. Artaxerxes however, being apprised beforehand of the scheme, either slew Artabanus with his own hand or procured him to be slain, and then resigned (known under the name of Artaxerxes Longimanus) for forty years, down to the period at which we are now arrived.¹

Nothing has already been made of the revolt of Egypt from the dominion of Artaxerxes, under the Libyan prince Inarus, actively aided by the Athenians. After a few years of success, this revolt was crushed and Egypt again subjugated, by the energy of the Persian general Megabyzus—with severe loss to the Athenian forces engaged. After the peace of Kallias, erroneously called the Kinnecian peace, between the Athenians and the king of Persia, war had not been since resumed. We read in Kallias, scilicet various anecdotes seemingly collected at the court of Susa, romantic adventures ascribed to Megabyzus, his wife Amyris, his mother Ananthe, and a Greek physician of Kōa, named Apollonides. Megabyzus son of Megabyzus, after the death of his father, deserted from Persia and came as an exile to Athens.²

The Athenians do not appear to have ever before sent envoys of courtesy, ambassadors with the Greek flag, through the idea of doing so must have been newly struck in them, as we may see by the frequent name of *Proxarchos* in the *Agamemnon* of Aristophanes, acted in the year before this event.

¹ *Diogen. li. 10*, *Aristotel. Polit. i.*

² *Diogen. li. 1*; *Strabo, Persia, c. 16, 16*. It is evident that there were contradictory traditions respecting the plot to which Xerxes and a Galatian were the victims, and we have no means of determining what the details were.

³ *Strabo, Persia, c. 16—17*; *Herodot. li. 82*.

At the death of Artabanus Longimanus, the family violence incident to a Persian succession were again exhibited. His son Xerxes succeeded him, but was assassinated, after a reign of a few weeks or months. Another son, Sogdianus, followed, who perished in like manner after a short interval.¹ Lastly, a third son, Ochus (known under the name of Darius Nothus), either able or more fortunate, kept his crown and life between nineteen and twenty years. By his queen the eunuch Parysatis, he was father to Artabanus Mianon and Cyrus the younger, both names of interest in reference to Greek history, to whom we shall hereafter recur.

¹ Herodotus, viii. 142-143; Ktesias, Persica, c. 41-42.

CHAPTER LIII.

FOURTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE eighth year of the war, on which we now touch, presents events of a more important and decisive character than any of the preceding. In reviewing the preceding years we observe that though there is much fighting, with hardship and privation inflicted on both sides, yet the operations are mostly of a desultory character, not calculated to determine the event of the war. But the capture of Sphakteria and its prisoners, coupled with the surrender of the whole Lacedæmonian fleet, was an event full of consequences and inspiring to the eyes of all Greece. It stimulated the Athenians to a series of operations, larger and more ambitious than anything which they had yet conceived—directed, not merely against Sparta in her own country, but also to the recovery of that ascendancy in Megara and Bœotia which they had lost on or before the Thirty years' truce. On the other hand, it intimidated so much both the Lacedæmonians, the revolted Chæliadic allies of Athens in Thracia, and Perikles king of Macedonia, that between them the expedition of Brasidas, which struck so serious a blow at the Athenian empire, was concerted. This year is thus the turning-point of the war. If the operations of Athens had succeeded, she would have regained nearly as great a power as she enjoyed before the Thirty years' truce. But it happened, that Sparta, or rather the Spartan Brasidas, proved successful, gaining enough to neutralise all the advantages derived by Athens from the capture of Sphakteria.

The first enterprise undertaken by the Athenians in the course of the spring was against the island of Kythira, on the southern coast of Laconia. It was inhabited by Lacedæmonian Perioeci,

landed at Kythira, and drove the inhabitants out of the lower town into the upper, where they speedily capitulated. A certain party among them had indeed secretly invited the coming of Nikias, through which intrigue easy terms were obtained for the inhabitants. Some few men, indicated by the Kythirians in intelligence with Nikias, were carried away as prisoners to Athens; but the remainder were left undisturbed and enrolled among the tributary allies under obligation to pay four talents per annum, an Athenian garrison being placed at Kythira for the protection of the island. From hence Nikias employed seven days in despoils and lavash upon the coast, near Helon, Ainal, Aphrodisia, Korymba, and elsewhere. The Lacedæmonian force was disseminated in petty garrisons, which remained each for the defense of its own separate post, without seeking to expel the Athenians, so that there was only one action, and that of little importance, which the Athenians deemed worthy of a trophy.

In returning home from Kythira, Nikias first ranged the small strip of cultivated land near Epicharmus Limira, on the rocky eastern coast of Laccada, and then attacked the *Agistean* settlement at Thyrea, the frontier strip between Laccada and Argolis. This town and district had been made over by Sparta to the *Agistean*, at the time when they were expelled from their own island by Athens in the first year of the war. The new inhabitants, finding the town too distant from the sea,¹ for their maritime habits, were now employed in constructing a fortification close on the shore, in which work a Lacedæmonian detachment under Tautabas, on guard in that neighbourhood, was assisting them. When the Athenians landed, both *Agistean* and Lacedæmonians at once abandoned the new fortification. The *Agistean*, with the commanding officer Tautabas, occupied the upper town of Thyrea; but the Lacedæmonian troops, not thinking it feasible, refused to take part in the defense, and retired to the neighbouring mountains, in

¹ Thucyd. ix. 28. He states that Thyrea was but a village, or about a mile and one-half, distant from the sea. But Colonel Leake observes in the *Notes*, vol. ii. ch. xxv. p. 202, who has discovered quite sufficient reason to

identify the spot, affirms "that it is at least three times that distance from the sea".

This explains to us the more clearly why the *Agistean* thought it necessary to build their new fort.

spite of urgent entreaty from the Argives.¹ Immediately after landing, the Athenians marched up to the town of Typhra, and sacked it by storm, burning or destroying everything within it. All the Argives were either killed or made prisoners, and even Tantalus, disabled by his wounds, became prisoner also. From hence the armament returned to Athens, where a vote was taken as to the disposal of the prisoners. The Kythirians brought home were distributed for sale mainly among the dependent islands: Tantalus was retained along with the prisoners from Sphakteria; but a harder fate was reserved for the Argives. They were all put to death, victims to the long-standing antipathy between Athens and Argos. This cruel act was nothing more than a strict application of admitted customs of war in those days. Had the Lacedæmonians been the victors, there can be little doubt that they would have acted with equal rigour.²

The occupation of Kythira, in addition to Tylos, by an Athenian garrison, following so closely upon the capital disaster in Sphakteria, produced in the minds of the Spartans feelings of alarm and depression such as they had never before experienced. Within the course of a few short months their position had completely changed, from superiority and aggression abroad, to insult and insecurity at home. They anticipated nothing less than incessant foreign attacks on all their weak points, with every probability of internal defection, from the standing discontent of the Helots. It was not unknown to them probably that even Kythira itself had been lost partly through betrayal. The capture of Sphakteria had caused peculiar emotion among the Helots, to whom the Lacedæmonians had addressed both appeals and promises of emancipation, in order to procure manœuvres for their hoplites while blockaded in the island. If the ultimate surrender of these hoplites had stated the terrors of Lacedæmonian power throughout all Greece, such effect had been produced to a still greater degree among the oppressed Helots. A refuge at Tylos, and a nucleus which presented some possibility of expanding into regenerated Messenia, were now before their eyes; while the establishment of an Athenian gari-

Alarm and depression among the Lacedæmonians—
they themselves in regard to the Helots.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 92; Diodorus, xii. 59.

men at Kythira opened a new channel of communication with the mainland of Sparta, so as to tempt all the Helots of daring temper to stand forward as liberators of their enslaved race.¹ The Lacedæmonians, habitually cautious at all times, felt now as if the tide of fortune had turned decidedly against them, and acted with confirmed mistrust and dismay—confining themselves to measures strictly defensive, but organizing a force of 400 cavalry, together with a body of bowmen, beyond their ordinary establishment.

The precautions which they thought it necessary to take in regard to the Helots added the last measure of their apprehensions at the moment, and exhibit moreover a reinforcement of fraud and cruelty rarely equalled in history. Wishing to single out from the general body such as were most high-couraged and valiant, the

They are, they, and some to the some, that, they of the Helots.

Epheors made proclamation that those Helots who conceived themselves to have earned their liberty by distinguished services in war might stand forward to claim it. A considerable number stayed the call—probably many who had undergone hardest hazards during the preceding summer in order to convey provisions to the beleaguered soldiers in Sphakteria.² After being examined by the government 2000 of them were selected as fully worthy of emancipation, which was forthwith bestowed upon them in public ceremonial—with garlands, visits to the temples, and the full measure of religious solemnity. The government had now made the selection which it desired; presently every man among these newly-emancipated Helots was made away with—we are told how.³ A stratagem at once so

¹ Thucyd. ii. 25, 26, 27.

² Thucyd. ii. 26.

³ Thucyd. ii. 26, and especially the beginning of the paragraphed passage, in which Thucydides is so fully explicit as to the manner of the massacre. It is at this point that Thucydides is so fully explicit as to the manner of the massacre. It is at this point that Thucydides is so fully explicit as to the manner of the massacre.

Dr. Thucydides is so fully explicit as to the manner of the massacre. It is at this point that Thucydides is so fully explicit as to the manner of the massacre. It is at this point that Thucydides is so fully explicit as to the manner of the massacre. It is at this point that Thucydides is so fully explicit as to the manner of the massacre.

means for restoring the freedom to the Helots is so fully explicit as to the manner of the massacre. It is at this point that Thucydides is so fully explicit as to the manner of the massacre. It is at this point that Thucydides is so fully explicit as to the manner of the massacre. It is at this point that Thucydides is so fully explicit as to the manner of the massacre.

perfidious in the contrivance, so murderous in the purpose, and so complete in the execution, stands without parallel in Grecian history—we might almost say without a parallel in any history. It implies a depravity far greater than the rigorous execution of a barbarous customary law against prisoners of war or rebels, even in large numbers. The Ephors must have employed numerous instruments, apart from each other, for the performance of this bloody deed. Yet it appears that no certain knowledge could be obtained of the details—a striking proof of the mysterious efficiency of this Council of Five, surpassing even that of the Council of Ten at Venice—as well as of the utter absence of public inquiry or discussion.

It was while the Lacedæmonians were in this state of uneasiness at home that envoys reached them from Pericles of Macedonia and the Chalkidians of Thrace, entreating aid against Athens, who was considered likely, in her present state of success, to resume aggressive measures against them. There were moreover other parties, in the neighbouring cities¹ subject to Athens, who secretly favoured the application, engaging to stand forward in open revolt as soon as any auxiliary force should arrive to warrant their incurring the hazard. Pericles (who had on his hands a dispute with his kinsman Arrheneus, prince of the Lyncestæ-Macedonians, which he was anxious to be enabled to close successfully) and the Chalkidians offered at the same time to provide the pay and maintenance, as well as to facilitate the transit, of the troops who might be sent to them. And—what was of still greater importance to the success of the enterprise—they specially requested that Brasidas might be invested with the command.² He had now recovered from his

Request from the Chalkidians and Lyncestians that Brasidas should be sent to them under Pericles.

Speakers of their Elide became engaged in the warlike business of the prosecution of the war mentioned in the text. Dr. Thirlwall observes that the Spartan government would not order the assistance of the Elide at a time when it could employ them elsewhere. "Certain that it may be replied that the capture of Epidauria took place in July or August, while the expedition under Brasidas was not organized until the following winter or spring. There was therefore an interval of some months, during

which the government had not yet formed the idea of employing the Elide in foreign service. And this interval is quite sufficient to give a full and distinct meaning to the expression not yet returned to, in which Dr. Thirlwall is misled, without the necessity of going back to any more remote point of antiquarian lore.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 27.

² Thucyd. ii. 28. *ἐπιτρέψαντες δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν Κορινθίων ἀρχὴν καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων ἀρχηγὸν ἀποπέμποντες αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὴν ἑξέδαν.*

worlds revolved at Pylos, and his reputation, for adventurous valor, great as it was from positive desert, stood out still more conspicuously, because not a single other Spartan had as yet distinguished himself. His other great qualities, apart from personal valor, had not yet been shown, for he had never been in any supreme command. But he burned with impatience to undertake the operation destined for him by the envoys; although at this time it must have appeared so replete with difficulty and danger, that probably no other Spartan except himself would have entered upon it with hopes of success. To raise up embarrasments for Athens in Thrace was an object of great consequence to Sparta, while she also obtained an opportunity of sending away another large detachment of dangerous Helots. Seven hundred of these latter were armed as hoplites and placed under the orders of Brasidas, but the Lacedæmonians would not assign to him any of their own proper forces. With the exception of the Spartan name—with 700 Helot hoplites, and with such other hoplites as he could raise in Peloponnesus by means of the funds furnished from the Chalcidians—Brasidas prepared to undertake this expedition, alike adventurous and important.

Had the Athenians entertained any suspicion of his design, they could easily have prevented him from ever reaching Thrace. But they knew nothing of it until he had actually joined Perikles, nor did they anticipate any serious attack from Sparta, in this moment of her depression—much less an enterprise far bolder than any which she had ever been known to undertake. They were now clad with hopes of conquest to come on their own part—their affairs being so prosperous and promising, that parties favorable to their interests began to revive, both in Megara and Boeotia; while Hippokratides and Demosthenes, the two chief strategæ for the year, were men of energy, well qualified both to project and execute military achievements.

The first opportunity presented itself in regard to Megara. The inhabitants of that city had been greater sufferers by the war than any other persons in Greece. They had been the chief

Brasidas is
ordered to go
with them
and take
possession
of Pylos.

He is and
order.
Brasidas
proceeds
to Athens.
The Lacedæ-
monians
order
Brasidas
to proceed
to Megara.



course of bringing down the war upon Athens, and the Athenians avenged upon them all the hardships which they themselves endured from the Lacedæmonian invasion. Twice in every year they laid waste the Megarid, which bordered upon their own territory ; and that too with such destructive efficacy throughout its limited extent, that they intercepted all supplies from the lands near the town—at the same time keeping the harbour of Nisæa closely blocked up. Under such bad conditions the Megarians found much difficulty in supplying even the primary wants of life.¹ But their own bad now, within the last few months, became still more intolerable by an intensive connexion in the city, ending in the expulsion of a powerful body of exiles, who seized and held possession of Pige, the Megarian port in the Gulf of Cæciliæ. Probably imports from Pige had been their chief previous resource against the destruction which came on them from the side of Athens ; so that it became severely possible to sustain themselves, when the exiles in Pige not only deprived them of this resource, but took positive part in harassing them. These exiles were oligarchical, and the government in Megara had now become more or less democratical. But the privations in the city presently reached such a height, that several citizens began to labour for a compromise, whereby the exiles in Pige might be reinstated. It was evident to the leaders in Megara that the bulk of the citizens would not long sustain the pressure of enemies from both sides ; but it was also their feeling that the exiles in Pige, their bitter political rivals, were worse enemies than the Athenians, and that the return of these exiles would be a sentence of death to themselves. To prevent this counter-revolution, they opened a secret correspondence with Hippobolus and Democritus, engaging to betray both Megara and Nisæa to the Athenians ; through Nisæa, the harbour of Megara, about one mile from the city, was a separate fortress, occupied by a Peloponnesian garrison, and by them exclusively, as well as the Long Walls—for the purpose of holding Megara fast to the Lacedæmonian underhand.²

¹ The picture drawn by Aristobolus (*Antiquities*, 100) is a exaggeration, but it indicates probably not too much.

² Thucyd. ii. 26. *Democritus* (ii. p. 200) gives negative details as the distance

between Megara and Pige : Thucydides only says, "There appears much reason to suppose the latter are Peloponnesians." Thucyd. Meg. 10, pp. 18—19.

The scheme for surprise was concerted, and what is more remarkable—in the extreme publicity of all Athenian affairs, and in a matter in which many persons must have been privy—was kept secret until the instant of execution. A large Athenian force, 4000 hoplites and 680 cavalry, was appointed to march at night by the high road through Eleusis to Megara; but Hippokratès and Demosthenès themselves went on ship-board from Piræus to the island of Minos, which was close against Sphæra, and had been for some time under occupation by an Athenian garrison. Here Hippokratès equipped himself with 400 hoplites, in a hollow cut of which brick work had been dug, on the mainland opposite to Minos, and not far from the gate in the Long Wall which opened near the junction of that wall with the ditch and wall surrounding Minos; while Demosthenès, with some light-armed Plataians and a detachment of active young Athenians (called *Peripoli*, and serving as the movable guard of Attica), in their first or second year of military service, placed himself in ambush in the sacred precincts of Archa, still closer to the same gate.

To procure that the gate should be opened was the task of the conspirators within. Amidst the difficulties to which the Megarians had been reduced in order to obtain supplies (especially since the blockading force had been placed at Minos), predatory sailing by night was not omitted. Some of these conspirators had been in the habit, before the intrigue with Athens was projected, of carrying out a small sculler-boat by night upon a cart, through this gate, by permission of the Peloponnesian commander at Minos and the Long Walls. The boat, when thus brought out, was first carried down to the shore along the hollow of the dry ditch which surrounded the wall of Minos—then put to sea for some nightly enterprise—and lastly, brought back again along the ditch before daylight in the morning; the gate being opened, by permission, to let it in. This was the only way by which any Megarian vessel could get to sea, since the Athenians at Minos were complete masters of the harbour.

On the night fixed for the surprise, this boat was carried out

Conspirators
were within
open the
gate, and
brought them
into the
harbour.
Long Walls.
They carried
the boat
down to the
Long Walls.

the gate, and interpreted the war rolled with all as they were about to open it. Without betraying any knowledge of the momentous secret which they had just learned, these opponents loudly protested against opening the gate and going out to fight an enemy for whom they had never estimated themselves, even in estimates of greater strength, to be a match in the open field. While insisting only on the public interests of the measure, they at the same time planted themselves in arms against the gate, and declared that they would perish before they would allow it to be opened. For such obstinate resistance the conspirators were not prepared, so that they were forced to abandon their design and leave the gate closed.

The Athenian generals, who were waiting in expectation that it would be opened, were surprised by the delay that their friends within had been baffled, and immediately resolved to make sure of Sphac which lay behind them—an acquisition important not less to itself than as a probable means for the mastery of Megara. They set about the work with the characteristic rapidity of Athenians. Sphac and such its abundance being forthwith sent for from Athens, the army distributed among themselves the wall of circumvallation round Sphac in distinct parts. First, the interior space between the Long Walls themselves was built across, so as to cut off the communication with Megara; next, walls were carried out from the outside of both the Long Walls down to the sea, so as completely to enclose Sphac with its fortifications and ditch. The scattered houses, which formed a sort of ornamental suburb to Sphac, furnished bricks for this enclosing circle, or were sometimes even made to form a part of it as they stood, with the parapets as their roofs; while the men went out down to supply material wherever palisades were wanted. In a day and a half the work of circumvallation was almost completed, so that the Peloponnesians in Sphac saw before them nothing but a hopeless mass of blockade. Deprived of all communication, they not only feared that the whole city of Megara had joined the Athenians, but they were moreover without any supply of provisions, which had been always furnished to them in daily rations from the city. Despairing of speedy relief from Peloponnesians, they accepted any terms of capitulation offered to

The Athenians
then at
Sphac
—the place
important
to them.

down by the Athenian generals.¹ After delivering up their arms, each man among them was to be assigned for a stipulated price; we are not told how much, but doubtless a moderate sum. The Lacedæmonian commander, and such other Lacedæmonians as might be in Sparta, were however required to surrender themselves as prisoners to the Athenians, to be held at their disposal. On these terms Nisaea was surrendered to the Athenians, who cut off its communication with Megara, by keeping the intermediate space between the Long Walls effectively blocked up—walls, of which they had themselves, in former days, been the original authors.²

Such interruption of communication by the Long Walls indicated in the minds of the Athenian generals a ^{disruption} conviction that Megara was now cut of their reach. ^{of parties in} But the town in its present distracted state would ^{be sure to} certainly have fallen into their hands³ had it not been ^{of Brasidas} snatched from them by the accidental neighbourhood and energetic intervention of Brasidas. That officer, occupied in the levy of troops for his Thracian expedition, was near Clusium and Elkyria when he first learned the surprise and capture of the Long Walls. Partly from the alarm which the news excited among these Peloponnesian towns, partly from his own personal influence, he got together a body of 2700 Corinthian hoplites, 800 Elkyrian, and 400 Pelusian, besides his own small army, and marched with this united force to Tripodiscus in the Megarid, half-way between Megara and Pigea, on the road over Mount Gennetia, having first despatched a pressing summons to the Boeotians, to request that they would meet him at that point with reinforcements. He trusted by a speedy movement to preserve Megara, and perhaps even Nisaea; but on reaching Tripodiscus in the night, he learnt that the latter place had already surrendered. Alarmed for the safety of Megara, he proceeded thither by a night-march without delay. Taking with him only a chosen band of 800 men, he presented himself,

¹ Thucyd. iv. 26.

² Thucyd. i. 107; iv. 26. not all 'city walls, &c.' were only 'blockaded' but into the Megarid 'plains and the narrow neighbourhoods, which surround Megara.'

Brasidas left, on starting Thracian.

³ Thucyd. iv. 26. 'if all was as it seems, Brasidas' (Brasidas) 'with his troops should be very powerful, and, I think, ready to take Megara or Tripodiscus during the night.'

without being expected, at the gates of the city, entreating to be admitted, and offering to lend his immediate aid for the recovery of Sikyon. One of the two parties in Megara would have been glad to comply; but the other, knowing well that in that case the relief from Pige would be brought back upon them, was prepared for a strenuous resistance, in which case the Athenian force, still only one mile off, would have been introduced as auxiliaries. Under these circumstances the two parties came to a compromise, and mutually agreed to refuse admittance to Brasidas. They expected that a battle would take place between him and the Athenians, and each calculated that Megara would follow the fortunes of the victor.¹

Returning back without success to Tripodisium, Brasidas was joined there early in the morning by 2000 Spartan hoplites and 600 cavalry; for the Spartans had been put in motion by the same news as himself, and had even commenced their march before his messenger arrived, with such celerity as to have already reached Flavia.² The total force under Brasidas was thus increased to 4000 hoplites and 600 cavalry, with whom he marched straight to the neighbourhood of Megara. The Athenian light troops, dispersed over the plain, were surprised and driven in by the Spartan cavalry; but the Athenian cavalry, coming to their aid, maintained a desperate action with the auxiliaries, wherein, after some loss on both sides, a slight advantage remained on the side of the Athenians. They granted a truce for the burial of the Spartan officer of cavalry, who was slain with some others. After this indecisive cavalry skirmish, Brasidas advanced with his main force into the plain between Megara and the sea, taking up a position near to the Athenian hoplites, who were drawn up in battle array hard by Nisaea and the Long Walk. He then offered them battle if they chose it; but each party expected that the other would attack, and each was unwilling to begin the attack on his own side. Brasidas was well aware that if the Athenians refused to fight, Megara would be preserved from falling into their hands; which was his main object to prevent, and which had, in fact, been prevented only by his arrival. If he attacked and was beaten, he

*Brasidas goes
to Megara to
offer aid,
and offers
Megara to
the Athenians
if he is
driven from
the place.
But the
Spartans
refuse.*

¹ Thucyd. iv. 71.

² Thucyd. iv. 71.

would forfeit this advantage; while if victorious, he could hardly hope to gain much more. The Athenian generals on their side reflected that they had already secured a material acquisition in Nisaea, which cut off Megara from their sea; that the army opposed to them was not only superior in number of hoplites, but composed of contingents from many different states, so that no one city bated much in the action; while their own force was all Athenian and composed of the best hoplites in Athens, which would render a defeat severely ruinous to the city. They did not think it worth while to encounter this risk, even for the purpose of gaining possession of Megara. With such views in the leaders on both sides, the two armies remained for some time in position, each waiting for the other to attack. At length the Athenians, seeing that no aggressive movement was contemplated by their opponents, were the first to retire into Nisaea. Thus left master of the field, Brasidas retired in triumph to Megara, the gates of which were now opened without reserve to admit him.¹

The army of Brasidas, having gained the chief point for which it was collected, speedily dispersed, he himself resuming his preparations for Thracæ; while the Athenians on their side also returned home, leaving an adequate garrison for the occupation both of Nisaea and of the Long Walls. But the interior of Megara underwent a complete and violent revolution. While the leaders friendly to Athens, not thinking it safe to remain, fled forthwith and sought shelter with the Athenians;² the opposite party opened communication with the ruler at Nisæa and re-admitted them into the city; binding them, however, by the most solemn pledges to observe absolute amnesty of the past, and to study nothing but the welfare of the common city. The new-comers only kept their pledge during the interval which elapsed until they acquired power to violate it with effect. They soon got themselves placed in the chief commands of state, and found means to turn the military force to their own purposes. A

Revolution at Megara—expulsion of the exiles from Nisæa, and the pledges of amnesty—They violate the pledge, and effect a further oligarchical revolution.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 73.

² The great troops in the Pelopon. war.

³ The chief names of these oligarchs are given in Thucyd. iv. 73.

In the middle of Athens, employed as

increased encouragement to turn their activity elsewhere. Accordingly, very soon after the troops had been brought back from the Megaris,¹ Hippokleides and Demosthenes concerted a still more extensive plan for the invasion of Boeotia, in conjunction with some malcontents in the Boeotian towns, who desired to break down and democratise the oligarchical governments—and especially through the agency of a Thesian exile named Penelethes. Demosthenes, with forty triremes, was sent round Peloponnesos to Naupaktos, with instructions to collect an Akarnanian force—to sail into the innermost recess of the Corinthian or Euboian Gulf—and to occupy Eglea, a maritime town belonging to the Boeotian Thespie, where intelligence had been already established. On the same day, determined beforehand, Hippokleides engaged to enter Boeotia, with the main force of Athens, at the south-eastern corner of the territory near Tanagra, and to fortify Deliora, the temple of Apollo on the coast of the Euboian strait; while at the same time it was concerted that some Boeotian and Phokian malcontents should make themselves masters of Chaeronea on the borders of Phokis. Boeotia would thus be assailed on three sides at the same moment, so that the forces of the country would be distracted and unable to co-operate. Internal movements were farther expected to take place in some of the cities, such as perhaps to establish democratical governments and place them at once in alliance with the Athenians.

Accordingly, about the middle of August, Demosthenes sailed from Athens to Naupaktos, where he collected his Akarnanian allies—now stronger and more united than ever, since the refractory inhabitants of Olinda had been at length compelled to join their Akarnanian brethren: moreover the neighbouring Agræans with their prince Solgetides were also brought into the Athenian alliance. On the appointed day, accordingly about the beginning of October, he sailed with a strong force of these allies up to Eglea, in full expectation that it would be betrayed to him.² But the execution of this enterprise was less happy than that against Megara. In the first place, there was a mistake as to the day

Demosthenes, with an Akarnanian force, makes a descent on Boeotia at Eglea in the Corinthian Gulf—the intention being that he would

¹ Thucyd. iv. 75. *οὐδὲν γὰρ εἶπε διὰ τὴν Μεγαρίαν ἀναγκάσας, &c.*

² Thucyd. iv. 75.

understood between Hippokratides and Demosthenes: in the next place, the entire plot was discovered and betrayed by a Phokian of Thakione (bordering on Chalkonai) named Nikomachos—communicated first to the Lacedæmonians, and through them to the Boeotarchs. Siphia and Chalkonai were immediately placed in as good a state of defence, that Demosthenes, on arriving at the former place, found not only no party within it favourable to him, but a formidable Boeotian force which rendered attack unavailing. Moreover Hippokratides had not yet begun his march, so that the defenders had nothing to distract their attention from Siphia.¹ Under these circumstances, while Demosthenes was obliged to withdraw without striking a blow, and to content himself with an unsuccessful descent upon the territory of Sikyle,² all the expected internal movements in Boeotia were prevented from breaking out.

It was not till after the Boeotian troops, having repelled the attack by sea, had retired from Siphia, that Hippokratides commenced his march from Athens to invade the Boeotian territory near Tanagra. He was probably encouraged by like promises from the Boeotian allies, otherwise it seems remarkable that he should have persisted in executing his part of the scheme alone, after the known failure of the other part. It was, however, executed in a manner which implies unusual secrecy and confidence. The whole military population of Athens was marched into Boeotia, to the neighborhood of Delion, the eastern coast-extremity of the territory belonging to the Boeotian town of Tanagra; the expedition comprising all classes, not merely citizens, but also natives or resident non-free-men, and even non-resident strangers then by accident at Athens. (Of course this statement must be understood with the reserve of single guards being left behind for the city; but besides the really effective force of 7000 hoplites and several hundred horsemen, there appear to have been not less than 25,000 light-armed, half-armed, or unarmed, attendants accompanying the march.)³ The number of hoplites is here

¹ *Thucyd.* iv. 95.

² *Thucyd.* iv. 95.

³ *Thucyd.* iv. 94, 95. He states that

the Boeotian allies were about 15,000, and that the Athenians were 7,000 hoplites, and 2,000 horsemen. He says

completed, that the army quitted Delium, and began its march homeward out of Boeotia : halting, after it had proceeded about a mile and a quarter, within the Athenian territory of Orôpus. It was here that the hoplites awaited the coming of Hippocrates, who still remained at Delium, stationing the pæribios, and giving his final orders about future defence ; while the greater number of the light-armed and unarméd, separating from the hoplites, and seemingly without any anticipation of the coming danger, continued their poterna-march to Athens.¹ The position of the hoplites was probably about the western extremity of the plain of Orôpus, on the verge of the low heights between that plain and Delium.²

During these five days, however, the forces from all parts of Boeotia had time to muster at Tanagra. Their number was just completed as the Athenians were beginning their march homeward from Delium. The contingents had arrived, not only from Tifthes and its dependent townships around, but also from Haliartus, Karkaria, Orchomenus, Kôpa, and Thespis : that of Tanagra joined on the spot. The government of the Boeotian confederacy at this time was vested in eleven *hokarchai*—two chosen from Tifthes, the rest in unknown proportion by the other cities, immediate members of the confederacy—and in four *sunekai* or councils, the constitution of which is not known.

Though all the *hokarchai*, now assembled at Tanagra, formed a sort of council of war, yet the supreme command was vested in Pagondas and Arsenochides, the *hokarchai* from Tifthes—either in Pagondas, as the author of the *two*, or perhaps in both, alternating with each other day by day.³ As the Athenians were

Gathering of the Boeotian contingents at Tanagra. Pagondas, the Tifthes *hokarchi*, Arsenochides stand in sight.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 92. That the view round the temple had supporting towers, which furnished the account used by the Athenians, we may reasonably presume : the same in those places which are spoken of in Herodotus, iii. 107; compare Pausan. i. 101.

² The plain of Orôpus between Olynthus looking upwards from its upper angle to Delium towards the mouth of the Asopos, and stretching about five miles along the shore, from the foot of the hills of Maroneia on the east, to

the village of Skelfield on the west, where the great river, having extended westward beyond Orôpus, the island Delium. — The plain of Orôpus is separated from the more inland plain of Thespis by rocky ranges, through which the Asopos flows. See the *Atlas*, Athens and the Coast of Asia, vol. II. map. 17. p. 115.

³ Thucyd. iv. 92; v. 26. Arsenochides may probably be considered as either a descendant of Tifthes, or perhaps in the general expression of Thespisians,

and encroaching of all enemies; so that the Theotians who had the misfortune to be their neighbours would only be secure against them by the most resolute promptitude in defending themselves as well as in returning the blows first given. If they wished to protect their autonomy and their property against the condition of slavery under which their neighbours in Eubœa had long suffered, as well as so many other portions of Greece, their only chance was to march forward and beat these invaders, following the glorious example of their fathers and predecessors in the field of Marathon. The maritimes were favourable to an advancing movement; while Apollo, whose temple the Athenians had desecrated by converting it into a fortified place, would lend his cordial aid to the Boeotian defence.¹

Finding his exhortations favourably received, Pagondas conducted the army by a rapid march to a position close to the Athenians. He was anxious to fight them before they should have retreated farther; moreover the day was nearly spent—it was already late in the afternoon.

Having reached a spot where he was only separated from the Athenians by a hill, which prevented either army from seeing the other, he marshalled his troops in the array proper for fighting. The Theban hoplites, with their dependent allies ranged in a depth of not less than twenty-five shields, occupied the right wing; the hoplites of Hallartus, Koroneia, Kôpas, and its neighbourhood were in the centre: those of Theopis, Tanagra, and Orchomenos on the left; for Orchomenos, being the second city in Boeotia next to Thebes, claimed the second post of honour at the opposite extremity of the line. Each contingent adopted its own mode of marshalling the hoplites, and its own depth of files: on this point there was no uniformity—a remarkable proof of the prevalence of dissension among the Greeks, and how much such torn, even among confederates, stood apart as a separate unit.² Thucydides specifies only the

marshalling of the Boeotian army, great depth in the Theban hoplites—special Theban band of three thousand.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 91.

² Thucyd. iv. 91. As Aristotle observes, it is not so much the Boeotian soldiers, as it is those in the other divisions.

What is said with regard to the Boeotians in the text, is the same of the Athenians in the text.

between the Lacedæmonians on the one side and the Athenians, Argives, Megarenses, &c. on the other: the different forms or divisions of the Lacedæmonian army were not all marshalled in the same depth of files.

prodigious depth of the Tibetan hoplite; respecting the rest, he merely intimates that no common rule was followed. There is another point also which he does not specify, but which, though we learn it only on the inferior authority of Hsüehua, appears both true and important. The front ranks of the Tibetan heavy-armed were filled by 200 select warriors, of distinguished bodily strength, valor, and discipline, who were accustomed to fight in pairs, each man being attached to his neighbour by a peculiar tie of intimate friendship. These pairs were termed the *Hsueichü* and *Paradü*—chariotmen and companions, a designation probably handed down from the Hsienpi times, when the foremost heroes usually consisted in chariots in front of the common soldiers, but now preserved after it had outlived its appropriate meaning.¹ This band, composed of the finest men in the various palatines of Tibet, was in all days placed under peculiar training (for the defence of the Kadmat or citadel), detached from the front ranks of the phalanx, and organized into a separate regiment under the name of the Sacred Lodge or Band: we shall see how much it contributed to the short-lived military supremacy of Tibet. On both flanks of this mass of Tibetan hoplites, about 7000 in total number, were distributed 1000 cavalry, 600 palatins, and 15,000 light-armed or unarméd. The language of the historian seems to imply that the light-armed on the Tibetan side were something more effective than the mere multitude who followed the *Arhantana*.

Such was the order in which Pagmas marched his army over the hill, halting once for a moment in front and to the right of the *Arhantana*, to see that the ranks were even, before he gave the word for actual charge.²

¹Such language, as commander of the Tibetan division, the depth of his own division (Chinese, p. 10).

²Tibetan, vol. 10, paragraph 12, where it says: "The King, Hsueichü and Paradü, with their 200 warriors, were the first to charge." (Chinese, p. 10.)

³Chinese, vol. 10, paragraph 12, where it says: "The King, Hsueichü and Paradü, with their 200 warriors, were the first to charge." (Chinese, p. 10.)

⁴Chinese, vol. 10, paragraph 12, where it says: "The King, Hsueichü and Paradü, with their 200 warriors, were the first to charge." (Chinese, p. 10.)

⁵Chinese, vol. 10, paragraph 12, where it says: "The King, Hsueichü and Paradü, with their 200 warriors, were the first to charge." (Chinese, p. 10.)

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⁸Tibetan, vol. 10, paragraph 12, where it says: "The King, Hsueichü and Paradü, with their 200 warriors, were the first to charge." (Chinese, p. 10.)

Hippocrates, on his side, apprised while still at Delium that the Boeotians had moved from Tanagra, first sent orders to his army to place themselves in battle array, and presently arrived himself to command them; leaving 800 cavalry at Delium, partly as garrison, partly for the purpose of acting as the rear of the Boeotians during the battle. The Athenian hoplites were ranged eight deep along the whole line—with the cavalry, and such of the light-armed as yet remained, placed on each flank. Hippocrates, after arriving on the spot and surveying the ground occupied, marched along the front of the line briefly encouraging his soldiers; who, as the battle was just on the Oropian border, might fancy that they were not in their own country, and that they were therefore exposed without necessity. He too, in a strain similar to that adopted by Pagondas, reminded the Athenians that on either side of the border they were alike fighting for the defence of Athens, to keep the Boeotians out of it; since the Peloponnesians would never dare to enter the country without the aid of the Boeotian horse.¹ He further called to their recollection the great name of Athens, and the memorable victory of Myrænikè at Olenopeia, whereby their fathers had acquired possession of all Boeotia. But he had scarcely half finished his progress along the line, when he was forced to desist by the sound of the Boeotian pipe. Pagondas, after a few additional sentences of encouragement, had given the word: the Boeotian hoplites were now charging down the hill; and the Athenian hoplites, not less eager, advanced to meet them at a regular step.²

reason for directing a temporary halt to any further action was in part the good condition before the charge began. But to prosecute the troops to "fill their arms" would be the last thing that he would wish of.

In the interpretation of *evangelio*, Jesus Christ, I agree with the idea that, who indispensably requires or requires after Jesus' presence. Thomas, V. III, discussing how to know and believe, who would understand otherwise, think, as it seems to me, that a very learned scholar, and to be mentioned by the people of the world, is the only one.

These last findings merit consideration in the light of the fact that the two most common types of non-accidental injury are inflicted on the face and head.

seriously answering before : it may have
been suggested by the general shape of
the sandstone : see *Geology*, p. 100.

TABLE 1

[illegible]

This passage indicates what he
thought, by Dr. J. Smith, Myers, and
others, to have been a great success.

which, the comparative force of forward pressure would decide the victory. This motive is sufficient to explain the extraordinary depth of the Theban column, which was increased by Epameinondas, half a century afterwards, at the battle of Leuctra, from a depth of twenty-five men to the still more astonishing depth of fifty. We need not suspect the correctness of the text, with some critics, or suppose with others that the great depth of the Theban line arose from the circumstance that the rear ranks were too poor to provide themselves with arrows.¹ Even in a depth of eight, which was that of the Athenian column in the present engagement,² and seemingly the usual depth in a battle, the spears of the four rear ranks could hardly have penetrated successfully beyond the first line to do any mischief. The great use of all the ranks behind the first four was partly to take the place of such of the foremost lines as might be slain—partly to push forward the lines before them from behind. The greater the depth of the line, the more irremediable did this prospecting prove become. Hence the Thebans at Delium as well as at Leuctra found their account in disposing the column to so remarkable a degree,—a movement to which we may fairly presume that their hoplites were trained beforehand.

The Thebans on the right thus pushed back³ the troops on the left of the Athenian line, who retired at first slowly and for a short space, maintaining their order unbroken, so that the victory of the Athenians on their own right would have restored the battle, had not Paganias detached from the rear two squadrons of cavalry; who, wheeling across round the left lateral, suddenly appeared to the relief of the Boeotian left, and produced upon the Athenians on that side, already damaged in their ranks by the ardour of pursuit, the intimidating effect of a fresh army arriving to reinforce the Boeotians. And then, even on the right, the vulnerable portion of their line, the Athenians lost courage and gave way; while on the left, where they were worsted from

Pushed and
drifted of the
Athenians
—*ἀπώθητο*
—*ἀπώθητο*
—*ἀπώθητο*
—*ἀπώθητο*
—*ἀπώθητο*
—*ἀπώθητο*
—*ἀπώθητο*
—*ἀπώθητο*
—*ἀπώθητο*

¹ See the notes of Ep. Arnold and Pappas, ad Thucyd. iv. 90.

² Compare Thucyd. v. 80, 81, 82.

³ Thucyd. iv. 90. *ἀπώθητο* is the Boeotian form, *ἀπώθητο* is the Athenian.

the beginning, they found themselves pressed harder and harder by the pursuing Thracians; so that, in the end, the whole Athenian army was broken and put to flight. The garrison of Delium, reinforced by 800 cavalry whom Hippocrates had left there to guard the rear of the Boeotians during the action, either made no vigorous movement, or was repelled by a Boeotian reserve stationed to watch them.

Fight having become general among the Athenians, the different parts of their army took different directions. The right sought refuge at Delium, the centre fled to Oelipus, and the left took a direction towards the high lands of Paros. The pursuit of the Boeotians was vigorous and destructive. They had an efficient cavalry, strengthened by some Lokrian horse who had arrived even during the action: their pikemen also and their light-armed would render valuable service against retreating hoplites.¹ Fortunately for the vanquished, the battle had begun very late in the afternoon, leaving no long period of daylight. This important circumstance saved the Athenian army from almost total destruction.² As it was, however, the general Hippocrates, together with nearly 1000 hoplites and a considerable number of light-armed and archers, were slain; while the loss of the Boeotians, chiefly on their defeated left wing, was rather under 800 hoplites. Some prisoners³ seem to have been made, but we hear little about them. Those who had fled to Delium and Oelipus were conveyed back by sea to Athens.

The victors retired to Tanagra, after creating their trophies, burying their own dead, and despoiling those of their enemies. An elevated trophy of arms from the victor warriors long remained to decorate the temple of Apollo, while the spoil in other ways is said to have been considerable. Paganus also retired to lay siege to the newly-established fortress at Delium. But before commencing operations—which might perhaps prove tedious, since the Athenians could always reinforce the garrison by sea—he tried another means of obtaining the same object. He

¹ Thucyd. ii. 95. Athenians, v. 5. 125. Diodorus tells us, however, that the Boeotian hoplites were a mixture of archery, in which the Athenians had the advantage. This is quite inconsistent with the narrative of Thucydides.

² Thucydides tells us directly upon this

disposition.

³ For a complete notice of an history from Thucydides and Diodorus previous to the account by the *Vindicta* (Thucydides, iv. 11, v. 125). See also Thucyd. ii. 95, which affords us made to secure prisoners.

aggressions upon Attica—a severity which they treated as the gods would pardon, since their altars were allowed as a protection to the involuntary offender, and none but he who sinned without constraint experienced their displeasure. The Boeotians were guilty of the greater impiety—in refusing to give back the dead, except upon certain conditions connected with the holy ground—thus the Athenians, who surely refused to turn the duty of sepulture into an onerous bargain. "Tell us unconditionally (concluded the Athenian herald) that we may bury our dead under truce, pursuant to the custom of our hostilities. Do not tell us that we may do so, on condition of going out of Boeotia—for we are no longer in Boeotia—we are in our own territory, won by the sword."

The Boeotian generals dismissed the herald with a reply short and decisive:—"If you are in Boeotia, you may take away all that belongs to you, but only on condition of going out of it. If, on the other hand, you are in your own territory, you can take your own resolution without asking us."¹

In this debate, various as an illustration of Grecian manners and feelings, there seems to have been special pleading and evasion on both sides. The final sentence of the Boeotians was good as a reply to the incidental argument raised by the Athenian herald, who had noted the defence of Athens in regard to the temple of Delius brought on the allegation that the territory was Athenian, not Boeotian—Athenian by conquest and by the right of the strongest—and had concluded by affirming the same thing about Oropus, the district to which the battle-field belonged. It was only this same argument, of moral superior force, which the Boeotians retorted, when they said—"If the territory to which your application refers is yours by right of conquest (i.e. if you are *de facto* masters of it and are strongest within it)—you can of course do what you think best in it: you need not ask any truce at our hands; you can bury your dead without a truce."² The

¹ See the two difficult chapters, in III. vii. in Thucydides.

² See the notes of Pappas, *op. cit.*, in Greek, and other commentators in these chapters.

Neither these notes nor the footnote seem to me to do justice respectively, nor do they settle the point of the opposition between the Athenian herald and the Boeotian officers, which will

Bonstons knew that at this moment the field of battle was under guard by a detachment of their army,¹ and that the Athenians could not obtain the dead bodies without permission. But since the Athenian herald had asserted the reverse as a matter of fact, we can hardly wonder that they resorted to the production of such an argument; meeting it by a reply sufficiently pertinent to more diplomatic feeling.

But if the Athenian herald—instead of raising the incidental point of territorial property, combined with an inventional definition of that which constituted territorial property, as a defence against the alleged desecration of the temple of Delium—had confined himself to the main issue, he would have put the Bonstons completely in the wrong. According to principles universally respected in Greece, the victor, if solicited, was bound to grant to the vanquished a truce for burying his dead; to grant and permit it absolutely, without attaching any conditions. On this, the main point in debate, the Bonstons sided against the moral international law of Greece, when they exacted the evacuation of the temple at Delium as a condition for consenting to permit the burial of the Athenian dead.² Ultimately, after they had taken Delium, we shall find that they did grant it unconditionally. We may doubt whether they would have ever persisted in refusing it, if the Athenian herald had pressed this one important principle separately and exclusively, and if he had not, by an unskillful plan in violation of the right to occupy and live at Delium, both misapprehended their feelings, and furnished them with a collateral issue as a means of evading the main demand.³

to have perfectly consistent as a piece of diplomatic language.

It is possible, but do not take notice that it is the Athenian herald who first makes the speech. What is the point? The point is that the Athenian herald is the one who first makes the speech. The point is that the Athenian herald is the one who first makes the speech. The point is that the Athenian herald is the one who first makes the speech.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 91.

² What we need, is connection with the history, and another is the fact that the Athenian herald is the one who first makes the speech.

about the Thucydides relating to the history of the war, and the point is that the Athenian herald is the one who first makes the speech.

It is possible, but do not take notice that it is the Athenian herald who first makes the speech. The point is that the Athenian herald is the one who first makes the speech. The point is that the Athenian herald is the one who first makes the speech.

To judge this curious debate with perfect impartiality, we ought to add, in reference to the conduct of the Athenians in occupying Delium, that for an enemy to make special choice of a temple, as a post to be fortified and occupied, was a proceeding certainly rare, perhaps hardly admissible, in Grecian warfare. Nor does the vindication offered by the Athenians hardly meet the real charge preferred. It is one thing for an enemy of superior force to overrun a country, and to appropriate everything within it, sacred as well as profane: it is another thing for a weaker enemy, not yet in sufficient force for conquering the whole, to convert a temple of convenient site into a regular garrisoned fortress, and make it a base of operations against the neighbouring population. On this ground, the Boeotians might reasonably complain of the seizure of Delium; though I apprehend that no impartial interpreter of Grecian international custom would have thought them warranted in requiring the restoration of the place, as a peremptory condition to their granting the burial-truce when solicited.

All negotiation being thus broken off, the Boeotian generals prepared to lay siege to Delium, aided by 2000 Corinthian hoplites, together with some Megarians and the late Peloponnesian garrison of Siana, who joined after the news of the battle. Though they sent for darters and slingers, probably Ciliciana and Arcadians, from the Maline Gulf, yet their direct attacks were at first all repelled by the garrison, aided by an Athenian squadron off the coast, in spite of the hasty and awkward defences by which alone the fort was protected. At length they contrived a singular piece of fire-machinery, which enabled them to master the place. They first moved to twin a thick beam, plaved a channel through it long-ways from end to end, studded most part of the channel with iron, and then joined the two halves severately together. From the farther end of this hollowed beam they suspended by chains a large metal pot, full of pitch, brimstone, and burning charcoal; lastly, an iron tube, projected from the end of the interior channel of the beam, so as to come near to the

side of Delium, before the siege of Delium, and to the side of the Athenian fleet, and to the side of the Athenian fleet, and to the side of the Athenian fleet.

side of Delium, before the siege of Delium, and to the side of the Athenian fleet, and to the side of the Athenian fleet, and to the side of the Athenian fleet.

pot. Such was the machine, which, constructed at some distance, was brought on carts and placed close to the wall, near the palisading and the wooden towers. The Dorianers then applied great bellows to their own end of the beam, blowing violently a current of air through the interior channel, so as to raise an intense fire in the machine at the other end. The wooden portions of the wall soon catching fire, became untenable for the defenders, who escaped in the best way they could, without attempting further resistance. Two hundred of them were made prisoners, and a few slain; but the greater number got safely on shipboard. This capture of Delium took place on the seventeenth day after the battle, during all which interval the Athenian slain had remained on the field unburied. Presently, however, arrived the Athenian herald to make fresh application for the burial-truce, which was now forthwith granted, and granted unconditionally.¹

Such was the remarkable expedition and battle of Delium—a fatal discouragement to the feeling of confidence and hope which had previously reigned at Athens, besides the painful immediate loss which it inflicted on the city. Among the hoplites who took part in the vigorous charge and pushing of shields, the philosopher Sokrates is to be numbered. His bravery, both in the battle and the retreat, was much extolled by his friends, and doubted with good reason. He had before served with credit in the ranks of the hoplites at Potidæa, and he served also at Amphipolis; his patience under hardship, and endurance of heat and cold, being not less remarkable than his personal courage. He and his friend Lachis were among those hoplites who in the retreat from Delium, instead of flinging away their arms and taking to flight, kept their ranks, their arms, and their firmness of countenance; inasmuch that the pursuing cavalry found it dangerous to meddle with them, and turned to an easier prey in the dispersed fugitives. Alkibiades also served at Delium in the cavalry, and stood by Sokrates in the retreat. The latter was thus exposing his life at Delium nearly at the same time when Aristophanes was exposing him to derision in the comedy of the "Clouds," as a dreamer alike morally worthless and physically incapable.²

Sokrates
and
Alkibiades,
personally
present at
Delium.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 116, 117.

² See Plato's Symposium, s. 20, p. 202.

Lachis, p. 151; Charmides, p. 166; Symposium, Sokrates, p. 197; Meno, iv. p. 86.

Severe as the blow was which the Athenians suffered at Delium, their disasters in Thrace about the same time, or towards the close of the same summer and autumn, were yet more calamitous. I have already mentioned the circumstances which led to the preparation of a Lacedæmonian force intended to act against the Athenians in Thrace, under Brasidas, in concert with the Chalkidians, enrolled subjects of Athens, and with Perikles of Macedonia. Having frustrated the Athenian designs against Nigara (as described above),¹ Brasidas completed the levy of his division—3700 hoplites, partly Boeotæ, partly Dorian Peloponnesians—and conducted them, towards the close of the summer, to the Lacedæmonian colony of Herakleia, in the Thracian territory near the Mæis Gulf.

To reach Macedonia and Thrace, it was necessary for him to pass through Thessaly, which was no easy task; for the war had now lasted so long that every state in Greece had become mistrustful of the transit of armed foreigners. Moreover, the men of the Thessalian population were decidedly friendly to Athens, and Brasidas had no sufficient means to force a passage; while, should he wait to apply for formal permission, there was much doubt whether it would be granted, and perfect certainty of such delay and publicity as would put the Athenians on their guard. But though such was the temper of the Thessalian people, yet the Thessalian governments, all disaffected, sympathized with Lacedæmon. The federal authority or power of the league, which bound together the separate cities, was generally very weak. What was of still greater importance, the Macedonians, Perikians, as well as the Chalkidians, had in every city powerful guests and partisans, whom they prevailed upon to exert themselves actively in forwarding the passage of the army.²

¹ Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, c. 7. "We find it mentioned among the stories told about Alcibiades in his retreat from Delium, that his life was preserved by the inspiration of the Thracian women or goddess, which insinuated into us one doubtful opinion which of two events was the most due to him; Plutarch, *de Alcibiade*, l. vii; Plutarch, *de Alcibiade*, c. 12, p. 187.

The completion of Alcibiades' p. 2, 251 about the military service of Alcibiades is not to be defended, but it may probably be explained by the organization and instructions which he had had, according to the philosopher's explanation.

² See above, pp. 220-222.

³ Thucyd., *de* 76.

To these men Brasidas sent a message at Pharsalus, as soon as he reached Herakleia. Nikonidas of Larissa, with other Thracian friends of Periklitos, assembling at Melite in Achais Philistia, undertook to escort him through Thracely. By their countenance and support, combined with his own boldness, dexterity, and rapid movements, he was enabled to accomplish the seemingly impossible enterprise of running through the country, not only without the consent, but against the feeling of its inhabitants—simply by such celerity as to forestall opposition. After traversing Achais Philistia, a territory dependent on the Thracians, Brasidas began his march from Melite through Thracely itself, along with his powerful native guides. Notwithstanding all possible secrecy and celerity, his march became so far divulged, that a body of volunteers from the neighbourhood, offered at the prospecting and ardently to Nikonidas, assembled to oppose his progress down the valley of the river Eupros. Regarding him with rightful violation of an independent territory, by the introduction of armed forces without permission from the general government, they forbade him to proceed farther. His only chance of making progress lay in dissuading their opposition by fair words. His guides counselled themselves by saying that the suddenness of his arrival had imposed upon them as his guests the obligation of conducting him through, without waiting to ask for formal permission: to offend their countrymen, however, was the farthest thing from their thoughts—and they would renounce the enterprise if the persons now assembled persisted in their resolution. The same conciliatory tone was adopted by Brasidas himself. "He protested his strong feeling of respect and friendship for Thracely and its inhabitants: his arms were directed against the Athenians, not against them: nor was he aware of any unfriendly relation subsisting between the Thracians and Macedonians, such as to exclude either of them from the territory of the other. Against the prohibition of the parties now before them, he could not possibly march forward, nor would he think of attempting it; but he put it to their good feeling whether they ought to prohibit him." Such conciliatory language was successful in softening the opponents and inducing them to disperse. But so afraid were his guides of renewed

Resistance
and address
with which
he got
through
Thracely.

Chalkidians of Thrace, who, as zealous enemies of Athens, joined him forthwith, but discouraged any vigorous efforts to relieve Perikles from embarrassing enemies in the interior, in order that the latter might be under more pressing motives to consolidate and assist them. Accordingly Brasidas, though he joined Perikles and marched along with the Macedonian army towards the territory of the Lyncestæ, was not only averse to active military operations, but even entertained with fervour propositions from Arctikhæa, wherein the latter expressed his wish to become the ally of Laccedæmon, and offered to refer all his differences with Perikles to the arbitration of the Spartan general himself. Communicating these propositions to Perikles, Brasidas invited him to listen to an equitable compromise, admitting Arctikhæa into the alliance of Laccedæmon. But Perikles indignantly refused: "he had not called in Brasidas as a judge to decide disputes between him and his enemies, but as an auxiliary to put them down wherever he might point them out; and he protested against the iniquity of Brasidas in entering into terms with Arctikhæa, while the Laccedæmonian army was half-paid and maintained by him" (Perikles).¹ Notwithstanding such remonstrances, and even a hostile protest, Brasidas persisted in his intended conference with Arctikhæa, and was so far satisfied with the propositions made, that he withdrew his troops without marching over the pass into Lynxus. Too feeble to act alone, Perikles loudly complained. He even constructed his allurances for the future, so as to provide for only one-third of the army of Brasidas instead of one-half.

To this inconvenience, however, Brasidas submitted, in haste to begin his march into Chalkidiki, and his operations jointly with the Chalkidians, for reducing or subduing the subject-allies of Athens. His first operation was against Abantus, on the borders of the peninsula of Athos, the territory of which he invaded a little before the vintage—probably about the middle of September, when the grapes were ripe, but still out, and the whole crop of course exposed to ruin at the hands of an enemy superior in force. So important was it to Brasidas to have escaped the necessity of waiting another month in conquering

Brasidas
marches
against
Abantus.
State of
grapes in
the time.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 82.

standing high as you do both for prudence and power, will hardly keep back other Greeks. It will make them suspect that I am wanting either in power to protect them against Athens, or in honest purpose. Now, in regard to power, my own present army was one which the Athenians, though superior in number, were afraid to fight near Nieme; nor are they at all likely to send an equal force thither against me by sea. And in regard to my purpose, it is not one of mischief, but of liberation—the Lacedæmonian authorities having pledged themselves to me by the most solemn oaths that every city which joins me shall retain its autonomy. You have therefore the best assurance both as to my purpose and as to my power; you need not apprehend that I am come with factious designs, to serve the views of any particular men among you, and to remodel your established constitution to the disadvantage either of the Many or the Few. That would be worse than foreign subjugation; and by such doings we Lacedæmonians should be taking trouble to earn hatred instead of gratitude. We should play the part of unworthy traitors, worse even than that high-handed oppression of which we accuse the Athenians: we should at once violate our oaths, and sit against our strongest political interests. Perhaps you may say that though you wish me well, you desire for your parts to be let alone, and to stand aloof from a dangerous struggle. You will tell me to carry my propositions elsewhere, to those who can safely embrace them, but not to thrust my alliance upon any people against their own will. If this should be your language, I shall first call your kind gods and heroes to witness that I have come to you with a mission of good, and have employed persuasion in vain; I shall then proceed to ravage your territory and extort your money, thinking myself justly entitled to do so, on two grounds. First, that the Lacedæmonians may not sustain actual damage from those good wishes which you profess towards me without actually joining—damage in the shape of that tribute which you annually send to Athens. Next, that the Greeks generally may not be prevented by you from becoming free. It is only on the ground of common good that we Lacedæmonians can justify ourselves for liberating any city against its own will. But as we are conscious of desiring only extinction of the empire of Athens, not acquisition of empire

political action appear as a part of the confirmed character of the Alcibiades. We shall not find Brasidas entering other towns in a way so available or so harmonious.

But there is another influence which the scene just described inevitably suggests. It affords the clearest proof that the Alcibiades had little to complain of as subject- allies of Athens, and that they would have continued in that capacity, if left to their own choice without the fear of having their crop destroyed. Such is the pronounced feeling of the mass of the citizens: the party who desire otherwise are in a decided minority. It is only the combined effect, of severe impending loss and of tempting advantages held out by the warlike representative whom Sparta ever sent out, which induces them to revolt from Athens. Nor even then is the resolution taken without long opposition, and a large dissident minority, in a case where secret suffrage ensured free and genuine expression of preference from every individual. Now it is impossible that the scene in Alcibiades at this critical moment could have been of such a character, had the empire of Athens been practically alien and burdensome to the subject- allies, as it is commonly depicted. Had such been the fact—had the Alcibiades felt that the imperial ascendancy of Athens oppressed them with harshness or transgression from which their neighbours, the so-called Chalcidians in Olynthus and elsewhere, were exempt—they would have hailed the advent of Brasidas with that ardour which he himself expected and was surprised not to find. The sense of present grievance, always acute and often excessive, would have stood out in their prominent impulses. They would have needed neither intimidation nor cajolery to induce them to throw open their gates to the liberator, who, in his speech within the town, took no actual suffering to appeal to, but is obliged to gain over an audience, evidently unwilling, by alternate threats and promises.

As in Alcibiades, so in most of the other Thracian subjects of Athens, the bulk of the citizens, though strongly solicited by the Chalcidians, manifest no spontaneous disposition to revolt from Athens. We shall find the party who introduce Brasidas to be a conspiring minority, who not only do not consult the

instances which this proceeding affords, that the bulk of citizens, having the Alcibiades among the warlike Athenians, and every inch soldiers to boot.

majority beforehand, but not in such a manner as to leave no free option to the majority afterwards, whether they will really or reject, bringing in a foreign force to overrule them and compromise them without their own consent in hostility against Athens. Now that which makes the events of Alcibiades so important as an evidence is, that the majority is not thus entrapped and compromised, but pronounces its judgment freely after ample discussion. The grounds of that judgment are clearly set forth to us, so as to show that hatred of Athens, if even it exists at all, is in no way a strong or determining feeling. Had there existed any such strong feeling among the subject-allies of Athens in the Chalcidic peninsula, there was no Athenian force now present to blinder them all from opening their gates to the liberator Spartans by spontaneous rejection; as he himself, encouraged by the sanguine promises of the Chalcidians, evidently expected that they would do. But nothing of this kind happened.

That which I before mentioned to be the result of Alcibiades, a privileged ally of Athens, is now confirmed in the result of Alcibiades, a voluntary and subject ally. The demonstrations of both prove that imperial Athens neither inspired hatred nor conscious partial prejudice to the population of her subject-cities generally. The movements against her arose from party-inclivities, of the same character as that Platonic party which introduced the Theban revolution into Plataea at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. There are of course differences of sentiment between one town and another; but the conduct of the towns generally demonstrates that the Athenian empire was not felt by them to be such a scheme of plunder and oppression as Mr. Mitford and others would have us believe. It is indeed true that Athens managed her empire with reference to her own feelings and interest, and that her hold was rather upon the preference than upon the affection of their allies; except in so far as those among them, who were democratically governed sympathized with her democracy. It is also true that restrictions in any form on the autonomy of each separate city were offensive to the political instincts of the Greeks: moreover Athens took care and took pains to disguise or soften the real character of her empire, as one resting simply on established fact and superior

form. But this is a different thing from the influence of practical hardship and oppression, which, had it been real, would have inspired strong positive hatred among the subject-classes: such feelings expected to find vent in Thessaly, but did not really find, in spite of the easy opening which his presence afforded.

The acquisition of Marathon and Sagira enabled Demades in no very long time to extend his conquests: to enter Arginae—and from thence to make the capital acquisition of Amphipolis.

Demades' acquisition of Arginae. He took the place for the purpose of the conquest of Amphipolis.

Arginae was situated between Sagira and the river Strymon, along the western bank of which since its territory extended. Along the eastern bank of the same river,—north of the lake which it forms under the name of Kerkiraia, and north of the town of Eion at its mouth,—was situated the town and territory of Amphipolis, communicating with the lands of Arginae by the important bridge there situated. The Arginians were subject to Athens, like Marathon and Sagira. The alliance of these two cities to Demades gave him opportunity to cultivate intelligence in Arginae, wherein Eion had excited a standing discontent against Athens, ever since the foundation of the neighbouring city of Amphipolis.¹ The latter city had been established by the Athenians. Agam, at the head of a numerous body of colonists, on a spot belonging to the Eionian Thracians called Kinos, Kinei or Kinos Waga, about five years prior to the commencement of the war (B.C. 437); after two previous attempts to colonise it—one by Hippias and Antagoras at the period of the Ionic revolt, and a second by the Athenians about 460 B.C.—both of which lamentably failed. So valuable however was the site, from its vicinity to the gold and silver mines near Mount Pangaea and to large forests of ship-timber, as well as for command of the Strymon, and for commerce with the interior of Thessaly and Macedonia, that the Athenians had sent a mixed expedition under Agam, who founded the city and gave it the name of Amphipolis. The resident settlers there, however, were only in small proportion Athenian citizens; the rest of mixed origin,

¹ Thucyd. iv. 103. *αἰγῶνα δὲ τὸ ἄρ-
γῶνα, ὅθεν καὶ ἀργῶνα καὶ ἀργῶνα*

some of them Argilian—a considerable number Chalkidians. The Athenian general Eklila was governor in the town, though seemingly with no paid force under his command. His colleague Thyrsidila the historian was in command of a small fleet on the coast.

Among these mixed inhabitants a conspiracy was organized to betray the town to Brasidas. The inhabitants of Argilus as well as the Chalkidians each tempered with those of the same race who resided in Amphipolis; while the influence of Perdikha, not inconsiderable in consequence of the commerce of the place with Macedonia, was also employed to increase the number of partisans. Of all the instigators, however, the most sincere as well as the most useful were the inhabitants of Argilus. Amphipolis, together with the Athenians at Istroumbon, had been alien to them from its commencement. Its foundation had doubtless abridged their commerce and importance as masters of the lower course of the Strymon. They had been long laying snares against the city, and the arrival of Brasidas now presented to them an unexpected chance of success. It was they who encouraged him to attempt the surprise, deferring proclamation of their own defection from Athens until they could make it subservient to his conquest of Amphipolis.

Starting with his army from Arua in the Chalkidic peninsula, Brasidas arrived in the afternoon at Arua and Promakia, near the channel whereby the lake Bolis is connected with the sea. From hence, after his men had supped, he began his night-march to Amphipolis, on a cold and stormy night of November or the beginning of December. He reached Argilus in the middle of the night, where the leaders at once admitted him, proclaiming their revolt from Athens. With their aid and guidance, he then hastened forward without delay to the bridge across the Strymon, which he reached before break of day.¹ It was guarded only by a feeble platoon—the town of Amphipolis itself being situated on the hill at some little distance higher up

¹ Thucyd. iv. 108. *κατασπερσεντο οὐρανὸς καὶ ἔβρισε τὴν γαλῶνα καὶ ἀνέμωσι.*

Thucyd. is speaking of night by allusion to the darkness of eyes. The latter word really adds nothing to the mean-

ing; whereas the fact that Brasidas got over the river before daylight is not both new and material; it is not necessarily implied in the previous words being of night.

the door ¹ so that Brantiss, preceded by the Argilian conspirators, unopposed and unopposed the guard without difficulty. Then master of this important communication, he crossed with his army headwith into the territory of Amphipolis, where his arrival spread the utmost dismay and terror. The governor Skille, the magistrates, and the citizens were all found wholly unprepared: the lands belonging to the city were occupied by residents with their families and property around them, calculating upon undisturbed security, as if there had been no enemy within reach. Bands of these as were close to the city succeeded in running thither with their families, though leaving their property exposed; but the more distant became in person as well as in property at the mercy of the invaders. Even within the town, filled with the thousand relatives of those victims without, insupportable confusion reigned, of which the conspirators within tried to avail themselves in order to get the gates thrown open. And so complete was the disorganization, that if Brantiss had marched up without delay to the gates and assaulted the town, many persons supposed that he would have carried it at once. Such a risk however was too great even for his boldness—the rather as regular would have been probably his ruin. Moreover, considering the assurance of the conspirators that the gates would be thrown open, he thought it safer to seize as many persons as he could from the out-citizens, as a means of working upon the sentiments of those within the walls. Lastly, this promise of seizure and plunder, being probably more to the taste of his own soldiers, could not well be hindered.

But he waited in vain for the opening of the gates. The conspirators in the city, in spite of the complete success of their surprise and the universal dismay around them, found themselves

¹ Though, in 186, Leipsa is an extensive river of Argiliana, and all equally agree nearly all, except in its Argilic derivation, &c.

² As, against, with Pedrus, Pappas, and most of the conspirators, who take these words—"the town of Amphipolis is better off than Argiliana than the province of the town." But this could be of course true, and enough to give information, seeing that Brantiss had to save the time to reach the town. Smith and Brantiss are right, I think, in con-

sidering its Argiliana as granted by Leipsa, and not by others: "the city is at present detached from the province," and the situation which Pappas would require. But other words, "the town of Amphipolis is better off than Argiliana than the province of the town." But this could be of course true, and enough to give information, seeing that Brantiss had to save the time to reach the town. Smith and Brantiss are right, I think, in con-

sidering the Argiliana, as a situation of the town of Argiliana, some further remarks will be found on the locality, with a plan annexed.

of escape, with comparatively little loss; while the non-Athenian citizens, particularly in the same relief from peril, felt little reluctance in accepting a capitulation which preserved both their rights and their properties inviolate, and merely severed them from Athens—towards which city they felt, not hatred, but indifference. Above all, the friends and relatives of the citizens exposed in the out-regions were strenuous in urging on the capitulation, so that the compromise soon became held enough to preclude themselves openly—insisting upon the moderation of Brasidas and the prevalence of admitting him. Thucydides found that the tone of opinion, even among his own Athenians, was gradually turned against him. He could not prevent the acceptance of the terms, and the admission of the enemy into the city, on that same day.

No such resolution would have been adopted, had the citizens been aware how near at hand Thucydides and his forces were. The message despatched early in the morning from Antipolea forced him, at Thebes with some trifles; with which he instantly put to sea, so as to reach Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of Antipolea, on the same evening. He hoped to be in time for saving Antipolea; but the place had surrendered a few hours before. He arrived indeed only just in time to preserve Eion; for parties in that town were already beginning to concert the admission of Brasidas, who would probably have entered it at daylight the next morning. Thucydides, putting the place in a condition of defence, successfully repelled an attack which Brasidas made both by land and by boats on the river. He at the same time received and provided for the Athenian citizens who were retiring from Antipolea.¹

The capture of this city, perhaps the most important of all the foreign possessions of Athens—and the opening of the bridge over the Strymon, by which even all her eastern allies became approachable by land—aroused prodigious emotion throughout all the Greek world. The dismay felt at Athens² was greater

Thucydides arrives at Eion from Thebes with his army. He had in time to prevent Antipolea from joining Brasidas.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 105, 106; Diod. xii.

² Thucyd. iv. 105. According to the 'Antiquities,' at Athens it was this

consequence, &c.

The prodigious importance of the site of Antipolea, with its adjoining bridge leading the communication

such as were deemed inevitable before they actually occurred, they inspired a degree of confidence, and turned a tide of opinion, towards this valiant man, which rendered him personally one of the first powers in Greece. Numerous salutations were transmitted to him at Amphipolis from parties among the subject-allies of Athens, in their present temper of large hopes from him, and distributed fear of the Athenians. The anti-Athenian party in each was impatient to revolt, the rest of the population was restrained by fear.¹

Of those who indulged in these sanguine calculations, many had yet to learn by painful experience that Athens was still but little aided in power. Still her situation during this important autumn had been such as may well explain their mistake. It might have been anticipated that on hearing the alarming news of the junction of Brasidas with the Chalcidians and Perinthians as close upon their dependent allies, they would forthwith have sent a competent force to Thracæ, which, if despatched at that time, would probably have checked all the subsequent disasters. So they would have acted at any other time—and perhaps even then, if Pericles had been alive. But the news arrived just at the period when Athens was engaged in the expedition against Brasida, which ended very shortly in the ruinous defeat of Dekeia.

Under the discouragement arising from the death of the Strategæ Hippokratès and 1000 citizens, the idea of a fresh expedition to Thracæ would probably have been inadvisable to Athenian hoplites. The hardships of a winter service in Thracæ, as experienced a few years before in the blockade of Potidæa, would probably also aggravate their reluctance. In Grecian history, we must constantly keep in mind that we are reading about citizen soldiers, not about professional soldiers, and that the temper of the time, whether of confidence or dismay, modifies to an unspeakable degree all the calculations of military and political prudence. Even after the rapid success of Brasidas, not merely at Abdera and Stagira, but even at Amphipolis, they sent only a few inadequate guards² to the points most threatened, thus leaving

Brasidas and his army of 1000 men, after the battle of Dekeia, especially in reference to securing the passages of Thracæ to Greece.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 102.

² Thucyd. iv. 102. at *gêrê* 'detached.'

detached to the defence and to guard the passages to the allies, &c.

to their enterprising enemy the whole remaining winter for his operations, without hindrance. Without depreciating the merits of Brasidas, we may see that his extraordinary success was in great part owing to the no less extraordinary depression which at that time pervaded the Athenian public—a feeling encouraged by Nicias and other leading men of the same party, who were building upon it their hopes of getting the Lacedæmonian proposals for peace accepted.

But while we thus notice the shortcomings of Athens in not sending timely forces against Brasidas, we must at the same time admit that the most serious and irreparable loss which she sustained—that of Amphipolis—was the fault of her officers more than her own. Nikias and the historian Thucydides, the two joint Athenian commanders in Thrace, to whom was committed the defence of that important town, had access amply sufficient to place it beyond all risk of capture, had they employed the most ordinary vigilance and precaution beforehand. That Thucydides became an exile immediately after this event, and remained so for twenty years, is certain from his own statement. And we hear, upon what in this case is quite sufficient authority, that the Athenians condemned him (probably Nikias also) to banishment, on the proposition of Nikias.¹

In considering this sentence, historians² commonly treat

¹ Thucyd. i. 10. See the biography of Thucydides in *Thucydides*, prefixed to all the editions, p. 24, at Athens.

² I am inclined to give history from the account of M. Thiers, whose judgment coincides on this occasion with what is generally given (Hist. of France, ed. 1833, vol. 24, p. 299).

On the evening of the same day, Thucydides, with seven sailors which he happened to have with him at Thessalonica, when he received the dispatch from Nikias called into the middle of the night, and having the fall of a night proceeded to put him in a state of defence. His timely arrival saved the place, which Brasidas attacked the next morning, both parties rivering the land, without effect; and the soldiers, who retired by virtue of the treaty from Amphipolis, found

shelter at Kila, and contributed to the security. The historian wanted no important event to his country; and it does not appear that Brasidas' conduct and strategy could have accomplished anything more under the same circumstances. Yet the unscrupulous justice perverted the occasion of a sentence, under which he spent twenty years of his life in exile; and he was only restored to his country in the course of his longest banishment by the public authorities. He made only one be gathered with certainty from his language: for he has not condemned, or mentioned either the charge which was brought against him, or the nature of the sentence, which he supposes have suffered or avoided by a voluntary exile. A statement, very probable in itself, though resting on slight authority, attributes his banishment to Nikias' calumny: that

Accordingly, the question which we have to put is, not whether Thucydides *did* all that could be done, after he received the clearest express at Thence (which is the part of the case that is sets prominently before us), but whether he and Eubides jointly took the best general measures for the security of the Athenian empire in Thracæ—especially for Amphipolis, the first jewel of her empire.

They suffer Athens to be robbed of that jewel,—and how! Had they a difficult position to defend? Were they overwhelmed by a superior force? Were they distracted by simultaneous raids in different places, or assailed by enemies unknown or unknown? Not one of those grounds for acquittal can be pleaded. First, their position was of all others the most defensible. They had only to keep the bridge over the Strymon adequately watched and guarded, or to retain the Athenian squadrons at Eion, and Amphipolis was safe. Either one or the other of those precautions would have sufficed: both together would have sufficed as amply as probably to prevent the scheme of attack from being formed. Next, the town under Brasidas was in no way superior—not even adequate to the capture of the inferior place Eion, when properly guarded—much less to that of Amphipolis. Lastly, there were no simultaneous raids to distract attention, nor unknown enemies to confound a well-laid scheme of defence. There was but one enemy, in one quarter, having one road by which to approach; an enemy of surprising mark indeed, and extremely dangerous to Athens, but without any chance of success, except from the shortcomings of the Athenian officers.

Now Thucydides and Eubides both knew that Brasidas had prevailed upon Alcibiades and Sphacelus to revolt, and that too in such a way as to extend his own personal influence materially. They knew that the population of Argilus was of Arcadian origin,¹ like that of Alcibiades and Sphacelus, and therefore peculiarly likely to be tempted by the example of these two towns. Lastly, they knew (and Thucydides himself tells us²) that this Argilæan

¹ Compare Thucyd. ii. 34, 35, 36.
² Thucyd. ii. 36. *ἡ πόλις ἔστιν Ἀργίλια, ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Alcibiades, ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Sphacelus ἐκείνην καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλαβον ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Alcibiades ἐκείνην καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλαβον.*

was of Arcadian (Amphipolis) birth, and was a native of Argilus. Thucydides ii. 34, 35, 36. *ἡ πόλις ἔστιν Ἀργίλια, ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Alcibiades ἐκείνην καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλαβον.*

population—whose territory bordered on the Bayada and the western foot of the bridge, and who had many connections in Amphipolis—had been long disaffected to Athens, and especially to the Athenian possession of that city. Yet having such foreknowledge, ample warning for the necessity of a vigilant defense, Thrasybulus and Eucleides withdrew, or wait, both the two precautions upon which the security of Amphipolis rested—precautions both of them obvious, either of them sufficient. The one leaves the bridge under a feeble guard,⁷ and is caught as unprepared every way, that one might suppose Athens to be in profound peace; the other is found with his squadron, not blue, but at Thasos—an island out of all possible danger either from Brasidas (who had no ships) or any other enemy. The arrival of Brasidas causes us both of them like a clap of thunder. Nothing more is required than this plain fact, under the circumstances, to prove their inconsiderance as commanders.

The presence of Theophrastus on the station of Thamus was important to Athens, partly because he possessed valuable family-connections, mining-property, and surrounding influence among the continental population round Amphipolis.¹ This was one main reason why he was named. The Athenian people outside looked in his private influence, over and above the public force under his command, looking to him even more than to his colleague Nikitas for the national security of the town; instead of which they find that not even their own equals under him is at hand near the vulnerable point at the moment when the enemy comes. Of the two, perhaps, the conduct of Nikitas admits of conceivable explanation more easily than that of Theophrastus. For it seems that Nikitas had no paid force in Amphipolis; no other force than the citizen hoplites, partly Athenian, partly of other towns. Doubtless these men found it tedious to keep guard through the winter on the Stramonian bridge. Nikitas

1. The first is the fact that the Japanese government has been unable to secure the necessary funds to carry out its program. This is due to the fact that the Japanese government has been unable to secure the necessary funds to carry out its program.

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(Letter from Psychiatry, Göteborg, 1981, vol. 2, pp. 37-40, section 2, p. 38-39) provides some data. The frequency was reduced for the youngest group, i.e. management of the young offender in the region itself. For the teenage group and beyond the two generally known, the frequency of the admission which is also sometimes used as an out-patient measure was reduced.

might fancy that, by enforcing a large perpetual guard, he ran the risk of making Athens unpopular. Moreover, strict constancy of watch, night after night, when no actual danger comes, with an unpaid citizen force, is not easy to maintain. This is an insufficient excuse, but it is better than anything which can be offered on behalf of Thrasyllos, who had with him a paid Athenian force, and might just as well have kept it at Eleusis as at Thebes.¹ We may be sure that the absence of Thrasyllos with his fleet at Thebes, was one essential condition in the plot laid by Brasidas with the Argives.

To say, with Dr. Thirlwall, that "human prudence and activity could not have accomplished more than Thrasyllos did under the same circumstances," is true as matter of fact, and credible as far as it goes. But it is wholly inadmissible as a justification, and meets only one part of the case. An officer in command is responsible not only for doing most "under the circumstances," but also for the circumstances themselves, insofar as they are under his control. Now nothing is more under his control than the position which he chooses to occupy. If the Emperor Napoleon or the Duke of Wellington had lost by surprise of an enemy not very numerous a post of supreme importance which they thought adequately protected, would they be satisfied to hear from the responsible officer in command—
 "Having no idea that the enemy would attempt my surprise, I thought that I might keep my force half a day's journey off from the post exposed, at another post which it was physically impossible for the enemy to reach; but the moment I was informed that the surprise had occurred, I hastened to the scene, did all that human prudence and activity could do to repel the enemy; and though I found that he had already mastered the capital post of all, yet I beat him back from a second post which he was on the point of mastering also!" Does any one imagine that these illustrious chiefs, meeting under the loss of an inestimable position which alters the whole prospects of a campaign, would be satisfied with such a report, and would decorate the officer with prizes for his vigour and bravery "under the circumstances"?

¹ That the regular station of the Athenian fleet was at Eleusis—and that the maintenance of the passage of the Bay of Salamis was inalienable to the Athenians—has been again and again pointed out by the late Mr. Thirlwall, in his *History of Greece*, vol. i. p. 124.

Thirlwall's statement is, however, in error. The Athenian fleet was not at Eleusis, but at Salamis, and the maintenance of the passage of the Bay of Salamis was inalienable to the Athenians.

They would assuredly reply that he had done right in coming back—that his conduct after coming back had been that of a brave man;—and that there was no impeachment on his courage. But they would at the same time add, that his want of judgment and foresight in omitting to place the valuable position really exposed under sufficient guard behindhand, and leaving it thus open to the enemy, while he himself was absent in another place which was out of danger—and his easy faith that there would be no dangerous surprise, at a time when the character of the enemy's officer, as well as the disposition of the neighbours (Aegians), plainly indicated that there would be, if the least opening were afforded—that these were defects meriting serious reproof, and disqualifying him from any future command of trust and responsibility. Nor can we doubt that the whole feeling of the respective armies, who would have to pay with their best blood the unhappy misadventure of this officer, would go along with such a sentence; without at all suspecting themselves to be guilty of injustice, or of "directing the imitation produced by the law against an innocent object".

The vehement leader-speech in the *Page* at Athens, when he brought forward what are called "his columns" against Thucydides and Eekles, as having caused, through culpable omission a fatal and irreparable loss to their country, might perhaps strike his case with greater keenness and acuteness. But it may be doubted whether he would say anything more really galling than would be contained in the dignified rebuke of an esteemed modern general to a subordinate officer under similar circumstances. In my judgment, not only the accusation against these two officers (I assume Eekles to have been included) was called for on the strict presumptive grounds—which would be sufficient as a justification of the leader-speech Kleon—but the positive verdict of guilty against them was fully merited. Whether the banishment inflicted was a greater penalty than the case warranted, I will not take upon me to pronounce. Every age has its own standard of feeling for measuring what is a proper intensity of punishment: penalties which our constitutions thought right and meet would in the present day appear intolerably rigorous. But when I consider the immense value of Amphipolis to Athens, combined with the conduct whereby it was lost, I cannot think that there

was a single Athenian, or a single Greek, who would damn the penalty of banishment for slaves.

It is painful to find such strong grounds of official censure against a man who as an historian has earned the lasting admiration of posterity—my own, among the first and warmest. But in withholding the conduct of Themistocles the officer, we are bound in justice to forget Themistocles the Historian. He was not known in the latter character, at the time when this sentence was passed. Perhaps he never would have been so known (fides the *Napoleonic Historian Colletta*), if exile had not driven him out of the active duties and hopes of a citizen.

It may be doubted whether he ever went home from Elia to encounter the grief, wrath, and shame, so strongly felt at Athens after the loss of Amphipolis. Condemned, either with or without appearance, he remained in banishment for twenty years,¹ not returning to Athens until after the conclusion of the *Peloponnesian* war. Of this long exile much is said to have been spent on his property in Thraciæ; yet he also visited most parts of Greece—mainland of Athens as well as several states. However much we may deplore such a misfortune on his account, thankful in general we are, and ever will have, the strongest reason to rejoice in it. To this compulsory leisure we owe the completion, or rather the near approach to completion, of his history. And the opportunities which an exile enjoyed of personally consulting records and records, contributed much to form that impartial, comprehensive, Pan-hellenic spirit, which reigns generally throughout his immortal work.

Themistocles Brasidas, installed in Amphipolis about the beginning of December 424 B.C., employed his increased power only the more vigorously against Athens. His first care was to reconstitute Amphipolis—a task wherein the Macedonian Perdiccas, whose intrigues had contributed to the capture, came and personally assisted. That city went through a partial reconnoitre and renovation of fortifications; being now moreover cut off from the port of Elia and the mouth of the river, which remained in the hands of the Athenians. Many new arrangements must have been required, as well for its internal

Fragment
of
history
in
Amphipolis
the
city
being
reconstituted
by
the
Macedonian
Perdiccas
and
Themistocles
Brasidas.

¹ *Thucyd.* i. 15.

policy as for its external defence. Basilides took measures for building ships of war, in the lake above the city, in order to cover the lower part of the river;¹ but his most important step was to construct a palisade work,² connecting the walls of the city with the bridge. He thus made himself permanently master of the crossing of the Euphrates, so as to shut the door by which he himself had entered, and at the same time to keep an easy communication with Arphox and the western bank of the Euphrates. He also made some acquisitions on the eastern side of the river. Pitakus, prince of the neighbouring Edessan-Thamesia township of Myrionia, had been recently assassinated by his wife Eudora and by some personal enemies. He had probably been the ally of Artaban, and his assassins now sought to strengthen themselves by securing the alliance of the new conqueror of Arphoxolis. The Thamesia continental colonies of Galapene and Glyrud also declared their adhesion to him.

While he went to Lacedæmon, commencing his excellent position as well as his large hopes, he at the same time, without waiting for the answer, began acting for himself, with all the allies whom he could get together. He marched first against the peninsula called Akhe—the narrow tongue of land which stretches out from the neighbourhood of Akranthus to the mighty headland called Mount Akhe—near thirty miles long, and between four and five miles for the most part in breadth.³ The long, rugged, rocky ridge—covering this peninsula so as to leave but narrow spaces for dwelling, or cultivation, or feeding of cattle—was at this time occupied by many distinct petty communities, some of them divided in race and language. Sami, a colony from Andros, was situated in the interior gulf (called the Single Gulf) between Akhe and the Edessian peninsula, near the Kerasia canal. The rest of the Akhe was distributed among Hædians, Kresidians, and Edessians, all fractions of the Thracian race—Peleagians or Tyrohemians, of the race which had once occupied Mysia and Ionia—and some Chalkidians. Some of these little communities spoke habitually two languages. Thyasa, Kladias, Ois-

¹ *Thucyd.* iii. 104—106.

² This is the *palisade*, mentioned in the text as *erigida* a *palis* and a *wall* afterwards, at the foot of the bridge of Arphoxolis. I shall say more respecting

ing the language of Arphoxolis when I come to the city of that name.

³ See *Strabo*, *Geogr. lib. xiv.* p. 525. See also *Strabo*, *lib. i.* ch. viii. p. 224.

physes, and others, all submitted on the arrival of Brasidas; but Sand and Dion held out, nor could he bring them to terms even by ravaging their territory.

He next marched into the Peloponnesian peninsula, to attack Tegeæ, situated near the northern extremity of that peninsula—opposite to Cape Kountassos, the extreme headland of the peninsula of Pallisus.¹

Tegeæ was inhabited by a Chalkidian population, but had not partaken in the result of the neighboring Chalkidianæ against Athens. A small Athenian garrison had been sent there, probably since the recent dangers, and was now defending it as well as repairing the town-wall in various parts where it had been so neglected as to crumble down. They occupied as a sort of distinct district the outlying cape called Ithyllus, joining by a narrow isthmus the hill on which the city stood, and forming a port wharves by two Athenian women as guardships. A small party in Tegeæ, without privity² or even suspicion of the rest, entered into correspondence with Brasidas, and engaged to provide for him the means of entering and capturing the town. Accord-

ingly he advanced by a night-march to the temple of the Diakouri (Kastor and Pollux) within about a quarter of a mile of the town-gate, which he reached a little before daybreak, sending forward 100 peloponnesians to be still nearer, and to rush upon the gate at the instant when signal was made from within. His Tegeæan partners, some of whom were already stationed on the spot awaiting his arrival, made their final arrangements with him, and then returned into the town—conducting with them seven detached men from his army, armed only with daggers, and having Leontion of Olynthus as their chief. Twenty men had been originally named for this service, but the danger appeared so extreme that only seven of them were bold enough to go. This forenoon, hoping enabled to creep in through a small aperture in the wall towards the sea, were conducted silently up to the topmost watch-tower on the city hill, where they surprised and slew the gatch, and set open a neighbouring postern gate, lead-

¹ Thucyd. iv. 126.

² Thucyd. iv. 126. and other follow
Editors: *deception*, *treachery*, *betrayal*;
and the same repetition. iv. 126. etc.

iv. Thucydides translation: *the Athenians*
etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc.
etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc.

ing towards Cape Kanastron, as well as the great gate leading towards the agora. They then brought in the pelicans from within, who, impatient with the delay, had gradually stolen close under the walls. Some of these pelicans kept possession of the great gate, others were led round to the postern at the top, while the fire-signal was forthwith lighted to invite Brandus himself. He and his men hastened forward towards the city at their utmost speed and with loud shouts—a terror-striking notice of his presence to the unprepared citizens. Admission was easy through the open gates, but some also clambered up by means of beams or a sort of scaffolding, which was lying close to the wall as a help to the workmen repairing it. And while the auxiliants were thus active in every direction, Brandus himself conducted a portion of them to secure himself of the high and commanding parts of the city.

So completely were the Trochians surprised and thunderstruck, that hardly any attempt was made to resist. Even the fifty Athenian hoplites who occupied the agora, being found still asleep, were partly slain, and partly compelled to seek refuge in the separately-guarded caps of Lékyptra, whither they were followed by a portion of the Trochian population; some from attachment to Athens, others from sheer terror. To these fugitives Brandus addressed a proclamation inviting them to return, and promising them perfect security for persons, property, and political rights; while at the same time he sent a herald with a formal summons to the Athenians in Lékyptra, requiring them to quit the place as belonging to the Chalkidians, but permitting them to carry away their property.

They refused to evacuate the place, but solicited a truce of one day for the purpose of burying their slain. Brandus granted them two days, which were employed, both by them and by him, in preparations for the defence and attack of Lékyptra, each party fortifying the houses on or near the connecting isthmus.

In the meantime he convened a general assembly of the Trochian population, whom he addressed in the same conciliating and equitable language as he had employed elsewhere. "He had not come to harm either the city or any individual citizens. Those who had let him in ought not to be regarded as his men

Some part
of the Tro-
chian popu-
lation, who
were taken
prisoners,
retire to the
caps of
Lékyptra.

cap.
of the
Trochian
population
of the city
of Troch.

at hand; but every man found in it was put to death. Brasidas, then master of the fort, and considering that he owed his success to the sudden capture of the Athenian scaffolding, regarded this incident as a divine interposition, and presented the thirty mines (which he had promised as a reward to the first man who broke in) to the goddess Athina for her temple at Lelkythos. He moreover consecrated to her the entire cape of Lelkythos; not only demolishing the defences, but also dismantling the private residences which it contained,¹ so that nothing remained except the temple, with its ministers and appurtenances.

What proportion of the Thebanes who had taken refuge at Lelkythos had been inclined to return by the proclamation of Brasidas, ^{Personal ability and military valour.} office, ^{power of persuasion.} prudence and politics, we are not informed. His language and conduct were admirably calculated to set this little community again in harmonious movement, and to obliterate the memory of past feuds. And above all, it inspired a strong sentiment of attachment and gratitude towards himself personally—a sentiment which gained strength with every successive incident in which he was engaged, and which enabled him to surmount a greater ascendency than could ever be acquired by Sparta, and in some respects greater than had ever been possessed by Athens. It is this reasonable development of commanding individuality, animated throughout by straightforward public purposes, and binding together so many little communities who had few other feelings in common, which leads to the short career of this eminent man a romantic, and even an heroic, interest.

During the remainder of the winter Brasidas employed himself in setting in order the acquisitions already made, and in laying plans for further conquests in the spring.² But the beginning of spring—or the close of the eighth year, and beginning of the ninth year, of the war, as Tracyville reckons—brought with it a new train of events, which will be recounted in the following chapter.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 114, 115. ² *supra* p. 114. ³ *supra* p. 115.

CHAPTER LIV.

TRUCE FOR ONE YEAR.—RENEWAL OF WAR AND BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS.—PEACE OF NIKIAS.

THE eighth year of the war, described in the last chapter, had opened with sanguine hopes for Athens, and with dark promises for Sparta, chiefly in consequence of the memorable capture of Sphakteria towards the end of the preceding summer. It included, not to mention other events, two considerable and important enterprises on the part of Athens—against Megara and against Boeotia; the former plan, partially successful—the latter, not merely unsuccessful, but attended with a ruinous defeat. Lastly, the losses in Thrace following close upon the defeat at Delium, together with the unbounded expectations everywhere entertained from the future career of Brasidas, had again seriously lowered the impression entertained of Athenian power. The year thus closed with humiliations the more painful to Athens as contrasted with the glowing hopes with which it had begun.

It was now that Athens felt the full value of those prisoners whom she had taken at Sphakteria. With those prisoners, as Kleon and his supporters had said truly, she might be sure of making peace whenever she desired it.¹ Having such a certainty to fall back upon, she had played a bold game, and aimed at larger acquisitions during the past year. This speculation, though not in itself unreasonable, had failed: moreover, a new phenomenon, alike unexpected by all, had occurred, when Brasidas broke open and cut up her

Eighth year of the war—begins with great favourable prospects for Athens—closed with great promises to her.

Capture of Sphakteria its great prize in order to enable the Athenians that desire making peace, to obtain it.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 41.

Ever since the capture of Epiklidas, the Lacedæmonians had been attempting, directly or indirectly, negotiations for peace and the recovery of the prisoners. Their pacific dispositions were especially instigated by King Plistonax, whose peculiar circumstances gave him a strong motive to bring the war to a close. He had been banished from Sparta, fourteen years before the commencement of the war, and a little before the Thirty years' truce, under the charge of having taken bribes from the Athenians on occasion of invading Attica. For more than eighteen years he lived in banishment close to the temple of Zeus Lykæos in Arkadia; in such constant fear of the Lacedæmonians, that his dwelling-house was half within the consecrated ground.¹ But he never lost the hope of procuring restoration, through the medium of the Pythian priestess at Delphi, whom he and his brother Aristoklis kept in their pay. To every sacred legation which went from Sparta to Delphi she repeated the same imperative injunction—"They want being back the seed of (Hiraklis) the deniged son of Zeus from foreign land to their own; if they did not, it would be their fate to plough with a silver ploughshare". The command of the god, thus incessantly repeated and backed by the influence of those friends who supported Plistonax at home, at length produced an entire change of sentiment at Sparta. In the fourth

King
Plistonax
of Sparta—
saves the
peace—
his special
mission—
the long
banishment
repeated
by word.

cent, if properly managed, to procure the restoration of the captives.

Proper refers only to the Athenians, under whom it is the vanishing Spartan military force, apart from the Spartans who were banished at Athens. The latter reference seems to me improper, for still it must signify some persons or things which have been before expelled or banished; and thus which either represent it to some one and have before mentioned. To refer it to the Athenians, with Proper and Hecker in the second edition, we should have to find a great war back for the subject, not being to encounter a difficulty in connecting themselves with the latter case. Likewise this case was meant by substituting, though I think it better to refer only to the same subject, as previous. In the former conclusion of the sentence, the above seems an sufficient reason why this and reading should be altered, as

appears, the particular has a different sense, of which there are analogous examples—the Editors, *Chalcidius* (Strabo), and the, describing approximately the same as (1) and (2) appear from in Thucydides, in both instances as possible, and were taken S. Th. 189—reading of the *Apollonia* (Strabo 7, Thucydides) until the 1, Th. Also 1, Th. and again the sentence in *Chalcidius*—where we need to read, respectively, or equivalent to it, since the very sentence is properly rendered with above.

Thucyd. 7, 127. Since the whole and part are not able otherwise fully the demonstration.

"The reason was, that he might be in possession of an historical truth, and not admit the whole in previous sense of the common sense of the without justification, which could not have been the case had the whole of reading been within the stated period." (Dr. Arnold's note.)

indirectly, by insisting on terms more favourable than could be obtained. On this point his political counsels would be wrong; but on another point they would be much sounder and more judicious than those of his rival Nicias; for he would recommend a strenuous prosecution of hostilities by Athenian arms against Brasidas in Thracæ. At the present moment this was the most urgent political necessity of Athens, whether she entertained or rejected the views of peace. And the policy of Nicias, who cradled up the existing depression of the citizens, by encouraging them to rely on the pacific inclinations of Sparta, was ill-judged and disastrous in its results, as the future will hereafter show.

Attempts were made by the peace-party both at Athens and Sparta to negotiate at first for a definitive peace. But the conditions of such a peace were not easy to determine, so as to satisfy both parties, and became more and more difficult with every success of Brasidas. At length the Athenians, eager above all things to arrest his progress, sent to Sparta to propose a truce for one year—desiring the Spartans to send to Athens envoys with full powers to settle the terms: the truce would allow time and tranquillity for settling the conditions of a definitive treaty. The proposition of the truce for one year,¹ together with the first two articles ready prepared, came from Athens, as indeed we might have presumed even without proof; since the interest of Sparta was rather against it, as allowing to the Athenians the leisure leisure for making preparations against further losses in Thracæ. But her main desire was, not so much to put herself in condition to make the best possible peace, as to ensure some peace which would liberate her captives. She calculated that when once the Athenians had tasted the sweets of peace for one year, they would not again voluntarily impose upon themselves the rigorous obligations of war.²

In the month of March, 423 B.C., on the fourteenth day of the month Elaphebolion at Athens, and on the twelfth day of the month Gerastios at Sparta, a truce for one year was concluded and sworn, between Athens on one side, and Sparta, Corinth,

¹ This appears from the form of the truce in Thucyd. iv. 118; it is proposed at Sparta, in consequence of a previous proposition from Athens; in sept. 8, of 423 B.C., when Agamemnon, king of the

Argives, made an alliance.

² Thucyd. iv. 117. and preceding lines: easily seen, and thoroughly settled by Brasidas (iv. 119). (Thucyd.) actually experienced (iv. 119), etc.

Skyria, Epidauria, and Megara on the other.¹ The Spartans, instead of merely despatching plenipotentiaries to Athens, as the Athenians had desired, went a step further. In concurrence with the Athenian envoys, they drew up a form of truce, approved by themselves and their allies, in such manner that it only required to be adopted and ratified by the Athenians. The general principle of the truce was not possible, and the conditions were in substance as follows:—

1. Respecting the temple at Delphi, every Greek shall have freedom the right to make use of it honestly and without fear, of the town. pursuant to the customs of his particular city. The main purpose of this stipulation, prepared and sent verbatim from Athens, was to allow Athenian visitors to go thither, which had been impossible during the war, in consequence of the hostility of the Boeotians² and Phocians. The Delphian authorities also were in the interest of Sparta, and doubtless the Athenians received no formal invitation to the Pythian games. But the Boeotians and Phocians were no parties to the truce: accordingly the Lacedæmonians, while accepting the article and proclaiming the general liberty in principle, do not pledge themselves to enforce it by arms as far as the Boeotians and Phocians are concerned, but only to try and persuade them by amiable representations. The liberty of sacrificing at Delphi was at this moment the most welcome to the Athenians, as they seem to have fastened themselves under the displeasure of Apollo.³

2. All the contracting parties will require out and punish, each according to its own laws, each person as may violate the property of the Delphian god. This article also is prepared at Athens, for the purpose accordingly of constituting the favour of Apollo and the Delphians. The Lacedæmonians accept the article literally, of course.

3. The Athenian garrisons at Pylos, Epidaur, Nisaea, and

¹Thucyd. iv. 118. The boundaries of Megalopolis, and the walls of Corinth, designate the strong fort. The truce must necessarily extend from Sparta to Athens, together with all the cities between, Corinth, Megara, Skyria, and Epidauria. The truce was accepted by the Athenians as such, and served to at once by all the troops as well as by these cities.

also starting provisions. It serves also the purpose to of thus the purpose, iv. 118; that day being fixed on for the commencement.

The lower middle in different cities were never in peace agreement.

²See Aristophanes, *Aves*, 100.

³Thucyd. v. 1-28. They might perhaps suppose that the acceptance of Apollo had given offence to Apollo.

Nisæa, and Methana in the neighbourhood of Trézene, are to remain as at present. No communication is to take place between Kythira and any portion of the mainland belonging to the Lacedæmonian alliance. The soldiers occupying Pylos shall confine themselves within the space between Nephrea and Tomarea; those in Nisæa and Methana, within the road which leads from the chapel of the hero Nisus to the temple of Poseidôn, without any communication with the population beyond that limit. In like manner the Athenians in the peninsula of Methana near Trézene, and the inhabitants of the latter city, shall observe the special convention concluded between them respecting boundaries.¹

4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall make use of the sea for trading purposes, on their own vessels, but shall not have liberty to sail in any ship of war, nor in any vessel merchant-vessel of tonnage equal to 500 talents. [All war-ships were generally impelled by oar: they sometimes used sails, but never when wanted for fighting. Merchant-vessels were generally to have sails, but were sometimes oared: the limitation of size is added, to mean that the Lacedæmonians shall not, under colour of merchantmen, get up a warlike navy.]

5. There shall be free communication by sea as well as by land, between Peloponnesians and Athens for herald or embassy, with suitable attendants, to treat for a definitive peace or for the adjustment of differences.

6. Neither side shall receive deserters from the other, whether free or slave. [This article was alike important to both parties. Athens had to fear the revolt of her subject-allies—Sparta the desertion of Helots.]

7. Disputes shall be amicably settled, by both parties, according to their established laws and customs.

Such was the substance of the treaty prepared at Sparta—seemingly in concert with Athenian overtures—and sent by the Spartans to Athens for approval, with the following addition—“If there be any provision which comes to you, more honourable or just than these, come to Lacedæmon and tell us; for neither the Spartans nor their allies will resist any just suggestion. But let those who come bring with them full powers to conclude,

¹ Thucyd. iv. 28; see Pope's note.

in the same manner as you desire of us. The truce shall be for one year.*

By the resolution which Locke proposed in the Athenian public assembly, ratifying the truce, the people further decreed that negotiations should be opened for a definitive treaty, and directed the Strategoi to propose to the next meeting assembly a scheme and principles for conducting the negotiations. But at the very moment when the errors between Sparta and Athens were bringing the truce to final adoption, events happened in Thrace which threatened to cancel it altogether. Two days' after the important fourteenth of Hephæstion, but before the truce could be made known in Thrace, Skidæi revolted from Athens to Brasidas.

Skidæi was a town calling itself Achæan, one of the numerous colonies which, in the wake of an acknowledged mother-city, traced its origin to warriors returning from Troy. It was situated in the peninsula of Pallinê (the westernmost of those three narrow tongues of land into which Chalkidic branches out); contiguous with the Eretrian colony Mende. The Strikians, not without considerable dissent among themselves, proclaimed their revolt from Athens, under escort with Brasidas. He immediately crossed the Gulf into Pallinê, himself in a little boat, but with a trireme close at his side; calculating that she would protect him against any small Athenian vessel, while any Athenian trireme which he might encounter would attack his trireme, paying no attention to the little boat in which he himself was. The revolt of Skidæi was, from the position of the town, a more striking defiance of Athens than any of the preceding events. For the isthmus connecting Pallinê with the mainland was occupied by the town of Potidæa—a town assigned at the period of its capture, seven years before, to Athenian settlers, though probably containing some other residents besides. Moreover the isthmus was so narrow, that the wall of Potidæa barred it across completely from sea to sea. Pallinê was therefore a quasi-island, not open to the aid of land forces from the continent, like the towns

* Thucyd. ii. 12.

Skidæi was in Thrace—revolt of Skidæi from Athens to Brasidas, two days after the truce was sworn. Thucyd. ii. 12 B.C.

previously acquired by Russia. The Sicilians thus put themselves, without any foreign aid, into conflict against the whole force of Athens, bringing into question her empire not merely over continental towns, but over islands.

Even to Brasidas himself their revolt appeared a step of astonishing boldness. On being received into the city, he addressed a public assembly, and addressed to them the same language which he had employed at Akasthus and Tivoli, disavowing all party preferences as well as all interference with the internal politics of the town, and exhorting them only to unanimous efforts against the common enemy. He bestowed upon them at the same time the warmest praise for their courage. "They,

Brasidas
addressed
them by
the same—his
language
was the
same—his
address
was the
same.

though exposed to all the hazards of islands, had stood forward of their own accord to procure freedom,¹ without waiting like cowards to be driven on by a foreign force towards what was clearly their own good. He considered them capable of any measure of future heroism, if the danger now impending from Athens should be averted, and he should assign to them the very first post of honour among the faithful allies of Lacedæmonia."

This generous, straightforward, and animating tone of exhortation—appealing to the strongest political instinct of the Greek mind, the love of complete city autonomy, and coming from the lips of one whose whole conduct had hitherto been conformable to it—had proved highly efficacious in all the previous towns. But in Skiros it roused the population to the highest pitch of enthusiasm.² It worked even upon the feelings of the dissident minority, bringing them round to partake heartily in the movement. It produced a unanimous and cordial confidence which made them look forward cheerfully to all the desperate chances in which they had engaged themselves; and it produced at the same time, in still more unbounded manifestation, the same personal attachment and admiration as Brasidas inspired elsewhere. The Sicilians not only voted to him publicly a golden crown, as the liberator of Greece, but when it was placed on his

¹ Thucyd. iv. 118. *from their state* *into the independence or self-helping, and they*
freedom, etc. *expressed intense feeling, and did splendid*

² Thucyd. iv. 118. *and of his town* *and showed its sympathy, etc.*

head, the burst of individual sentiment and sympathy was the strongest of which the Grecian bosom was capable. "They crowded round him individually, and embraced his head with effusion, like a victorious athlete," says the historian. This remarkable incident illustrates what I observed before—that the achievements, the self-sacrificing march, the straightforward politics, and policy of this illustrious man—who in character was more Athenian than Sparta, yet with the good qualities of Athens predominant—inspired a personal emotion towards him such as rarely found its way into Grecian political life. The sympathy and admiration felt in Greece towards a victorious athlete was not merely an intense sentiment in the Grecian mind, but was perhaps of all others the most widespread and far-reaching. It was connected with the religion, the laws, and the love of remuneration common to the whole nation—while politics tended rather to divide the separate cities: it was further a sentiment of more familiar and confidently personal. Of its exaggerated intensity throughout Greece the philosophers often complained, not without good reason. But Thucydides cannot convey a more lively idea of the enthusiasm and anxiety with which Brasidas was welcomed at Sicily, just after the desperate resolution taken by the citizens, than by using this simile.

The Lacedæmonian commander knew well how much the utmost resolution of the Sicilians was needed, and how speedily their inner position would draw upon them the vigorous invasion of Athens. He accordingly brought across to Sicily a considerable portion of his army, not merely with a view to the defence of Sicily, but also with the intention of surprising both Messæ and Pericles, in both which places there were small parties of conspirators prepared to open the gates.

It was in this position that he was found by the conspirators who came to announce formally the conclusion of the truce for one year, and to enforce its provisions—Athens from Sparta,

¹ Thucyd. iv. 123. and Herodotus, *op. cit.* giving preceding chapters and concluding the Sicilian story by describing the conspiracy. See also Herodotus, *op. cit.*

Compare Plutarch, *Pericles*, c. 20.

Compare also Herodotus, *op. cit.*, and Thucydides, *op. cit.* in the context of the Sicilian story. In the context of the Sicilian story, Thucydides, *op. cit.* in the context of the Sicilian story.

one of the three Spartans who had sworn to the treaty; Aristonymus, from Aithia. The face of affairs was materially altered by this communication; much to the satisfaction of the newly-acquired allies of Sparta in Thessaly, who accepted the treaty forthwith, but to the great chagrin of Brasidas, whose career was thus suddenly arrested. Yet he could not openly refuse obedience, and his army was accordingly transferred from the peninsula of Pallis to Torisæ.

The case of Skidæ, however, immediately raised an objection, doubtless very agreeable to him. The commissioners, who had come in an Athenian vessel, had heard nothing of the revolt of that place, and Aristonymus was astonished to find the enemy in Pallisæ. But on inquiring into the case, he discovered that the Skidæans had not revealed until two days after the day fixed for the commencement of the treaty. Accordingly, while sanctioning the treaty for all the other cities in Thessaly, he refused to comprehend Skidæ in it, sending immediate news home to Aithia. Brasidas, protesting loudly against this proceeding, refused on his part to sanction Skidæ, which was peculiarly endeared to him by the recent scenes; and even obtained the countenance of the Laconian commissioners, by falsely asserting that the city had revolted before the day named in the treaty.

Violent was the heat of indignation when the news went home by Aristonymus reached Aithia. It was now confirmed, when the Laconian commissioners, acting upon the request of the men sent to them by Brasidas and Aithians, despatched an embassy thither to claim protection for Skidæ, or at any rate to procure the adjustment of the dispute by arbitration or pacific decision. Having the terms of the treaty on their side, the Athenians were least of all disposed to relax from their rights in favour of the first revolting blockade. They resolved at once to undertake an expedition for the reconquest of Skidæ; and further, on the proposition of Kleon, to put to death all the adult male inhabitants of that place as men as it should have been reconquered. At the same time they showed no disposition to

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substances
from Sparta
and Aithia
agreed in
Thessaly, to
accept of the
treaty, but
that
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Dispute
regarding
Skidæ.
The com-
missioners
to Thessaly,
but in
sanctioned
everywhere
else.

more certain than before ; conveying the women and children of those two towns across to the Chalkidic Olynthos, and sending thither as garrison 500 Peloponnesian hoplites with 300 Chalkidic peltasts ; the commander of which force, Polydamidas, took possession of the acropolis with his own troops separately.¹

Brasidas then withdrew himself, with the greater part of his army, to accompany Perdikhas on an expedition into the interior against Arkiflores and the Lynkestæ. On what ground, after having before entered into terms with Arkiflores, he now became his active enemy, we are left to conjecture. Probably his relations with Perdikhas, whose alliance was of essential importance, were such that this step was forced upon him against his will ; or he may really have thought that the force under Polydamidas was adequate to the defence of Mende and Ekkedæ, an idea which the unaccountable backwardness of Athens for the last six or eight months might well foster. Had he even remained, indeed, he could hardly have saved them, considering the situation of Pallantæ and the superiority of Athens at sea ; but his absence made their ruin certain.²

While Brasidas was thus engaged far in the interior, the Athenian armament under Nikias and Nikostratos reached Potidea—fifty triremes, ten of them Chians, 1000 hoplites and 800 bowmen from Athens, 1000 mercenary Thracians, with some peltasts from Melibolæ and other towns in the neighbourhood. From Potidea they proceeded by sea to Cape Pædonisæ, near which they landed for the purpose of attacking Mende. Polydamidas, the Peloponnesian commander in the town, took post with his force of 700 hoplites, including 300 Chianians, upon an eminence near the city, strong and difficult of approach ; upon which the Athenians generally divided their forces—Nikias, with sixty Athenian chosen hoplites, 120 Methonean peltasts, and all the bowmen, tried to march up the hill by a side path and thus turn the position, while Nikostratos with the main army attacked it in front. But such were the extreme difficulties of the ground that both were repulsed. Nikias was himself wounded, and the division of Nikostratos

While and
Nikostrotos
were with
an Athenian
armament
in Potidea,
they took
Cape Pædonisæ.
The Læmæ
the whole of
garrison
under Poly-
damidas all
but captured
them.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 108.

² Thucyd. iv. 110, 111.

was thrown into great disorder, narrowly escaping a destructive defeat. The Mendeans, however, evacuated the position in the night and retired into the city, while the Athenians, sailing round on the morrow to the suburb on the side of Sikion, occupied the neighbouring land. Nikias on the morning day carried his devastations still further, even to the border of the Sikian territory.

But Spartan operations had already commenced within the walls, that the Sikian auxiliaries, becoming mistrustful of their situation, took advantage of the night to return home. The revolt of Mendi had been brought about against the will of the citizens, by the intrigues and for the benefit of an oligarchical faction. Moreover, it does not appear that Brasidas personally visited the town, as he had visited Sikion and the other revolted towns. Had he come, his personal influence might have done much to soothe the offended citizens, and create some disposition to accept the revolt as a fact accomplished, after they had once been compromised with Athens. For his animating words had not been heard, and the Peloponnesian troops, whom he had sent to Mendi, were mere instruments to sustain the newly-created oligarchy and keep out the Athenians. The feelings of the citizens generally towards them were soon unequivocally displayed. Nikias came with half of the Athenian force was planted before the gate of Mendi which opened towards Poidon. In the neighbourhood of that gate, within the city, was the place of arms and the chief station both of the Peloponnesians and of the citizens. Polydamidas, intending to make a sally forth, was marshalling both of these in battle order, when one of the Mendeans, Demos, manifesting with angry reference a sentiment common to most of them, told him "that he would not sally forth, and did not choose to take part in the contest". Polydamidas seized hold of the man to punish him, when the mass of the armed Demos, taking part with their country, made a sudden rush upon the Peloponnesians. The latter, unprepared for such an onset, sustained at first some loss, and were soon forced to retreat into the acropolis—the rather as they saw some of the Mendeans open the gates to the invaders without, which induced them to suspect a preconcerted betrayal. No

Demosthenes among the citizens of Mendi—strategy of the Peloponnesians—Polydamidas—the Athenians are admitted into the town.

such concert however existed; though the besieging generals, when they saw the gates thus suddenly opened, soon comprehended the real position of affairs. But they found it impossible to restrain their soldiers, who pushed in forthwith, from plundering the town; and they had even some difficulty in saving the lives of the citizens.¹

Mende being thus taken, the Athenian generals desired the help of the citizens to restore the former government, leaving it to them to single out and punish the authors of the late revolt. What use was made of this permission we are not told; but probably most of the authors had already escaped into the acropolis along with Polydamidas. Having erected a wall of circumvallation round the acropolis, joining the sea at both ends, and left a force to guard it, the Athenians moved away to begin the siege at Skidra, where they found both the citizens and the Peloponnesian garrison posted on a strong hill, not far from the wall. As it was impossible to surround the town without being masters of this hill, the Athenians attacked it at once, and were more fortunate than they had been before Mende; for they carried it by assault, compelling the defenders to take refuge in the town. After erecting their trophy, they commenced the wall of circumvallation. Before it was finished, the garrison who had been shut up in the acropolis of Mende got into Skidra at night, having broken out by a sally on a side where the blockading wall around them joined the sea. But this did not hinder Nikias from prosecuting his operations, so that Skidra was in no long time completely enclosed, and a division placed to guard the wall of circumvallation.²

Such was the state of affairs which Brasidas found on returning from the island Macdonia. Unable either to recover Mende or to relieve Skidra, he was forced to confine himself to the protection of Teuch. Nikias, however, without attacking Teuch, retired some afterwards with his army to Athens, leaving Skidra under blockade.

The march of Brasidas into Macdonia had been unfortunate in every way. Nothing but his extraordinary gallantry rescued him from utter ruin. The joint force of himself and Perdikkas

The Athenians, by their aid, were enabled to surround the acropolis of Mende, and to begin the siege of Skidra.

¹Thucyd. iv. 100; Diod. xii. 76.

²Thucyd. iv. 101.

consisted of 1000 Grecian hoplites—Peloponnesian, Achaian, and Chalkidian—with 1800 Macedonian and Chalkidian horse, and a considerable number of non-Hellenic auxiliaries. As soon as they had got beyond the mountain-pass into the territory of the Lyncestæ, they were met by Arrhidæus, and a battle ensued, in which that prince was completely worsted. They halted here

Expedition of Brasidas along with Perikles into Thracian territory against Arrhidæus.

for a few days, awaiting—before they pushed forward to attack the villages in the territory of Arrhidæus—the arrival of a body of Illyrian mercenaries, with whom Perikles had concluded a bargain.¹ At length Perikles became impatient to advance without them, while Brasidas, on the contrary, apprehensive of the fate of Mende during his absence, was bent on retreating back. The dissension between them becoming aggravated, they parted company and occupied separate encampments at some distance from each other, when both received unexpected intelligence which made Perikles as anxious to retreat as Brasidas. The Illyrians, having broken their compact, had joined Arrhidæus, and were now in full march to attack the invaders. The small number of these barbarians was reported as considerable, while such was their reputation for ferocity as well as for valour, that the Macedonian army of Perikles, seized with a sudden panic, broke up in the night and fled without orders, hurrying Perikles himself along with them, and not even sending notice to Brasidas, with whom nothing had been concerted about the retreat. In the morning the latter found Arrhidæus and the Illyrians close upon him, the Macedonians being already far advanced in their journey homeward.

The contrast between the rout of Hælias and of Mendeia—general as well as soldiers—was never more strikingly exhibited than on this critical occasion. The soldiers of Brasidas, though surprised as well as deserted, lost neither their courage nor their discipline: the commander preserved not only his presence of mind, but his full authority. His hoplites were directed to form in a hollow square or oblong, with the light-armed and attack-bats in the centre, for the retreating march. Thracian soldiers were posted either in the water-racks or in convenient stations, to run out

Retreat of Perikles with five thousand before the Illyrians.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 124.

The superiority of disciplined and regimented force over disorderly numbers, even with equal individual courage, is now a truth so familiar, that we require an effort of imagination to put ourselves back into the 25th century before the Christian era, when this truth was recognized only among the Hellenic communities; when the practice of all their neighbours—Hyrians, Thracians, Asiatics, Syrians, and even Macedonians—implied ignorance or contradiction of it. In respect to the Ephrati, the difference between their military habits and those of the Greeks has been already noticed, having been pointedly manifested in the memorable joint attack on the Alabastrian town of Stratus, in the second year of the war.¹ Both Ephrati and Macedonians, however, are a step nearer to the Greeks than either Thracians or those Hyrian barbarians, against whom Brasidas was now about to march, and in whose case the contrast comes out yet more strikingly. It is not merely the contrast between two modes of fighting which the Lacemonian commander impresses upon his soldiers. He gives what may be called a moral theory of the principles on which that contrast is founded: a theory of large range, and going to the basis of Greek social life, in peace as well as in war. The sentiment, in each individual man's bosom, of a certain place which he has to fill and duties which he has to perform, combined with fear of the displeasure of his neighbours as well as of his own self-reproach if he shirks back, but at the same time essentially bound up with the feeling, that his

opponent shirks his duty, are two great influences. A man shirks only if he has no duty shirked; and each man shirks only if he shirks from shirking. It is not shirking, but duty, which is the basis of the moral theory of the principles on which that contrast is founded.

Such is the moral theory of the principles on which that contrast is founded. It is not shirking, but duty, which is the basis of the moral theory of the principles on which that contrast is founded. It is not shirking, but duty, which is the basis of the moral theory of the principles on which that contrast is founded.

The moral attitude which every man takes in this struggle is based on the principle of duty. It is not shirking, but duty, which is the basis of the moral theory of the principles on which that contrast is founded.

The speech of the Spartan general Brasidas, in describing the battle, deserves to be compared. "For the Spartans, the principle of duty is the basis of the moral theory of the principles on which that contrast is founded."

"For the Spartans, the principle of duty is the basis of the moral theory of the principles on which that contrast is founded."

flattered by being addressed as if they were themselves sprung from the race which had ennobled their ancestors. Next, we have seen the sight of the strongest invoked as the legitimate source of power, and as an honourable and sensible reflection, by an officer of Dorian race, oligarchical politics, unperverted intellect, and estimable character. We shall accordingly be prepared, when we find a similar principle hereafter laid down by the Athenian envoys at Miletus, to dismiss the explanation of those who treat it merely as a theory invented by demagogues and sophists—open one or other of whom it is common to throw the blame of all that is objectionable in Grecian politics or morality.

Having finished his baggage, Brasidas gave orders for retreat.

The city
of Sparta
was
in the
centre
of the
war.

As soon as his march began, the Illyrians rushed upon him with all the confidence and shouts of warriors against a flying enemy, believing that they should completely destroy his army. But whenever they approached near, the young soldiers specially stationed for the purpose turned upon and beat them

back with severe loss; while Brasidas himself, with his vanguard of 500, was present everywhere rendering vigorous aid. When the Lyncestians and Illyrians attacked, the army halted and repelled them, after which it resumed its retreating march. The barbarians found themselves so rudely handled, and with such unwonted vigour—for they probably had had no previous experience of Grecian troops—that after a few trials they desisted from meddling with the army in its retreat along the plain. They ran forward rapidly, partly in order to overtake the Macedonians under Perdiccas, who had fled before; partly to occupy the narrow pass, with high hills on each side, which formed the entrance into Lyncestia, and which lay in the road of Brasidas. When the latter approached this narrow pass he saw the barbarians masters of it. Several of them were already on the summit, and more were ascending to reinforce them, while a portion of them were moving down upon his rear. Brasidas immediately gave orders to his chosen 500 to charge up the most accessible of the two hills, with their best speed, before it became more numerously occupied—not staying to preserve compact ranks. This unexpected and vigorous move-

Relations
between
Athens and
the Peloponnesians
—the
purpose
being
to bring
about a
definitive
peace.
Lacedæmon
with reinforcement,
on its way
to Sicily,
prevented
from meeting
Thucydides
himself.

The relation between Athens and Peloponnesians, since the conclusion of the truce in the preceding March, had settled into a curious combination. In Thessaly, war was prosecuted by mutual understanding and with unobscured vigour; but everywhere else the truce was observed. The main purpose of the truce, however, that of giving time for discussion preliminary to a definitive peace, was completely frustrated. The claims of the Athenian people (which already included in their vote sanctioning the truce), for sending and receiving envoys to negotiate such a peace, seems never to have been accepted.

Instead of this, the Lacedæmonians despatched a considerable reinforcement by land to join Brasidas; probably at his own request, and also instigated by hearing of the Athenian armament now under Nicias in Sicily. But Isagoras, the commander of the reinforcement, on reaching the borders of Thessaly, found all further progress impracticable, and was compelled to send back his troops. For Perikles, by whose powerful influence alone Brasidas had been enabled to pass through Thessaly, now directed his Thessalian guests to keep the new-comers off; which was the more easily executed, and was gratifying to the feelings of Perikles himself, as well as an essential service to the Athenians.¹

Isagoras however—with a few companions, but without his army—made his way to Brasidas, having been particularly directed by the Lacedæmonians to inspect and report upon the state of affairs. He numbered among his companions a few select Spartans of the military age, intended to be placed as harpasts or governors in the cities reduced by Brasidas. This was among the first violations, apparently often repeated afterwards, of the ancient Spartan custom—that none except elderly men, above the military age, should be named to such posts. Indeed Brasidas himself was an illustrious departure from the ancient rule. The mission of these officers was intended to guard against the appointment of any but Spartans to such posts; for there were no Spartans in the army of Brasidas. One of the new-comers, Klearchus, was made governor of Amphipolis—

¹ Thucyd. i. 104.

describer.

Temples in
Pelopon-
nesus—the
temple of
Mithras
Argos
indisputably
lost.

The great temple of Mithra, between Mykion and Argos (near to the forum, and in early times more intimately connected with it, but now an appendage of the latter; Mykion itself having been subjected and almost depopulated by the Argians)—enjoyed an ancient Pan-hellenic reputation. The catalogue of its prisoners, scoringly with a statue or bust of

each, was preserved or imagined through centuries of past time, real and mythical, beginning with the goddess herself or her immediate mistress. Chrysis, an old woman who had been prisoner there for fifty-six years, happened to fall asleep in the temple with a burning lamp near to her head: the fillet encircling her head took fire, and though she herself escaped unhurt, the temple itself, very ancient and perhaps built of wood, was consumed. From fear of the wrath of the Argians, Chrysis fled to Mykion, and subsequently thought it necessary to seek protection as a suppliant in the temple of Asklepias at Tegea: Phaeia was appointed prisoner in her place.¹ The temple was rebuilt on an adjoining spot by Epulodemos of Argos, contrasting as much as possible the antiquities and traditions of the former, but with greater splendour and magnificence. Pausanias the traveller, who describes this second edifice as a visitor near 600 years afterwards, saw now in the remnant of the old temple which had been burnt.

We hear further of a war in Arcadia, between the two important cities of Mantinea and Tegea—each attended by its Arcadian allies, partly free, partly subject. In a battle fought between them at Lacodæmon, the victory was disputed. Each party erected a trophy—each sent spoils to the temple of Delphi. We shall have occasion soon to speak farther of these Arcadian discussions.

War in
Arcadia—
Tegea
Mantinea
and Tegea.

¹ *Thucyd.* ii. 1, 1-121; *Strabo*, ii. 27, 7, 12, 1, 2. *Herodotus* is completely at Thucydides, but separates this war from the war between the and Elis, and Herodotus had found a chronological series of these prisoners of Mithra, with a history of past events belonging to the supposed time of war. And such was the Pan-hellenic importance of the temple at this time, that Thucydides, when he describes generally the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, tells us, as one of his indications of time, that Chrysis had

been long thirty-eight years prisoner in the Argians. To supply the series of Chrysis prisoner and Chrysis as a continuous indication of time was a practice which had not yet got losing.

The catalogue of these prisoners of Mithra, beginning with actual and descending to mythical names, is illustrated by the inscription belonging to the temple of the Dioscuri at Sparta, *Copied from Mr. Hall's new Sparta Commentary, and Pausanias, Hellenic Geography, pp. 12, 13.*

The Boeotians had been no parties to the truce sworn between Sparta and Athens in the preceding month of March. But they seem to have followed the example of Sparta in abstaining from hostilities *de facto*; and we may conclude that they acceded to the request of Sparta so far as to allow the transit of Athenian visitors and sacred arrays through Boeotia to the Delphian temple. The only actual incident which we hear of in Boeotia during this interval is one which illustrates forcibly the harsh and ungenerous ascendancy of the Thebans over some of the inferior Boeotian cities.¹ The Thebans destroyed the walls of Thebes, and ordered the city to remain unfortified, on the charge of stirring tendencies. How far this suspicion was well-founded, we have no means of judging. But the Thebans, far from being dangerous at this moment, were altogether helpless—having lost the flower of their military force at the battle of Delium, where their station was on the defeated wing. It was this very helplessness, brought upon them by their services to Thebes against Athens, which now both impelled and enabled the Thebans to enforce the rigorous sentence above-mentioned.²

But the month of March (or the Attic Hekatebeion), *558* B.C.—the time prescribed for expiration of the One year's truce—had now arrived. It has already been mentioned that this truce had never been more than partially observed. Brasidas in Thrace had disregarded it from the beginning. Both the contending powers had tacitly acquiesced in the anomalous condition of war in Thrace coupled with peace elsewhere. Either of them had thus an excellent pretext for breaking the truce altogether; and as neither acted upon this pretext, we plainly see that the personal feeling and accidental parties, among both, tended to peace of their own accord, at that time. There was nothing except the interest of Brasidas, and of those revolted subjects of Athens to whom he had bound himself, which kept alive the war in Thrace. Under such a state of feeling, the wish taken to maintain the truce still seemed imperative on both parties—always excepting Thracian affairs. Moreover the Athenians

Boeotians
at peace
at Athens,
though not
parties to
the truce.—
Their
treatment
of the
Thebans
by Thebes.

558 B.C.

Expiration
of the truce
for one year.
Expiration
of both
Sparta and
Athens at
that time
towards
peace; but
prevents in
consequence
of the
violence of
Sparta in
Thrace.

¹ Xenophon, Memorabilia, II. 5, 2.

² Thucyd. iv. 108.

were to a certain degree cooled by their success at Menda and Skink, and by their recognition of Pythians as an ally, during the summer and autumn of 418 B.C. But the state of sentiment between the contracting parties was not such as to make it possible to treat for any longer peace, or to conclude any new agreement; though neither were disposed to depart from that which had been already concluded.

The same circumstances of the last day of the truce made no practical difference at first in this condition of things. The truce had expired: either party might renew hostilities; but neither actually did renew them. To the Athenians there was this additional motive for abstaining from hostilities for a few months longer: the great Pythian festival would be celebrated at Delphi in July or the beginning of August; and as they had been excluded from that holy spot during all the interval between the beginning of the war and the conclusion of the One year's truce, their pious feelings were now to have taken a peculiar longing towards the visits, pilgrimages, and festivals connected with it. Though the truce, therefore, had really ceased, no actual warfare took place until the Pythian games were over.¹

¹ This must be no the next summer, this must be put upon the usual delayed passage of Thucyd. v. l. 1. and 2. *ἡ ἀποστολή* means at the same time another *ἀποστολή* after the fashion of the 1st of every year. *Ἀθῆναι* are now described as *ἀποκαταστάσας* v. 1. *ἑαυτὰς* is *ἀποκαταστάσας* is at all times *ἀποκαταστάσας* each day for a long time.

Thucydides now says that "the truce was dissolved." But what he meant was, both parties were armed, and both renewed their pilgrims, &c. But he does not say that "hostilities commenced" before the Pythian, as Liller and other editors seem to do. The interval between the end of the second *ἀποστολή* and the Pythian festival was not so short that war or hostilities were any longer to have, and not so short that it was an interval of peace, as we see the words of Thucydides which he describes the relations between Corink and Athens in the ensuing year (v. 20).

The word *ἀποκαταστάσας* here means, in my judgment, the truce prolonged at the request of the Pythian festival—quite distinct from the truce for one year which had expired a year before. The change in the word in the course of one day from *ἀποκαταστάσας* to *ἀποκαταστάσας* shows this distinctly.

I agree with Mr. Arnold (introducing both Lys. II. 1000, and Lys. II. 1000) in the correctness of the words of this text. Thucydides, on his expedition to Thera after the Pythian festival, in the beginning of August, between that date and the end of September, happened the nature of Corink and the words of *ἀποκαταστάσας* and the war in which Dr. Arnold attacks his opinion is not at all satisfactory. In the discussion appended to his second volume of *Thucydides* p. 100, he says: "The words in Thucydides, as Aristotle repeated hostilities after the Pythian games, are I understand them, and the words of a Peace that lasted on till the Pythian

Them—an
 opponent of
 peace—the
 strong and
 motive as
 stated by
 Thucydides.
 Klean, but
 no personal
 interest in
 war.

But the coloring which Thucydides gives to Klean's support of the war is open to much greater comment. First, we may well raise the question, whether Klean had any real interest in war—whether his personal or party consequents in the city was at all enhanced by it. He had himself no talent or competence for war-like operations—which tended inflexibly to place ascendancy in the hands of others, and to throw him into the shade. As to his power of carrying on disingenuous intrigues with success, that must depend on the extent of his political ascendancy. Matter of estimation against others (assuming him to be careless of truth or falsehood) could hardly be wanting either in war or peace. And if the war brought forward unsuccessful generals open to his accusations, it would also throw up successful generals, who would certainly overthrow him, and would probably put him down. In the life which Plutarch has given us of Phokion—a plain and straightforward military man—we read that one of the frequent and estimative speakers of Athens (of character analogous to that which is ascribed to Klean) expressed his surprise on hearing Phokion dissuade the Athenians from embarking in a new war: "Yes," said Phokion, "I think it right to dissuade them; though I know well that, if there be war, I shall have command over you; if there be peace, you will have command over me".¹ This is surely a more rational estimate of the way in which war affects the comparative importance of the soldier and the military officer, than that which Thucydides pronounced in reference to the interests of Klean. Moreover, when we come to follow the political history of Symeon, we shall find the demagogic Athenians ultra-peace, and the aristocratic Hellenists far more warlike.² The former is afraid, not without reason, that war will raise into consequence energetic military leaders dangerous to the popular constitution. We may add that Klean himself had not been always warlike. He commenced his political career as an opponent of Perikles, when the latter was strenuously maintaining the necessity and prudence of beginning the Peloponnesian war.³

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, c. 18. Compare also the conversation of Nearchos and Epameinondas—*Diogen. Laert.* viii. 11.

² See the speeches of Athenagoras and Hermokleides, *Thucyd.* vi. 16–17.

³ Plutarch, Perikles, c. 12–13.

But further—if we should even grant that Kleon had a separate party-interest in promoting the war—it will still remain to be considered whether, at this particular crisis, the employment of energetic warlike measures in Thessaly was not really the sound and prudent policy for Athens. Taking Perikles as the best judge of policy, we shall find him at the outset of the war advocating emphatically two important points. 1. To stand

To prove
that the
war vigorously
in Thessaly was
at this time
the real
political
interest of
Athens.

vigilantly upon the defensive, maintaining unimpaired their maritime empire, "keeping their subject-allies well in hand,"¹ submitting patiently even to see Attika ravaged. 2. To abstain from trying to enlarge their empire or to make new conquests during the war.² Consistently with this well-defined plan of action, Perikles, had he lived, would have taken care to interfere vigorously and business to prevent Brasidas from making his conquests. Had such interference been either impossible or accidentally frustrated, he would have thought no efforts too great to recover them. To maintain undiminished the integrity of the empire, as well as that imposition of Athenian force upon which the empire rested, was his cardinal principle. Now, it is impossible to deny that, in reference to Thessaly, Kleon adhered more closely than his rival Nikias to the policy of Perikles. It was in Nikias, more than in Kleon, that the fatal mistake made by Athens in not interfering speedily after Brasidas first broke into Thessaly is to be imputed. It was Nikias and his partisans, desirous of peace at almost any price, and knowing that the Lacedæmonians also desired it, who encouraged the Athenians, at a moment of great public depression of spirit, to leave Brasidas unopposed in Thessaly, and rely on the chance of negotiation with Sparta for arresting his progress. The peace party at Athens carried their point of the truce for a year, with the promise, and for the express purpose, of checking the further conquests of Brasidas; also with the further promise of maturing that truce into a permanent peace, and obtaining under the peace even the restoration of Amphipolis.

Such was the policy of Nikias and his party, the friends of

¹ Thucyd. i. 101, 102, 103; ii. 12. ² Thucyd. i. 101, 102, 103; ii. 12. ³ Thucyd. i. 101, 102, 103; ii. 12.

question
of peace or
war, as it
stood
between
Athens and
Sparta, in
March,
B.C. 421,
after the
expiration
of the
truce for
one year.

peace, and opponents of Kleon. And the promises which they then held out might perhaps appear plausible. In March, B.C. 421, at the moment when the truce for one year was concluded. But subsequent events had frustrated them in the most glaring manner, and had even shown the best reason for believing that no such expectations could possibly be realised, while Brasidas was in unbroken and unopposed action. For the Lacedæmonians, though seemingly sincere in concluding the truce on the basis of all possible, and desiring to extend it to Thrace as well as elsewhere, had been unable to enforce the observance of it upon Brasidas, or to restrain him even from making new acquisitions—so that Athens never obtained the benefit of the truce, exactly in that region where she most stood in need of it. Only by the despatch of her army to Skione and Mende had she maintained herself in possession even of Pallene.

Now what was the lesson to be derived from this experience, when the Athenians came to discuss their future policy, after the truce was at an end? The great object of all parties at Athens was to recover the lost possessions in Thrace—especially Amphipolis. Nikias, still urging negotiations for peace, continued to hold out hopes that the Lacedæmonians would be willing to restore that place, as the price of their acquiescence now at Athens. His connexion with Sparta would enable him to announce her professions even upon authority. But to this Kleon might make, and doubtless did make, a complete reply, grounded upon the most recent experience:—"If the Lacedæmonians consent to the restitution of Amphipolis (he would say), it will probably be only with the view of finding some means to escape punishment, and yet to get back their prisoners. But granting that they are perfectly sincere, they will never be able to control Brasidas, and those parties in Thrace who are bound up with him by community of feeling and interest: so that after all you will give them back their prisoners, on the faith of an equivalent beyond their power to realise. Look at what has happened during the truce! So different are the views and obligations of Brasidas in Thrace from those of the Lacedæmonians, that he would not even obey their orders when they directed him to stand

as he was, and to desist from further conquest. Much less will he shy there when they direct him to surrender what he has already got; least of all, if they require the surrender of Amphipolis, his grand acquisition and his central point for all future effort. Depend upon it, if you desire to regain Amphipolis, you will only regain it by energetic employment of force, as has happened with Sitalces and Meneas. And you ought to put forth your strength for this purpose immediately, while the Lacedæmonian prisoners are yet in your hands, instead of waiting until after you shall have been defeated into giving them up, thereby leaving all your hold upon Lacedæmonia."

Such anticipations were fully verified by the result; for subsequent history will show that the Lacedæmonians, when they had bound themselves by treaty to give up Amphipolis, either would not, or could not, enforce performance of their stipulation, even after the death of Brasidas. Much less could they have done so during his life, when there was his great personal influence, strenuous will, and hopes of future conquest to serve as increased obstructions to them. Such anticipations were also plainly suggested by the recent past; so that in putting them into the mouth of Klein, we are only suggesting him to read the lesson open before his eyes.

Now since the war-policy of Klein, taken at this moment after the expiration of the One year's truce, may be thus shown to be not only more conformable to the genius of Pericles, but also founded on a juster estimate of events both past and future, than the peace-policy of Nikias—what are we to say to the historian, who, without rejecting such presumptions, every one of which is deduced from his own narrative—say, without even indicating their existence—merely tells us that "Klein opposed the peace in order that he might check dishonest intrigues and find matter for plausible criticism?"¹ We cannot but say of this criticism, with profound regret that such words must be pronounced respecting any judgment of Thucydides, that it is harsh and unfair towards Klein, and careless in regard to truth and the instruction of his readers. It breathes not that same spirit of honest-to-be impartiality which pervades his general history. It is an interpola-

Klein's
policy
of war
is
not
the
peace-
policy
of
Nikias
—
rather
a
policy
of
war
—
which
is
the
basis
of
his
policy.

easily entertained at the time, though afterwards proved to be illusory by the result, that Amphipolis might really be got back through peace with the Macedonians.

If Kleon, in proposing the expedition, originally proposed himself as the commander, a new ground of objection, and a very feasible ground, would thus be furnished. Since everything which Kleon does is understood to be a manifestation of some vicious or silly attribute, we are told that this was an instance of his absurd presumption, arising out of the success of Pylus, and persuading him that he was the only general who could put down Brasidas.

Original
leader of
Pylus and
the paper
work in
reference to
the re-
capture of
Amphi-
polis.

But if the success of Pylus had really filled him with such overweening military conceit, it is most unreasonable that he should not have procured for himself some command during the year which immediately succeeded the affair at Sphakteria—the eighth year of the war: a season of most active warlike enterprise, when his presumption and indifference arising out of the Sphakteria victory must have been fresh and glowing. As he obtained no command during this immediately succeeding period, we may fairly doubt whether he ever really received such excessive personal presumption of his own talents for war, and whether he did not retain after the affair of Sphakteria the same character which he had manifested in that affair—reluctance to engage in military expeditions himself, and a disposition to see them commanded as well as carried on by others. It is by no means certain that Kleon, in proposing the expedition against Amphipolis, originally proposed to take the command of it himself: I think it at least equally probable that his original wish was to induce Nikias or the Boeotai to take the command of it, as in the case of Sphakteria. Nikias doubtless opposed the expedition as much as he could. When it was determined by the people, in spite of his opposition, he would peremptorily decline the command for himself, and would do all he could to force it upon Kleon, or at least would be better pleased to see it under his command than under that of any one else. He would be not less glad to exonerate himself from a dangerous service than to see his rival entangled in it. And he would have before him the same alternative which he and his friends had contemplated with so much satisfaction in the affair

of Sphakteria; either the expedition would succeed, in which case Amphipolis would be taken—or it would fail, and the consequence would be the ruin of Kleon. The last of the two was really the more probable at Amphipolis—as Nikias had erroneously imagined it to be at Sphakteria.

It is easy to see, however, that an expedition proposed under these circumstances by Kleon, though it might command a majority in the public assembly, would have a large proportion of the citizens unfavourable to it, and even wishing that it might fail. Moreover, Kleon had neither talents nor experience for commanding an army; so that the being engaged under his command in fighting against the ablest officer of the time could inspire no confidence to any man in putting on his armour. From all these circumstances united, political as well as military, we are not surprised to hear that the hoplites whom he took out with him went with much reluctance.¹ An ignorant general with unwilling soldiers, many of them politically disliking him, stood little chance of winning Amphipolis from Brasidas. But had Nikias or the Strategoi done their duty, and carried the entire force of the city under competent command to the same object, the issue would probably have been different as to gain and loss—certainly very different as to dishonour.

Kleon started from Piræus, apparently towards the beginning of August, with 1200 Athenian, Lacedæmon, and inferior hoplites, and 300 horsemen, troops of excellent quality and condition; besides an auxiliary force of allies (number not exactly known) and thirty triremes. This armament was not of magnitude at all equal to the taking of Amphipolis; for Brasidas had equal numbers, besides all the advantages of the position. But it was a part of the scheme of Kleon, on arriving at Eion, to procure Macedonian and Thracian reinforcements before he commenced his attack. He first halted in his voyage near Skione, from which place he took away such of the hoplites as could be spared from the blockade. He next sailed across the Gulf from Pallene to the Bithynian peninsula, to a place called the Harbour of the Kolophonians near Tenedos.² Having here

¹ Thucyd. v. 26. and Herodotus de decem.
re armis peritibus.

² The town of Tenedos was situated near the extremity of the Hellespont.

learned that neither Brasidas himself, nor any considerable Peloponnesian garrison, were present in Turtak, he landed his forces, and marched to attack the town, sending ten triremes at the same time round a promontory which separated the harbour of the Ekolophonians from Turtak, to seal the latter place from seaward.

It happened that Brasidas, desiring to enlarge the fortified circle of Turtak, had broken down a portion of the old wall, and employed the materials in building a new and larger wall enclosing the position or suburb. This new wall appears to have been still incomplete and in an imperfect state of defence. Perdikkas, the Peloponnesian commander, resisted the attack of the Athenians as long as he could; but when already beginning to give way, he saw the ten Athenian triremes sailing into the harbour, which was hardly guarded at all. Abandoning the defence of the suburb, he hastened to rally those few auxiliaries, but came too late, so that the town was entered from both sides at once. Brasidas, who was not far off, rendered aid with the utmost celerity, but was yet at five miles' distance from the city when he learnt the capture and was obliged to retire unsuccessfully. Perdikkas the commander, with the Peloponnesian garrison and the Thracian male population, were dispatched as prisoners to Athens; while the Thracian women and children, by a fate but too common in those days, were sold as slaves.¹

After this not unimportant success, Elien sailed round the promontory of Akta to Elm at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of Amphipolis. From hence, in execution of his original scheme, he sent envoys to Perdikkas, urging him to lend effective aid as the ally of Athens in the attack of Amphipolis, with his whole forces; and to Poliks the king of the Thracian Odrysians, inviting him also to come with as many Thracian mercenaries as could be levied. The Elimeans, the Thracian tribe nearest to Amphipolis, took part with Brasidas.

promontory, on the side looking towards Perdikkas, that the landward Peloponnesians in the town corresponded to the armament of the peloponnesians on both sides, including the corresponding point Ekta Agrotis—'against the Peloponnesians' (Humbert, p. 122). Thucydides calls the English Old Remover eye

before Turtak (p. 122).

The value of Turtak, having the deepest river, and Ekta, a headland harbour near it, are said to be more likely. Thucyd. in Brasidas' speech, vol. II. ed. 1829, p. 123.

¹ Thucyd. v. 2.

The local influence of the banished Themistocles would no longer be at the service of Athens, much less at the service of Kleon. Awaiting the expected reinforcements, Kleon employed himself, first, in an attack upon Stagira in the Strymonic Gulf, which was repulsed; next upon Oulipona, on the coast opposite the island of Thasos, which was successful. But the reinforcements did not at once arrive, and being too weak to attack Amphipolis without them, he was obliged to remain inactive at Elion; while Brasidas on his side made no movement out of Amphipolis, but contented himself with keeping constant watch over the forces of Kleon, the view of which he commanded from his station on the hill of Korymbos, on the western bank of the river, communicating with Amphipolis by the bridge. Some days elapsed in such inaction on both sides. But the Athenian hoplites, becoming impatient of doing nothing, soon began to give vent to those feelings of dislike which they had brought out from Athens against their general, "whose ignorance and cowardice says the historian they contrasted with the skill and bravery of his opponent".¹ Athenian hoplites, if they felt such a sentiment, were not likely to refrain from manifesting it. And Kleon was presently made aware of the fact in a manner sufficiently painful to force him against his will into some movement; which, however, he did not intend to be anything else than a march for the purpose of surveying the ground all round the city, and a demonstration to temper the apprehensions of doing nothing, being aware that it was impossible to attack the place with any effect before his reinforcements arrived.

To comprehend the important incidents which followed, it is necessary to say a few words on the topography of Amphipolis, as far as we can understand it on the imperfect evidence before us. That city was placed on the left bank of the Strymon, on a conspicuous hill around which the river makes a bend, first in a

¹ Thucyd. v. 2. 1-11. Under this old bridge, there happened a well-known battle between Brasidas and Kleon, the Athenian general, who was repulsed. Thucydides also tells that Brasidas was killed in this battle, and that Kleon was killed in the same battle.

Thucydides also tells that Brasidas was killed in this battle, and that Kleon was killed in the same battle. Thucydides also tells that Brasidas was killed in this battle, and that Kleon was killed in the same battle.

south-westerly direction, then, after a short course to the southward, back in a north-easterly direction. Amphipolis had for its only artificial fortification one long wall, which began near the point north-east of the town, where the river narrows again into a channel, after passing through the lake Kirkiritis—ascended along the eastern side of the hill, crossing the ridge which connects it with Mount Pangaea, and then descended so as to touch the river again at another point south of the town, thus being, as it were, a string to the highly-bent bow formed by the river. On three sides—north, west, and south—the city was defended only by the Strymon. It was thus *vicinia* without any intervening wall to spectators from the side of the sea (north), as well as from the side of the continent (or west and north?). At some little distance below the point where the wall touched the river south of the city, was the bridge,¹ a communication of great

¹ Thucyd. ii. 102. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους*. In the *Geographia* of Strabo, lib. 7. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned.

² *Geographia* of Strabo, lib. 7. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned.

³ I cannot find a plan which will convey more than a faint idea of the hill of Amphipolis, and the surrounding country. I have seen a plan of the town of Amphipolis, and the surrounding country, in the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned.

⁴ *Geographia* of Strabo, lib. 7. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned.

the respects a natural one to the *Geographia* of Strabo, lib. 7. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned.

The *Geographia* of Strabo, lib. 7. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned.

⁵ *Geographia* of Strabo, lib. 7. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned. In the *Geographia* of Ptolemy, lib. 2. c. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὕψους* is also mentioned.

importance for the whole country, which connected the territory of Amphipolis with that of Anglia. On the western or right bank of the river, bordering it and forming an outer bend corresponding to the bend of the river, was situated Mount Korymbos. In fact, the course of the Styrakos is here determined by these two steep eminences, Korymbos on the west and the hill of Amphipolis on the east, between which it flows. At the time when Brasidas first took the place, the bridge was totally unconnected with the long city wall. But during the intervening eighteen months, he had erected a palisade work (probably on northern bank topped with a palisade) connecting the two. By means of this palisade, the bridge was thus at the close of Kleon's expedition comprehended within the fortifications of the city; so that Brasidas, while keeping watch on Mount Korymbos, could pass over whenever he chose into the city, without impediment.¹

which occupied the higher slope of the hill. It was not to suppose that the whole space between the long wall and the first was covered by buildings. I thought, I think, that Amphipolis was not far from a circular valley, on the eastern side of which the long wall lay. Hence the idea of a valley, from which the

The palisade which I have here given to the third period will not give to any one else; it will appear to me the only one entitled to be considered as a palisade, and necessary to the whole narrative.

When Brasidas surprised Amphipolis and the bridge was completely unconnected with the long wall, and at a certain distance from it, then when Brasidas wrote his history, there was a gap of twenty years between the bridge and the fortifications of the city to show how much of another valley there was in the city, the whole fortification of the city had been altered during the intervening period.

Now the question is—Was the long wall of Amphipolis connected, or unconnected, with the bridge at the time of the truce between Brasidas and Kleon? Whoever reads the narrative of Thucydides attentively will see, I think, that they must have been connected, though Thucydides does not in express terms specify the fact.

For if the bridge had been detached from the wall, so it was when Brasidas surprised the place first, the hill of Korymbos, on the opposite side of the river, would have been an excellent position for him to occupy. He might have been cut off from Amphipolis by an enemy attacking the bridge. But we shall find him remaining quietly on the hill of Korymbos, with the perfect security of possessing Amphipolis at any moment that he chose to do so. It is evident, then, the bridge, though unconnected with the long wall, might still be under a strong garrison, and I think that at that position it might have been well naturally placed. The bridge, then, we have to regard as a bridge completely detached from the city, though by means of a palisade, which was certainly separate the fortifications of Brasidas. It is not then possible to attach the bridge separately from the city, and that wall would have been and would it is describing the operations of Kleon, who is represented as having nothing to do with, except the fortifications of the town.

Assuming then that there was such a gap of thirty years between the bridge and the long wall, added by Brasidas since the first capture of the place, I have no objection or demand to give to the word *palisade*. No other English meaning is proposed by any one. There

polis, to the Athenian month without. Moreover, as conspicuous
 Ktesias was the interior of the city to spectators without,
 is often his
 retreat.

minutæ around him performing the ceremony of
 sacrifice, was distinctly recognised. The fact was made known
 to Kleon as he stood on the high ridge taking his survey, while
 at the same time those who had gone near to the gates reported
 that the feet of many horses and men were beginning to be seen
 under them, as if preparing for a sally.¹ He himself went close
 to the gate, and satisfied himself of this circumstance: we must
 recollect that there was no defender on the walls, nor any danger
 from missiles. Anxious to avoid coming to any real engagement
 before his reinforcements should arrive, he at once gave orders
 for retreat, which he thought might be accomplished before the
 attack from within could be fully organised. For he imagined
 that a considerable number of troops would be marched out, and
 ranged in battle order, before the attack was actually begun—not
 dreaming that the sally would be instantaneous, made with a
 mere handful of men. Orders having been proclaimed to wheel
 to the left, and retreat in column on the left flank towards Ekeæ,
 Kleon, who was himself on the top of the hill with the right
 wing, waited only to see his left and centre actually in march on
 the road to Ekeæ, and then directed his right also to wheel to the
 left and follow them.

The whole Athenian army were thus in full retreat, marching
 in a direction nearly parallel to the Long Wall of
 Amphipolis, with their right or unobscured side
 exposed to the enemy, when Brasidas, looking over
 the southernmost gate of the Long Wall, with his
 small detachment ready marshalled near him, burst
 out into contemptuous exclamations on the disorder
 of their army.² "These men will not stand to: I see
 it by the quivering of their spears and of their hands.

Ktesias
 neither met
 upon the
 army in the
 retreat—the
 Athenians
 were com-
 pletely
 routed.
 Brasidas
 met Kleon
 both sides.

¹ Thucyd. v. 12. at H. Kleon
 against Brasidas about, but not Kleon
 was mentioned and, as if with the
 army, there was at least one Athenian
 detachment on either side, Brasidas, Thucy-
 dæus, Brasidas, the river and the
 fact that it was Brasidas, Brasidas, the
 mountain of H. Kleon.

Kleon did not himself see Brasidas

withdrawing, or see the enemy's army
 within the city: column on the lower
 ground was hidden, Brasidas, for seeing
 what was going on in Amphipolis, that
 he was within the high ridge. Brasidas
 saw it, and gave information to him.

² Thucyd. v. 12. at H. Kleon, both of
 Brasidas, Brasidas, Brasidas, the river
 Brasidas, Brasidas, Brasidas, the river

him, immediately after it began its retreat. But the soldiers on the Athenian right had probably seen the previous movement of Brasidas against the other division, and, though astonished at the sudden danger, had then a moment's warning, before they were themselves assailed, to halt and form on the hill. Klearchus here found a considerable resistance, in spite of the desertion of Kleas, who, more astounded than any man in his army by a catastrophe so unexpected for, lost his presence of mind and fell at once; but was overtaken by a Thracian peltast from Myrkinas, and slain. His soldiers on the right wing, however, repulsed two or three attacks in front from Klearchus, and maintained their ground; until at length the Chalkidian cavalry and the peltasts from Myrkinas, having come forth out of the gates, assailed them with missiles in flank and rear, so as to throw them into disorder. The whole Athenian army was then put to flight; the left hurrying to Elea, the men of the right dispersing and seeking safety among the hilly grounds of Pangaea in their rear. Their sufferings and loss in the retreat, from the hands of the pursuing peltasts and cavalry, were most severe. When they at last again gathered at Elea, not only the commander Kleas, but 600 Athenian hoplites, half of the force sent out, were found missing.¹

So miserably had the attack been concerted, and so entire was

Profound
grief in
Thrace for
the death
of Brasidas—
Funeral
honours
paid him in
Amphipolis.
The
Athenian
commanders,
much
displeased
at the loss in
the battle,
refused
honour.

his success, that only seven men perished on the side of the victors. But of those seven, one was the gallant Brasidas himself, who, being carried into Amphipolis, lived just long enough to learn the complete victory of his troops and then expired. Great and bitter was the sorrow which his death occasioned throughout Thrace, especially among the Amphipolitans. He received, by special decree, the distinguished honour of interment within their city—the universal habit being to inter even the most ancient deceased persons in a suburb without the walls. All the cities attended his funeral, in arms

¹ It is almost painful to read the account given by Diodorus (XII. 73, 74) of the battle of Amphipolis, when every detail is full of the darkest and ghastliest atrocities of Thucydides—only inferior to being too brief. It is difficult to believe that Brasidas is

describing the same event; so totally different are all the circumstances, except that the Amphipolitans at last gain the victory. To say, with Wesseling in his note—"Hic non commemorat consequentem Thucydides"—is prodigiously below the truth.

and with military honours. His tomb was enclosed by a railing, and the space immediately fronting it was consecrated as the great agora of the city, which was remodelled accordingly. He was also proclaimed *Cléist* or Founder of Amphipolis, and as such received heroic worship with annual games and sacrifices to his honour.¹ The Athenian *Agora*, the real founder and originally reigning *Cléist* of the city, was stripped of all his commemorative honours and expunged from the remembrance of the people; the buildings, which served as visible monuments of his name, being destroyed. Full of hatred as the Amphipolitans now were towards *Athens*—and not merely of hatred, but of fear, since the loss which they had just sustained of their saviour and protector—they felt repugnance to the idea of rendering further worship to an Athenian *Cléist*. It was inconvenient to keep up such a religious link with *Athens*, now that they were forced to look exclusively to *Lamachus* for assistance. *Klearchus*, as governor of Amphipolis, superintended these various alterations in the city which this important change required, together with the erection of the trophy, just at the spot where *Brasidas* had first charged the Athenians; while the remaining ornament of *Athens*, having obtained the usual truce and buried their dead, returned home without further operations.

There are few battles recorded in history wherein the disparity and contrast of the two generals opposed has been so manifest—consummate skill and courage on the one side against ignorance and panic on the other. On the singular ability and courage of *Brasidas* there can be but one verdict of unqualified admiration. But the criticism passed by *Thucydides* on *Klein*, here as elsewhere, cannot be adopted without reserves. He tells us that *Klein* undertook his march, from *Siro*, up to the hill in front of Amphipolis, in the same rash and confident spirit with which he

Stagnated
on the
banks of
Amphipolis
—a
man
of
the
field
of
Klein.

¹Thucyd. v. 11. *Agorastis* is supposed to signify near to Amphipolis, when the soldiers resorted to *Brasidas* as to a fortress of impregnable strength, by speech and loyal attachment (*Klein*, *Mythology*, v. 7).

In reference to the question now introduced by the Amphipolitans to the continued vicinity of *Agora* as

their *Cléist*, compare the discourse addressed by the *Pharmak* to the *Lamachusians*, pleading for mercy. The *Pharmak*, if truly benevolent towards the *Pharmakians*, would acknowledge the merit of the man who had granted victory at the great battle of *Pharmak*—and therefore in answer to the date (*Thucyd.* ii. 26).

artfully laid out by a superior enemy, to create belief in their absence. A fault substantially the same had been committed by Themistokles himself and his colleagues at Salamis a year and a half before, when they suffered Brasidas to surprise the Athenian bridge and Amphipolis; not even taking common precautions, nor thinking it necessary to keep the fleet at Elion. They were not men particularly rash and presumptuous, but ignorant and uneducated, in a military sense; incapable of keeping before them dangerous contingencies which they perfectly knew, simply because there was no present evidence of approaching evil.

This military incompetence, which made Klein fall into the trap laid for him by Brasidas, also made him take wrong measures against the danger, when he unexpectedly discovered at last that the enemy within was preparing to attack him. His fatal error consisted in giving instant order for retreat, under the vain hope that he could get away before the enemy's attack could be brought to bear.¹ An able officer, before he commenced the retreating march so close to the hostile walls, would have taken care to marshal his men in proper array, to warn and address them with the usual harangue, and to wind up their courage to the fighting-point. Up to that moment they had no idea of being called upon to fight; and the courage of Greek hoplites—taken thus unawares while hurrying to get away in disorder visible both to themselves and their enemies, without any of the usual preliminaries of battle—was but too apt to prove deficient. To turn the right or unaided flank to the enemy was unavoidable, from the direction of the retreating movement; nor is it reasonable to blame Klein for this, as some historians have done, or for causing his right wing to move too soon in following the lead of the left, as Dr. Arnold seems to think. The great fault seems to have consisted in not waiting to marshal his men and prepare them for standing fight during their retreat. Let us add however—and the remark, if it serves to explain Klein's idea of being able to get away before he was actually assailed, counts as a double compliment to the judgment as well as boldness of Brasidas—that no other Lacedæmonian general of that day (perhaps not even Demosthenes, the most enterprising general of

¹ Thucyd. v. 10. *ἑξαίρετον ἀνέστη, &c.*

narrow limits the three assigned, and was one main reason, which frustrated its success.

Had Perikles been alive, *Amphipolis* might perhaps still have been lost, since its capture was the fault of the officers employed to defend it. But if not, it would probably have been attacked and recovered with the same energy as the revolted *Samos* had been; with the full force, and the best generals, that *Athens* could furnish. With such an armament under good officers, there was nothing at all impracticable in the recovery of the place; especially so at that time it had no defense on three sides except the *Strymon*, and might then be approached by *Athensian* ships on that navigable river. The armament of *Klein*,¹ even if his reinforcements had arrived, was hardly sufficient for the purpose. But *Perikles* would have been able to concentrate upon it the whole strength of the city, without being paralyzed by the animosities of political party. He would have seen as clearly as *Klein* that the place could only be recovered by force, and that its recovery was the most important object to which *Athens* could devote her energies.

It was then that the Athenians, partly from political intrigues, partly from the incompetence of Kleon, underwent a disastrous defeat instead of carrying Amphipolis. But the death of Brasidas converted their defeat into a substantial victory. There remained no Spartan, like or second to that eminent man, either as a soldier or a reconciling politician; none who could replace him in the confidence and affection of the allies of Athens in Thracia; none who could prosecute those enterprising plans against Athens on her unshielded side, which he had first shown to be practicable. With him the fears of Athens, and the hopes of Sparta, in respect to the future, alike disappeared. The Athenians sought Flaminio and Demosthenes.

L. longipennis was actually three
collected by the Almaty, Kopeysk,
Kokchetav, and other groups of workers,
beginning in the 1930s (Kozlov, 1948, p. 8). Earlier specimens (Kozlov, 1948, p. 8) were referred to *L. longipennis* by *L. longipennis* (Kozlov, 1948, p. 8) and *L. longipennis* (Kozlov, 1948, p. 8).

the rear.] But the distributions of the plants seem to have independently adjusted during the interval. Instead of one long wall, with three sides open to the street, it seems to have adopted a curved wall, only open to the street on a comparatively short space near the lake, while the curved wall toward the bridge continues for most of a parallel pair of long walls with road between.

had both of them acquired among the Akadians an influence personal to themselves, apart from their post and from their country. But the career of Brasidas exhibited an extent of personal ascendancy and admiration, obtained as well as deserved, such as had never before been paralleled by any military chieftain in Greece; and Plato might well select him as the most reliable historical counterpart to the heroic Achilles.¹ All the achievements of Brasidas were his own individually, with nothing more than bare encouragement, sometimes even without encouragement, from his country. And when we recollect the strict and narrow training in which as a Spartan he had been educated, so fatal to the development of everything like original thought or impulse, and so completely estranged from all experience of party or political dissension, we are amazed at his resource and flexibility of character, his power of adapting himself to new circumstances and new persons, and his felicitous dexterity in making himself the rallying point of opposite political parties in each of the various cities which he acquired. The combination "of every sort of practical excellence"—valour, intelligence, probity, and gentleness of dealing—which his character presented, was never forgotten among the subject-allies of Athens; and procured for other Spartan officers in subsequent years favourable presumptions, which their conduct was seldom found to realize.² At the time when Brasidas perished, in the flower of his age, he was unquestionably the first man in Greece. And though it is not given to us to predict what he would have become had he lived, we may be sure that the future course of the war would have been sensibly modified; perhaps even to the advantage of Athens, since she might have had sufficient occupation at home to keep her from undertaking her disastrous enterprise in Sicily.

Thucydides seems to take pleasure in setting forth the gallant exploits of Brasidas, from the first at Methone to the last at Amphipolis, not less than the dark side of Kleon; both, though in different scenes, the causes of his bankruptcy. He never mentions the latter except in connection with some proceeding represented as unwise or

Exploits of
Thucydides
Brasidas
and Kleon.

¹ Plato, Symposium, p. 205, p. 210.

² Thucyd. vi. 34. *Agar alia causa videtur, Agathis, &c.*

discreditable. The barbarities which the offended majesty of empire though itself entitled to practise in ancient times against dependences revolted and reconquered, reached their maximum in the propositions against Megara and Skione; both of these are ascribed to Kleon by name as their author. But when we come to the slaughter of the Melians—equally barbarous, and worse in respect to grounds of excuse, inasmuch as the Melians had never been subjects of Athens—we find Thucydides mentioning the deed without naming the proposer.¹

Respecting the foreign policy of Kleon, the facts already narrated will enable the reader to form an idea of it as compared with that of his opponents. I have shown grounds for believing that Thucydides has forgotten his usual impartiality in criticising this personal enemy; that in regard to Spakteria, Kleon was really one main and indispensable cause of procuring for his country the greatest advantage which she obtained throughout the whole war; and that in regard to his judgment, as advocating the prosecution of war, three different times must be distinguished—1. After the first blockade of the hoplites in Spakteria; 2. After the capture of the island; 3. After the expiration of the One-year truce. On the earliest of these three occasions he was wrong, for he seems to have shut the door on all possibilities of negotiation, by his manner of dealing with the Lacedæmonian envoys. On the second occasion he had fair and plausible grounds to offer on behalf of his opinion, though it turned out unfortunate; moreover, at that time all Athens was warlike, and Kleon is not to be treated as the pacifist adviser of that policy. On the third, and last occasion, after the expiration of the truce, the political counsel of Kleon was right, judicious, and truly Periclean—much surpassing in wisdom that of his opponents. We shall see in the coming chapters how these opponents managed the affairs of the state after his death; how Nikias threw away the interests of Athens in the enforcement of the conditions of peace; how Nikias and Alcibiades together dispossessed the power of the country on the shores of Spasos. And when we judge the demagogue Kleon in

Character
of Kleon—
his foreign
policy.

¹ Thucyd. v. 115.

this comparison, we shall find ground for remarking that Thucydides is reserved and even indulgent towards the errors and vices of other statesmen, harsh only towards those of his country.

As to the internal policy of Kleon, and his conduct as a politician in Athenian constitutional life, we have but little trustworthy evidence. There exists indeed a portrait of him drawn in colours broad and glaring; most impressive to the imagination, and hardly effaceable from the memory—the portrait in the "Knights" of Aristophanes. It is through this representation that Kleon has been transmitted to posterity, crucified by a poet who admits himself to have a personal grudge against him, just as he has been commemorated in the prose of an historian whose biasment he had provoked. Of all the productions of Aristophanes, so replete with comic genius throughout, the "Knights" is the most concentrated and inevitable—the most distinct in its character, symmetry, and purpose. Looked at with a view to the object of its author, both in reference to the audience and to Kleon, it deserves the greatest possible admiration, and we are not surprised to learn that it obtained the first prize. It displays the maximum of that which wit combined with malice can achieve, in scoring an enemy with ridicule, contempt, and calumny. Dem. Smith could have desired nothing worse, even for Níkes and Whiston. The old man Demos of Pnyx, introduced on the stage as personifying the Athenian people; Kleon, brought on as his newly-bought Paphlagonian slave, who, by coarsing, lying, impudent and false denunciation of others, has gained his master's ear, and heaps ill-nuage upon every one else, while he enriches himself; the Knights, or cold members of what we may call the Athenian aristocracy, forming the chorus of the piece as Kleon's pronounced enemies; the Scurvy-seller from the market-place, who, instigated by Níkes and Demosthenes along with those Knights, overdoes Kleon in all his own low arts, and supplants him in the favour of Demos;—all this, exhibited with incomparable vivacity of expression, forms the masterpiece and glory of lifelike comedy. The effect produced upon the Athenian audience when this piece was represented at the Lenæan festival

(January, A.D. 484, about six months after the capture of Sphakteria), with Kleon himself and most of the rest. Kleon present, must have been intense beyond what we can now easily imagine. That Kleon could maintain himself after this humiliating exposure, is an small proof of his mental vigour and ability. It does not seem to have impaired his influence, at least not permanently. For not only do we see him the most effective opponent of peace during the next two years, but there is ground for believing that the poet himself found it convenient to soften his tone towards this powerful enemy.

So ready are most writers to find Kleon guilty, that they are satisfied with Aristophanes as a witness against him; though no other public man, of any age or nation, has ever been condemned upon such evidence. No man thinks of judging Sir Robert Walpole, or Mr. Fox, or Mirabeau, from the numerous lampoons put in circulation against them. No man will take measure of a political Englishman from Parnet, or of a Frenchman from the *Chauffeur*. The unqualified comic merit of the "Knights" of Aristophanes is only one reason for distrusting the resemblance of its picture to the real Kleon. We have means too of testing the candour and accuracy of Aristophanes by his delineation of Sokrates, whom he introduced in the comedy of the "Clouds" in the year after that of the "Knights". As a comedy, the "Clouds" stands second only to the "Knights"; as a picture of Sokrates it is little better than pure fancy: it is not even a caricature, but a totally different person. We may indeed perceive single features of resemblance: the bare feet and the argumentative subtilty belong to both, but the entire portrait is such that if it bore a different name, no one would think of comparing it with Sokrates, whom we know well from other sources. With such an analogy before us, not to mention what we know generally of the portraits of Perikles by these authors, we are not warranted in treating the portrait of Kleon as a likeness, except on points where there is corroborative evidence. And we may add that some of the hits against him, where we can authentically test their pertinence, are decidedly not founded in fact; as, for example, where the poet accuses Kleon of having deliberately

Unlikelihood
of judging
Kleon
upon such
evidence—
picture of
Sokrates
by Arist.
not likely
to serve
misleading.

his intimacy with them, conceiving that private friendships would distract him from his paramount duty to the commonwealth.¹

Moreover, the reputation of Kleis, as a frequent and unmeasured accuser of others, may be explained partly by a passage of his story *Antiphonia*: a passage the more deserving of confidence as a just representation of fact, since it appears in a comedy (the "Frogs") represented (428 B.C.) three years after the death of Kleis, and five years after that of Hyperbolus, when the poet had less motive for misrepresentation against either. In the "Frogs," the scene is laid in Hades, whither the god Dionysus goes, in the attire of Mikallos, and along with his slave Xanthias, for the purpose of bringing up again to earth the deceased poet Euripides. Among the incidents, Xanthias, in the attire which his master had worn, is represented as acting with violence and insult towards two hucksters of eating-houses—consuming their substance, robbing them, refusing to pay when called upon, and even threatening their lives with a drawn sword. Upon which, the women, having no other resource left, announce their resolution of calling, the one upon her protector Kleis, the other on Hyperbolus, for the purpose of bringing the offender to justice before the dikastery.² This passage shows us (if inferences on comic evidence are to be held as admissible) that Kleis and Hyperbolus became involved in accusations partly by helping poor persons who had been wronged to obtain justice before the dikastery. A rich man who had suffered injury might purchase of Antipho, or some other rhetor, advice and aid as to the conduct of his complaint. But a poor man or woman would think themselves happy to obtain the generous suggestion, and sometimes the auxiliary speech, of Kleis or Hyperbolus, who would thus extend their own popularity by means very similar to those practised by the leading men in Rome.³

¹ Plutarch, *Life of Dem. Foenop.* p. 228. Compare two other passages in the same treatise, p. 224, where Plutarch speaks of the influence and services of Kleis; and p. 225, where he says, with truth, that Kleis was not at all qualified to act as general in a campaign.

² Aristophanes, *Frogs* 225–278.

³ Here again we find that the idea represented so constantly in the fictions of Rome, together with of this kind and regarding the names of others who had provided it completed (Plutarch, *Life of C. M.*) and also the dispute Antipho and Euripides were bringing—very old thoughts and notions which had the language, etc.

But besides lending aid to others, despicable Klein was often also a prosecutor, in his own name, of official delinquents, real or alleged. That some one should undertake this duty was indispensable for the protection of the city, otherwise the responsibility in which official persons were subjected after their term of office would have been merely nominal: and we have proof enough that the general public morality of these official persons, acting individually, was by no means high. But the duty was, at the same time, one which most persons would and did shun. The prosecutor, while absconding to general dislike, gained nothing even by the most complete success; and if he failed so much as not to procure a minority of votes among the *ekklesiasts*, equal to one-fifth of the numbers present, he was condemned to pay a fine of 1000 drachmæ. What was still more serious, he drew upon himself a formidable mass of private hatred—from the friends, partisans, and the political slack of the accused party—extremely menacing to his own future security and comfort in a community like Athens. There was, therefore, little motive to accept, and great motive to decline, the task of prosecuting on public grounds. A prudent politician at Athens would undertake it occasionally, and against special rivals; but he would carefully guard himself against the reputation of doing it frequently or by inclination—and the wiser constantly do so guard themselves in those speeches which yet remain.

It is this reputation which Thrasyllos fastens upon Klein, and which, like Cato, the censor at Rome, he probably method: from native artfulness of temper, from a powerful talent for narrative, and from his position, both inferior and hostile, to the Athenian knights or aristocracy, who overshadowed him by their family importance. But in what proportion of cases his accusations were just or calumnious—the real question upon which a sound judgment turns—we have no means of deciding, either in his case or in that of Cato. "To lack the wicked (observes Aristophanes himself²) is not only no blame, but i

Probably he voluntarily acquiesces in a law—general enough and almost always existing in some form.

We have no evidence to doubt in what proportion of cases he acted thoroughly.

² Aristophanes, *Knights*, 1271.—
 Justitiam recte recusamus, utitur ipse iniquitate,
 Quam recte rectos spernit, dicitur illi iniquum.

even a matter of honour to the poet." It has not been common to allow to Klean the benefit of this observation, though he is much more entitled to it than Aristophanes. For the sticks of a poetical libeller admit neither of defence nor retaliation; whereas a prosecutor before the dikastery found his opponent prepared to reply, or even to retort—and was obliged to specify his charge, as well as to furnish proof of it—so that there was a fair chance for the innocent man not to be confounded with the guilty.

The quarrel of Klean with Aristophanes is said to have arisen out of an accusation which he brought against that poet¹ in the senate of Five Hundred, on the subject of his second comedy, the "*Babylonians*," exhibited A.C. 426, at the festival of the urban Dionysia in the month of March. At that season many strangers were present at Athens; especially many visitors and deputies from the subject-allies, who were bringing their annual tributes. And as the "*Babylonians*" (now lost), like so many other productions of Aristophanes, was full of shocking riblics not only against individual citizens, but against the functionaries and institutions of the city,² Klean instituted a complaint against it in the senate, as an exposure dangerous to the public security before strangers and allies. We have to remark that Athens was then in the midst of an embarrassing war—that the fidelity of her subject-allies was much doubted—that Lacedæ, the greatest of her allies, had been reconquered only in the preceding year, after a revolt both troublesome and perilous to the Athenians. Under such circumstances, Klean might see plausible reason for thinking that a political comedy of the Aristophanic vein and talent tended to degrade the city in the eyes of strangers, even granting that it was innocuous when confined to the citizens themselves. The poet complains³ that Klean summoned him before the

¹ It appears that the complaint was made immediately against Kallimachos, in whose name the poet brought on the "*Babylonians*." (*Index ad Arist. Vesp.* 1161, and also list of names the respectable party, though the real author was doubtless probably well known. The "*Kleanes*" was the first case brought out by the poet in the first scene.

² See *Athens*, 377, with the Scholia, and the interesting biography of Aristophanes.

³ See *Metellus* (*Aristoph.* *Vesp.* 1161, 1162, 1163, 1164, 1165, 1166, 1167, 1168, 1169, 1170, 1171, 1172, 1173, 1174, 1175, 1176, 1177, 1178, 1179, 1180, 1181, 1182, 1183, 1184, 1185, 1186, 1187, 1188, 1189, 1190, 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194, 1195, 1196, 1197, 1198, 1199, 1200, 1201, 1202, 1203, 1204, 1205, 1206, 1207, 1208, 1209, 1210, 1211, 1212, 1213, 1214, 1215, 1216, 1217, 1218, 1219, 1220, 1221, 1222, 1223, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1227, 1228, 1229, 1230, 1231, 1232, 1233, 1234, 1235, 1236, 1237, 1238, 1239, 1240, 1241, 1242, 1243, 1244, 1245, 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249, 1250, 1251, 1252, 1253, 1254, 1255, 1256, 1257, 1258, 1259, 1260, 1261, 1262, 1263, 1264, 1265, 1266, 1267, 1268, 1269, 1270, 1271, 1272, 1273, 1274, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1278, 1279, 1280, 1281, 1282, 1283, 1284, 1285, 1286, 1287, 1288, 1289, 1290, 1291, 1292, 1293, 1294, 1295, 1296, 1297, 1298, 1299, 1300, 1301, 1302, 1303, 1304, 1305, 1306, 1307, 1308, 1309, 1310, 1311, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1315, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1319, 1320, 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containing some few bitter jests against Kleon, manifested no second deliberate plan of attack against him.

The battle of Amphipolis remained at once the two most pronounced individual opponents of peace, Kleon and Brasidas. Athens too was more than ever discouraged and averse to prolonged fighting; for the number of hoplite slain at Amphipolis doubtless filled the city with mourning, besides the unconfined distress now terrifying Athenian soldiery. The peace-party under the auspices of Nicias and Laches, relieved at once from the internal opposition of Kleon, as well as from the foreign enterprise of Brasidas, were enabled to resume their negotiations with Sparta in a spirit promising success. King Plistonax, and the Spartan elders of the year were on their side equally bent on terminating the war, and the deputies of all the allies were convoked at Sparta for discussion with the envoys of Athens. Such discussion was continued during the whole autumn and winter after the battle of Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities on either side. At first the pretensions advanced were found very conflicting; but at length, after several debates, it was agreed to treat upon the basis of each party surrendering what had been acquired by war. The Athenians insisted at first on the restoration of Platæa; but the Spartans replied that Platæa was theirs neither by force nor by treaty, but by voluntary capitulation and surrender of the inhabitants. This distinction seems to our ideas somewhat remarkable, since the capitulation of a besieged town is not less the result of force than capture by storm. But it was adopted in the present treaty; and under it the Athenians, while foregoing their demand of Platæa, were enabled to retain Naxos, which they had acquired from the Megarians, and Amuktorion and Sollium,¹ which they had taken from Corinth. To ensure accommodating temper on the part of Athens, the Spartans held out the threat of invading Attica in the spring, and of establishing a permanent fortification in the

¹ Thucyd. v. 17-20. The statement is not so good as that this was the ground on which the Athenians were allowed to retain Sollium and Amuktorion. For if their position in these two places had been distinctly

and in issue at variance with the treaty, the Corinthians would doubtless have shown this fact as the principal ground of their complaint; whereas they preferred to have recourse to a catalogue of wrongs.

territory; and they even sent round proclamation to their allies, enjoining all the details requisite for this step. Since Attica had now been exempt from invasion for three years, the Athenians were probably not insensible to this threat of renewal under a permanent form.

At the beginning of spring—about the end of March, 422 B.C.—shortly after the urban Dionysia at Athens—the important treaty was concluded for the term of fifty years. The following were its principal conditions:—

1. All shall have full liberty to visit all the public temples of Greece—for purposes of private sacrifice, consultation of oracles, or visit to the festivals. Every man shall be undisturbed both in going and coming.—[The value of this article will be felt when we recollect that the Athenians and their allies had been unable to visit either the Olympic or the Pythian festival since the beginning of the war.]

Peace
ratified the
same day
of the
festival
in March.
422 B.C.
Conditions
of peace.

2. The Delphians shall enjoy full autonomy and mastery of their temple and their territory.—[This article was intended to exclude the ancient claim of the Phocians concerning the management of the temple—a claim which the Athenians had once supported, before the Thirty years' truce; but they had now little interest in the matter, since the Phocians were in the hands of their enemies.]

3. There shall be peace for fifty years between Athens and Sparta with their respective allies, with abstinence from mischief either overt or fraudulent, by land as well as by sea.

4. Neither party shall invade for purposes of mischief the territory of the other—not by any artifice or under any pretence.

Should any subject of difference arise, it shall be settled by equitable means, and by oaths tendered and taken, in form to be hereafter agreed on.

5. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians.

They shall further relinquish to the Athenians Anglos, Stenonæ, Amathus, Skellæ, Olynthus, and Spartolus. But these cities shall remain autonomous, on condition of paying tribute to Athens according to the assessment of Aristobolus. Any citizen of these cities (Amphipolis as well as the others) who may choose to

quit them: shall be at liberty to do so, and to carry away his property. Nor shall the cities be counted hereafter either as allies of Athens or of Sparta, unless Athens shall induce them, by amiable persuasions, to become her allies, which she is at liberty to do if she can.

The inhabitants of Meliæra, Sestæ, and Singæ shall dwell independently in their respective cities, just as much as the Olynthians and Abantes.—[These were towns which adhered to Athens, and were still numbered as her allies, though they were near enough to be molested by Olynthians¹ and Abantes, against which this clause was intended to secure them.]

The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Piræum to the Athenians.

3. The Athenians shall restore to Sparta Korymbæum, Kythion, Meliæra, Peleum, Atalanti, with all the captives in their hands from Sparta or her allies. They shall further release all Spartans or allies of Sparta now blocked up in Skion.

7. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall give back all the captives in their hands from Athens or her allies.

8. Respecting Skion, Tortosæ, Serresia, or any other town in the possession of Athens, the Athenians may take their own measures.

9. Oaths shall be exchanged between the contracting parties according to the solemnities held most binding in each city respectively, and in the following words:—"I will adhere to this convention and true sincerely and without fraud". The

¹ Compare v. 30 with v. 13, which seems to say to release the captives suggested by Dr. Arnold, and adopted by Perce.

The use of the word *ἀλλοτρίων* is suggested in the restoration of *ἀλλοτρίων* at Athens—most of the word captives in regard to the restoration of the same cities—observed words. These who drive up the treaty, which is written in a very unusual way, seem to have intended that the word *ἀλλοτρίων* should apply both to *ἀλλοτρίων* and the other cities, but that the word *ἀλλοτρίων* should apply only to *ἀλλοτρίων*. The word *ἀλλοτρίων* is especially apt to the restoration of *ἀλλοτρίων*; for that which is referred to is a town delivered up. But it is

reasonable that this word *ἀλλοτρίων* does not properly apply to the other cities; for they were not delivered up to Athens—they were only relinquished at the desire immediately following further exigencies. Perhaps there is a little addition made in the use of the word—just to intimate indirectly that the Lacedæmonians were to deliver up various cities to Athens; that to add words afterwards, which show that the cities were only to be relinquished—not surrendered to Athens.

The provision for guaranteeing liberty of retirement and carrying away of property was intended chiefly for the *ἀλλοτρίων*, who would naturally desire to migrate, if the town had first actually returned to Athens.

Salliers and Amaklerian; the Megarians, because they did not regain Salamis; the Boeotians, because they were required to surrender Paustium. In spite of the urgent solicitations of Sparta, the deputies of all these powerful states not only denounced the peace as unjust, and voted against it in the general assembly of allies, but refused to accept it when the vote was carried, and went home to their respective cities for instructions.¹

Such were the conditions, and such the accompanying circumstances, of the peace of Nikias, which terminated, or p. 404. 11-12. pretended to terminate, the great Peloponnesian war, after a duration of ten years. Its consequences and fruits, in many respects such as were not anticipated by either of the contending parties, will be seen in the following chapters.

¹ Thucyd. i. 12.

CHAPTER LV.

FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC
FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 80.

My last chapter terminated with the peace called the Peace of Nikias, concluded in March, 421 B.C., between Athens and the Spartan confederacy, for fifty years.

This peace—negotiated during the autumn and winter succeeding the defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis, wherein both Kleon and Brasidas were slain—resulted partly from the extraordinary anxiety of the Spartans to recover their captives who had been taken at Sphakteria, partly from the discouragement of the Athenians leading them to listen to the peace party who acted with Nikias. The general principle adopted for the

peace was the restitution by both parties of what acquired by war, yet excluding such places as had been rendered by capitulation: according to which reserve, the Athenians, while prevented from reconquering Plataea, continued to hold Mende, the harbour of Megara. The Lacedæmonians engaged to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and to relinquish their connection with the revolted allies of Athens in Thracia—

—that is, Argilus, Staphirus, Alusasion, Skolias, Olynthos, and Spartolus. These six cities, however, were not to be enrolled as allies of Athens unless they chose voluntarily to become so, but only to pay regularly to Athens the tribute originally assessed by Aristides, as a sort of recompense for the protection of the *Ægean* sea against private war or piracy. Any inhabitant of Amphipolis or the other cities who chose to leave them was at liberty to do so, and to carry away his property. Further,

Negotiated
during the
winter following
the defeat of
the Athenians
at Amphipolis.

had been
con-

Precluded
the peace of
Nikias—
negotiated
in March,
421 B.C.—
by the
conditions
of peace.

the Lacedæmonians consented to restore Perikles to Athens, together with all the Athenian prisoners in their possession. As to Skink, Torkin, and Sornayin, the Athenians were declared free to take their own measures. On their part, they engaged to release all captives in their hands, either of Sparta or her allies; to restore Pylas, Kynides, Melchod, Pictors, and Alimakh; and to liberate all the Peloponnesian or Boeotian soldiers now under blockade in Skink.

Provision was also made, by special articles, that all Greeks should have free access to the sacred Pan-hellenic festivals, either by land or sea, and that the autonomy of the Delphian temple should be guaranteed.

The contracting parties swore to abstain in future from all injury to each other, and to settle by amicable decision any disputes which might arise.¹

Lastly, it was provided that if any matter should afterwards occur as having been forgotten, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might by mutual consent amend the treaty as they thought fit. So prepared, the oaths were interchanged between seventeen principal Athenians and as many principal Lacedæmonians.

Earnestly bent as Sparta herself was upon the peace, and ratified as it had been by the vote of a majority among her confederates, still there was a powerful minority who not only refused their assent, but strenuously protested against its conditions. The Corinthians were discontented because they did not receive back Sallurus and Anakhoriom; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisaea; the Boeotians, because Perikles was to be restored to Athens; the Elisians also, on some other ground which we do not distinctly know. All of these, moreover, took common offence at the article which provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent, and without consulting the allies, amend the treaty in any way that they thought proper.² Though the peace was sworn, therefore, the most powerful members of the Spartan confederacy remained all resolute.

Peace
concluded at
Sparta
by the
majority of
members of
the Pelopon-
nesian
alliance.

The most
powerful
members of
the alliance
refuse to
accept the
treaty—
Corinthians,
Megarians,
Boeotians,
Elisians.

¹ Thucyd. v. 27-28.

² Thucyd. v. 28.

So strong was the interest of the Spartans themselves, however, that having obtained the favourable vote of the majority, they wished to carry the peace through, even at the risk of breaking up the confederacy. Besides the earnest desire of recovering their captives from the Athenians, they were further alarmed by the fact that their treaty for thirty years coincided with Argos was just now expiring. They had indeed made application to Argos for renewing it, through Lichas the Spartan proxenos of that city. But the Argives had refused, except upon the inadmissible condition that the border territory of Kynuria should be ceded to them: there was reason to fear therefore that this new and powerful force might be thrown into the scale of Athens, if war were allowed to continue.¹

Accordingly, as soon as the peace had been sworn, then the Spartans proceeded to execute its provisions. Lots being drawn to determine whether Sparta or Athens should be the first to make the cession required, the Athenians drew the favourable lot—an advantage so very great, under the circumstances, that Themophronus affirmed Nikias to have gained the point by bribery. There is no ground for believing such alleged bribery; the rather, as we shall presently find Nikias gratuitously throwing away most of the benefit which the lucky lot conferred.²

The Spartans began their compliance by forthwith releasing all the Athenian prisoners in their hands, and despatching Lachagoras with two others to Amphipolis and the Thracian towns. These envoys were directed to proclaim the peace as well as to enforce its observance upon the Thracian towns, and especially to command Kleonides, the Spartan commander in Amphipolis, that he should surrender the town to the Athenians. But on arriving in Thrace, Lachagoras met with nothing but unanimous opposition: and as energetic were the remonstrances of the Chalkidians, both in Amphipolis and out of it, that even Kleonides refused obedience to his own government, pretending that he was not strong enough to surrender the place against the resistance of the Chalkidians. Thus completely baffled, the envoys returned to Sparta, whither

Position and feelings of the Lacedæmonians—*Argos great anxiety for peace.*—*Their important relations with Argos.*

Steps taken by the Lacedæmonians to execute the peace—*Amphipolis is not restored to Athens.*—*The great object of Sparta is not to accept the peace.*

¹ Thucyd. v. 16, 22, 24.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 12.

Klearchus thought it prudent to accompany them, partly to explain his own conduct, partly in hopes of being able to procure some modification of the terms. But he found this impossible. He was sent back to Amphipolis with peremptory orders to surrender the place to the Athenians, if it could possibly be done; if that should prove beyond his force, then to come away, and bring home every Peloponnesian soldier in the garrison. Perhaps the surrender was really impracticable to a force no greater than that which Klearchus commanded, since the reluctance of the population was doubtless obstinate. At any rate, he represented it to be impracticable: the troops accordingly came home, but the Athenians still remained excluded from Amphipolis, and all the stipulations of the peace respecting the Thracian towns remained unperformed. Nor was this all. The envoys from the recent minority (Christians and others), after having gone home for instructions, had now come back to Sparta with increased repugnance and protest against the infusion of the peace, so that all the efforts of the Spartans to bring them to compliance were fruitless.¹

The Spartans were now in serious embarrassment. Not having executed their portion of the treaty, they could not demand that Athens should execute hers; and they were threatened with the double misfortune of forfeiting the confidence of their allies without acquiring any of the advantages of the treaty. In this dilemma they determined to enter into closer relations, and separate relations, with Athens, at all hazard of offending their allies. Of the enmity of Argos, if united by Athens, they had little apprehension; while the moment was now favourable for alliance with Athens, from the decided pacific tendencies reigning on both sides, as well as from the known philo-Laconian sentiment of the leaders Nikias and Lachis. The Athenian envoys had remained at Sparta ever since the avowing of the peace—avowing the fulfilment of the conditions; Nikias or Lachis, one or both, being very probably among them. When they saw that Sparta was unable to fulfil her bond, so that the treaty seemed likely to be cancelled, they would doubtless encourage, and perhaps may even have suggested, the idea of a separate alliance between Sparta and

Separate
alliance for
military
defence
concluded
between
Sparta and
Athens.

¹ Thucyd. i. 91, 92.

Athens, as the only expedient for averting the deficiency; providing that under that alliance the Spartan captives should be restored. Accordingly a treaty was concluded between the two, for fifty years—not merely of peace, but of *defensive* alliance. Each party pledged itself to assist in repelling any invaders of the territory of the other, to treat them as enemies, and not to conclude peace with them without the consent of the other. This was the single provision of the alliance,—with one addition, however, of no mean importance, for the security of Lacedæmon. The Athenians engaged to lend their best and most energetic aid in putting down any rising of the Helots which might occur in Laconia. Such a provision indisputably the weakness felt by the Lacedæmonians respecting their serf-population. But at the present moment it was of peculiar value to them, since it bound the Athenians to restrain, if not to withdraw, the Messenian garrison of Pylæ, planted there by themselves for the express purpose of provoking the Helots to revolt.

An alliance with stipulations so few and simple took no long time to discuss. It was concluded very speedily after the return of the envoys from Amphipolis—probably not more than a month or two after the former peace. It was sworn to by the same individuals on both sides; with similar declaration that the oath should be mutually renewed, and also with similar proviso that Sparta and Athens might by mutual consent either enlarge or restrict the terms, without violating the oath.¹ Moreover the treaty was directed to be inscribed on two columns—one to be set up in the temple of Apollo at Amyclæ, the other in the temple of Athénæ in the acropolis of Athens.

The most important result of this new alliance was something not specified in its provisions, but understood, we may be well assured, between the Spartans Ephors and Nicias at the time when it was concluded. All the Spartan captives at Athens were forthwith restored.²

Athens
restores the
Spartan
captives.

¹ Thucyd. v. 26. The treaty of alliance seems to have been drawn up at Sparta, and appeared as sanctioned with the Athenian envoys; they went to Athens, and there adopted by the people; then sworn to on both sides. The interval between this second treaty and the First (or *Peace of Nicias*), v. 22) may

have been more than a month; for it comprised the visit of the Lacedæmonian envoys to Amphipolis and the other power of Thucyd.—the negotiation of assistance in those terms, and the return of Alcibiades to Sparta to give an account of his conduct.

² Thucyd. v. 26.

Nothing can demonstrate more powerfully the pacific and equivoque feeling now reigning at Athens, as well as the strong philo-Laconian inclinations of her leading men (at this moment Alcibiades was competing with Nikias for the favour of Sparta, as will be stated presently) than the terms of this alliance, which bound Athens to assist in keeping down the Helots, and the still more important after-proceeding of restoring the Spartan captives. Athens thus parted irreversibly with her best card, and promised to reimburse her several but without obtaining the smallest equivalent beyond what was contained in the oath of Sparta to become her ally. For the last three years and a half, ever since the capture of Epikleria, the possession of these captives had placed her in a position of divided advantage in regard to her chief enemy—advantage, however, which had to a certain extent been counterbalanced by subsequent losses. This state of things was fairly enough represented by the treaty of peace deliberately discussed during the winter, and sworn to at the commencement of spring, whereby a series of concessions, reciprocal and balancing, had been imposed on both parties. Moreover, Athens had been lucky enough in drawing lots to find herself enabled to wait for the actual fulfilment of such concessions by the Spartans, before she consummated her own. Now the Spartans had not as yet realized any one of their promised concessions; nay more, in trying to do so, they had displayed such a want either of power or of will, as made it plain that nothing short of the most stringent necessity would convert their promises into realities. Yet under these marked indications, Nikias persuaded his countrymen to conclude a second treaty which particularly made the first, and which ceded to the Spartans gratuitously all the main benefits of the first, with little or none of the correlative condition. The alliance of Sparta could hardly be said to count as a consideration; for such alliance was at this moment (under the uncertain relations with Argos) not less valuable to Sparta herself than to Athens. There can be little doubt that if the game of Athens had now been played with prudence, she might have recovered Amphipolis in exchange for the captives; for the inability of Kleonides to make good the pledge, even if we grant it to have been a real fact and not merely

Monumentary
part of the
public
business of
a State by
Nikias and
the peace
party.

simulated, might have been removed by decisive co-operation on the part of Sparta with an Athenian armament sent to occupy the place. In fact, that which Athens was now induced to grant was precisely the original proposition transmitted to her by the Lacedæmonians four years before, when the hoplites were first enclosed in Sphakteria, but before the actual capture. They then treated an equivalent, but merely said, through their envoys, "Give us the men in the island, and accept, in exchange, peace, together with our alliance!"¹ At that moment there were some plausible reasons in favour of granting the proposition; but even then, the case of Kleia against it was also plausible and powerful, when he contended that Athens was entitled to make a better bargain. But now, there were no reasons in its favour, and a strong concurrence of reasons against it. Alliance with the Spartans was of no great value to Athens, peace was of material importance to her; but peace had been already sworn to on both sides, after deliberate discussion, and required now only to be carried into execution. That equal reciprocity of execution, which presented the best chance of permanent result, had been agreed on; and fortune had procured for her the privilege of receiving the purchase-money before she handed over the goods. Why renounce so advantageous a position, accepting in exchange a hollow and barren alliance, under the obligation of handing over her most precious merchandise upon credit, and upon credit as definitive in promise as it afterwards proved unexecutive in reality? The alliance in fact prevented the peace from being fulfilled: it became (as Thucydides himself² admits) no peace, but a simple suspension of direct hostilities.

Thucydides states no more than one reason,—and it was the sentiment of Nikias himself,—that at the moment of concluding the peace which bears his name, the position of Sparta was one of disadvantage and dishonour in reference to Athens.³ He alludes chiefly to the captives in the hands of the latter, for as to

¹ Thucyd. iv. 88. Lacedæmonians, if their envoys were to depart, and but three hoplites, including their children and domestics, and three Athenian envoys, and three Athenian hoplites, and three Athenian domestics, to take to the ships.

² Thucyd. v. 26. the date is before the capture of Sphakteria, 425.

³ Thucyd. v. 26. and the decisive sentence is in Aristophanes' *Knights*. He made Sparta and Lacedæmonia but the Persians,—*Spárta, Lakedaimon, but the Persians*—(Lacedæmonia is the name of the island, Lakedaimonia the name of the country, *Knights*, 424, v. 26.)—On the date see the *Lacedæmonians* but *Persians* in *Knights*, 424.

other matters, the debate of Delium and Amphipolis, with the serious losses in Thrace, would more than counter-balance the acquisitions of Nesea, Tylis, Ephydra, and Medion. Yet so inconsiderate and short-sighted were the philo-Laonian feelings of Nikias and the men who now commanded confidence at Athens, that they threw away this advantage—offered Athens to be cheated of all those hopes which they had themselves held out as the inducement for peace—and nevertheless yielded gratuitously to Sparta all the main points which she desired. Most certainly, there was never any public reconsecration of Kleon (as far as our information goes) so rashly impulsive as this alliance with Sparta and surrender of the captives, wherein both Nikias and Alkibiades concurred. Probably the Spartan Ephore named Nikias, and he assailed the Athenian assembly, with fallacious assurances of certain successes in Thrace, under alleged peremptory orders given to Kleonides. And now that the vigorous leader-chieftain, with his eliminative eloquence, had passed away—replaced only by an inferior successor, the lampooner¹ Hypertolus—and leaving the Athenian public under the unopposed guidance of citizens undant for birth and station, descended from gale and heroes, there remained no one to expose effectively the fallacy of such assurances, or to enforce the lesson of simple and obvious prudence: "Wait, as you are entitled to wait, until the Spartans have performed the onerous part of their bargain, before you perform the onerous part of yours. Or if ye choose to relax in regard to some of the concessions which they have sworn to make, at any rate stick to the capital point of all, and lay before them the peremptory alternative—Amphipolis in exchange for the captives."

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The Athenians were not long in finding out how completely they had forfeited the advantage of their position and their chief means of enrichment by giving up the captives, which imparted a freedom of action to Sparta such as she had never enjoyed since the first blockade of Epikleistia. Yet it seems that under the present Ephore Sparta was not guilty of any deliberate or positive act which could be called a breach of

¹ Aristophanes, *Pax*, 685-695.

The discontent of the recent Peloponnesian allies was now inducing them to turn their attention towards Argos as a new chief. They had mistrusted Sparta, even before the peace, well knowing that she had separate interests from the confederacy, arising from desire to get back her captives. In the terms of peace, it seemed as if Sparta and Athens alone were regarded, the interests of the remaining allies, especially those in Thessaly, being put out of sight. Moreover, that article in the treaty of peace whereby it was provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent add or strike out any article that they chose, without consulting the allies, excited general alarm, as if Sparta were meditating some treason in conjunction with Athens against the confederacy.¹ And the alarm, once roused, was still further augmented by the separate treaty of alliance between Sparta and Athens, which followed so closely afterwards, as well as by the restoration of the Spartan captives.

Such general displeasure among the Peloponnesian states at the unexpected combination of Athenians and Lacedæmonians, strengthened in the case of each particular state by private interests of its own, first manifested itself openly through the Corinthians. On retiring from the conference at Sparta—where the recent alliance between the Athenians and Spartans had just been made known, and where the latter had vainly endeavoured to prevail upon their allies to accept the peace—the Corinthians went straight to Argos to communicate what had passed, and to solicit intermeddling. They suggested to the leading men in that city, that it was now the duty of Argos to step forward as saviour of Peloponnesus, which the Lacedæmonians were openly betraying to the common enemy, and to invite for that purpose, into alliance for reciprocal defence, every autonomous Hellenic state which would bind itself to give and receive amicable satisfaction in all points of difference. They affirmed that many cities, from hatred of Sparta, would gladly comply with such invitation; especially if a list of commensurate in small number were named, with full powers to admit all suitable applicants; so that, in case of rejection, there might at

¹ Thucyd. v. 26. *ἡ μὲν ἰσχυρία τῶν πολέμων, ἀντιφύγοντος Ἀθηναίων, ὀργιστοῦσαν Ἰσθμίων, αἰ. 75.*

least be an exposure before the public assembly in the Argivean democracy. This suggestion, privately made by the Corinthians who returned home immediately afterwards, was eagerly adopted both by leaders and people at Argos, as promising to realize their long-cherished pretensions to hegemony. Twelve commissioners were accordingly appointed, with power to admit any new allies whom they might think eligible, except Athens and Sparta. With either of these two cities no treaty was allowed without the formal sanction of the public assembly.¹

Meanwhile the Corinthians, though they had been the first to set the Argives in motion, nevertheless thought it right, before enrolling themselves publicly in the new alliance, to invite a congress of Peloponnesian representatives to Corinth. It was the Mantinians who made the first application to Argos under the notice just issued. And here we are admitted to a partial view of the relations among the secondary and tertiary states of Peloponnesus. Mantinea and Tegea, being continuous as well as the two most considerable states in Arcadia, were in perpetual rivalry, which had shown itself, only a year and a half before, in a bloody but indecisive battle.² Tegea, situated on the frontier of Laconia and oligarchically governed, was tenaciously attached to Sparta; while for that very reason, as well as from the democratical character of her government, Mantinea was less so—though she was still enrolled in, and acted as a member of, the Peloponnesian confederacy. She had recently conquered for herself a little empire in her own neighbourhood, composed of village districts in Arcadia, reckoned as her subject-allies, and commander in her ranks at the last battle with Tegea. This conquest had been made even during the continuance of the war with Athens—a period when the lesser states of Peloponnesus generally, and even subject-states as against their own imperial states, were under the guarantee of the confederacy, to which they were required to render their unpaid service against

Congress of
Peloponnesian
states called
at Corinth
—the Man-
tinians being
the first
to make it
—Argives—
representing
Tegea and
Mantinea.

¹ Thucyd. v. 26.

² Thucyd. iv. 124.

³ Thucyd. v. 26. only fifty Mantinians join in the Arcadian confederacy, de-
spite the fact upon Peloponnesian antiquity
being, not only of Mantinea's ally
only Mantinea's ally, but also

Argives &c.

As to the way in which the agree-
ment of the members of the confederacy
modified the relations between im-
perial and subject states, see further
on, pages 417-418, in the case of Elis
and Lepreum.

the common enemy—so that she was apprehensive of Lacedæmonian interference at the request and for the transmigration of these subjects, who lay moreover near to the borders of Lacedæia. Such interference would probably have been checked earlier, only that Sparta had been under pressing embarrassments—and farther, had assembled no general muster of the confederacy against Athens—ever since the disaster in Sphactæria. But now she had her hands free, together with a good pretext as well as motive for interference.

To maintain the autonomy of all the little states, and prevent any of them from being swallowed or grouped into aggregations under the ascendancy of the greater, had been the general policy of Sparta, especially since her own influence as general leader was increased by securing to every lesser state a substantive vote at the meetings of the confederacy.¹ Moreover, the rivalry of Tegea would probably operate here as an auxiliary motive against Mantinea. Under such apprehensions, the Mantinians hastened to court the alliance and protection of Argos, with whom they enjoyed the additional sympathy of a common democracy.² Such revolt from Sparta³ (for so it was considered) excited great emotion throughout Peloponnesus, together with considerable disposition, amidst the dissensions then prevalent, to follow the example.

In particular, it contributed much to enhance the importance of the survey at Corinth, whether the Lacedæmonians thought it necessary to send special surveys to counteract the intrigues going on against them. Their survey addressed to the Corinthians strenuous remonstrances, and even reproach, for the leading part which they had taken in stirring up dissension among the old confederates, and organising a new confederacy under the presidency of Argos.⁴ They (the Corinthians) were thus aggravating the original guilt and perjury which they had committed by setting at naught the formal vote of a majority of the confederacy, and refusing to accept the peace; for it was the sworn

¹ Thucyd. i. 118.
² Thucyd. v. 10. See also the account of the revolt of Mantinea, and the effect of the Spartan intervention in their relations to the rest.

after various trials, the state of the city was such that it was necessary to send a special survey to the city.

and fundamental maxim of the confederacy that the decision of the majority should be binding on all, except in such cases as involved some offence to Gods or Heres.¹ Encouraged by the presence of many sympathizing delegates—Bosnian, Megarian, Chalkidian from Thessal² &c.—the Corinthians replied with firmness. But they did not think it good policy to protest their real ground for rejecting the peace, viz., that it had not procured for themselves the restoration of Euboea and Androtion; since, first, this was a question in which their allies present had no interest; next, it did not furnish any valid excuse for their resistance to the vote of the majority. Accordingly, they took their stand upon a protest at once generous and religious—upon that reserve for religious scruples which the Lacedæmonian envoy had himself admitted, and which, of course, was to be construed by each member with reference to his own place feeling. "It was a religious impediment (the Corinthians maintained) which prevented us from acceding to the peace with Athens, notwithstanding the vote of the majority; for we had previously exchanged oaths, careless apart from the confederacy, with the Chalkidians of Thessal at the time when they revolted from Athens; and we should have infringed those oaths had we accepted a treaty of peace in which those Chalkidians were abandoned. As for alliance with Argos, we consider ourselves free to adopt any resolution which we may deem suitable, after consultation with our friends here present."³ With this unsatisfactory answer the Lacedæmonian envoys were compelled to return home. Yet some Argive envoys, who were also present in the assembly for the purpose of urging the Corinthians to renounce forthwith the hopes of alliance which they had held out to Argos, were still unable on their side to obtain a decided affirmative, being requested to come again at the next conference.⁴

Though the Corinthians had themselves originated the idea of the new Argive confederacy and compromised Argos in an open proclamation, yet they now hesitated about the execution of their own scheme. They were restrained in part, doubtless, by the

¹ Thucyd. i. 10. *Εσπεύσαν δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἀποδοκιμασάσης, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῇ συνόδῳ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, τὴν αὐτὴν ἀποφασίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ νόμος, ἀλλὰ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἥθος.*
² Thucyd. i. 10.
³ Thucyd. i. 10.
⁴ Thucyd. i. 10.

They were linked together by commonness of interest, not merely as being both neighbours and intense enemies of Athens, but as each having a body of democratical exiles who might perhaps find encouragement at Argos. Discouraged by the resistance of these two important allies, the Corinthians hung back from visiting Argos, until they were pushed forward by a new accidental impulse—the application of the Kleians, who, eagerly entering the new project, sent envoys first to conclude alliance with the Corinthians, and next to go on and send Eile as an ally of Argos. This incident confirmed the Corinthians in their previous scheme, that they speedily went to Argos, along with the Chalcidians of Thessaly, to join the new confederacy.

The conduct of Eile, like that of Mantinea, is thus revealing from Sparta, had been dictated by private grounds of quarrel, arising out of relations with their dependent ally Lepreum. The Lepreates had become dependent on Eile some time before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in consideration of aid lent by the Kleians to extricate them from a dangerous war against some Arcadian enemies. To purchase such aid, they had engaged to cede to the Kleians half their territory, but had been left in violence and occupation of it, under the stipulation of paying one talent yearly as tribute to the Olympian Zeus—in other words, to the Kleians as his stewards. When the Peloponnesian war began,¹ and the Lacedæmonians began to call for the unpaid tribute of the Peloponnesian states generally, small as well as great, against Athens, the Lepreates were, by the standing agreement of the confederacy, exempted for the time from continuing to pay their tribute to Eile. Such exemption ceased with the war; at the close of which Eile became entitled, under the same agreement, to resume the suspended tribute. Eile accordingly required that the payment should then be recommenced; but the

The Kleians became allies of Argos—Eile supports for doing non-compliance with Lepreum—Eile sends envoys to Argos.

sent by the Spartans to prevent Corcyra from joining Argos, seems to indicate for the words here in discussion, that no similar confederacy was entered into by them to prevent the Corinthians and Megarians from joining Argos: "The Spartans and Megarians intended to stay were left to themselves by the Lacedæmonians, and forbidding the

Argives, democracy was permitted to them, that the object of Sparta was."

¹ Thucyd. 2. 12. "and when all Argos and Corinth and Epidauri" (others, where, among the Argives and Epidauri, of Thucyd. 2. 12. "and Epidauri" only, only, and Epidauri).

For the argument here attacked to, see, but not denied.

Lepreus refused, and, when she proceeded to apply force, threw themselves on the protection of Sparta, by whose decision the Elians themselves at first agreed to abide, having the general agreement of the confederacy decidedly in their favour. But it presently appeared that Sparta was more disposed to carry out her general system of favouring the autonomy of the lesser states than to enforce the positive agreement of the confederacy. Accordingly, the Elians, accusing her of unjust bias, removed her authority as arbitrator, and sent a military force to occupy Lepreum. Nevertheless, the Spartans persisted in their objection, pronounced Lepreum to be autonomous, and sent a body of their own hoplites to defend it against the Elians. The latter loudly protested against this proceeding, and denounced the Lacedæmonians as having rebelled thus of one of their dependences, contrary to that agreement which had been adopted by the general confederacy when the war began,—to the effect that each imperial city should receive back at the end of the war all the dependences which it possessed at the beginning, on condition of waiving its title to tribute and military service from them so long as the war lasted. After fruitless remonstrances with Sparta, the Elians eagerly embraced the opportunity now offered of revailing from her, and of joining the new league with Corinth and Argos.¹

¹ Thucyd. v. 51. *the positive agreement is of Sparta, I agree to the general system and general war, unless Sparta and I should, or the law against dependence, be.*

On the agreement here alluded to among the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, we have said in this volume. It was apparently important to most of the confederates as well as imperial cities—those to which had surrendered or subjected.

They and Mantinea wonder that the Lacedæmonians did not appeal to this agreement to assist in securing the submission of Corinth and Isthmia. But they themselves, in the war, did the thing of the agreement, which did the thing to assist in securing the war to the common enemy. It was to assist in the confederacy to enter into a formal agreement that none of the members should lose anything

through action made by the enemy. This would have question of superiority of force—for an agreement could bind the enemy. But the confederacy might very well make a covenant among themselves, as to the relations between their own imperial members, members, and the subject or subordinate dependencies of each. Each imperial state intended to keep the tribute or portion of its dependence, as long as the latter was called upon to lend its aid in the general effort of the confederacy against the common enemy. But the confederacy at the same time gave the guarantee that the imperial state should receive back those surrendered rights, or look to the war should be to an end. This guarantee was clearly violated by Sparta, in the case of Elis and Lepreum. On the contrary, in the case of Mantinea, sustained a few years back, p. 421. The Mantinians had violated the

That new league, including Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Mantinea, had now acquired such strength and confidence, that the Argives and Corinthians proceeded on a joint embassy to Tegea, to obtain the junction of that city—seemingly the most powerful in Peloponnesus next to Sparta and Argos. What grounds they had for expecting success we are not told. The main fact of Mantinea having joined Argos, seemed likely to deter Tegea, as the rival Arcadian power, from doing the same; and so it proved,—for the Tegeans decidedly refused the proposal, not without strenuous protestations that they would stand by Sparta in everything. The Corinthians were greatly disheartened by this refusal, which they had by no means expected—having been so far misled by general expressions of discontent against Sparta as to believe that they could transfer nearly the whole body of confederates to Argos. But they now began to despair of all further extension of Argolian headship, and even to regard their own position insecure on the side of Athens, with whom they were not at peace; while by joining Argos they had forfeited their claim upon Sparta and all her confederacy, including Boeotia and Megara. In this embarrassment they betook themselves to the Boeotians, whom they again entreated to join them in the Argolian alliance: a request already once refused, and not likely to be now granted—but intended to elicit in a different request preferred at the same time. The Boeotians were entreated to accompany the Corinthians to Athens, and obtain for them from the Athenians an armistice terminable at ten days' notice, such as that which they had contracted for themselves. In case of refusal, they were further entreated to throw up their own agreement, and to conclude no other without the concurrence of the Corinthians. So far the Boeotians complied, as to go to Athens with the Corinthians, and back their application for an armistice—which the Athenians declined to grant, saying that the Corinthians

instead of
going to
negotiate
with
Sparta, the
Corinthians
are dis-
heartened
—and
application
through the
Boeotians
to Athens.

motives of the confederates, and Sparta was justified in considering as the signal of their subsiding to undertake the conquest of the Pelop. The Boeotians apparently share that the Mantinians had withdrawn from Arcadian districts, during the very time

while the war against Athens was going on—and yet afterwards joined in the Argolian confederacy against her, and made extensive warfare from p. 55. The Boeotians were in possession of Lepreum, and in receipt of tribute from it, before that war began.

were already included in the general peace, if they were allies of Sparta. On receiving this answer, the Corinthians entreated the Boeotians, putting it as a matter of obligation, to renounce their own amission, and make common cause as to all future compact. But this request was stoutly refused. The Boeotians maintained their ten days' amission; and the Corinthians were obliged to acquiesce in their existing condition of peace *de facto*, though not guaranteed by any pledge of Athens.¹

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians were not unanxious of the affront which they had sustained by the revolt of Mantinea and Elis. At the request of a party among the Perææi, the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, they marched under king Plistonemus into that territory, and compelled the Mantinians to evacuate the fort which they had erected within it; which the latter were unable to defend, though they received a body of Argian troops to guard their city, and were thus enabled to march their whole force to the threatened spot. Besides liberating the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, the Lacedæmonians also planted an additional body of Helots and Neohæcædæ at Lepreum, as a defence and means of observation on the frontiers of Elis.² These were the Spartan soldiers, whom Clearchus had now brought back from Thracia. The Helots among them had been transmitted as a reward, and allowed to reside where they chose. But as they had inherited habits of levity under their distinguished commanders, their presence would undoubtedly be dangerous among the ranks of

¹ Thucyd. v. 26. *Ἐκείνηται δὲ ἀποφασίζοντες ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι περὶ τῆς ἀπομίσσεως.*

Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks—“It is evident, in respect to most agreements in words, not sealed by the submission of soldiers. And the Greeks at no early time considered the breach of their word very different from the breach of their oath.”

Not so much is here asserted as is that which Dr. Arnold supposes. There was no agreement at all either in words or by oath. There was a simple absence of justification, as there was arising out of any recognised pledge. Such is the meaning of *ἀποφασίζοντες*, l. 26; II. 22, 23.

The answer here made by the Athenians to the application of Corinth is not easy to understand. They reply, with much better reason, have declined to conclude the ten days' amission with the Arcadians; because those latter still retained allies of Sparta, though willing to accede to the general peace; whereas the Corinthians, having killed Argives, had less right to be admitted allies of Sparta. Nevertheless, we shall still find them attending the meetings at Sparta, and acting as allies of the latter.

² Thucyd. v. 26, 26. The Neohæcædæ were Helots previously distinguished, as the sons of such.

Of the proceedings of the Athenians during this summer we hear nothing, except that the town of Scillus at length surrendered to them after a long continued blockade, and that they put to death the male population of military age—selling the women and children into slavery. The edict of having proposed this cruel resolution, two years and a half before, belongs to Kleon; that of executing it, nearly a year after his death, to the leaders who succeeded him, and to his countrymen generally. The reader will however now be sufficiently accustomed to the Greek laws of war not to be surprised at such treatment against subjects revolted and reconquered. Scillus and its territory was made over to the Platæan refugees. The native population of Delos, also, who had been removed from that island after the preceding year, under the impression that they were too impure for the discharge of the sacerdotal functions, were now restored to their island. The subsequent defeat at Amphipolis had created a belief in Athens that this removal had offended the gods—under which impression, confirmed by the Delphian oracle, the Athenians now showed their repentance by restoring the Delian oracle.¹ They further lost the towns of Thymon on the peninsula of Attica, and Molybœia on the Eubœian Gulf, which were captured by the Chalkidians of Thessaly.²

Meanwhile the political relations throughout the powerful Grecian states remained all provisional and unaltered. The alliance still subsisted between Sparta and Athens, yet with continual complaints on the part of the latter that the prior treaty remained unfulfilled. The members of the Spartan confederacy were dissatisfied; some had seceded, and others seemed likely to do the same; while Argos, ambitious to supplant Sparta, was trying to put herself at the head of a new confederacy, though as yet with very partial success. Eliserto, however, the authorities of Sparta—King Plistonax, as well as the Ephors of the year—had been sincerely desirous to maintain the Athenian alliance, so far as it could be done without sacrifice,

¹ Thucyd. i. 10.
² Thucyd. i. 10, 11. I agree with Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold in put-

ting the capture of Pnyx—Gallia—in this place.

and without the real employment of force against opponents, of which they had merely talked in order to excite the Athenians. Moreover, the prodigious advantage which they had gained by recovering the prisoners, doubtless making them very popular at home, would attach them the more firmly to their own measures. But at the close of the summer (scarcely about the end of September or beginning of October, B.C. 481) the year of these Ephors expired, and new Ephors were nominated for the ensuing year. Under the existing state of things this was an important revolution: for out of the five new Ephors, two (Kleobidas and Xenarch) were decidedly hostile to peace with Athens, and the remaining three apparently indifferent.¹ And we may here remark that this fluctuation and instability of public policy, which is often denounced as if it were the peculiar attribute of a democracy, occurs quite as much under the constitutional ascendancy of Sparta—the least popular government in Greece, in principle and detail.

The new Ephors convened a special congress at Sparta for the settlement of the pending differences, at which, among the rest, Athenian, Boeotian, and Corinthian envoys were all present. But, after prolonged debate, no approach was made to agreement; so that the congress was on the point of breaking up, when Kleobidas and Xenarch, together with many of their partisans,² originated, in concert with the Boeotian and Corinthian deputies, a series of private unauthorised manoeuvres for the dissolution of the Athenian alliance. This was to be effected by bringing about a separate alliance between Argos and Sparta, which the Spartans secretly desired, and would grasp at it in preference (so these Ephors affirmed), even if it cost them the breach of their new tie with Athens. The Boeotians were urged, first to become allies of Argos themselves, and then to bring Argos into alliance with Sparta. But it was further essential that they should give up Psekokera to Sparta, so that it might be tendered to the Athenians in exchange for Pylos; for Sparta could not easily

Congress at
Sparta.—
Athenian,
Boeotian,
and
Corinthian
deputies
present.—
But
no
agreement
effected, and
the congress
about to
break up.
Kleobidas
and
Xenarch
secretly
bring about
an alliance
between
Argos and
Sparta.

¹ Thucyd. v. 25.

² Thucyd. v. 27. *ἀποσπασθέντες*—and Kleobidas and Xenarch and their

others were called, &c.

couched in the most comprehensive terms, in order that it might authorise them to proceed further afterwards, and conclude alliance on the part of the Boeotians and Megarians with Argos; that other purpose being however for the present kept back, because alliance with Argos was a novelty which might surprise and alarm the Senate. The manoeuvre, skillfully contrived for entrapping these bodies into an approval of measures which they never contemplated, illustrates the manner in which an oligarchical executive could shroud the checks devised to control its proceedings. But the Boeotarcha, to their astonishment, found themselves defeated at the outset; for the Senate would not even hear of alliance with Corinth—as much did they fear to offend Sparta by any special connexion with a city which had severed from her. Nor did the Boeotarcha think it safe to divulge their communications with Chalcidians and Xenarchi, or to asseverate the Senate that the whole plan originated with a powerful party in Sparta herself. Accordingly, under this formal refusal on the part of the Senate, no further proceedings could be taken. The Corinthian and Chalcidian envoys left Thebes, while the promise of sending Boeotian envoys to Argos remained unexecuted.¹

But the anti-Athenian Ephors at Sparta, though baffled in their schemes for entering at the Argolian alliance through the agency of the Boeotians, did not the less persist in their views upon Parakton. That place—a frontier fortress in the mountainous range between Attica and Boeotia, apparently on the Boeotian side of Pnyx², and on or near the direct road from Athens to Thebes which led through Pnyx³—had been an Athenian possession, until six months before the peace, when it had been treacherously betrayed to the Boeotians.⁴ A special provision of the treaty between Athens and Sparta prescribed that it should be restored to Athens; and Lacedæmonian envoys were now sent on an express mission to Boeotia, to request from the Boeotians the delivery of Parakton, as well as of their Athenian captives, in order that by tendering these to Athens, she might be induced to sur-

The Lacedæmonians concluded a special alliance with the Boeotians, thereby violating their alliance with Athens —the Boeotians sent Parakton to the Greeks.

¹ Thucyd. v. 32.

² See Vol. I. *Boeotia in Northern*.

Boeotia, vol. II. *de. well*, p. 429.

³ Thucyd. v. 3.

under Pylas. The Boeotians refused compliance with this request, except on condition that Sparta should enter into special alliance with them as she had done with the Athenians. Now the Spartans were pledged by their agreement with the latter (either by its terms or by its recognised import) not to enter into any new alliance without their consent. But they were eagerly bent upon getting possession of Panakton; while the prospect of breach with Athens, far from being a deterring motive, was exactly that which Kleobulus and Xenakis desired. Under these feelings, the Lacedæmonians consented to and swore the special alliance with Boeotia. But the Boeotians, instead of handing over Panakton for surrender as they had promised, immediately rased the fortress to the ground; under pretence of some ancient oath which had been exchanged between their ancestors and the Athenians, to the effect that the district round it should always remain without resident inhabitants—as a neutral strip of husbandland, and under common pasture.

These negotiations, after having been in progress throughout the winter, ended in the accomplishment of the alliance and the destruction of Panakton at the beginning of spring or about the middle of March.* And while the Lacedæmonian Ephors thus seemed to be carrying their point on the side of Boeotia, they were apparently surprised by an unexpected announcement to their views from another quarter. An embassy arrived at Sparta from Argos, to solicit renewal of the peace just expiring. The Argives found that they made no progress in the enlargement of their newly-formed confederacy, while their recent disappointment with the Boeotians made them despair of realising their ambitious projects of Peloponnesian hegemony. But when they learnt that the Lacedæmonians had concluded a separate alliance with the Boeotians, and that Panakton had been rased, their disappointment was converted into positive alarm for the future. Naturally inferring that this new alliance would not have been concluded except in concert with Athens, they interpreted the whole proceeding as indicating that Sparta had prevailed upon the Boeotians to accept the peace with Athens—the destruction of Panakton being con-

A.C. 425.

Application
from the
Athenians to
Sparta, to
renew the
expired
treaty.
Project of
renewed
treaty
spurned.
Emb. sent.
Emb. rejected.
The Athenians
determined to
demand
or take the
treaty
even against
the will of
Sparta.

ceived as a compromise to civilise disputes respecting possession. Under such a permission—noway unreasonable in itself, when the two contracting governments, both oligarchical and both severe, furnished no collateral evidence to explain their real intent—the Argives saw themselves excluded from alliance not merely with Thebes, Sparta, and Tegea, but also with Athens; which latter city they had hitherto regarded as a sure resort in case of hostility with Sparta. Without a moment's delay, they despatched *Enstrophos* and *Alkos*—two Argives much esteemed at Sparta, and perhaps persons of that city—to press for a renewal of their expiring treaty with the Spartans, and to obtain the best terms they could.

To the Lacedæmonian Ephors this application was extremely acceptable—the very event which they had been unconsciously endeavouring to bring about. Negotiations were opened, in which the Argives at first proposed that the disputed possession of Thyrea should be referred to arbitration. But they found their demand met by a peremptory negative—the Lacedæmonians refusing to enter upon such a discussion, and insisting upon simple renewal of the peace now at an end. At last the Argives, sagely bent upon keeping the question respecting Thyrea open, in some way or other, prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to assent to the following singular agreement. Peace was concluded between Argos and Sparta for fifty years; but if at any moment within that interval, excluding either periods of epidemic or periods of war, it should suit the views of either party to provide a combat by chosen champions of equal number for the purpose of determining the right to Thyrea, there was to be full liberty of doing so—the combat to take place within the territory of Thyrea itself, and the victors to be intitled to pass pursuing the victorious beyond the well-defined border of either territory. It will be recollected that, about 128 years before this date, there had been a combat of this sort by 300 champions on each side, in which, after desperate valour on both sides, the victory as well as the disputed right still remained undetermined. The proposition made by the Argives was a revival of this old practice of judicial combat; nevertheless, such was the alteration which the Greek mind had undergone during the interval, that it now appeared a perfect absurdity—even in

the eyes of the Lacedæmonians, the most old-fashioned people in Greece.¹

Yet, since they hazarded nothing, practically, by so vague a concession, and were supremely anxious to make their relations smooth with Argos, in contemplation of a breach with Athens, they at last agreed to the condition, drew up the treaty, and placed it in the hands of the envoys to carry back to Argos. Formal acceptance and ratification, by the Argolian public assembly, was necessary to give it validity: should this be granted, the envoys were invited to return to Sparta at the festival of the Hyacinthia, and there go through the solemnity of the ratia.

Amidst such strange crossing of purposes and interests, the Spartan Ephors seemed now to have carried all their points—friendship with Argos, breach with Athens, and yet the means (through the possession of Panakton) of procuring from Athens the release of Pylas. But they were not yet on firm ground. Far when their deputies, Andromachis and two colleagues, arrived in Boeotia for the purpose of going on to Athens and prosecuting the negotiation about Panakton (at the time when Eusebius and Meno were carrying on their negotiation at Sparta), they discovered for the first time that the Boeotians, instead of performing their promise to hand over Panakton, had used it to the ground. This was a serious blow to their chance of success at Athens; nevertheless, Andromachis proceeded thither, taking with him all the Athenian captives in Boeotia. Thence he returned at Athens, at the same time announcing the denatation of Panakton as a fact: Panakton as well as the prisoners were thus released (he pretended); for the Athenians would not now find a single enemy in the place, and he claimed the ransom of Pylas in exchange.²

But he soon found that the final term of Athenian compliance

¹ Thucyd. v. 21. *καὶ τὸ Λακεδαιμόνιον ἐν αὐτῇ ἑστῶσι πλέον ἢ πάντες ἄλλοι λαοὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος.* Hence Andromachis and the Argives returned without being recognised by the Athenians, and were captured.

² By the treaty of Nicias, which remains, we are led to infer that the treaty was

not subscribed by any signatures, but drawn up by the secretaries in unadorned style, and ultimately approved on a tablet. The names of those who take the oath are recorded, but wanting official signatures.

³ Thucyd. v. 22.

had been reached. It was probably on this occasion that the separate alliance concluded between Sparta and the Boeotians first became discussed at Athens; since not only were the proceedings of these oligarchical governments habitually secret, but there was a peculiar motive for keeping such alliances concealed until the discussion about Perikles and Pylas had been brought to a close. Both the alliance and the denunciation of Perikles excited among the Athenians the strongest marks of disgust and anger; aggravated probably rather than softened by the epilogue of *Andromedon*—that denunciation of the lost, being testament to restitution, and precluding any further tenacity by the enemy, was a substantial satisfaction of the treaty; and augmented still further by the recollection of all the other unperformed items in the treaty. A whole year had now elapsed, amidst frequent notes and protocols (to employ a modern phrase); nevertheless, not one of the conditions favorable to Athens had yet been executed (except the restitution of her captives, seemingly not many in number); while she on her side had made to Sparta the capital cession on which almost everything hinged. A long train of accumulated indignation, brought to a head by this mission of *Andromedon*, discharged itself in the harshest censure and rebuke of himself and his colleagues.¹

Even Nikias, Lachar, and the other leading Athenians, to whose imprudent facility and misjudgment the embarrassment of the moment was owing, were probably not much behind the general public in condemnation against Spartan perfidy, if it were only to divert attention from their own mistake. But there was one of them—*Alkibiades*, son of *Kleinos*—who took this opportunity of putting himself at the head of the vehement anti-Lacedæmon sentiment which now agitated the *Ekklesia*, and giving to it a substantive aim.

The present is the first occasion on which we hear of this remarkable man as taking a prominent part in public life. He was now about thirty-one or thirty-two years old, which in Greece was considered an early age for a man to exercise important command. But such was the splendour, wealth, and antiquity

The charges are largely repeated at Athens every fest, and captured the large assemblies.

Alkibiades stands forward as a party-leader, the education and character.

¹ Thucyd. i. 22.

of his family, of Sicilian lineage through the heroes Eurypolis and Ajax, and such the effect of that lineage upon the democratic public of Athens, that he stepped speedily and easily into a conspicuous station. Belonging also through his mother Demomachid to the gens of the Alcmeonidae, he was related to Pericles, who became his guardian when he was left an orphan at about five years old, along with his younger brother Kleonias. It was at that time that their father Kleonias was slain at the battle of Marathon, having already served with honour in a triform of his own at the sea-fight of Artemision against the Persians. A Spartan name named Amykles was provided for the young Alcibiades, and a slave named Xerxes chosen by his distinguished guardian to watch over him. But even his boyhood was utterly ungovernable, and Athens was full of his frolics and exorbitances, to the unending regret of Pericles and his brother Archippos.¹ His violent passions, love of enjoyment, exhibition of pre-eminence, and insolence towards others² were manifested at an early age, and never deserted him throughout his life. His finished beauty of person, both as boy, youth, and mature man, caused him to be much run after by women—and even by women of generally reserved habits. Moreover, even before the age when such temptations were usually presented, the beauty of his earlier youth, while going through the ordinary gymnastic training, procured for him assiduous caresses, compliments, and attentions of every sort, from the leading Athenians who frequented the public palestra. These were not only

¹ Thucyd. i. 65. "Ἀλκιβιάδης . . . ὅτε τέλει ἦεν ἔτι καὶ ἄλλοι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἔτι ἄλλοι, ἀσπαστοὶ δὲ ὑπερβολῇ ἦσαν ἄνθρωποι."

The expression of Plutarch, however, is, *ἰσχυροὶ καὶ ἀσπαστοὶ καὶ ὑπερβολῇ ἠδαιμένοι* (adduced, s. 10).

Arrian and Xenophon, in reply to the question of Alcibiades, whom they had forbidden to converse with or touch, saying that, "should a young man be so low under thirty years of age—the usual age of Alcibiades (Xenophon, *Hæcrot.* i. 2, 34).

² Plut., *Pericles*, c. 18, p. 100; *Pericles*, adduced, s. 1, 2, 3; *Isocrates*, *De Mito*, *Orat.* vol. p. 161, *Orat.* 10, 34; *Comed.* *Supra*, adduced, s. 1.

³ *Isocrates* in reply to Arrian (Xenophon)

ἀνδραγαθῶτα, ὃν οὐδὲν ἄλλοις ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν ἀλλοδαγαῖς ἐκείνῳ ἦν."

This is a part of the language which Plutarch puts into the mouth of Alcibiades in the *Symposium*, c. 30, p. 161; see also Plut., *adduced*, s. 1, 2, 3, 4.

Compare the other contemporary, *Xenophon*, *Hæcrot.* i. 2, 35–36.

There is nothing more and nothing either in doing or suffering (Xenophon) to be so low as Alcibiades, in later life, and variously interpreted (Plutarch, *Isocr.* s. 5).

⁴ It is possible, with some distribution of the sense of the words, the expression of a contemporary author, *Xenophon*, *Symposium*, i. 2, 35. "Ἀλκιβιάδης ὅτι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλος οὐδὲν ἄλλοις ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν ἀλλοδαγαῖς ἐκείνῳ ἦν."

endured his petulance, but were even flattered when he would condescend to bestow it upon them. Amidst such universal admiration and indulgence—amidst corrupting influences exercised from so many quarters and from so early an age, combined with great wealth and the highest position—it was not likely that either self-control or regard for the welfare of others would ever acquire development in the mind of Alkibiades. The anecdotes which fill his biography reveal the utter absence of both these constituent elements of morality; and though, in regard to the particular stories, allowance must doubtless be made for anecdotal and exaggeration, yet the general type of character stands plainly marked and indelibly established in all.

A dissolute life, and an immoderate love of pleasure in all its forms, is what we might naturally expect from a young man so circumstanced; and it appears that with him these tastes were indulged with an offensive publicity which destroyed the comfort of his wife Hipparete, daughter of Hipponikos, who was slain at the battle of Delium. She had brought him a large dowry of ten talents. When she sought a divorce, as the law of Athens permitted, Alkibiades violently interposed to prevent her from obtaining the benefit of the law, and brought her back by force to his house, even from the presence of the magistrate. In this violence of selfish passion, and reckless disregard of social obligation towards every one, which forms the peculiar characteristic of Alkibiades. He strikes the schoolmaster whom he happens to find unprovided with a copy of Homer¹; he strikes Thrasos,² a rival choragus, in the public theatre, while the representation is going on; he strikes Hipponikos (who afterwards became his father-in-law), out of a wager of more wantonness, afterwards appeasing him by an ample apology; he protects the Thracian poet Egeas, against whom an indictment had been formally lodged before the archon, by effacing it with his own hand from the list put up in the public edifice, called Metron, defying both magistrates and accusers to press the cause on for trial.³ Nor does it appear that any injured

Great energy and capacity of Alkibiades in public affairs—his reckless magnificence in domestic management, and his military services.

¹ Demosthenes, *cont. Midias*, c. 1. ² *Alkibiades*, c. 1, p. 333.
³ Thucyd. ii. 15. ⁴ *Alkibiades*, c. 1, p. 337.

of various sophisticated and rhetorical teachers¹ — Prodicus, Protagoras, and others; but, most of all, that of Sokrates. His intimacy with Sokrates has become celebrated on many grounds, and is commemorated both by Plato and Xenophon, though unfortunately with less instruction than we could desire. We may readily believe Xenophon when he tells us that Alkibiades (like the allegorical Erismos, of whom we shall have much to say hereafter) was attracted to Sokrates by his unrivalled skill of dialectical conversation; his suggestive influence over the minds of his hearers, in eliciting new thoughts and combinations; his mastery of apposite and homely illustrations; his power of seeing the beforehand the end of a long cross-examination; his ironical affectation of ignorance, whereby the humiliation of opponents was rendered only the more complete, when they were convicted of inconsistency and contradiction out of their own answers. The exhibitions of such ingenuity were in themselves highly interesting and stimulating to the mental activity of listeners, while the faculty itself was one of peculiar value to those who proposed to take the lead in public debate; with which view both these ambitious young men tried to catch the knack from Sokrates,² and to copy his formidable string of interrogations. Both of them doubtless immoderately respected the poet, self-sufficing, honest, temperate, and brave citizen in whom this excellent talent resided; especially Alkibiades, who not only owed his life to the generous valour of Sokrates at Potidæa, but

¹ See the description in the Protagoras of Plato, p. 318, p. 317.

² See Xenophon, Memorabilia, I. 2, 27—28, 29—30.

Xenophon also and Alcibiades, who had never seen Sokrates, hesitating to give Sokrates credit, but after a certain amount of persuasion, the latter, by the Sokrates, declares the latter to be a man of a very different character. . . . And what other objects for contemplation besides Sokrates? Alas, Sokrates is also in appearance, and you think that Sokrates is a philosopher, but he is a philosopher in appearance, not in reality. . . . In the same manner, Alas, Sokrates is a philosopher in appearance, but he is a philosopher in reality. . . . Compare Plato, Apology, p. 20, p. 21, p. 22, p. 23.

Xenophon, Memorabilia, I. 2, 27—28, 29—30. . . . Sokrates, who was a philosopher, was a philosopher in appearance, not in reality. . . .

See also the description of Sokrates in the Protagoras of Plato, p. 318, p. 317.

See also the description of Sokrates in the Protagoras of Plato, p. 318, p. 317.

The representation given by Plato of the great intellect, embodied in Sokrates, was Alkibiades, and of the independence and sublimity of the latter, it is not to be taken as historical, even if we had not the more direct and trustworthy picture of Xenophon. . . . See also the description of Sokrates in the Protagoras of Plato, p. 318, p. 317.

had also learnt in that service to admire the iron physical frame of the philosopher in his armour, enduring hunger, cold, and hardship.¹ But we are not to suppose that either of them came to Sokrates with the purpose of hearing and storing his precepts on matters of duty, or receiving from him a new plan of life. They came partly to gratify an intellectual appetite, partly to acquire a stock of words and ideas, with facility of argumentative handling, suitable for their other-purpose as public speakers. Subjects moral, political, and intellectual served as the themes sometimes of discourse, sometimes of discussion, in the society of all these sophists—Prodiros and Protagoras not less than Sokrates; for in the Athenian sense of the word Sokrates was a sophist as well as the others, and to the rich youth of Athens, like Alkibiades and Kritias, such society was highly useful.² It imparted a nobler aim to their ambitions, including mental accomplishments as well as political success; it enlarged the range of their understandings, and opened to them as ample a vein of literature and criticism as the age afforded; it accustomed them to survey human conduct, with the means and obstructions of human well-being, both public and private; it even suggested to them indirectly lessons of duty and probeness, from which their social position tended to estrange them, and which they would hardly have admitted to hear except from the lips of one whom they involuntarily admired. In learning to talk they were forced to learn more or less to think, and familiarized with the difference between truth and error; nor would an eloquent lecturer fail to calliet their feelings in the great topics of morality and politics. Their thirst for mental stimulus and rhetorical accomplishments had thus, as far as it went, a

¹ *Philo. Symposium*, c. 14-16, p. 184, 185.

² See the representation given in the *Protagoras* of Plato, of the banquet in which the young and wealthy Alkibiades goes to seek instruction from Protagoras, and of the objects which Protagoras proposes to himself in the meeting the instruction (Plato, *Protagoras*, c. 1, p. 316 B; c. 2, p. 324 D; c. 3, p. 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000).

Alkibiades, 1st.]

It would not be reasonable to expect, as true and just, all the polemical charges against those who are called the Sophists, even as we find them in Plato, without scrutiny and consideration. But modern writers on Hellenic affairs can give the Sophists even more than Plato did, and take no notice of the admissions in their favour which he, though their opponent, is perpetually making.

This is a very extensive subject, to which I hope to revert.

found in Athens, that of Socrates most of all and most frequently. The philosopher became greatly attached to him, and Alcibiades lost no opportunity of insinuating on him solitary lessons, as far as could be done without disgusting the pride of a haughty and selfish youth who was looking forward to the celebrity of public life. But unhappily his lessons never produced any serious effect, and ultimately became even distasteful to the pupil. The whole life of Alcibiades attests how feebly the sentiment of obligation, public or private, ever got footing in his mind—how much the ends which he pursued were dictated by overbearing vanity and love of aggrandizement. In the later part of life, Socrates was marked out to public hatred by his enemies, as having been the teacher of Alcibiades and Critias. And if we could be so unjust as to judge of the morality of the teacher by that of these two pupils, we should certainly rank him among the worst of the Athenian sophists.

At the age of thirty-one or thirty-two, the earliest at which it was permitted to look forward to an ascendant position in public life, Alcibiades came forward with a reputation stained by private enmities, and with a number of enemies created by his insolent demeanour. But this did not hinder him from stepping into that position to which his rank, connexions, and dissipation afforded him introduction; nor was he slow in displaying his extraordinary energy, decision, and capacity of command. From the beginning to the end of his eventful political life he showed a

Overbearing
arrogance
which he
deliberately
—his great
energy and
capacity
—his
decisions, and
energy,
which he
displayed.

not to identify with the just and honest tone of Dr. Thirlwall's history.

I will add that Plato himself, in a very important passage of the Republic (iii. p. 471, see 475-476), notices the insinuations against the Sophists of being specially the corrupters of youth. He represents them as insinuating upon their youthful pupils that morality which characterised an honest just in their age and society—society honest, seeking virtue. The great corrupter (he says) is society itself: the Sophists merely repeat the voice and language of society. Platon himself at present knew but Plato or Socrates was right in condemning the

political morality of their contemporaries. I must fully agree to his assertion, that the great body of the contemporary professional teachers taught what we considered good morality among the Athenian public; there were therefore some who taught a better morality, others who taught a worse. And this may be said with equal truth of the great body of professional teachers in every age and nation.

Socrates, nevertheless, various causes he notices in explaining the corruption of the character of Alcibiades—wealth, rank, personal beauty, dissipation, &c., but he does not notice the influence among them (Republic, i. p. 34, 35).

if opportunity offered, by overthrowing¹ the constitution to make himself master of the persons and property of his fellow-citizens. He never inspired confidence or esteem in any one; and sooner or later, among a public like that of Athens, so much accumulated odium and suspicion were sure to bring a public man to ruin, in spite of the strongest adulation for his capacity. He was always the object of very conflicting sentiments: "the Athenians desired him, hated him, but still wished to have him," was said in the latter years of his life by a contemporary poet; while we find also another pitying precept delivered in regard to him—"You ought not to keep a lion's whelp in your city at all; but if you choose to keep him, you must submit yourself to his behaviour!"² Athens had to feel the force of his energy, as an ally and enemy; but the great harm which he did to her was in his capacity of adviser—awakening in his countrymen the same thirst for show, rapacious, uncertain, perfidious aggrandizement which dictated his own personal actions.

Mentioning Alkibiades now for the first time, I have somewhat anticipated an future chapter, in order to present a general idea of his character, hereafter to be illustrated. But at the moment which we have now reached (March, 480 B.C.) the lion's whelp was yet young, and had neither acquired his entire strength nor disclosed his full-grown claws.

He began to put himself forward as a party leader, seemingly not long before the peace of Nikias. The political traditions hereditary in his family, as in that of his relatives Perikles, were democratical: his grandfather Alkibiades had been vehement in his opposition to the Peisistratids, and had even afterwards publicly renounced an established connexion of hospitality with the Lacedæmonian government, from strong antipathy to them on political grounds. But Alkibiades himself, in commencing political life, departed from this family

see also Alkibiades' trial in regard to the accused, but interpreted "conviction" of his own opinion with some justice as pointed.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 12. Compare Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 1, p. 290. The words which Thucyd. uses in the first three chapters of the sixth book of the *History* of the orator who would throw into a dagger and poison his fellow-citizens, striking into the character of Alkibiades. See also the same

orator, ii. 4-8, pp. 271-281, and the picture of Alcibiades in the *Speeches* of the *Plutarch* called *Alkibiades* the First.

² Aristophanes, *Knave*, 140-150; Plutarch, *Alkibiades*, c. 10; Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 1.

tradition, and presented himself as a partizan of oligarchical and philo-Laconian sentiment—double for more consistent to his natural temper than the democratical. He thus started in the more general party with Nikias, and with Thucydides son of Kimon, who afterwards became his bitter opponents. And it was in part probably to put himself on a par with them, that he took the marked step of trying to revive the ancient family tie of hospitality with Sparta, which his grandfather had broken off.

To promote this object, he displayed peculiar assiduity for the good treatment of the Spartan captives during their detention at Athens. Many of them being of high family at Sparta, he naturally calculated upon their gratitude, as well as upon the favourable sympathies of their countrymen, whenever they should be restored. He advocated both the peace and the alliance with Sparta, and the restoration of her captives. Indeed he not only advocated these measures, but tendered his services, and was eager to be employed, as the agent of Sparta, for carrying them through at Athens. From such selfish hopes in regard to Sparta, and especially from the expectation of acquiring, through the agency of the restored captives, the title of Procurer of Sparta, Alcibiades thus became a partizan of the blind and gratuitous philo-Laconian concessions of Nikias. But the captives, on their return, were either unable, or unwilling, to carry the point which he wished; while the authorities at Sparta rejected all his advances—not without a contemptuous sneer at the idea of consulting important political interests to the care of a notoriously known for ostentation, profligacy, and insolence. That the Spartans should thus judge is somewhat astonishing, considering their extreme reverence both for old age and for strict discipline. They naturally preferred Nikias and Laches, whose presence would command, if it did not originally suggest, their mistrust of the new claimant. Nor had Alcibiades yet shown the mighty movement of which he was capable. But this contemptuous refusal from the Spartans stung him so to the quick, that,

¹ Thucyd. v. 23, vi. 33; Isokrates, De Isokrat. represents Alcibiades as being
 Ages. de. vii. p. 361, 370, 371—38.
 Thucyd. (Isokrates v. 14) says
 Alcibiades.

making an entire revolution in his political course,¹ he immediately threw himself into anti-Lacedæmonian politics with an energy and ability which he was not before known to possess.

The moment was favorable, since the recent death of Kleon, for a new political leader to espouse this side, and was rendered still more favorable by the contact of the Lacedæmonians. Month after month passed, remonstrances after remonstrances were addressed, yet not one of the restitutions prescribed by the treaty in favour of Athens had yet been accomplished. Alkibiades had therefore ample pretext for showing his tone respecting the Spartans—and for denouncing them as deceivers who had broken their solemn oaths, abusing the generous confidence of Athens. Under his present antipathies, his attention naturally turned to Argos, in which city he possessed some powerful friends and family guests. The condition of that city, disengaged by the expiration of the peace with Sparta, opened a possibility of connexion with Athens—a policy now strongly recommended by Alkibiades, who insisted that Sparta was playing false with the Athenians, namely in order to keep their hands tied until she had attacked and put down Argos separately. This particular argument had less force when it was seen that Argos acquired new and powerful allies—Mantineia, Elis, and Corinth; but, on the other hand, such acquisition rendered Argos positively more valuable as an ally to the Athenians.

It was not so much, however, the inclination towards Argos, but the growing wrath against Sparta, which fostered the pro-Argive plans of Alkibiades. And when the Lacedæmonian envoy Andremonides arrived at Athens from Boeotia, bringing to the Athenians the mere ruins of Panakton in exchange for Pylæ—when it further became known that the Spartans had already concluded a special alliance with the Thebans without consulting Athens—the unmeasured expression of displeasure in the Athenian Ekklesia showed Alkibiades that

He tries
to bring
Athens into
alliance
with Argos.

¹ Thucyd. v. 26. At Athens Kleon and Demosthenes, both of whom were afterwards slain, were the chief opponents of Alkibiades. But Kleon and Demosthenes together with Perikles, Aristotle and the other eminent Athenians, not only the citizens but the foreigners who were in the city, were all of one mind in their

opinion, to call Alkibiades back, and to send him to the place where he had been before. Alkibiades, however, apprehending the resolution to exclude him, fled to the Peloponnese, and thence to Argos, where he was received with great honor.

exchange for the demolished Parthenon. Such was still the confidence of the Lacedæmonians in the strength of assent at Athens, that they did not yet despair of obtaining an affirmative, even to this very unequal proposition. And when the three envoys, under the introduction and advice of Nikias, had their first interview with the Athenian senate, preparatory to an audience before the public assembly, the impression which they made, on stating that they came with full powers of settlement, was highly favourable. It was indeed so favourable, that Alibiadés became alarmed lest, if they made the same statement in the public assembly, holding out the prospect of some trifling concessions, the philo-Læconian party might determine public feeling to accept a compromise, and thus preclude all idea of alliance with Argos.

To obviate such a defeat of his plans, he resorted to a singular manoeuvre. One of the Lacedæmonian envoys, ^{namely} Endios, was his private guest, by an ancient and particular intimacy subsisting between their two families.¹ This probably assisted in procuring for him a secret interview with the envoys, and enabled him to address them with greater effect, on the day before the meeting of the public assembly, and without the knowledge of Nikias. He assured them in the tone of a friend of Sparta, anxious that their proposition should succeed; but he intimated that they would find the public assembly turbulent and angry, very different from the tranquil demeanour of the senate; so that if they proclaimed themselves to have come with full powers of settlement, the people would burst out with fury, to act upon their fears and bully them into extravagant concessions. He therefore strongly urged them to declare that they had come, not with any full powers of settlement, but merely to explain, discuss, and report: the people would then find that they could gain nothing by intimidation—explanations would be heard, and disputed points be discussed with temper—while he (Alibiadés) would speak emphatically in their favour. He would advise, and felt confident that he could persuade, the Athenians to restore Pylos—a step which his opposition had hitherto been

¹ Thucyd. viii. 2.

These latter, it must be added, display a carelessness of public faith and consistency—a facility in publicly unswearing what they have just before publicly said—and a treachery towards their own confidential agent—which is truly surprising, and goes far to justify the general charge of habitual duplicity so often alleged against the Lacedæmonian character.¹

The disgraced envoys would doubtless quit Athens immediately ;
 seeing but this opportune earthquake gave Nikias a few hours
 to recover from his unexpected overthrow. In the
 assembly of the next day, he still contended that the
 friendship of Sparta was preferable to that of Argos,
 and insisted on the prudence of postponing all
 consideration of engagement with the latter until the
 real intentions of Sparta, now so contradictory and
 inexplicable, should be made clear. He succeeded

that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and alliance,
 was that of superior honour and advantage—the position of
 Sparta, one of comparative disgrace : Athens had then a greater
 interest than Sparta in maintaining what had been concluded.
 But he, at the same time, admitted that a distinct and peremptory
 explanation must be craved from Sparta as to her intentions, and
 he requested the people to send himself with some other colleagues
 to demand it. The Lacedæmonians should be apprised that
 Argivean envoys were already present in Athens with propositions,
 and that the Athenians might already have concluded this alliance,
 if they could have permitted themselves to do wrong to the exist-
 ing alliance with Sparta. But the Lacedæmonians, if their
 intentions were honourable, must show it forthwith—1. By
 restoring Penakten, not demolished, but standing. 2. By restoring
 Anaphipolis also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance
 with the Boeotians, unless the Boeotians on their side chose to
 become parties to the peace with Athens.²

The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of
 Nikias, invested him with the commission which he required ;
 a remarkable proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding
 day, how strong was the hold which he still retained upon them,
 and how sincere their desire to keep on the best terms with

¹ Herodot. *Antiquities*. cxi.—cxv; Herodot. ix. 84; Thucyd. ix. 32.

² Thucyd. v. 26.

Sparta. This was a last chance granted to Nicias and his policy—a perfectly fair chance, since all that was asked of Sparta was just—but it forced him to bring matters to a decisive issue with her, and shut out all further evasion. His mission to Sparta failed altogether: the influence of Kleobidas and Xenarch, the anti-Athensian Ephors, was found predominant, so that not one of his demands was complied with. And even when he formally announced that unless Sparta renounced her special alliance with the Boeotians or compelled the Boeotians to accept the peace with Athens, the Athenians would immediately contract alliance with Argos, the measure produced no effect. He could only obtain, and that too as a personal favour to himself, that the oaths as they stood should be formally renewed—an empty concession, which covered but hardly the humiliation of his request to Athens. The Athenian assembly listened to his report with strong indignation against the Lacedæmonians, and with marked displeasure even against himself, as the great author and conductor of this unperformed treaty; while Alcibiades was permitted to introduce the envoys (already at hand in the city) from Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, with whom a pact was at once concluded.¹

The works of this convention, which Thucydides gives us doubtless from the record on the public columns, comprise two engagements—one for peace, another for alliance.

"The Athenians, Argives, Mantinians, and Elisians have concluded a treaty of peace by sea and by land, without fraud or subdile, each for themselves and for the allies upon whom each expressly requires." [The express alliance terms in which these states announce themselves as imperial states and their allies as dependant states deserve notice. No such words appear in the treaty between Athens and Lacedæmonia. I have already mentioned that the main ground of discontent on the part of Mantinea and Elis towards Sparta, was connected with their imperial power.]

"Neither of them shall bear arms against the other for purpose of damage."

¹Thucyd. v. 27; Xenarch, Nicias, &c.

²Thucyd. v. 27. *Τῶν τε ἑαυτοῖς ἀλλήλων καὶ τῶν προσηγορῶν ὑποκρίσεων ἀποδοχῆς.*

Failure of
the embassy
of Nicias to
Sparta.—
Nicias now
declares that
alliance
with Argos,
Elis, and
Mantinea.

Questions
of this con-
vention and
allies upon
whom each
expressly
requires.

"The Athenians, Argives, Mantinians, and Elisians shall be allies with each other for one hundred years. If any enemy shall invade Attica, the three contracting cities shall lend the most vigorous aid in their power at the invitation of Athens. Should the forces of the invading city damage Attica and then retire, the three will punish that city their enemy and attack it; neither of the four shall in that case suspend the war, without consent of the others.

"Badproof obligations are imposed upon Athens, in case Argos, Mantinea, or Elis shall be attacked.

"Neither of the four contracting powers shall grant passage to troops through their own territory or the territory of allies ever when they may at the time be exercising command, either by land or sea, unless upon joint resolution.¹

"In case auxiliary troops shall be required and sent under this treaty, the city requiring shall furnish their maintenance for the space of thirty days, from the day of their entrance upon the territory of the city requiring. Should their services be needed for a longer period, the city requiring shall furnish their maintenance, at the rate of three *Sigmas* daily for each hoplite, light-armed or archer, and of one *Sigma* draughts or six *Oboi* for each horseman, per day. The city requiring shall possess the command, as long as the service required shall be in her territory. But if any expedition shall be undertaken by joint resolution, then the command shall be shared equally between all."

Such were the substantive conditions of the new alliance. Provisions were then made for the *oaths*—by whom? where? when? in what words? how often? they were to be taken, Athens was to swear on behalf of herself and her allies; but Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, with their respective allies, were to swear by separate oaths. The oaths were to be renewed every four years; by Athens, within thirty days before each Olympic festival; at Argos, Elis, and Mantinea; by these three cities, at Athens, ten days before each festival of the greater Panathenæan.

"The words of the treaty of peace and alliance, and the oaths sworn,

¹ Thucyd. v. 24. and the function to do so given to Athens. The latter and preceding chapters contain, as compared with the clauses in the former part of the treaty—the function to

to govern & defend.

The clause regarding armed allies thus to hinder the passage of troops required to be put upon the appendix in the second class.

shall be engraven on stone columns, and put up in the temples of each of the four cities, and also upon a brazen column, to be put up by joint cost, at Olympia, for the festival now approaching.

"The four cities may by joint consent make any change they please in the provisions of this treaty, without violating their oaths."¹

The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of complication into the grouping and association of the Greek cities than had ever before been known. The ancient Spartan confederacy, and the Athenian empire, still subsisted. A peace had been concluded between them, ratified by the formal vote of the majority of the confederates, yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not merely peace, but also special alliances had been concluded between Athens and Sparta, and a special alliance between Sparta and Boeotia. Corinth, member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a defensive alliance with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis, which three states had concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other (without Corinth) and now recently with Athens. Yet both Athens and Sparta still retained the alliance² concluded between themselves, without formal rupture on either side, though Athens still complained that the treaty had not been fulfilled. No relations whatever subsisted between Argos and Sparta. Between Athens and Boeotia there was an amicable truce, terminable at ten days' notice. Lastly, Corinth could not be prevailed upon, in spite of repeated solicitation from the Argives, to join the new alliance of Athens with Argos; so that no relations subsisted between Corinth and Athens, while the Corinthians hoped, though feebly, to resume their former tendencies towards Sparta.³

The alliance between Athens and Argos, of which particulars have just been given, was concluded not long before the Olympic festival of the 80th Olympiad or 428 B.C.; the festival being about the beginning of July, the treaty might be in May.⁴ That festival was memorable, on more than one ground. It was the first which had been celebrated since the conclusion of the peace, the

Complicated relations among the Greek states can be traced and explained.

Olympic festival of the 80th Olympiad, 428 B.C. The treaty was concluded about this time.

¹ Thucyd. v. 27.
² Thucyd. v. 28.
³ Thucyd. v. 28-30.

⁴ Herodotus ix. 121. "The festival was celebrated at Olympia, and the treaty was concluded at Athens, a few months of the treaty."

leading classes of which had been expressly introduced to guarantee to all Greeks free access to the great Pan-hellenic temples, with liberty of movement, consulting the oracles, and witnessing the matches. For the last eleven years, including two Olympic festivals, Athens herself, and apparently all the numerous allies of Athens, had been excluded from sending their solemn legations or *Thespieis*, and from attending as spectators, at the Olympic games.¹ Now that such exclusion was removed, and that the Rhodian heralds (who came to announce the approaching games and proclaim the truce connected with them) again took the soil of Attica, the visit of the Athenians was felt both by themselves and by others as a novelty. No small curiosity was entertained to see what signs the *Thespieis* of Athens would make as to show and splendour. Nor were there wanting spiteful rumours, that Athens had been so much impoverished by the war as to be prevented from appearing with appropriate magnificence at the altar and in the presence of Olympic Iona.

Athens took pride in showing these novelties, as well as in glorifying his own name and power, by a display more imposing than had ever been previously beheld. He had already distinguished himself in the local tournaments and struggles of Athens by an occupation surpassing Athenian deeds; but he now felt himself standing forward as the champion and leader of Athens before Greece. He had discredited his political rival Nicias, given a new direction to the politics of Athens by the Argive alliance, and was about to commence a series of inter-Peloponnesian operations against the Lacedæmonians. On all these grounds he determined that his first appearance on the plain of Olympia should impress upon all beholders. The

¹ Proclus of Rhodes was chief in the Panhellenic, held in 448 B.C. and in 447-446 B.C. Rhodes was excluded among the ordinary allies of Athens. But the *Thespieis* who came to conduct were privileged and so it would appear necessary that they should be admitted from outside to the festival. It may thus be seen, under any state of war, that it is possible that some alienated city may come to the festival, sending an *Amphiprotos*, *Amphiprotos*, &c. &c.

But this does not prove that Rhodes, rather generally, or a Rhodian *Thespieis*, could have come to Olympia between 448-447 B.C.

From the presence of individuals, that is individuals, Rhos can be seen, because some of the very persons, instead of the *Amphiprotos*, were present at a meeting. Rhos all Lacedæmonians were not much excluded by prohibition of the *Amphiprotos*, &c. &c.

(which it was his purpose to do) both of overweening personal vanity, and of that reckless expenditure which he would be compelled to try and overtake by persuasion or violence at the public cost. All the unfavourable impressions suggested to prudent Athenians by his previous life were aggravated by such a stupendous display; much more, of course, the jealousy and hatred of personal competitors. And this feeling was not the less real, though as a political man he was now in the full tide of public favour.

But it was probably Olympic 35, B.C. 276.

In my judgment, both Olympic 35 (B.C. 276) and Olympic 36 (B.C. 275) are indicated somewhat positively respectively, by the fact that the general war was ending at both periods. To suppose that in the midst of the anxiety of these two fighting years, there was an Olympic festival is a notion, involving doubts and hesitations to which I think their serious historians, their chroniclers for contemporary, and their subsequent traditional writers, assents to no contrary to all probability. The Olympic games of B.C. 276 would come just about the time when Marathon was at the bottom of her struggle for the freedom of Greece from the Persian yoke, and when he retired Marathon from the Athenian attack. This would not be a very good time for the people of Marathon, with the early danger of ruin and almost ruin and the subsequent victory, to give up, on the way to Olympia, leaving the time when the Olympic festival, the greatest of the Grecian games, would pass, except along the narrow way from Salamis to Marathon (see Map. I. & II.).

Moreover, we see that the very first article both of the laws for one year, and of the laws of 3000, expressly respecting the liberty to all to attend the Olympic temples and festivals. The first of this law relates to Peloponnesians; the second to Greeks and subjects of Greeks as well as to Hellenes. If the Athenians had desired Olympia to shut out all B.C. without exception, these stipulations in the law would have no purpose, nor meaning. But the fact of their standing in the face of the hostile power that they were under, even as it made Marathon and

I have placed the Olympic festival wherein Alcibiades commanded with his own squadron, in 276 B.C. in the page, but immediately after the word. No other festival appears to me at all suitable.

By Thucydides further assured, as a matter of course, that there was only one Olympic festival in the Olympic festival—that all the great athletes of Alcibiades ran in this one race—read that in the festival of 276 B.C. Alcibiades gained the prize, thus implying that Alcibiades had not been gained the prize at the same festival.

I am not aware that there is any evidence to prove either of these three propositions. To me they all appear impossible.

We know from Pausanias (9. 12. 15) that even in the case of the Spartans, as runners who continued in the stadium all year had brought out in the race. They were distributed into two or three, of which numbers we have not. But not run in one heat, and the winners in each they competed with each other in a final heat; so that the victor who gained the great prize was one of two or three who had.

Now, if this practice was adopted with the post-runner, much there would be in likely to be adopted with the chariot-race to give other chariots were brought in the same festival. The danger would be increased, the sport would be increased, and the glory of the competitors enhanced. The Olympic festival lasted five days. I had think to provide accommodation for all was a record of competitors. Alcibiades and others may therefore both have gained victories in the same festival; of course only one of them can have gained the great final prize—and which of the two that was, it is impossible to say.

The Eleans
prohibit the
Spartans
from taking
part in the
Olympic
festival, in
consequence
of having
been the
cause of the
Olympic
truce.

If the festival of the 80th Olympiad was peculiarly distinguished by the co-operation of Athens and those connected with them, it was marked by a further novelty yet more striking—the exclusion of the Lacedæmonians. Each exclusion was the consequence of the new political interests of the Eleans, combined with their increased consciousness of force arising out of the recent alliance with Argos, Athens, and Elis. It has already been mentioned that, since the peace with Athens, the Lacedæmonians, seeing an arbitrator in the case of Lepreum, which the Eleans claimed as their dependency, had declared it to be autonomous, and had sent a body of troops to defend it. Probably the Eleans had recently renewed their attacks upon the district since the junction with their new allies; for the Lacedæmonians had detached either a fresh body of 1000 hoplites immediately prior to the Olympic festival. Out of the number of this fresh detachment the system of exclusion arose. The Eleans were privileged administrators of the festival, regulating the details of the ceremony itself, and formally proclaiming by heralds the commencement of the Olympic truce, during which all violation of the Elean territory by an armed force was a sin against the majesty of Zeus. On the present occasion they affirmed that the Lacedæmonians had sent the 1000 hoplites into Lepreum, and had captured a fort called Phylakas, both Elean possessions, after the proclamation of the truce. They accordingly imposed upon Sparta the fine prescribed by the "Olympian law," of two minæ for each man—2000 minæ in all, a part to Zeus Olympicus, a part to the Eleans themselves. During the interval between the proclamation of the truce and the commencement of the festival, the Lacedæmonians sent to restrain against this fine, which they alleged to have been justly imposed, inasmuch as the heralds had not yet proclaimed the truce at Sparta when the hoplites reached Lepreum. The Eleans replied that the truce had already at that time been proclaimed among themselves (for they always proclaimed it first at home, before their heralds crossed the borders), so that they were intimated from all military operations, of which the Lacedæmonian hoplites had taken advantage to march their

last aggressions. To which the Lacedæmonians rejoined that the behaviour of the Elisians themselves constituted their own allegation, for they had sent the Elisians heralds to Sparta to proclaim the truce after they knew of the sending of the hoplites, thus showing that they did not consider the truce to have been already violated. The Lacedæmonians added, that after the herald reached Sparta, they had taken no further military measures. Now the truth stood in this disputed question, we have no means of deciding. But the Elisians rejected the explanation, though offering, if the Lacedæmonians would restore to them Lepreum, to forgo such part of the fine as would accrue to themselves, and to pay out of their own treasury on behalf of the Lacedæmonians the portion which belonged to the god. This new proposition, being also refused, was again modified by the Elisians. They intimated that they would be satisfied if the Lacedæmonians, instead of paying the fine at once, would publicly on the altar at Olympia, in presence of the assembled Greeks, take an oath to pay it at a future date. But the Lacedæmonians would not listen to the proposition either of payment or of promise. Accordingly the Elisians, as judges under the Olympic law, intimated them from the temple of Olympic Zeus, from the privilege of sanctifying there, and from attendance and competition at the games; that is, from attendance in the form of the sacred legation called *Thestey*, occupying a formal and recognised place at the solemnity.¹

All the other Greek states (with the single exception of Lepreum) were present by their *Thesties*² as well as by individual spectators, so the Spartan *Thestey* "shown by its absence" in a manner painfully and hardly less conspicuous. So extreme indeed was the affront put upon the Lacedæmonians, connected as they were with Olympia by a tie ancient, peculiar, and never yet broken—as pointed the evidence of that comparative degradation into which they had fallen, through the peace with Athens coming at the back of the Sphakterion disaster.³—

Allego aut
et hoc
testamentum
factum
est
ante oculos
omnium
græcorum.

¹ Thucyd. v. 26, 28.
² Thucyd. v. 26. ἀποδείκνυσθαι αὐτὸν εὐφρανὴν καὶ ἰσχυρὰ καὶ ἡλικίαν, καὶ ἄλλοις ἄνθρωποις ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἔσθαι, ἀποδείκνυσθαι αὐτὸν εὐφρανὴν καὶ ἰσχυρὰ καὶ ἡλικίαν, καὶ ἄλλοις ἄνθρωποις ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἔσθαι.

³ Thucyd. v. 26. καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄνθρωποις ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἔσθαι, καὶ ἰσχυρὰ καὶ ἡλικίαν, καὶ ἄλλοις ἄνθρωποις ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἔσθαι, καὶ ἰσχυρὰ καὶ ἡλικίαν, καὶ ἄλλοις ἄνθρωποις ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἔσθαι.

that they were supposed likely to set the exclusion at defiance, and to escort their Theoris into the Temple at Olympia for sacrifice, under the protection of an armed force. The Eleans even thought it necessary to put their younger hoplites under arms, and to summon to their aid 1600 hoplites from Mantinea, as well as the same number from Argos, for the purpose of repelling this probable attack; while a detachment of Achaean cavalry were stationed at Argos during the festival, to lend assistance in case of need. The alarm prevalent among the spectators of the festival was most intense, and became considerably aggravated by an incident which occurred after the chariot-race. Lichas,¹ a Lacedæmonian of great wealth and consequence, had a chariot running in the lists, which he was obliged to enter, not in his own name, but in the name of the Eleania celebration. The sentence of exclusion hindered him from taking any ostensible part, but it did not hinder him from being present as a spectator; and when he saw his chariot proclaimed victorious under the title of Eleania, his impatience to make himself known became uncontrollable. He stepped into the midst of the lists, and placed a chaplet on the head of the charioteer, thus advertising himself as the master. This was a flagrant indecorum and known violation of the order of the festival; accordingly the official attendants with their staffs interfered at once in performance of their duty, chastising and driving him back to his place with blows.² Hence arose an increased apprehension of armed Lacedæmonian interference. None such took place, however; the Lacedæmonians, for the first and last time in their history, offered their Olympic sacrifice at home, and the

¹ See a previous note, p. 327.

² Plutarch, *l. c.* It is to be remembered that Lacedæmonians were not only not the high-estly Greek people, but were not only not the most powerful, but were not the most numerous. Hence the Eleans were not only the most powerful, but were not the most numerous. Hence the Eleans were not only the most powerful, but were not the most numerous.

We are to observe, with the incident here noted, the rough and hard, and the violent of dealing at Olympia, and in how much more violent a spirit than in the games were conducted. At the Athenian festival of the *Propter*, if a person committed

himself as obstructed himself into a place not properly belonging to him in the theatre, the justice of his offence was both suggested and settled in regard to the character by striking the person, and being told of necessity, that they were upon an account to strike him. If they did, they were punished according to the ordinary laws of the state. And, indeed, it may be remarked that the same necessary measure would probably be required in similar cases in an open assembly than in a closed theatre. Some allowance might necessarily be made for this difference.

festival passed off without any interruption.' The boldness of the Eleans in putting this affront upon the most powerful state in Greece is so astonishing, that we can hardly be mistaken in supposing their proceeding to have been suggested by Alcibiades and encouraged by the counsel aid from the allies. He was at this moment not less ostentatious in humiliating Sparta than in showing off Athens.

Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a further proof was soon afforded by the fate of her colony the *Trachinæa Herakleia*, established near Thermopylae in the third year of the war. That colony, though at first comprising a numerous body of warriors, in consequence of the general trust in Lacedæmonian power, and though always under the government of a Lacedæmonian hermet, had never prospered. It had been persecuted from the beginning by the neighbouring tribes, and administered with harshness as well as peculation by its governors. The establishment of the town had been regarded from the beginning by the neighbours, especially the Thebans, as an invasion of their territory; and their hostilities, always venial, had, in the winter succeeding the Olympic festival just described, been carried to a greater point of violence than ever. They had defeated the Herakleote in a ruinous battle, and slain Xenartes the Lacedæmonian governor. But though the place was so reduced as to be unable to maintain itself without foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed by Peloponnesian warlike and warfare to be able to succour it; and the Boeotians, observing her inability, became apprehensive that the interference of Athens would be invoked. Accordingly they thought it prudent to occupy Herakleia with a body of Boeotian troops, dismissing the Lacedæmonian governor Hagesyllides for alleged misconduct. Nor could the Lacedæmonians prevent this proceeding, though it occasioned them to make indignant remonstrances.¹

Depressed
condition
of Sparta
throughout
Greece—
Herakleia.

¹ It will be seen, however, that the Lacedæmonians remonstrated and engaged themselves upon the Eleans for this insult twelve years afterwards.

during the plenitude of their power (Xenoph. *Hæc.* vi. 4, 11; *Æsch.* *fr.* 27).

² Xenoph. *s. c.* 12.

CHAPTER LVI.

FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 92, DOWN TO THE
BATTLE OF MANTINÆA.

RECENT after the remarkable events of the Olympic festival described in my last chapter, the Argives and their allies sent a fresh embassy to invite the Corinthians to join them. They thought it a promising opportunity, after the effort just put upon Sparta, to prevail upon the Corinthians to desert her; but Spartan troops were present also, and though the discussions were much protracted, no new resolution was adopted. An earthquake—possibly an earthquake not real, but simulated for convenience—suddenly terminated the congress. The Corinthians—though seemingly distrustful Argos now that she was united with Athens, and leaning rather towards Sparta—were unwilling to pronounce themselves in favour of one or as to make an enemy of the other.¹

In spite of this last failure, the new alliance of Athens and Argos manifested its fruits vigorously in the ensuing spring. Under the inspiration of Alcibiades, Athens was about to attempt the new experiment of seeking to obtain intra-Peloponnesian followers and language. At the beginning of the war she had been maritime, defensive, and simply conservative, under the guidance of Pericles. After the events of Epikatoria, she made use of that great advantage to aim at the recovery of Megara and Boeotia, which she had before been compelled to abandon by the Thirty years' truce, at the recommendation of Kleon. In this attempt she employed the eighth year of the war, but with signal ill success; while Brasidas during that period broke open the gates

¹ Thucyd. i. 101-102.

of her maritime empire, and robbed her of many important dependencies. The grand object of Athens then became to recover these lost dependencies, especially Amphipolis: Nikias and his partisans sought to effect such recovery by making peace, while Kleon and his supporters insisted that it could never be achieved except by military efforts. The expedition under Kleon against Amphipolis had failed—the peace concluded by Nikias had failed also: Athens had surrendered her capital advantage without regaining Amphipolis; and if she wished to regain it, there was no alternative except to repeat the attempt which had failed under Kleon. And this perhaps she might have done (as we shall find her projecting to do in the course of about four years forward), if it had not been, first, that the Athenian mind was now probably sick and disheartened about Amphipolis, in consequence of the prodigious disaster so recently undergone there; next, that Aleksandria, the new chief adviser or prime minister of Athens (if we may be allowed to use an inaccurate expression, which yet suggests the reality of the case), was prompted by his personal impetus to turn the stream of Athenian ardour into a different channel. Full of antipathy to Sparta, he regarded the interior of Peloponnesos as her most vulnerable point, especially in the present dispirited condition of its important cities. Moreover, his personal thirst for glory was better gratified amidst the centre of Grecian life than by undertaking an expedition into a distant and barbarous region; lastly, he probably recoiled with discomfort at the hardships and extreme cold (unreportable to all except the iron frame of Sokrates) which he had himself endured at the blockade of Potidea twelve years before,¹ and which any armament destined to oust Amphipolis would have to go through again. It was under these impressions that he now began to press his intra-Peloponnesian operations against Lakoskorta, with the view of acquiring a counter-alliance under Argos sufficient to keep her in check, and at any rate to nullify her power of carrying invasions beyond the isthmus. All this was to be done without actually breaking the peace and alliance between Athens and Lakoskorta, which stood in conspicuous letters on pillars erected in both cities.

¹ Plut., *Strap.* ii. 32, p. 105. *Isotai pēi stēthēi pōtēi, ekpōi alai kōmōtēi, &c.*

Coming to Argos at the head of a few Athenian hoplites and bowmen, and reinforced by Peloponnesian allies, Alcibiades exhibited the spectacle of an Athenian general traversing the interior of the peninsula, and imposing his own arrangements in various quarters—a spectacle at that moment new and striking.¹ He first turned his attention to the Achaean towns in the north-west, where he persuaded the inhabitants of Patras to ally themselves with Athens, and even to undertake the labour of connecting their town with the sea by means of long walls, so as to place themselves within the protection of Athens from seaward. He further projected the erection of a fort and the formation of a naval station at the extreme point of Cape Rhium, just at the narrow entrance of the Corinthian Gulf, whereby the Athenians, who already possessed the opposite shore by means of Megara, would have become masters of the commerce of the Gulf. But the Corinthians and Silyonians, to whom this would have been a serious mischief, despatched forces enough to prevent the execution of the scheme—and probably also to hinder the erection of the walls at Patras.² Yet the march of Alcibiades doubtless strengthened the anti-Laonian interest throughout the Achaean coast.

He then returned to take part with the Argives in a war against Epidaurea. To acquire possession of this city would much facilitate the communication between Athens and Argos, since it was not only immediately opposite to the island of Argos, now occupied by the Athenians, but also opened to the latter an access by land, disposing with the labour of circumnavigating Cape Sphæreum (the north-eastern point of the Argian and Epidaurian peninsula) whenever they sent forces to Argos. Moreover the territory of Epidaurea bordered to the north on that of Corinth, so that the possession of it would be an additional guarantee for the neutrality of the Corinthians. Accordingly it was resolved to attack Epidaurea, for which a pretext was easily found. As presiding and administering state of the temple of Apollo

¹Thucyd. v. 25. Alcibiades (as he has a right to call attention to it) took, and if, p. 255, account of this as something very remarkable on the part of Alcibiades in his own time.

²Thucyd. v. 26.

Pythians (situated within the walls of Argos), the Argians enjoyed a sort of religious supremacy over Epidaurians and other neighbouring cities—seemingly the remnant of that extensive supremacy, political as well as religious, which in early times had been theirs.¹ The Epidaurians owed to this temple certain sacrifices and other ceremonial obligations—one of which, arising out of some circumstance which we cannot understand, was now due and unperformed: at least so the Argians alleged. Such default imposed upon them the duty of gathering together a military force to attack the Epidaurians and enforce the obligation.

Their invading march however was for a time suspended by the news that King Agis, with the full force of Lacedæmonians and her allies, had advanced as far as Leuktra, ^{of the Argians} one of the leader towns of Lacedæmon on the north-west, ^{assaulted} towards Mount Lykæum and the Arcadian Frontier. What this movement meant was known only to Agis himself, who did not even explain the purpose to his own soldiers or officers or allies.² But the sacrifice constantly offered before passing the border was found so unfavourable that he abandoned his march for the present and returned home. The month Karmæus, a period of truce as well as religious festival among the Dorians, being now at hand, he directed the allies to hold themselves prepared for an on-march as soon as that month had expired.

On being informed that Agis had disbanded his troops, the Argians prepared to execute their invasion of Epidaurum. The day on which they set out was already the 25th of the month preceding the Karmæus month, so that there remained only three days before the commencement of that latter month with its holy truce, binding upon the religious feelings of the Dorian states generally, to which Argos, Sparta, and Epidaurum all belonged. But the Argians made use of that very peculiarity of the Ægean, which was accounted likely to keep them at home, to facilitate their scheme, by playing a trick with the calendar, and pretending one of those arbitrary interferences with the

The great month Karmæus—trick played by the Argians with their calendar.

¹ Paus. v. 25, with its qualifications.

² Thucyd. i. 101. Agis is called the mysterious ruler of states of the Peloponnese.

This incident shows that Sparta

employed the military force of her allies without any regard to their feelings—such as Sparta's at Athens, though there were some among them too powerful to be thus treated.

of their out-march, however, was transmitted to Athens; upon which Alcibiades, at the head of 1000 Athenian hoplites, was sent to join the Argives. But before he arrived, the Lacedæmonian army had been already disbanded; so that his services were no longer required, and the Argives carried their ravages over one-third of the territory of Epidaurea before they at length evacuated it.¹

The Epidaurians were reinforced about the end of September by a detachment of 300 Lacedæmonian hoplites under Agisipolis, sent by sea without the knowledge of the Athenians. Of this the Argives produced good complaints at Athens. They had good reason to condemn the negligence of the Athenians as allies, for not having kept better naval watch at their neighbouring station of Mityla, and for having allowed this enemy to enter the harbour of Epidaurea. But they took another ground of complaint somewhat remarkable. In the alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, it had been stipulated that neither of the four should suffer the passage of troops through its territory without the joint consent of all. Now the sea was accounted a part of the territory of Athens; so that the Athenians had violated this article of the treaty by permitting the Lacedæmonians to send troops by sea to Epidaurea. And the Argives now required Athens, in compensation for this wrong, to carry back the Messenians and Helots from Epidaurea to Pylos, and allow them to ravage Laconia. The Athenians, under the persuasion of Alcibiades, complied with their requisition; inscribing, at the foot of the pillar on which their alliance with Sparta stood recorded, that the Lacedæmonians had not observed their oath. Nevertheless they still obtained from

Athenians
prohibit of
troops—the
alliance
between
Athens and
Sparta
violations to
none, but
is indirectly
violated
by both.

¹ Thucyd. v. 26. and *Antiquities* about 73. *Thucydides* notices not Alcibiades' presence, but says, "ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπὶ Ἰπιδάυρειον—καὶ ἐπὶ αὐτῷ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ Ἀθήνῃ." This is the reading which Porphy, Broussell, Dindorf, and other editors adopt as correct; leaving out the particle *ἐν* which stands in the common text & has no authority.

If we do not adopt this reading, we must suppose Alcibiades and his friend and fellow countryman to be the cause of "having already completed their

expedition and returned home." But this is hardly to be presumed the reading with a meaning from the verb *ὑπερβαίνειν*; and the learned Dr. Arnold, who observes that this meaning evidently belongs to the phrase of *ὑπερβαίνειν* in the case of the verb *ὑπερβαίνειν* in v. 11, the same verb and the same book, yet in a meaning contrary to that which he assigns.

It appears to me the last objection, after perceiving of the verb, to disagree with the particle *ἐν*.

formally throwing up their treaty with Lacedæmonia, or breaking it in any other way.¹ The relations between Athens and Sparta thus remained, in name—peace and alliance—or far as concerns direct operations against each other's territory; in reality—hostile action as well as hostile manœuvring, against each other, as allies respectively of third parties.

The Argives, after having prolonged their incursions on the Epidaurian territory throughout all the autumn, made in the winter an unavailing attempt to take the town itself by storm. Though there was no considerable action, but merely a succession of desultory attacks, in some of which the Epidaurians even had the advantage, yet they still suffered serious hardship, and pressed their case forcibly on the sympathy of Sparta. Thus importuned, and mortified as well as alarmed by the increasing defection or coldness which they now experienced throughout Peloponnesia, the Lacedæmonians determined, during the course of the ensuing summer, to put forth their strength vigorously, and win back their lost ground.²

Towards the month of June (A.D. 425), they marched with their full force, footmen as well as Holois, under King Agis, against Argos. The Tegyrenæ and other Argolian allies joined them on the march, while their other allies near the Isthmus—Boeotians, Megarians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Polianians, &c.—were directed to assemble at Pelina. The number of these

20. 118.

Remains of
Argos by
Agis and
the Lacedæmonians,
Boeotians,
Megarians,
and Corinthians.

latter allies was very considerable—for we hear of 8000 Boeotian hoplites and 2000 Corinthians; the Boeotians had with them also 8000 light-armed, 800 horsemen, and 500 foot-soldiers, who ran alongside of the horsemen. The numbers of the rest, or of Spartans themselves, we do not know; nor probably did Thucydides himself know: for we find him remarking elsewhere the impenetrable concealment of the Lacedæmonians on all public affairs, in reference to the numbers at the subsequent battle of Mantinea. Each member of the Lacedæmonian alliance was no secret to the Argives, who marching first to Mantinea, and then taking up the force of that city as well as 8000 Elian hoplites who came to join them, met the Lacedæmonians in their march at Molybdium in Arcadia.

¹ Thucyd. v. 26.

² Thucyd. v. 27.

The two armies being posted on opposite hills, the Argives had resolved to attack Agis the next day, so as to prevent him from joining his allies at Pelina. But he eluded this separate encounter by decamping in the night, reached Pelina, and opened his junction in safety. We do not know that there was in the Lacedæmonian army any commander of buckles, who, copying the unbecomable pusillity of Ananapharotus before the battle of Platæa, refused to obey the order of retreat before the enemy, to the imminent risk of the whole army. And the fact that no similar incident occurred now may be held to prove that the Lacedæmonians had acquired greater familiarity with the exigencies of actual warfare.

As soon as the Lacedæmonian retreat was known in the morning, the Argives left their position also, and marched with their allies, first to Argos itself, next to Nemea, on the ordinary road from Corinth and Pelina to Argos, by which they imagined that the invaders would approach. But Agis acted differently. Distributing his force into three divisions, he himself, with the Lacedæmonians and Arcadians, taking a short, but very rugged and difficult road, crossed the ridge of the mountains, and descended straight into the plain near Argos. The Corinthians, Peloponnesians, and Pelionians were directed to follow another mountain road, which entered the same plain upon a different point; while the Boeotians, Corinthians, and Sikyonians followed the longer, more even, and more ordinary route by Nemea. This route, though apparently frequented and convenient, led for a considerable distance along a narrow ravine called the Triton, bounded on each side by mountains. The united army under Agis was much superior in number to the Argives; but if all had marched in one line by the frequented route through the narrow Triton, their superiority of number would have been of little use, whilst the Argives would have had a position highly favourable to their defence. By dividing his force, and taking the mountain road with his own divisions, Agis got into the plain of Argos in the rear of the Argives' position at Nemea. He anticipated that when the Argives saw him devastating their properties near the city, they would forthwith quit the advantageous ground near Nemea to come and attack him in the plain :

Approach
of the
invaders to
Argos by
Pelina.
Line of
march.

the Boeotian division would thus find the road by Xanthe and the Tectæa open, and would be able to march without resistance into the plain of Argos, where their numerous cavalry would act with effect against the Argians engaged in attacking Agis. This triple march was executed. Agis with his division, and the Corinthians with theirs, got across the mountains into the Argian plain during the night; while the Argians,¹ hearing at day-break that he was near their city, ravaging Mantinea and other places, left their position at Xanthe to come down to the plain and attack him. In their march they had a partial skirmish with the Corinthian division, which, having reached a high ground immediately above the Argian plain, was forced nearly in the road. But this affair was inconclusive, and they soon found themselves in the plain near to Agis and the Lacedæmonians, who lay between them and their city.

On both sides the armies were marshalled, and order taken for battle. But the situation of the Argians, was in reality little less than desperate; for while they had Agis and his division in their front, the Corinthian detachment was near enough to take them in flank, and the Boeotians marching along the undefended road through the Tritæa would attack them in the rear. The Boeotian cavalry too would act with full effect upon them in the plain, since neither Argos, Elis, nor Mantinea seems to have possessed any horsemen: a description of force which ought to have been sent from Athens, though from some cause which does not appear the Athenian contingent had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, in spite of a position so very critical, both the Argians and their allies were elate with confidence and impatient for battle; thinking only of the division of Agis immediately in their front which appeared to be enclosed between them and their city, and taking no heed to the other formidable enemies in their flank and rear. But the Argian generals were better aware than their soldiers of the real danger; and just as the two armies were about to charge, Alkibiades, pretences of the Lacedæmonians at Argos, accompanied Thersites,

¹ Thucyd. v. 66. *at de Argibus priores Mantinea Epidauri sita in epe Nephæ, &c.*

having unhesitatingly thrown away a certain victory. They had indeed good ground, in the received practice, to censure him for having concluded a truce without taking the assent of the people. It was their custom, on returning from a march, to hold a public court-martial before entering the city, at a place called the Chaulon or winter torrent near the walls, for the purpose of adjudicating on offences and faults committed in the army. Such was their wrath on this occasion against Themistocles, that they would scarcely be prevailed upon even to put him upon his trial, but began to stone him. He was forced to seek personal safety at the altar; upon which the soldiers tried him, and he was condemned to have his property confiscated.¹

Very shortly afterwards the expected Athenian contingent arrived, which probably ought to have come earlier: 1000 hoplites, with 300 horsemen, under Laches and Nibristes. Alkibiades came as ambassador, probably serving as a soldier also among the horsemen. The Argives, notwithstanding their displeasure against Themistocles, nevertheless felt themselves pledged to observe the truce which he had concluded, and their magistrates accordingly desired the newly-arrived Athenians to depart. Nor was Alkibiades even permitted to approach and address the public assembly, until the Spartan and Helian allies insisted that this much at least should not be refused. An assembly was therefore convened, in which these allies took part, along with the Argives. Alkibiades contended strenuously that the recent truce with the Lacedæmonians was null and void, since it had been contracted without the privity of all the allies, distinctly at variance with the terms of the alliance. He therefore called upon them to resume military operations forthwith, in conjunction with the reinforcements now seasonably arrived. His speech so persuaded the assembly, that the Spartans and Helians consented at once to join him in an expedition against the Arcadian town of Orchomenus; the Argives also, though at first reluctant, very speedily followed them thither. Orchomenus was a place important to acquire, not merely because its territory joined that of Sparta on the

Early
arrival of
Alkibiades,
Laches, &c.,
with the
Athenian
contingent
at Argos—
application
of Alkibiades
to Themis-
tocles, and
Argives, against the
Athenian
troops of
volun-
teers.

¹ Thucyd. v. 69.

northward, but because the Lacedæmonians had deposited therein the hostages which they had taken from Arcadian townships and villages as guarantee for fidelity. Its walls were, however, in bad condition, and its inhabitants, after a short resistance, capitulated. They agreed to become allies of Mantinea, to furnish hostages for faithful adhesion to such alliance, and to deliver up the hostages deposited with them by Sparta.¹

Encouraged by first success, the allies debated what they should next undertake. The Eleans contended strenuously for a march against Lepreum, while the Mantinæans were anxious to attack their enemy and neighbor Tegeæ. The Argives and Athenians preferred the latter, incomparably the more important enterprise of the two; but such was the disgust of the Eleans at the rejection of their proposition, that they abandoned the army altogether, and went home. Notwithstanding their desertion, however, the remaining allies continued together at Mantinea organizing their attack upon Tegeæ, in which city they had a strong favorable party, who had actually laid their plans, and were on the point of proclaiming the revolt of the city from Sparta,² when the philo-Lacædæmon Tegeans just averted themselves by despatching an urgent message to Sparta and receiving the most rapid answer. The Lacædæmonians, filled with indignation at the news of the surrender of Cythærona, vented anew all their displeasure against Agis, whom they now threatened with the severe punishment of demolishing his house and flogging him in the sum of 100,000 drachmæ, or about 57½ Attic talents. He urgently entreated that an opportunity might be afforded to him of redeeming by some brave deed the ill name which he had incurred; if he failed in doing so, then they might inflict upon him what penalty they chose. The penalty was accordingly withdrawn; but a restriction, new to the Spartan constitution, was now placed upon the authority of the king. It had been before a part of his prerogative to lead out the army single-handed and on his own authority; but a council of Ten was now named, without whose concurrence he was interdicted from exercising such power.³

Plans against Tegeæ—The Eleans refuse to join.

¹Thucyd. v. 81. ²Thucyd. v. 82. ³See also *Antiquities*, lib. x.
⁴Thucyd. v. 82.

To the great good fortune of Agis, the pressing message now arrived announcing imminent revolt of Tegea, the most important ally of Sparta, and close upon her border. Such was the alarm occasioned by this news, that the whole military population instantly started off to relieve the place, Agis at their head; the most rapid movement ever known to have been made by Laconian soldiers.¹ When they arrived at Corinthium in Arcadia in their way, perhaps hearing that the danger was somewhat less pressing, they sent back to Sparta one-sixth part of the force, for home defence, the oldest as well as the youngest men. The remainder marched forward to Tegea, where they were speedily joined by their Arcadian allies. They further sent messages to the Corinthians and Boeotians, as well as to the Phocians and Lebanians, invoking the immediate presence of these contingents in the territory of Mantinea. The arrival of such reinforcements, however, even with all possible zeal on the part of the cities contributing, could not be looked for without some lapse of time; the rather, as it appears that they could not get into the territory of Mantinea except by passing through that of Argos,² which could not be safely attempted until they had all formed a junction. Accordingly Agis, impatient to redeem his reputation, marched at once with the Laconians and the Arcadian allies present into the territory of Mantinea, and took up a position near the Herakleion, or temple of Hēraklēs,³ from whence he began to ravage the neighbouring lands. The Argives and their allies presently came forth from Mantinea, planted themselves near him, but on very rugged and impracticable ground, and thus offered him battle. Nothing daunted by the difficulty of the position, he marshalled his army and led it up to attack them. His rashness on the present occasion might have produced as much mischief as his inconsiderate concession to Thrasyllas near Argoe, had not an ancient Spartan called out to him that he was now nearly proceeding "to heal mischief by mischief". So

¹ Thucyd. v. 68. Arcadia & Laconia are the neighbouring provinces, which, as Mr. Clinton observes, (p. 105, 106) afterwards, the veterans of the Spartan and before the battle of Platae, also led by to Marathon, viz. 104 years before we have been quite as rapid and

instantaneous.

² Thucyd. v. 44. Mantinea was the only place. The Laconians, being obliged to have first a series of provisions to accompany them a temple of Hēraklēs, their heroic progenitor (see Xenophont, *Hellen.* vi. 4, 15).

forcibly was Agri impressed either with this timely admonition, or by the clear view of the position which he had undertaken to assault, that he suddenly halted the army, and gave orders for retreat, though actually within distance no greater than the cast of a javelin from the enemy.¹

His march was now intended to draw the Argives away from the difficult ground which they occupied. On the frontier between Mantinea and Tegea—both situated on a lofty but enclosed plain, divided only by hills, hollows, or natural subterraneous channels in the mountains—was situated a head of water, the regular efflux of which seems to have been kept up by joint operations of both cities for their mutual benefit. Thither Agri now conducted his army for the purpose of turning the water towards the side of Mantinea, where it would commit serious damage; calculating that the Mantinians and their allies would certainly demand from their position to hinder it. No stratagem, however, was necessary to induce the latter to adopt this resolution. For as soon as they saw the Lacedæmonians, after advancing to the foot of the hill, first suddenly halt, next retreat, and lastly disappear, their surprise was very great; and this surprise was soon converted into contemptuous confidence and impudence to pursue the flying enemy. The generals, not sharing such confidence, hesitated at first to quit their secure position; upon which the troops became clamorous, and loudly denounced them for treason in leaving the Lacedæmonians quietly except a second time, as they had before done near Argos. These generals would probably not be the same with those who had incurred, a short time before, so much undesired censure for their convention with Agri; but the sentence on the present occasion, hardly less unreasonable, drove them, not without considerable shame and confusion, to give orders for advance. They abandoned the hill, marched down into the plain so as to approach the Lacedæmonians, and employed the next day in arranging themselves in good battle order, so as to be ready to fight at a moment's notice.

Meanwhile it appears that Agri had found himself disappointed

¹ Thucyd. v. 21. See an explanation of the moment when a battle was going to be fought, in Xenophon, *Hellen.* vii. 4, 15.

Maneuver of Agri to bring on a battle on this ground.

in his operations upon the water. He had either not done so much damage, or not spread so much terror as he had expected; and he accordingly decided, putting himself again in march to resume his position at the Herakleion, and supposing that his enemies still retained their position on the hill. But in the course of this march he came suddenly upon the Argives and allied army whom he was not in the least prepared to see there. They were not only in the plain, but already drawn up in perfect order of battle. The Spartans occupied the right wing, the post of honour, because the ground was in their territory; next to them stood their dependent Acadian allies; then the chosen Thousand-regiment of Argos, citizens of wealth and hardly trained in arms at the cost of the state; alongside of them the remaining Argive hoplites, with their dependent allies of Kleonæ and Oreea; last of all, on the left wing, stood the Athenians, their hoplites as well as their bowmen.

It was with the greatest surprise that Agis and his army beheld this unexpected opposition. To any other Greeks than Lacedæmonians, the sudden presentation of a formidable enemy would have caused a feeling of dismay from which they would have found it difficult to recover; and even the Lacedæmonians, on this occasion, underwent a momentary shock unparalled in their previous experience.¹ But they now felt the full advantage of their rigorous training and habit of military obedience, as well as of that subordination of officers which was peculiar to themselves in Greece. In other Greek armies orders were proclaimed to the troops in a loud voice by a herald, who received them personally from the general: each tent or company, indeed, had its own herald, but the latter did not receive his orders separately from the general, and seems to have had no personal responsibility for the execution of them by his soldiers. Subordinate and responsible military authority was not recognised. Among the Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, there was a regular gradation of military and responsible authority—"commanders of companies"—each of whom had his special duty in

¹ Thucyd. v. 66. *ἰσχυρῶς ἐκ δυνάμει*. *ἰσχυρῶς*—*by surprise*; *ἐκ δυνάμει*—*with suddenness*, in a moment, in a twinkling of an eye.

with unbecoming readiness.¹ Next to the Sicritae, who were 600 in number, stood the enfranchised Helots, recently returned from serving with Brasidas in Thracæ, and the Neodamodee, both probably summoned home from Lacedæmon, where we were told before that they had been planted. After them, in the centre of the entire line, came the Lacedæmonian leuch, seven in number, with the Argolidæ dependent allies, Hermæ and Macellariæ, near them. Lastly, in the right wing, stood the Tegyææ, with a small division of Lacedæmonians occupying the extreme right, as the post of honour. On each flank there were some Lacedæmonian *hypomachæ*.²

Thucydides, with a frankness which enhances the value of his testimony wherever he gives it positively, informs us that he cannot pretend to set down the number of either army. It is evident that this silence is not for want of having inquired—but none of the answers which he received appeared to him trustworthy: the extreme scarcity of Lacedæmonian public admitted of no certainty about their numbers, while the empty ceremonial boasts of other Greeks served only to mislead. In the absence of assured information about aggregate number, the historian gives us some general information accessible to every inquirer, and some facts visible to a spectator. From his language it is conjectured, with some probability, by Dr Thirlwall and others, that he was himself present at the battle, though in what capacity we cannot determine, as he was an exile from his country. First he states that the Lacedæmonian army appeared more numerous than that of the enemy. Next he tells us that, independent of the Sicritæ on the left, who were 600 in number, the remaining Lacedæmonian front, to the extremity of their right wing, consisted of 448 men, each company having four men in front. In respect to depth, the different subdivisions were not all equal; but for the most part the files were eight deep. There were seven leuch in all (apart from the Sicritæ); each leuch comprised four pentachoriæ—each pentachoriæ contained four subdivisions.³ Multiplying 448 by

¹ Xenophon, *Cyrop.* iv. 2. 11. 222 speaking the situation of the Lacedæmonian army. We know that the Sicritæ was the permanent division—the military unit; that the Pentachoriæ was composed of a definite (but

² Thucyd. i. 10.

³ Very little can be made out re-

4, and adding the 400 Skirmish, this would make a total of 4184 lancers, besides a few horsemen on each flank. Respecting light-armed, nothing is said. I have no confidence in such an estimate—but the total is smaller than we should have expected, considering that the Lacedæmonians had marched out from Sparta with their entire force as a pressing emergency, and that they had only sent home one-sixth of their total, their oldest and poorest soldiers.

It does not appear that the generals on the Argian side made any attempt to charge while the Lacedæmonians were ^{Protesting} ^{passing} ^{to the} ^{aid.} army was yet incomplete. It was necessary for them, according to Grecian practice, to wind up the courage of their troops by some words of exhortation and encouragement; and before these were finished, the Lacedæmonians may probably have attained their order. The Spartan officers reminded their countrymen that the coming battle would decide whether

always the same number of Spartans that the Lædians also was composed of a body that always the same number of Spartans. The more appears to have been a still larger body, consisting of an equal force (according to Lacedæmon, of four lancers), but these were equal as to the time we should expect them to be.

Second, this was a great force. The more seems to have been certainly satisfied about the Lacedæmonian military discipline. We ought to remember, in regard to that, that these were, Lacedæmon, Spartan, Lacedæmon, etc., but the same kind of men; and we can easily imagine, according to the same, that they were all men of the same kind, and that they were all men of the same kind.

Third, which was similar to the Lacedæmonian drill was the training of a small number of men like the Spartans. It is, in fact, as we know, that the Lacedæmonians were the most perfect of the Spartans. When this was more perfect, it is probable that the Lacedæmonians of these Lacedæmonian divisions was left to be defended in every case by the Spartans.

Fourth, which was similar to the Spartans. I have already had occasion to say, that the Lacedæmonians were the most perfect of the Spartans. When this was more perfect, it is probable that the Lacedæmonians of these Lacedæmonian divisions was left to be defended in every case by the Spartans.

to be successful. Given the number of men in front, and the number of soldiers in each line, the depth of the Lacedæmonian line of four lancers, without reference to the character of any one. These two elements appear distinctly contradictory; and we cannot expect that they will be able to follow that the Lacedæmonians might make use of the fact that the Lacedæmonians were more than the rest. These two elements, as a means of securing this, in the case of the Lacedæmonians, we should have confidence, however, in the same.

Another opinion has been suggested, viz., that each Lacedæmonian had the power of striking his lance into the ground or having something to be done, only under the obligation that he was should maintain the front rank of each company; the depth would then of course be the variable item. I incline to believe that this is what Lacedæmonians have done in battle. What is more, therefore, that these Lacedæmonians were in each line, and how confident in each position, we must suppose him to think in the army as it marched out from Sparta, and in Lacedæmon, by the words which follow, that each Lacedæmonian had the power of modifying the distribution in regard to the front line, when the order of battle was about to be formed. This, at all events, seems the most satisfactory solution of the difficulty.

Marineke should continue to be a free and imperial city, with Argolian dependencies of her own, as she now was, or should again be degraded into a dependency of Lacodemone. The Argolian leaders dwelt upon the opportunity which Argos now had of recovering her lost ascendancy in Peloponnesus, and of revenging herself upon her worst enemy and neighbour. The Athenian troops were exhorted to show themselves worthy of the many brave allies with whom they were now associated, as well as to protect their own territory and empire by vanquishing their enemy in Peloponnesus.

It illustrates forcibly the peculiarity of Lacodemonian character, that to them no similar words of encouragement were addressed either by Agis or any of the officers. "They know (says the historian¹) that long practice beforehand, in the business of war, was a better preservative than fine speeches on the spur of the moment." As among professional soldiers, bravery was assumed as a thing of course, without any special exhortation; but mutual suggestions were heard among them with a view to get their order of battle and position perfect, which at first it probably was not, from the sudden and hurried manner in which they had been constrained to form. Moreover various war-songs, perhaps those of Tyrtæus, were chanted in the ranks. At length the word was given to attack: the numerous pipes in attendance (an hereditary caste at Sparta) began to play, while the slow, solemn, and equable march of the troops adjusted itself to the time given by those instruments without any break or wavering in the line. A striking contrast to this deliberate pace was presented by the enemy, who, having no pipes or other musical instruments, rushed forward to the charge with a step vehement and even furious,² fresh from the exhortations just addressed to them.

It was the natural tendency of all Grecian armies, when coming into conflict, to march not exactly straight forward, but

¹ Thucyd. v. 66. *Lacodemones δὲ καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἐκείνους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, ἐκείνους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς.*

² Thucyd. v. 66. *Ἄγριον δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῇ*

ἑστίασει, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, ἐκείνους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς.

somewhat adiant towards the right. The soldiers on the extreme right of both armies set the example of such conduct, ^{in order to} in order to avoid exposing their own unshielded ^{flanks} flanks; while for the same reason every man along the line took care to keep close to the shield of his right-hand neighbour. We see from hence that, with equal numbers, the right was not merely the post of honour, but also of comparative safety. So it proved on the present occasion, even the Lacedæmonian discipline being never exempt from this cause of disturbance. Though the Lacedæmonian front, from their superior numbers, was more extended than that of the enemy, still their right files did not think themselves safe without starting still further to the right, and thus outflanked very greatly the Athenians on the opposite left wing; while on the opposite side the Mantinæans who formed the right wing, from the same disposition to keep the left shoulder forward, outflanked, though not to so great a degree, the Skiritæ and Brasidæans on the Lacedæmonian left. King Agis, whose post was with the Lœki in the centre, saw plainly that when the armies closed his left would be certainly taken in flank and perhaps even in the rear. Accordingly he thought it necessary to alter his dispositions even at this critical moment, which he effected upon being able to accomplish through the exact discipline, practised evolutions, and slow march of his soldiers.

The natural mode of meeting the impending danger would have been to bring round a division from the extreme right, where it could well be spared, to the extreme left against the advancing Mantinæans. But the ancient privilege of the Skiritæ, who always fought by themselves on the extreme left, forbade such an order.¹ Accordingly, Agis gave signal to the Brasidæans and Skiritæ to make a flank movement on the left so as to get on equal front with the Mantinæans; while in order to fill up the vacancy thus created in his line, he sent

Movement ordered by Agis on the instant before the battle: his order was obeyed. His left wing is detached.

¹ Thucyd. 2. 22. *ἦν δὲ αὖτε αἱ ἀριστερὲς ἑταῖραι αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντιπαραστάς αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔμελλεν εἶναι ἰσχυρὸν αὐτῷ· ἡ δὲ ἀριστερὴ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔμελλεν εἶναι ἰσχυρὸν αὐτῷ· ἡ δὲ ἀριστερὴ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔμελλεν εἶναι ἰσχυρὸν αὐτῷ.*

The strong and precise language which Thucydides here uses shows that this was a privilege pointedly

noted and much esteemed; among the Lacedæmonians, especially, ancient custom was more strict than elsewhere. And it is worthy to take notice of the circumstance, in order to appreciate the probability of Agis, which has been rather hastily asserted.

orders to the two polemarches Aristobolus and Hippomenes, who had their lochs on the extreme right of the line, to move to the rear and take post on the right of the Brasibolans, so as again to close up the line. But these two polemarches, who had the safest and most victorious place in the line, chose to keep it, disobeying his express orders: so that Ages, when he saw that they did not move, was forced to send a second order countermanding the flank movement of the Skiritæ, and directing them to fall in upon the centre, back into their former place. But it had now become too late to execute this second command before the hostile armies closed; and the Skiritæ and Brasibolans were thus smitten while in disorder and cut off from their own centre. The Mæthians, finding them in this condition, defeated and drove them back: while the chosen Thousand of Argos, breaking in by the vacant space between the Brasibolans and the Locodemontians centre, took them on the right flank and completed their discomfiture. They were routed and pursued even to the Locodemontian baggage-waggons in the rear: some of the select troops who guarded the waggons being slain, and the whole Locodemontian left wing altogether dispersed.

But the victorious Mantineans and their comrades, thinking only of what was immediately before them, wasted thus a precious time when their aid was urgently needed elsewhere. Matters passed very differently on the Laconian coast and night ; where Agis, with his holy guard of 300 chosen youths called Hippias, and with the Spartan Laski, forced himself in front conflict with the centre and left of the enemy—with the Argives, their chiefest troops and the so-called Five Laski—with the Eleuteres and Orestes, dependent allies of Argos—and with the Athenians. Over all these troops they were completely victorious, after a short resistance—indeed on some points with no resistance at all. So formidable was the aspect and name of the Laconians, that the opposing troops gave way without raising spears, and even with a panic so heaving, that they trod down each other in anxiety to escape.¹ While thus defeated in front they were taken

¹Therrell & H. (ed.) *Amphioxus*: with *Myxine* (Pisces), and a review of the related *Leptocottidae*, 145 p. 44 figures. Amsterdam, 1963, 48 pp.

the defeated enemy. Ptolemean, the other Spartan king, had advanced as far as Tegea with a reinforcement composed of the older and younger citizens; but on hearing of the victory he returned home.¹

Such was the important battle of Mantinæa, fought in the month of June, 418 B.C. Its effect throughout Greece was prodigious. The numbers engaged on both sides were very considerable for a Grecian army of that day, though seemingly not so large as at the battle of Delium five years before: the number and grandeur of the states whose troops were engaged was however greater than at Delium. But what gave peculiar value to the battle was, that it wiped off at once the pre-existing stain upon the honour of Sparta. The disaster in Sphakteria, disappointing all previous expectation, had drawn upon her the imputation of something like cowardice; and there were other proceedings which, with far better reason, caused her to be stigmatised as stupid and backward. But the victory of Mantinæa cleared all such disparaging criticism, and replaced Sparta in her old position of military pre-eminence before the eyes of Greece. It worked so much the more powerfully because it was entirely the fruit of Lacedæmonian courage, with little aid from that peculiar skill and tactics, which was generally seen concentrated, but had in the present case been found comparatively wanting. The manoeuvre of Agis, in itself not ill-conceived, for the purpose of extending his left wing, had failed through the disobedience of the two subsidiary polemarchæ; but in such a case the chance of failure falls more or less upon all parties concerned; nor could either general or soldiers be considered to have displayed at Mantinæa any of that professional aptitude which caused the Lacedæmonians to be styled "*artists in warlike affairs*". So much the more conspicuously did Lacedæmonian courage stand out to view. After the left wing had been broken, and when the Argives Thousand had penetrated into the vacant space between the left and centre, so that they might have taken the centre in flank, and ought to have done so had they been well-aided, the troops in the centre, instead of being decimated as most Grecian soldiers would have been, had marched forward

Great
effects of
the victory
in re-establishing the
reputation
of Sparta.

¹Thucyd. v. 26.

against the enemies in their front, and gained a complete victory. The consequences of the battle were thus immense in re-establishing the reputation of the Lacedæmonians, and in enabling them again to their ancient dignity of chiefs of Peloponnesia.¹

We are not surprised to hear that the two polemarchs, Aristicles and Hippocleides, whose disobedience had well-nigh caused the ruin of the army, were tried and condemned to banishment on their return to Sparta.²

Looking at the battle from the point of view of the other side, we may remark that the defeat was greatly accelerated by the selfish caprice of the Elisians in withdrawing their 2000 men immediately before the battle, because the other allies, instead of marching against Lepæum, preferred to attempt the far more important town of Tegeæ: an additional illustration of the remark of Pericles at the beginning of the war, that numerous and equal allies could never be kept in harmonious co-operation.³ Shortly after the defeat, the 2000 Elisians came back to the aid of Mantinea—probably regretting their previous untoward departure—together with a reinforcement of 1800 Athenians. Moreover, the Carneian month began—a season which the Lacedæmonians kept rigidly holy; even despatching messengers to constrictured their extra-Peloponnesian allies, whom they had invaded prior to the late battle,⁴ and reminding themselves within their own territory, so that the field was for the moment left clear for the operations of a debated enemy. Accordingly, the Epidaurians, though they had made an incursion into the territory of Argos during the absence of the Argolian main force at the time of the late battle, and had gained a partial success, now found their own territory overrun by the united Elisians, Mantinians, and Athenians, who were bold enough even to commence a wall of circumvallation round the town of Epidaurum itself. The entire work was designated between them to be accomplished; but the superior activity and perseverance of the Athenians were here displayed in a conspicuous manner. For while the portion of work con-

¹ Thucyd. v. 76. and the last sentence of the passage, which is to be understood as referring to the return of the army to Sparta, and the trial of the polemarchs, is not strictly correct. The trial and banishment of the polemarchs, as Thucyd. v. 76. and the last sentence of the passage, which is to be understood as referring to the return of the army to Sparta, and the trial of the polemarchs, is not strictly correct.

² Thucyd. v. 76.

³ Thucyd. i. 101.

⁴ Thucyd. v. 76.

initial to them (the fortification of the cape on which the Heraion or temple of Hérâ was situated) was indefatigably prosecuted and speedily brought to completion, their allies, both Eleans and Mantinæans, abandoned the tasks respectively allotted to them, in impatience and disgust. The idea of circumvallation being for this reason relinquished, a joint position was left in the new fort at Cape Heraion, after which the allies evacuated the Epidaurian territory.¹

So far the Lacedæmonians appeared to have derived little positive benefit from their late victory; but the fruits of it were soon manifested in the very centre of their enemy's force—at Argos. A material change had taken place since the battle in the political tendencies of that city. There had been within it always an opposition party—*philæ-Læconian* and anti-democratical; and the effect of the defeat at Mantinæa had been to strengthen this party so much as it depressed their opponents. The democratical leaders—who, in conjunction with Athens and Aikibiadês, had aspired to maintain an ascendancy in Peloponnesian hostile and equal, if not superior, to Sparta—now found their calculations overturned and exchanged for the discouraging necessities of self-defence against a victorious enemy. And while these leaders thus lost general influence by so complete a defeat of their foreign policy, the military democratical section of Argos brought back with them from the field of Mantinæa nothing but humiliation and terror of the Lacedæmonian arms. But the chosen Argæan Thousand-captain returned with very different feelings. Victorious over the left wing of their enemies, they had not been narrowly outstrutted in their retreat even by the Lacedæmonian centre. They had thus reaped positive glory,² and doubtless felt contempt for their beaten fellow-citizens. Now it has been already mentioned that these Thousand were men of rich families and the best military age, set apart by the Argæan democracy to

¹ Thucyd. v. 78.

² Aikibiadês (Thucyd. v. 4, 5) expressly notices the credit gained by the Argæan forces of Argos in the battle of Mantinæa, as one main cause of the subsequent revolution—notwithstanding that the Argæans generally were beaten and disgraced, although

superior to Hermion, &c.

An example of contempt entertained by victorious troops over defeated others—contempt is mentioned by Xenophon in his *Hæcæcæ* army under Aikibiadês and Themistoklês, in one of the later years of the Peloponnesian war: see Xenophon, *Hæcæcæ*, l. 5, 12–17.

receive permanent training at the public expense, just at a time when the ambitious views of Argos first began to dawn, after the peace of Nicias. So long as Argos was likely to become or continue the imperial state of Peloponnesus, these Thousand would probably find their dignity sufficiently committed in upholding her as such, and would thus acquiesce in the democratical government. But when the defeat of Mantinea reduced Argos to her own limits, and threw her upon the defensive, there was nothing to counterbalance their natural oligarchical sentiments, so that they became decided opponents of the democratical government in its distress. The oligarchical party in Argos, thus encouraged and reinforced, entered into a conspiracy with the Lacedæmonians to bring the city into alliance with Sparta, as well as to overthrow the democracy.*

As the first step towards the execution of this scheme, the Lacedæmonians, about the end of September, marched out their full force as far as Tegea, thus threatening invasion, and inspiring terror at Argos. From Tegea they sent forward as envoy Lichas, proconsul of the Argives at Sparta, with two alternative propositions: one for peace, which he was instructed to tender and prevail upon the Argives to accept, if he could; another, in case they refused, of a menacing character. It was the scheme of the oligarchical faction first to bring the city into alliance with Lacedæmonia and dissolve the connexion with Athens, before they attempted any innovation in the government. The arrival of Lichas was the signal for them to manifest themselves by strenuously pressing the acceptance of his pacific proposition. But they had to contend against a strong resistance; since Alcibiades, still in Argos, employed his utmost energy to defeat their views. Nothing but the presence of the Lacedæmonian army at Tegea and the general despondency of the people at length enabled them to carry their point, and to procure acceptance of the proposed treaty; which, being already adopted by the Ekklesia at Sparta, was sent ready prepared to Argos, and there sanctioned without alteration. The conditions were substantially as follows:—

* The Argives shall restore the boys whom they have received

† Thucyd. v. 95; Diodor. xii. 62.

as hostages from Orchomenus, and the war-hostages from the Meneia. They shall restore to the Lacedaemonians the men now in Mantinea, whom the Lacedaemonians had placed as hostages for safe custody in Orchomenus, and whom the Argives and Mantinians have carried away from that place. They shall evocate Epidauros, and raise the fort recently erected near it. The Athenians, unless they also forthwith evocate Epidauros, shall be proclaimed as enemies to Lacedaemon as well as to Argos, and to the allies of both. The Lacedaemonians shall restore all the hostages whom they now have in keeping, from whatever place they may have been taken. Regarding the sacrifices alleged to be due to Apollo by the Epidaurians, the Argives will consent to tender to them an oath, which if they swear they shall clear themselves.¹ Every city in Peloponnesus, small or great, shall be autonomous and at liberty to maintain its own ancient constitution. If any extra-Peloponnesian city shall come against Peloponnesus with unchastened projects, Lacedaemon and Argos will take joint counsel against it, in the manner most equitable for the interest of the Peloponnesians generally. The extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be in the same position with reference to this treaty as the allies of Lacedaemon and Argos in Peloponnesus, and shall hold their own in the same manner. The Argives shall show this treaty to their allies, who shall be admitted to subscribe to it, if they think fit. But if the allies desire anything different, the Argives shall send them home about their business."²

Treaty of peace
between
Sparta and
Argos.

¹ *Demost.* v. 19. The text of Thucydides is extremely corrupt, in regard to several words of this clause, though the general sense appears sufficiently certain, that the Lacedaemonians are to be allowed to clear themselves in regard to this demand by an oath. In regard to this particular oath, it seems to have been essential that the oath should be taken by one official party and sworn by the other; perhaps, therefore, either or both of (Thucydides's) conjectures might be preferable to those of.

² In Herodotus, vi. 56, and Aristotle, *Metaph.* i. 2, 4, which Dr. Arnold and other commentators notice in discussion of this practice, we may add the Spartan opinion of the antiquated practice in the procedure of

Roman law, as given by Varro in his *De Re Rustica* (see *Reliquiae Herodoticae*, London, 1833, 183-221, vol. ix. pp. 22-23). It was an oath taken by one (disputing) party to the opposite, to swear that the latter would observe to him (i. e. if taken, it had the effect of a judgment in favour of the seceder). But the Roman lawyers said three such oaths, *triple* and *triple* will regard to this Antiochian dispute, which Varro says were taken with the same propriety.

³ *Demost.* v. 22. Antiochus is not precisely Antiochus, if we call him; it is in fact the king who was present, *king of Antioch*. See Dr. Arnold's note, and Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr. Ant.* vol. iii. p. 241.

Each was the agreement and ready prepared by the Lacedæmonians to Argos, and there literally accepted. It presented a reciprocity little more than nominal, imposing one obligation of no importance upon Sparta; though it answered the purpose of the latter by substantially dissolving the alliance of Argos with its three confederates.

But this treaty was meant by the oligarchical party in Argos only as prelude to a series of ulterior measures. As soon as it was concluded, the menacing army of Sparta was withdrawn from Tegea, and was exchanged for free and peaceful intercourse between the Lacedæmonians and Argives. Probably Alcibiades at the same time retired, while the renewed visits and hospitalities of Lacedæmonians at Argos strengthened the interest of their party more than ever. They were soon powerful enough to persuade the Argolian assembly formally to renounce the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantinea, and to conclude a special alliance with Sparta on the following terms:—

“There shall be peace and alliance for fifty years between the Lacedæmonians and the Argives—upon equal terms—each giving suitable satisfaction, according to its established constitution, to all complaints preferred by the other. On the same condition, also, the other Peloponnesian cities shall partake in this peace and alliance—holding their own territory, laws, and separate constitution. All other Peloponnesian cities of Sparta shall be put upon the same footing as the Lacedæmonians themselves. The cities of Argos shall also be put upon the same footing as Argos herself, holding their own territory undisturbed. Should occasion arise for common military operations on any point, the Lacedæmonians and Argives shall take counsel together, determining in the most equitable manner they can for the interest of their allies. If any one of the cities

Treaty of
alliance
between
Sparta and
Argos—the
signature of
the alliance
of Argos
with
Athens,
Mantinea,
and Elis.

One cannot be certain about the meaning of these two last words, but I think it better that they signify a pecuniary and domestic liability, and not, as I have given in the text. The other have already to say Athens, Elis, and Mantinea; all besides, it includes Sparta. The Lacedæmonians could not well desire admitting these cities upon the same footing as themselves.

but would probably think it equitable to regard them, even with Athens, as they agreed and always.

I rather imagine, too, that this last phrase (on the footing of an ally) was referred to the Argives, and not to the Lacedæmonians; and, the type of the treaty is that of a resolution already taken at Sparta, and sent for approval to Argos.

have modified further with Elia. Being already possessed of Lepreum (through the Boeotian settlers planted there), they perhaps did not wish again to provoke the Eliaans, from fear of being excluded a second time from the Olympic festival.

Meanwhile the conclusion of the alliance with Lacedæmonia, ^{negotiations effected at Argos by the Thebans, in concert with the Lacedæmonians.} (about November or December, 435 B.C.) had still further depressed the popular leaders at Argos. The oligarchical faction, and the chosen regiment of the Thousand, all men of wealth and family, as well as bound together by their common military training, now saw their way clearly to the dissolution of the democracy by force, and to the accomplishment of a revolution. Instigated by such ambitious views, and flattered by the idea of admitted leadership jointly with Sparta, they espoused the new policy of the city with extreme vehemence, and began immediately to multiply conditions of collision with Athens. Joint Lacedæmonian and Argivean envoys were despatched to Thracæ and Macedonia. With the Chalcidians of Thracæ, the revolted subjects of Athens, the old alliance was renewed, and even new engagements concluded; while Perdiccas of Macedonia was urged to renounce his servants with Athens, and join the new confederacy. In that quarter the influence of Argos was considerable; for the Macedonian princes prized very highly their ancient descent from Argos, which constituted them brothers of the Hellenic family. Accordingly Perdiccas consented to the demand and concluded the new treaty; insisting, however, with his habitual duplicity, that the step should for the moment be kept secret from Athens.¹ In further pursuance of the new tone of hostility to that city, joint envoys were also sent thither, to require that the Athenians should quit Peloponnese, and especially that they should evacuate the fort recently erected near Epidauria. It seems to have been held jointly by Argives, Macedonians, Eliaans, and Achæians; and as the latter were only a minority of the whole, the Athenians in the city judged it prudent to send Demosthenes to bring them away. That general not only effected the retreat, but also contrived a stratagem, which gave to it the air almost of an advantage. On his first arrival in the fort, he proclaimed a gymnastic match outside of the gates for the amusement of the whole garrison,

¹ Compare Thucyd. i. 95 and v. 25.

contriving to keep back the Athenians within until all the rest had marched out: then hastily shutting the gates, he remained master of the place.³ Having no intention however of keeping it, he made it over presently to the Spilarchians themselves, with whom he renewed the treaty to which they had been parties jointly with the Locustomonians five years before, two years before the ruin of Sikina.

The mode of proceeding here resorted to by Athens, in respect to the surrender of the fort, seems to have been dictated by a desire to manifest her displeasure against the Argives. This was exactly what the Argian leaders and oligarchical party, on their side, most desired; the breach with Athens had become irremediable, and their plans were now matured for violently subverting their own democracy. They concerted with Sparta a joint military expedition, of 1000 hoplites from each city (the first joint expedition under the new alliance), against Sikyon, for the purpose of introducing more thorough-paced oligarchy into the already oligarchical Sikyonian government. It is possible that there may have been some democratical opposition gradually acquiring strength at Sikyon; yet that city seems to have been, as far as we know, always oligarchical in policy, and positively faithful to Sparta. Probably therefore that joint enterprise against Sikyon was nothing more than a pretext to cover the introduction of 1000 Lacedæmonian hoplites into Argos, whither the joint detachment immediately returned, after the business at Sikyon had been accomplished. Thus reinforced, the oligarchical leaders and the chosen Thousand at Argos put down by force the democratical constitution in that city, slew the democratical leaders, and established themselves in unobscured possession of the government.²

¹The tendency appears to have been not rare where Christian Service changed members by the witness those going out of the gates all together, or most part of them, for some religious festival. See the case of Ipswich, February, I. reported the preliminary suggestions of the military writer, "Notes on the Grenadier called Station-keeping," p. 77.

T. Shoup, P. M. Anderson, and J. H. Anderson, "The effects of the 1990s on the U.S. economy," *Journal of Applied Economics*, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 1-15, 1998.

We are now told that the *Athens* interview took place with the Episcopians; but, I know no trace particularly between them, except the general trace for a year, which the Episcopians never let, in cooperation with sports, Dr. Hall, in the beginning of 1844, etc.

Thymel. 9, 12, und Anacardiaceae
und Juncaceae, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842

This revolution (accomplished about February, B.C. 417)—the result of the victory of Mantineæ and the consummation of a train of policy laid by Sparta—raised her ascendancy in Peloponnesus to a higher and more undisputed point than it had ever before attained. The towns in Achaia were as yet not sufficiently dispirited for her purpose—perhaps since the march of Alcibiades thither two years before—amazingly she now remodelled their governments in conformity with her own views. The new rulers of Argos were subservient to her, not merely from dispirited sympathy, but from need of her aid to keep down internal rising against themselves: so that there was neither enemy, nor even neutral, to counterwork her or to favour Athens, throughout the whole peninsula.

For the Spartan ascendancy at Argos was not destined to last. Though there were many cities in Greece, in which oligarchies long maintained themselves unshaken, through adherence to a traditional routine, and by being usually in the hands of men accustomed to govern—yet an oligarchy erected by force upon the ruins of a democracy was rarely of long duration. The angry discontent of the people, put down by temporary intimidation, usually revived, and threatened the security of the rulers enough to render them suspicious and probably cruel. Such cruelty moreover was not their only fault: they found their emancipation from democratical restraints too tempting to be able to control either their lust or their rapacity. With the population of Argos—comparatively coarse and brutal in all ranks, and more like Thebes than the Athenians—such abuse was partly sure to be speedy as well as flagrant. Especially the chosen regiment of the Thousand—men in the vigour of their age, and proud of their military prowess as well as of their wealthier station—constructed the new oligarchical government which they had helped to erect as a period of individual licence to themselves. The behaviour and fate of their chief, Bryas, illustrate the general character of the troop. After many other outrages against persons of poorer condition, he one day

By the aid of a Thracian mercenary, having seduced his mistress, he was seized and executed. Oligarchy itself was now at an end.

met in the streets a wedding procession, in which the person of the bride captivated his fancy. He caused her to be violently torn from her company, carried her to his house, and possessed himself of her by force. But in the middle of the night, this high-spirited woman, revengeful herself for the outrage by putting out the eyes of the seducer while he was fast asleep;¹ a terrible revenge, which the pointed daggers of the females attire sometimes scalped women² to take upon those who wronged them. Having contrived to make her escape, she found several men among her friends, as well as protection among the people generally, against the indignant efforts of the chosen Thousand to avenge their leader.

From incidents such as this, and from the multitude of petty insults which so flagitious an outrage implies as concomitant, we are not surprised to learn that the Demos of Argos soon recovered their lost courage, and resolved upon an effort to put down their oligarchical oppressors. They waited for the moment when the festival called the *Gymnæpeleia* was in course of being celebrated at Sparta—a festival at which the athletic performances of men and boys were an interlude with Spartan religion as well as bodily training, that the Lacedæmonians would make no military movement until they were finished. At this critical moment, the Argæan Demos rose in insurrection; and after a sharp contest, gained a victory over the oligarchy, some of whom were slain, while others only saved themselves by flight. Even at the first instant of danger, pressing messages had been sent to Sparta for aid. But the Lacedæmonians at first peremptorily refused to move during the period of their festival; nor was it until messenger after messenger had arrived to set forth the pressing necessities of their friends, that they reluctantly put aside their festival to march towards Argos. They were too late: the precious moment had already passed by. They were met at Tegeæ by an intimation that their friends were overthrown, and Argos in possession of the victorious people. Nevertheless, various exiles who had escaped still promised them success, secretly contriving them to proceed; but the Lacedæmonians refused to comply, returned to Sparta, and resumed their accustomed festival.³

¹ *Plutarchus*, l. 10, c. 1.

² *See* *Herodotus*, v. 67; *Plutarch*, *l. 10, c. 1*; *Thucydides*, v. 67; *Herodotus*, xii. 126; and the note of *Stephane*, *ib.*

³ *See* the *IG*, of that drama.

⁴ *Thucydides*, v. 67; *Herodotus*, xii.

Thus was the oligarchy of Argos overthrown—after a continuance of about four months,¹ from February to June, 417 B.C.—and the chosen Thousand-regiment either dissolved or destroyed. The movement excited great sympathy in several Peloponnesian cities,² who were becoming jealous of the exorbitant preponderance of Sparta. Nevertheless the Argive Demos, though victorious within the city, felt so much distress of being able to maintain themselves, that they sent envoys to Sparta to plead their cause and to extort favourable treatment: a pleading which proves the intervention to have been spontaneous, not fomented by Athens. But the envoys of the expelled oligarchs were there to confront them, and the Lacedæmonians, after a long-continued discussion, adjudging the Demos to have been guilty of wrong, prohibited the resolution of sending forces to put them down. Still the habitual selfishness of Lacedæmonian habits prevented any immediate or separate movement. Their allies were to be summoned, none being very anxious to be the ones,—and least of all at this moment, when the period of harvest was at hand: so that about three months intervened before any actual force was brought together.

This important interval was turned to account by the Argive Demos, who, being plainly warned that they were to look on Sparta only as an enemy, immediately renewed their alliance with Athens. Regarding her as their main refuge, they commenced the building of long walls to connect their city with the sea, in order that the road might always be open for supplies and reinforcement from Athens in case they should be confined to their walls by a superior Spartan force. The whole Argive population—men and women, free and slave—set about the work with the utmost ardour; while Alcibiades brought assistance from Athens³—especially skilled masons and carpenters, of whom they stood in much need. The step may probably have been suggested

¹ Diodorus tells us more than 4000 men were slain, but this, if correct at all, must be taken as including from the distance between Sparta and Argos, and not from the direct neighbourhood of the oligarchs. The number of Thurophages does not allow more than four gladiators for the duration of

the siege.

² Thucyd. 2. 25. Argives to the number of 4000, and other Peloponnesians with them.

³ Thucyd. 2. 25. and 2. 26. Argives, Corinthians, and others, and Greeks and others, Argives, 200. Thucyd. 2. 25.

by himself, as it was the case which, two years before, he had urged upon the inhabitants of Patrae. But the construction of walls adequate for defence, along the line of four miles and a half between Argo and the sea,¹ required a long time. Moreover the oligarchical party within the town, as well as the allies without—a party defeated but not annihilated—strongly urged the Lacedaemonians to put an end to the work, and even promised them a counter revolutionary movement in the town as soon as they drew near to sail—*the same intrigue which had been entered into by the oligarchical party at Athens forty years before, when the walls down to Patrae were in course of erection.*² Accordingly about the end of September (417 B.C.), King Agis conducted an army of Lacedaemonians and allies against Argo, drove the population within the city, and destroyed so much of the Long Walls as had been already raised. But the oligarchical party within were not able to realise their expectations of doing us arms, so that he was obliged to retire after merely ravaging the territory and taking the town of Mythe, where he put to death all the freemen who fell into his hands. After his departure, the Argives consolidated their ravages upon the neighbouring territory of Pilae, where the allies from Argo chiefly resided.³

The close neighbourhood of such allies—together with the declared enmity of Sparta, and the continued schemes of the oligarchical party within the walls—kept the Argive democracy in perpetual uneasiness and alarm throughout the winter, in spite of their recent victory and the suppression of the dangerous regiment of a Thousand. To relieve them in part from embarrassment, Alcibiades was despatched thither early in the spring with an Athenian armament and twenty triremes. His friends and guests appear to have been now in ascendancy, as leaders of the democratical government; and in concert with them, he selected 800 marked oligarchical persons, whom he

¹ *Plutarchus*, B. 10, § 4.

² *Thucyd.* i. 102.

³ *Thucyd.* v. 25. *Thucydides* leaves no doubt that the Argives had already built their long walls down to

Mythe—probably, not Argos itself, but Argos, as it is called in the text. The Argives were the principal of the persons named—of whom Alcibiades was a large body and considerable, etc.

hostilities in an indirect manner, so long as each was acting as ally of some third party—nevertheless neither the one nor the other would formally renounce the sworn alliance, nor obliterate the record inscribed on its stone columns. Both parties shrink from proclaiming the real truth, though each half-year brought them a step nearer to it in fact. Thus during the course of the present summer (418 B.C.) the Athenian and Mantinean garrison at Pylos became more active than ever in their incursions on Laconia, and brought home large booty; upon which the Lacedæmonians, though still not renouncing the alliance, publicly proclaimed their willingness to grant what we may call letters of marque, to any one, for privateering against Athenian commerce. The Chalkidians also, on private grounds of quarrel, commenced hostilities against the Athenians.¹ Yet still Sparta and her allies remained in a state of formal peace with Athens: the Athenians resisted all the repeated solicitations of the Argives to induce them to make a landing on any part of Laconia and commit devastation.² Nor was the licence of free intercourse for individuals as yet suspended. We cannot doubt that the Athenians were invited to the Olympic festival of 416 B.C. (the 71st Olympiad), and sent thither their solemn legation along with those of Sparta and other Dorian Greeks.

Now that they had again become allies of Argos, the Athenians probably found out, more fully than they had before known, the intrigue carried on by the former Argolian government with the Mantineian Perdikides. The effects of these intrigues, however, had made themselves felt even earlier in the conduct of that prince, who, having as an ally of Athens engaged to co-operate with an Athenian expedition projected under Nikias for the spring or summer of 417 B.C., against the Chalkidians of Thrace and Amphipolis, now withdrew his concurrence, recoiled from the alliance of Athens, and frustrated the whole scheme of expedition. The Athenians

¹ Thucyd. v. 23.
² Thucyd. vi. 101. A similar alliance that the war was renewed by Athens against Sparta on the persuasion of the Argolians Thuc. iii. 10, c. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.

with Argos was one of the causes of the suspension of war, but only one among others, some of them were general. Thucydides tells us that the presence of Argos to induce Athens to draw up her alliance with Sparta, was repeated and unavailing.

accordingly placed the ports of Macedonia under naval blockade, prohibiting Perikles as enemy.¹

Nearly five years had elapsed since the defeat of Kleon, without any fresh attempt to recover Amphipolis: the project just alluded to appears to have been the first. The proceedings of the Athenians with regard to this important town afford ample proof of that want of wisdom on the part of their leading men, Nikias and Alkibiades, and of erroneous tendencies on the part of the body of the citizens, which we shall gradually find conducting their empire to ruin. Among all their possessions out of Attica, there was none so valuable as Amphipolis: the centre of a great commercial and mining region—situated on a large river and lake which the Athenian navy could readily command—and claimed by them with reasonable justice, since it was their original colony, planted by their wisest statesman Perikles. It had been lost only through supercilious negligence on the part of their generals; and when lost, we should have expected to see the chief energies of Athens directed to the recovery of it; the more so, as, if once recovered, it admitted of being made sure and retained as a future possession. Kleon is the only leading man who at once perceives to his countrymen the important truth that it never can be recovered except by force. He strenuously urges his countrymen to make the requisite military effort, and prevails upon them in part to do so, but the attempt disastrously fails—partly through his own incompetence as commander, whether his overlooking of that duty was a matter of choice or of constraint—partly through the strong opposition and antipathy against him from a large portion of his fellow-citizens, which rendered the military force not hearty in the enterprise. Next, Nikias, Laches, and Alkibiades, all concur in making peace and alliance with the Macedonians, under express promise and purpose to 'procure the restoration of Amphipolis. But after a series of diplomatic proceedings which display as much silly credulity in Nikias as selfish deceit in Alkibiades, the result becomes evident, as Kleon had insisted, that peace will not restore to them Amphipolis, and that it can only be regained by force. The final defeat of Nikias

¹Thucyd. i. 10.

is now conspicuously seen: his increase of character and incapacity of divided or unsteady effort. When he discovered that he had been misinformed by the Lacedæmonian Embassy, and had fatally misdirected his countrymen into making important omissions on the faith of equivalents to come, we might have expected to find him spurred on by indignant repentance for this mistake, and putting forth his own strongest efforts, as well as those of his country, in order to recover those portions of her empire which the peace had promised, but did not restore. Instead of which he exhibits no effective movement, while Alcibiades begins to display the defects of his political character, yet more dangerous than those of Nicias—the passion for glory, pretensions, boundless, and even perfidious ambition. It is only in the year 417 B.C., after the defeat of Marathon had put an end to the political speculations of Alcibiades in the interior of Peloponnesus, that Nicias projects an expedition against Amphipolis; and even then it is projected only contingent upon the aid of Pericles, a prince of notorious perversity. It was not by any half-measures of force that the place could be regained, as the defeat of Kleon had sufficiently proved. We obtain from these proceedings a fair measure of the foreign policy of Athens at this time, during what is called the peace of Nicias, preparing us for that melancholy catastrophe which will be developed in the coming chapters—where she is brought near to ruin by the defects of Nicias and Alcibiades combined; for by singular misfortune, she does not reap the benefit of the good qualities of either.

It was, in one of the three years between 438—435 B.C., though we do not know in which, that the vote of censure took place, arising out of the contention between Miltiades and Alcibiades.¹ The political antagonism between the two having reached a point

Dr. Thidwell (*History of Greece*, vol. III, ch. xxiv, p. 265) places this note of attraction in mid-May or early spring of 445 B.C. following the battle of Coronea.

The grounds for this position are the well-known distinctions called probabilities against utilitarianism, the few examples of which he seems to accept (see his App. II, on that subject, vol. II, p. 294, etc.).

Finally, the more she I feel persuaded that it is a spurious collection of one or two quotations when the time to which it pretends to refer. My reasons for this opinion have been already stated in previous notes. I cannot think that Dr. Thirlwall's *Agreement* is successful in removing the objections against the genuineness of the speech. In my preceding observations here.

of great violence, it was proposed that a vote of ostracism should be taken, and this proposition (probably made by the partisans of Nicias, since Alcibiades was the person most likely to be reputed dangerous) was adopted by the people. Hyperbolus the lamp-maker, son of Cleombia, a speaker of considerable influence in the public assembly, strenuously supported it, hating Nicias not less than Alcibiades. Hyperbolus is named by Aristophanes as having succeeded Kleon in the membership of the ostracism in the *Purga* :¹ if this were true, his supposed demagogic pre-eminence would commence about September, 428 B.C., the period of the death of Kleon. Long before that time, however, he had been among the chief brutes of the comic writers, who ascribe to him the same baseness, dishonesty, impudence, and malignity in accusation as that which they fasten upon Kleon, though in language which seems to imply an inferior idea of his power. And it may be doubted whether Hyperbolus ever succeeded to the same influence as had been enjoyed by Kleon, when we observe that Thucydides does not name him in any of the important debates which took place at and after the peace of Nicias. Thucydides only mentions him once—in 411 B.C., while he was in banishment under sentence of ostracism, and resident at Samos. He terms him "one Hyperbolus, a person of bad character, who had been ostracised, not from fear of dangerous excess of dignity and power, but through his wickedness and his being felt as a disgrace to the city."² This sentence of Thucydides is really the only evidence against Hyperbolus; for it is not less unjust in his case than in that of Kleon to die the fate and blame of comedy as if they were as much authentic fact and trustworthy criticism. It was at Samos that Hyperbolus was slain by the oligarchical conspirators who were aiming to overthrow the democracy at Athens. We have no particular facts respecting him to enable us to test the general character given by Thucydides.

¹ Aristophanes, *Purga*, 695.
² Thucyd., *lib. vi.* Thucydides is
 of course the strongest evidence
 against the demagogic pre-eminence
 of Hyperbolus, as he mentions him
 once in his history, 411 B.C., and
 nowhere else.

According to Aristophanes, *lib. vi.*,
 Thucydides is the strongest
 evidence against Hyperbolus, as
 he mentions him once in his
 history, 411 B.C., and nowhere
 else.

At the time when the resolution was adopted at Athens to take a vote of ostracism, suggested by the political discussion between Nicias and Alcibiades, about twenty-four years had elapsed since a similar vote had been resorted to; the last example having been that of Pericles and Thucydides,¹ sons of Miltiades, the latter of whom was ostracised about 444 B.C.

*Quoted
verbatim
of the
original
in the
Demosthenic
edition
above.*

The democratic constitution had become sufficiently conformed to human nature, the necessity for ostracism as a safeguard against individual usurpers; moreover, there was now full confidence in the numerous *Dikasteries* as competent to deal with the greatest of such criminals, thus obviating the necessity as conceived in man's mind, not less than the real necessity, for such precautionary intervention. Under such a state of things, altered reality as well as altered feeling, we are not surprised to find that the vote of ostracism now invoked, though we do not know the circumstances which immediately preceded it, ended in an abuse, or rather in a sort of parody, of the ancient preventive. At a moment of intense heat of party dispute, the friends of Alcibiades probably accepted the challenge of Nicias and concurred in supporting a vote of ostracism, each hoping to get rid of the opponent. The vote was accordingly decreed, but before it actually took place, the passions of both changed their views, preferring to let the political discussion proceed without closing it by separating the contestants. But the ostracising vote, having been formally pronounced, could not now be prevented from taking place: it was always, however, perfectly general in its form, admitting of any citizen being selected for temporary banishment. Accordingly the two opposing parties, each divided including various clubs or *hetairiai*, and, according to some accounts, the friends of Pericles also, united to urge the

¹ It might properly be said, the last example being resorted to in the dispute between Nicias and Alcibiades, to show an error, contradiction and want of general position Pericles and Thucydides, whose names are given. There had been one instance of ostracism previously; Miltiades and Pericles, the former's father, nephew, and successor at Persia. The political enemies of Pericles proposed

that Themis should be ostracised, a citizen before the Peloponnesian war (Plutarch, Pericles, 4. 4). This was a Greek name and a parody of the ostracism vote in its principle. We have not here it was thought should not be altogether shut out a suggestion that Themis was sentenced to banishment, as a consequence either of failure of war apparently to an opponent—not defended at all.

vote against some one else. They fixed upon a man whom all of them jointly disliked—Hypobolus.¹ By thus concurring, they obtained a sufficient number of votes against him to pass the sentence which sent him into temporary banishment. But such a result was in no one's contemplation when the vote was desired to take place, and Plutarch even represents the people as clapping their hands at it as a good joke. It was generally recognized by every one, seemingly even by the enemies of Hypobolus, as a gross abuse of the constitution. And the language of Thucydides himself distinctly implies this; for if we even grant that Hypobolus fully deserved the censure which that historian bestows, no one could treat his presence as dangerous to the commonwealth; nor was the constitution introduced to meet law-dishonesty or wickedness. It was, even before, passing out of the political morality of Athens; and this sentence consummated its extinction, so that we never hear of it as employed afterwards. It had been extremely valuable in earlier days as a security to the growing democracy against individual usurpation of power, and against dangerous exaggeration of rivalry between individual leaders; but the democracy was now strong enough to dispense with such exceptional protection. Yet if Alcibiades had returned as victor from Syracuse, it is highly probable that the Athenians would have had no other means than the precautionary antidote of ostracism to save themselves from him as despot.

It was in the beginning of summer, 416 B.C., that the Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Doric island of Milo²—one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thira, which was not already included in their empire. Milo and Thira were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with Athens; but at the same time, neither had they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground of complaint, nor did she land

¹Plutarch, *Alcibiades* c. 31; Plutarch, *Milo* c. 2. Thucydides says that the object of ostracism was not the removal of a man, but the removal of a man's name from the public list of names.

²Milo, but before Plutarch and Alcibiades.

The position of Milo and Thira may well have included all three.

³Thucyd. ii. 15.

and attacked them in the sixth year of the recent war. She now recovered her attempt, sending against the island a considerable force under Kleombrotus and Thion: thirty Athenian triremes, with six Chians, and two Lesbian—1500 Athenian hoplites, and 1800 hoplites from the allies—with 300 horsemen and twenty horse-bowmen. These officers, after disembarking their forces, and taking position, sent envoys into the city summoning the government to surrender, and to become a subject-city of Athens.

It was a practice frequent, if not universal, in Greece—even in governments not professedly democratised—to discuss propositions for peace or war before the assembly of the people. But on the present occasion the Median leaders departed from this practice, admitting the envoys only to a private conversation with their executive council. Of the conversation which passed

Thucydides
and *Herodotus*
by *Thucydides*,
however the
Athenian
envoys and
the Median
council of
Miles.

Thucydides professes to give a detailed and elaborate account—at surprising length, considering his general brevity. He sets down thirteen distinct observations, with as many replies, interchanged between the Athenian envoys and the Medians, no one of these separately long, and some very short; but the dialogue carried on is dramatic and very impressive. There is, indeed, every reason for concluding that what we have read in Thucydides is in the larger proportion his own, and in smaller proportion authentic report, than any of the other speeches which he professes to set down. For this was not a public harangue, in respect to which he might have had the opportunity of consulting the recollection of many different persons: it was a private conversation, wherein three or four Athenians, and perhaps ten or a dozen Medians, may have taken part. Now, as all the Median prisoners of military age, and certainly all those leading citizens then in the town who had conducted this interview, were slain immediately after the capture of the town, there remained only the Athenian envoys through whose report Thucydides could possibly have heard what really passed. That he did hear, either from or through them, the general character of what passed, I make no doubt; but there is no ground for believing that he received from them anything like the consecutive stream of debate, which, together with part of the

Melania reply, that (justifying all appeal to justice and speaking only of what was expedient) they hold it to be even expedient for Athens not to break down the common moral maxims of mankind, but to permit that equity and justice shall still remain as a refuge for men in trouble, with some indulgence even towards those who may be unable to make out a case of full and strict right. Most of all was this the interest of Athens herself, inasmuch as her ruin, if it ever occurred, would be cruel both as punishment to herself and as losses to others. "We are not afraid of that (rejoined the Athenians) even if our empire should be overthrown. It is not imperial cities like Sparta who deal harshly with the conquered. Moreover, our present contest is not undertaken against Sparta.—It is a contest to determine whether subjects shall by their own attack prevail over their rulers. This is a risk for us to judge of: in the meantime, let us remind you that we come here for the advantage of our own empire; and that we are now speaking with a view to your safety—wishing to get you under our empire without trouble to ourselves, and to preserve you for the mutual benefit of both of us." "Cannot you leave us alone, and let us be your friends instead of enemies, but neither allies of you nor of Sparta?" said the Melians. "No (is the reply)—your friendship does us more harm than your enmity: your friendship is a proof of our weakness in the eyes of our subject allies—your enmity will give a demonstration of our power."¹ "But do your subjects really take such a measure of equity as to put us, who have no sort of connexion with you, on the same footing with themselves, most of whom are your own colonists, while many of them have even revolted from you and been reconquered?" "They do; for they think that both one and the other have fair ground for claiming independence, and that if you are left independent, this arises only from your power and from our fear to attack you. So that your submission will not only enlarge our empire, but strengthen our security throughout the whole; especially as you are islanders and feeble islanders too, while we are lords of the sea."² "But surely that very circumstance is in other ways a protection to you, as evincing your moderation; for if you attack us, you will at once alarm all neutrals, and convert them into enemies."³ "We are in little fear of continental cities, who

are out of our reach and not likely to take part against us, but only of islanders, either yet unincorporated in our empire, like you, or already in our empire and discontented with the constitution which it imposes. It is such islanders also, by their ill-judged slowness, are likely, with their eyes open, to bring both us and themselves into peril." "We know well (said the Melians, after some other observations had been interchangeably) how terrible it is to contend against your superior power and your good fortune; nevertheless, we trust that in point of fortune we shall receive fair treatment from the gods, since we stand upon grounds of right against injustice; and as to our inferior power, we trust that the deficiency will be made up by our city spirits, whose kindred men will compel her from very shame to aid us." "We too (replied the Athenians) think that we shall not be worse off than others in regard to the divine favour. For we neither advance any claim, nor do any act, over-passing that which men believe is owed to the gods and which is owed to themselves. What we believe about the gods is the same as that which we see to be the practice of men: the impulse of nature inclines them of necessity to rule over what is inferior in force to themselves. This is the principle on which we now proceed—not having been the first either to lay it down or to follow it, but finding it established and likely to continue for ever, and knowing well, too, that you or others in our position would do as much. As for your expectations from the Lacedæmonians, founded on the disgrace of their remaining deaf to your call, we anticipate you on your innocent simplicity, but we at the same time deprecate such foolishness. For the Lacedæmonians are indeed most students of excellence in regard to themselves and their own national customs. But looking at their behaviour towards others, we often readily, and can prove by many examples of their history, that they are of all men the most conspicuous in construing what is pleasing as if it were honourable, and what is expedient as if it were just. Now that is not the state of mind which you require, to square with your desperate calculations of safety."

After various other observations interchangeably in a similar tenor, the Athenians ceased, strenuously urging upon the Melians to reconsider the matter more cautiously among themselves, with-

draw, and after a certain interval were recalled by the Median council to hear the following words:—"We hold to the same opinion, as at first, men of Athens. ^{Refused at the opening blockade.} We shall not surrender the independence of a city which has already stood for 700 years: we shall not make an effort to save ourselves, relying on that favourable fortune which the gods have hitherto vouchsafed to us, as well as upon old iron men, and especially from the Lacedæmonians. We request that we may be considered as your friends, but as hostile to another party; and that you will leave the island after concluding such a truce as may be mutually acceptable." "Well said the Athenians answered, you alone seem to consider future contingencies as clearer than the facts before your eyes, and to look at an uncertain distance through your own wisdom, as if it were present reality. You have staked your all upon the Lacedæmonians, upon fortune, and upon fond hopes; and with your all you will come to ruin."

The siege was forthwith commenced. A wall of circumvallation, distributed in portions among the different sides of Athens, was constructed round the town, which was ^{surrounded and occupied} left under full blockade both by sea and land, while the rest of the army retired home. The town remained blocked up for several months. During the course of that time the besieged made two successful sallies, which afforded them some temporary relief, and forced the Athenians to send an additional detachment under Philocrates. At length the provisions within were exhausted; plots for betrayal commenced among the Medians themselves, so that they were constrained to surrender at discretion. The Athenians resolved to put to death all the men of military age, and to sell the women and children as slaves. This the proposer of this barbarous resolution was Theodides does not say; but Ptolemy and others inform us that Alcibiades¹ was vigorous in supporting it. Five hundred Athenian officers were subsequently sent thither, to form a new community; apparently not as slaves, or sub-judges of Athens, but as new Medians.²

¹ Ptolemy, *Alcibiades*, c. 16. This is probably one of the expedients which the emperor of the Division of Macedonia applied Alcibiades found

correct in respect to the conduct of the latter general. 166. Now is there any reason for supposing the truth of it.

² Theophrastus, c. 166. It is possible some

Taking the proceedings of the Athenians towards Miloë from the beginning to the end, they form one of the grossest and most incredible pieces of cruelty combined with injustice which Grecian history presents to us. In appreciating the cruelty of such wholesale executions, we ought to recollect that the laws of war placed the prisoners altogether at the disposal of his conqueror, and that an Athenian prisoner, if captured by the Corinthians in Syracuse, Sicily, or elsewhere, would naturally have undergone the same fate, unless in so far as they might be kept for exchange. But the treatment of the Miloëans goes beyond all rigour of the laws of war; for they had never been at war with Athens, nor had they done anything to incur her enmity. Moreover the acquisition of the island was of no material value to Athens; not sufficient to pay the expenses of the armament employed in its capture. And while the gain was thus in every sense slender, the shock to Grecian feeling by the whole proceeding seems to have contained serious mischief to Athens. Far from tending to strengthen her entire empire, by sweeping in this small insular population who had hitherto been neutral and harmless, it raised nothing but odium against her, and was treasured up in after times as among the first of her misdeeds.

To gratify her pride of empire, by a new conquest—easy to effect, though of small value—was doubtless her chief motive; probably also strengthened by pique against Sparta, between whom and herself a thoroughly hostile feeling subsisted, and by a desire to humiliate Sparta through the Miloëans. This passion for new acquisition, superseding the more reasonable hopes of recovering the lost portions of her empire, will be seen in the coming chapters breaking out with still more fatal predominance.

Both these two points, it will be observed, are prominently marked in the dialogue as both by Thucydides. I have already stated that this dialogue can hardly represent what actually passed, except as to a few general points, which the historian has followed out

degrees, besides an increase in the number of prisoners. Thucydides, indeed, states distinctly in the sequel that the bulk of the prisoners (Thucyd. *Miloë*, ii. 1, 15) were therefore most cruelly treated.

or must have been stated, or some of the cruelties and wrongs told us above at the time of the capture, must have been unknown or disconnected from reality.

of Thucydides will suggest to us the explanation of this dream, with its powerful and magical effect. The capture of Milea comes immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which was received upon them or four months afterwards, and despatched during the course of the following summer. That expedition was the gigantic effort of Athens, which ended in the most ruinous catastrophe known to ancient history.

Thus when it is spoken in the dream of the capture of Milea, it is the capture of Syracuse.

From such a blow it was impossible for Athens to recover. Though crippled, indeed, she struggled against its effects with surprising energy; but her fortune went on, in the main, declining—yet with occasional moments of apparent restoration—until her complete prostration and subjugation by Lysander. Now Thucydides, just before he gets upon the plane of this descending progress, makes a halt, to illustrate the sentiment of Athenian power in its most exaggerated, insolent, and cruel manifestation, by his dramatic fragment of the survey at Milea. It will be recollected that Herodotus, when about to describe the forward march of Xerxes into Greece, destined to terminate in such fatal humiliation, impresses his readers with an elaborate idea of the monarch's insolence and superhuman pride by various conversations between him and the warriors about him, as well as by other anecdotes, combined with the overwhelming specifications of the master at Deriakes. Such moral contrasts and juxtapositions, especially that of ruinous reverses following upon overwhelming good fortune, were highly interesting to the Greek mind. And Thucydides—having before him an act of great injustice and cruelty on the part of Athens, committed exactly at this point of time—has availed himself of the form of dialogue, for ease in his history, to bring out the sentiments of a disaffected and confident conspirator in dramatic antithesis. They are however his own sentiments, conceived as suitable to the situation; not those of the Athenian enemy—still less, those of the Athenian public—least of all, those of that much calumniated class of men, the Athenian sophists.

CHAPTER LVII.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE
SELUSTIAN DYNASTY.

In the preceding chapters, I have brought down the general history of the Peloponnesian war to the time immediately preceding the memorable Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which changed the whole face of the war. At this period, and for some time to come, the history of the Peloponnesian Greeks becomes intimately blended with that of the Sicilian Greeks. But hitherto the connexion between the two has been merely occasional, and of little reciprocal effect; so that I have thought it for the convenience of the reader to keep the two streams entirely separate, omitting the proceedings of Athens in Sicily during the first ten years of the war. I now proceed to fill up this blank; to recount as much as can be made out of Sicilian events during the interval between 415—413 B.C.; and to assign the successive steps whereby the Athenians entangled themselves in ambitious projects against Syracuse, until they at length came to stake the larger portion of their force upon that fatal hazard.

The extinction of the Selustian dynasty at Syracuse¹ followed by the expulsion or retirement of all the other despots throughout the island, left the various Grecian cities to re-organise themselves in free and self-constituted governments. Unfortunately our memorials respecting this revolution are extremely scanty; but there is enough to indicate that it was something much more than a change from single-headed to popular government. It indicated, further, transfers on the largest

¹ See above, ch. xliii., for the history of these events. I now take up the thread from this chapter.

Sicily a feeling of local instability, very different from the long traditional tenure in Peloponnesus and Attica, and troubled by foreign machins among the elements of its weakness.¹ The wonder indeed rather is, that such real and powerful causes of disorder were soon so effectively controlled by the popular governments, that the half-century now approaching was decidedly the most prosperous and undisturbed period in the history of the island.

The southern coast of Sicily was occupied (beginning from the westward) by Selinus, Agrigenton, Gela, and Kamarina. Then came Syracuse, possessing the south-eastern cape, and the southern portion of the eastern coast: next, on the eastern coast, Leontini, Katina, and Naxos: Messini, on the coast adjoining Italy. The centre of the island, and even much of the northern coast, was occupied by the non-Hellenic Sikels and Sikanes; on this coast Himera was the only Grecian city. Between Himera and Cape Lilybaeus, the western corner of the island was occupied by the non-Hellenic cities of Egesta and Eryx, and by the Carthaginian seaports, of which Panormus (Palermo) was the principal.

Of these various Grecian cities, all independent, Syracuse was the first in power, Agrigenton the second. The causes above noticed, disrupting the first commencement of popular governments in all of them, were most powerfully operative at Syracuse. We do not know the particulars of the democratical constitution which was there established, but its stability was threatened by more than one ambitious pretender, eager to seize the sceptre of Gela and Himera. The most prominent among these pretenders was Tyrindarion, who employed a considerable fortune in distributing largesses and procuring partisans among the poor. His political designs were so largely so openly manifested, that he was brought to trial, condemned, and put to death: yet not without an abortive insurrection of his partisans to rescue him. After several leading citizens had tried and failed in a similar manner, the people thought it expedient to pass a law similar to the Athenian *ostracism*, authorizing the infliction of temporary preventive banishment.² Under this law several

Political power and authority of the Sicilian cities. Political institutions of Syracuse. Character tried and abandoned.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 15.

² Thucyd. vi. 54, 55. The institution

of *Ostracism* was called the *prothesis*, because, in taking the vote, the magis-

powerful citizens were actually and speedily banished; and such was the abuse of the new engine by the political parties in the city, that men of conspicuous position are said to have become afraid of meddling with public affairs. Thus put in practice, the institution is said to have given rise to new political contentions not less violent than those which it checked, inasmuch that the Syracusans found themselves obliged to repeal the law not long after its introduction. We should have been glad to learn some particulars concerning this political experiment, beyond the vague abstract given by Dio Cassius—and especially to know the precautionary measures by which the application of the ostracising sentence was restrained at Syracuse. Perhaps no care was taken to copy the checks and formalities provided by Kleisthenes at Athens. Yet under all circumstances, the institution, though tardy if reserved for its proper emergencies, was eminently open to abuse, so that we have no reason to wonder that abuse occurred, especially at a period of great violence and discord. The wonder rather is, that it was so little abused at Athens.

Although the ostracism (or *petalism*) at Syracuse was speedily discontinued, it may probably have left a salutary impression behind, so far as we can judge from the fact that new pretensions to despotism are not hereafter mentioned. The republic increases in wealth and manifests an energetic action in foreign affairs. The Syracusan admiral Phagfius was despatched with a powerful fleet to repress the pirates of the Tyrrhenian maritime towns, and after ravaging the island of Elba, returned home, under the regretted of having been brought off by bribes from the enemy, when attention he was tried and banished—a second fleet of sixty triremes under Apollis being sent to the same regions. The new admiral not only plundered many parts of the Tyrrhenian coast, but also carried his ravages into the island of Corsica (at that time a Tyrrhenian possession), and reduced the island of Elba completely. His return was signalled by a large number of captives and a rich booty.¹

Meanwhile the great aristocratic revolutions, among the Grecian cities in Sicily, had raised a new spirit among the chiefs of the

Power and
despotism in
Syracuse.

See also.

of the citizens intended to be banished
was written upon a list of olive, instead

of a shell or petaloid.
Thucyd. vi. 55, 56.

interior, and inspired the Sikel prince Iphitos, a man of spirit and ability, with large ideas of aggrandizement. Many wild Greeks having probably sought service with him, it was either by their suggestion, or from having himself caught the spirit of Hellenic improvement, that he renounced the plan of bringing the petty Sikel communities into something like city-life and collective co-operation. Having acquired glory by the capture of the Greek town of Mangastis, he induced all the Sikel communities (with the exception of Hythia) to enter into a sort of federative compact. Next, in order to obtain a central point for the new organization, he transferred his own little town from the hilltop, called *Mama*, down to a convenient spot of the neighbouring plain, near to the sacred precinct of the gods called *Palki*.¹ As the veneration paid to these gods, determined in part by the striking volcanic manifestations in the neighbourhood, rendered this plain a suitable point of attraction for Sikels generally, Iphitos was enabled to establish a considerable new city of *Palki*, with walls of large circumference, and an ample range of adjacent land which he distributed among a numerous Sikel population, probably with some Greeks intermingled.

The powerful position which Iphitos had thus acquired is attested by the aggressive character of his measures, intended gradually to recover a portion at least of that ground which the Greeks had appropriated at the expense of the indigenous population. The Sikel town of *Ennesia* had been seized by the Illyrian Greeks expelled from *Alma*, and had received from them the name of *Alma*.² Iphitos now found means to reconquer it, after assuming by stratagem the leading magistrature. He was next bold enough to invade the territory of the Agrigentine, and to besiege one of their country garisons called *Matyrea*. We are

¹ *Strabo*, vi. 75, 85, 86. The position of *Palki* is illustrated by the description of Ennesia in the *Strabo*, vi. 75.

² *Strabo* vi. 75, 85, 86. See also *Strabo* vi. 75.

³ *Strabo* vi. 75, 85, 86. See also *Strabo* vi. 75.

⁴ *Strabo* vi. 75, 85, 86. See also *Strabo* vi. 75.

⁵ *Strabo* vi. 75, 85, 86. See also *Strabo* vi. 75.

impressed with a high idea of his power when we learn that the Agrigentines, while marching to relieve the place, thought it necessary to invoke aid from the Syracuseans, who sent to them a fleet under Dabotus. Over this united force Dabotus gained a victory—in consequence of the treason or cowardice of Bofion, as the Syracuseans believed—insomuch that they condemned him to death. In the succeeding year, however, the good fortune of the Sicilian prince changed. The united army of these two powerful cities raised the Mochada of Motyru, completely defeated him in the field, and dispersed all his forces. Finding himself deserted by his comrades and even on the point of being betrayed, he took the desperate resolution of casting himself upon the mercy of the Syracuseans. His sale off by night to the gates of Syracuse, entered the city unknown, and sat down as a suppliant on the altar in the open, surrendering himself together with all his territory. A spectacle thus unexpected brought together a crowd of Syracuse citizens, existing in them the strongest emotions; and when the magistrates convened the assembly for the purpose of deciding his fate, the voice of mercy was found predominant, in spite of the contrary recommendations of some of the political leaders. The most respected among the older citizens—earnestly recommending mild treatment towards a foe thus fallen and suppliant, coupled with scrupulous regard not to bring upon the city the avenging hand of Nemesis—found their appeal to the generous sentiment of the people welcomed by one unanimous cry of "Save the suppliant!"¹ Dabotus, withdrawn from the altar, was sent off to Corinth under his engagement to live there quietly for the future, the Syracuseans providing for his comfortable maintenance.

Around the cruddy habitant in ancient warfare, this remarkable incident excites mingled surprise and admiration. Doubtless the instant impulse of the people mainly arose from their seeing Dabotus actually before them in suppliant posture at their altar, instead of being called upon to determine his fate in his absence—just as the Athenian people were in like manner moved by the actual sight of the captive Darius, and inclined to spare his life, on an

extreme
beyond his
power and
patience to
hold.

¹ Diod. xi. 22, 23. "O δὲ πρὸς αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος ἀφῆκεν αὐτὸν ὁ λαός."

at first not thoroughly democratical, the principal authority residing in a large Senate of One Thousand members. We are told even that an ambitious class of citizens were striving at the re-establishment of a despotism, when Pericles, availing himself of wealth and high position, took the lead in a popular opposition; so as not only to defeat this intrigue, but also to put down the Senate of One Thousand and render the government completely democratical. His influence over the people was enhanced by the vein of mysticism and pretence to visions and divine endowments which accompanied his philosophical speculations, in a manner similar to Pythagoras.¹ The same combination of rhetoric with metaphysical speculation appears also in Gorgias of Leontini, whose celebrity as a teacher throughout Greece was both greater and earlier than that of any one else. It was a similar demand for popular speaking in the assembly and the jelliotures which gave encouragement to the rhetorical teachers Thias and Korax at Syracuse.

In such state of material prosperity, popular politics, and intellectual activity, the Sicilian towns were found at the breaking out of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy in 431 B.C. In that struggle the Italian and Sicilian Greeks had no direct concern, nor anything to fear from the ambition of Athens; who, though she had founded Thurii in 444 B.C., appears to have never aimed at any political ascendancy even over that town, much less anywhere else on the coast. But the Sicilian Greeks, though forming a system apart in their own island, from which it suited the dominant policy of Syracuse to exclude all foreign interference,² were yet connected by sympathy, and on one side even by alliance, with the two main streams of Hellenic politics. Among the allies of Sparta were numbered all or most of the Dorian cities of Sicily—Syracuse, Kamarina, Gela, Agrigento, Selinus, perhaps Himera and Messana—together with Lokri and Tarentum in Italy: among the allies of Athens, perhaps, the

Sicilian cities, their position and sympathies in the first breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, 431 B.C.

¹ Hecataeus, *loc. cit.* 221-2; Herodotus, *loc. cit.* 221; Diodorus, *loc. cit.* 221; Strabo, *loc. cit.* 221; Pausanias, *loc. cit.* 221; Thucydides, *loc. cit.* 221.

² Thucydides, *loc. cit.* 221. This is the

name of the speech delivered by Pericles at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. The language is remarkable for its calmness and moderation.

(Chalcidæ or Ionic Rhagium in Italy.)¹ Whether the Ionic cities in Sicily—Syracæ, Katana, and Leontini—were at this time united with Athens by any special treaty is very doubtful. But if we examine the state of politics prior to the breaking out of the war, it will be found that the connexion of the Sicilian cities on both sides with Central Greece was rather one of sympathy and tendency than of pronounced obligation and action. The Dorian Sicilians, though doubtful during the antipathy of the Peloponnesian Dorians to Athens, had never been called upon for any co-operation with Sparta; nor had the Ionic Sicilians yet learned to look to Athens for protection against their powerful neighbour, Syracuse.

It was the memorable quarrel between Corinth and Eorkyra, and the intervention of Athens in that quarrel (B.C. 435-433), which brought the Sicilian parties one step nearer to co-operation in the Peloponnesian quarrel, in two different ways; first, by exciting the most violent anti-Athenian war-spirit in Corinth, with whom the Sicilian Dorians held their chief commerce and sympathy—next, by providing a basis for the action of Athenian maritime force in Italy and Sicily, which would have been impracticable without an established footing in Eorkyra. But Ptolemy (whom most historians have followed) is mistaken, and is contradicted by Thucydides, when he ascribes to the Athenians at this time ambitious projects in Sicily of the nature of those which they came to conceive seven or eight years afterwards. At the outbreak, and for some years before the outbreak, of the war, the

Relations
of Sicily to
Athens and
Corinth—
alluded to
in the quarrel
between
Corinth and
Eorkyra
and the
interven-
tion of
Athens.

¹ The inscription in Bonaldi's *Cronaca Siciliana*, Vol. IV. Part I. p. 123, relating to the alliance between Athens and Rhagium, contains little certain information. Bonaldi refers it to a covenant concluded in the archiepiscopate of Agathias at Athens (B.C. 391, A.D. 95-96), the year before the Peloponnesian war; receiving an addition which was given them in old date. But it appears to me that the supposition of a covenant is only too very conjecture; and even the name of the archiepiscopate, which he has restored by a fanciful conjecture, was hardly to be considered as certain.

If we could believe the story in Justin, B.C. Rhagium would have allied to its Ionic brethren the Peloponnesian war. But that is a mistake; that is a mistake of Rhagium, one of the parties cited by Justin as from Athens. That Rhagium allies, having that destroyed the parties against whom they were divided, and separated the friends who had divided them—"and Rhagium will become independent." They turned the Rhagium women, and asked the city for assistance.

I do not know what is made of this story, which neither appears quoted in Thucydides, nor seems to accord with what he tells us.

here, as elsewhere, she was then on the offensive, and Athens only on the defensive. Probably the Corinthians had encouraged the expectation of ample reinforcements from Syracuse and the neighbouring towns—a hope which must have contributed largely to the confidence with which they began the struggle. What were the causes which prevented it from being realized, we are not distinctly told; and we find Hermocrates, the Syracusan, reproaching his countrymen fifteen years afterwards (immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse) with their antipathy against Sparta.¹ But it is easy to see that, as the Sicilian Greeks had no direct interest in the contest—neither wrongs to avenge nor dangers to apprehend from Athens, nor any hope of obviating requisitions from Sparta—as they might naturally content themselves with expressions of sympathy and promises of aid in case of need, without taking themselves to the enormous extent which it pleased Sparta to impose, for purposes both aggressive and purely Peloponnesian. Perhaps the leading men in Syracuse, from attachment to Corinth, may have sought to act upon the order. But no similar motive would be found operative either at Agrigento or at Gela or Selinus.

Though the order was not executed, however, there can be little doubt that it was publicly announced and threatened, thus becoming known to the Ionic cities in Sicily as well as to Athens; and that it weighed materially in determining the latter afterwards to assist those cities, when they sent to invoke her aid. Instead of dispatching their forces to Peloponnesus, where they had nothing to gain, the Sicilian Dorians preferred attacking the Ionic cities in their own island, whose territory they might have reasonable hopes of conquering and appropriating—Naxos, Katana, and Leontini. These cities doubtless sympathized with Athens in her struggle against Sparta; yet, far from being strong enough to assist her or to threaten their Dorian neighbours, they were unable to defend themselves without Athenian aid. They were assisted by the Dorian city of Kasos, which was shielded by the powerful border city Syracuse, and by Rhegium in Italy; while Lokoi in Italy, the bitter enemy of Rhegium,

¹ Thucyd. vi. 80; compare iii. 82.

sided with Syracuse against them. In the fifth summer of the war, finding themselves blockaded by sea and confined to their walls, they sent to Athens, both to entreat succour as allies¹ and to state, and to represent that if Syracuse succeeded in crushing them, she and the other Dorians in Sicily would forthwith send over the positive aid which the Peloponnesians had so long been taunting. The eminent rhetor, Gorgias of Leontini, whose peculiar style of speaking is said to have been new to the Athenian assembly, and to have produced a powerful effect, was at the head of this embassy. It is certain that this rhetor procured for himself numerous pupils and large gains not merely in Athens, but in many other towns of Central Greece,² though it is exaggeration to ascribe to his pleading the success of the present application.

Now, the Athenians had a real interest as well in protecting these Ionic Sicilians from being conquered by the Dorians in the island as in obstructing the transport of Sicilian corn to Peloponnesus; and they sent twenty triremes under Laches and Charonides, with instructions, while accomplishing these objects, to ascertain the possibility of going beyond the defensive, and making conquests. Taking station at Rhegium, Laches did something towards relieving the Ionic cities in part from their maritime blockade, and even undertook an abortive expedition against the Lipari isles, which were in alliance with Syracuse.³ Throughout the ensuing year he pressed the war in the neighbourhood of Rhegium and Messini, his colleague Charonides being slain. Attacking Myla, in the Messinian territory, he was fortunate enough to gain so decisive an advantage over the troops of Messini, that that city itself capitulated to him, gave hostages, and enrolled itself as ally of Athens and the Ionic cities.⁴

n. c. 47.

The Ionic cities in Sicily entreat Athens to send them aid from the fleet—first, to disengage themselves from the blockade, and then to attack the Lipari isles.

n. c. 48.

¹ Thucyd. v. 26.
² Thucyd. ii. 39; Isæus, vii. 41; Platon, *Alleg.* p. 280 B. It is not probable that Thucydides thought he could count much probability of having been among the pupils of Gorgias, unless he admitted of that rhetor generally raising the masses. Isæus probably copied from Isæmus, the pupil of Isæus. Among the writers

of the last century stand the persons of distinguished names, and their repeated political influence, secured by such close ties in the education of Thucydides. Platonius (l. c. 26) speaks of Thucydides as having been among the troops in this celebrated battle.

³ Thucyd. ii. 32; Isæus, vii. 41.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 32; vi. 4.

He also contracted an alliance with the non-Hellenic city of Egesta, in the north-west portion of Sicily, and he invaded the territory of Lokri, capturing one of the country forts on the river Hales;¹ after which, in a second despatchment, he defeated a Lokrian detachment under Prokoma. But he was unsuccessful in an expedition into the interior of Sicily against Inessa. This was a native Etruscan township, held in vassalage by a Syracusan garrison in the acropolis, which the Athenians vainly attempted to storm, being repulsed with loss.² Laskis concluded his operations in the autumn by an ineffective incursion on the territory of Himera, and on the Lipari Isles. On returning to Rhegium at the beginning of the ensuing year (B.C. 459), he found Pythokleus already arrived from Athens to supersede him.³

That officer had come as the foreman of a more considerable expedition, intended to arrive in the spring under ^{expedition} Karpusodon and Epiphantos, who were to command in ^{command} conjunction with himself. The Ionian cities in Sicily, finding the squadron, under Laskis insufficient to master them a warlike for their enemies at sea, had been entreated to send a naval embassy to Athens, with request for further reinforcements—at the same time making increased efforts to enlarge their own naval force. It happened that at this moment the Athenians had no special employment elsewhere for their fleet, which they desired to keep in constant practice. They accordingly resolved to send to Sicily forty additional triremes, in full hope of bringing the contest to a speedy close.⁴

Early in the ensuing spring, Karpusodon and Epiphantos started ^{a.d. 459.} from Athens for Sicily in command of this squadron, with instructions to afford relief at Eorkyra in their way, and with Demosthenes on board to act on the coast of Peloponnesus. It was this fleet which, in conjunction with the land force under the command of Kleon, making a descent almost by accident on the Lacedæmonian holdings in Sphakteria.⁵ But the fleet was so long occupied, that in the blockade of that island, sent in

¹ Thucyd. II. 10. ² Thucyd. II. 105. ³ Thucyd. II. 116.

⁴ Thucyd. II. 115.

⁵ See II. 21.

operations at Euboea, that it did not reach Sylla until about the month of September.¹

Such delay, evidently advantageous for Athens generally, was fatal to her hopes of success in Sylla during the whole summer. For Pythodorus, acting only with the fleet previously commanded by Lachis at Rhagium, was not merely defeated in a descent upon Lokri, but experienced a more irreparable loss by the result of Menedot, which had surrendered to Lachis a few months before, and which, together with Rhagium, had given to the Athenians the command of the strait. Apprised of the coming Athenian fleet, the Syracusans were anxious to deprive them of this important base of operations against the island; and a fleet of twenty sail—half Syracusan, half Lokrian—was enabled by the concurrence of a party in Menedot to seize the town. It would appear that the Athenian fleet was then at Rhagium, but that town was at the same time threatened by the armists of the entire land force of Lokri, together with a body of Rhagian exiles: these latter were even, not without hopes of obtaining admission by means of a favourable party in the town. Though such hopes were disappointed, yet the diversion prevented all manner from Rhagium to Menedot. The latter town now served as a harbour for the fleet hostile to Athens,² which was speedily reinforced to more than thirty sail, and began warlike operations forthwith, in hopes of crushing the Athenians and capturing Rhagium before Karyseides should arrive. But the Athenians, though they had only sixteen triremes, together with eight others from Rhagium, gained a decided victory, in an action brought on accidentally for the possession of a merchantman sailing through the strait. They put the enemy's ships to flight, and drove them to seek refuge, under shelter protection of the Syracusan land force at Cape Pelorus, near Menedot, others under the Lokrian force near Rhagium, such as they best could, with the loss of one trireme.³ This defeat so broke up the

¹ Thucyd. ii. 45.

² Thucyd. ii. 45; Pl. 5.

³ Thucyd. ii. 46. and afterwards led the Athenians and captured Menedotus, in however doing, in all places reported, it is in the history and in the Thucyd. after this destruction, etc.

Reference to the Anecdotes of the Athenians, for concerning that the result in Athens, before the battle of Menedot, because they all the Lokrian ships did not get back to the Lokrian strait, nor all the Syracusan ships in the Syracusan

schemes of Lokrian operations against the latter place, that their land force retired from the Bhegias territory, while the whole defeated squadron was recruited on the opposite coast under Cape Pallarus. Here the ships were moored close on shore, under the protection of the land force, when the Athenians and Bhegians came up to attack them, but without success, and even with the loss of one trireme, which the men on shore contrived to seize and detain by a grappling iron, her crew escaping by swimming to the vessels of their comrades. Having repulsed the enemy, the Syracusans got aboard, and rowed close along-shore, partly aided by tow-ropes, to the harbour of Mestel, in which triants they were again attacked, but the Athenians were a second time beaten off, with the loss of another ship. Their superior seamanship was of no avail in this along-shore fighting.¹

The Athenian fleet was now suddenly withdrawn in order to prevent an intended movement in Kamarina, where a philo-Syracusan party under Archias threatened revolt; and the Messanian force, thus left free, invaded the territory of their neighbours the Chalkidic city of Naxos, sending their fleet round to the mouth of the Albenia near that city. They were ravaging the lands, and were preparing to storm the town, when a considerable body of the indigent Sikels were seen descending the neighbouring hills to menace the Naxians, upon which, the latter, close with the sight and mistaking the newcomers for their Orosian brethren from Locustini, rushed out of the gates and made a vigorous rally at a moment when their enemies were unprepared. The Messanians were completely defeated, with the loss of no less than 1600 men, and with a still greater loss sustained in their retreat home from the pursuit of the Sikels. Their fleet went back also to Mestel, from whence each of the ships as were not Messanian returned home. So much was the city weakened by its recent defeat, that

action; but each separate ship had to attack one or the other, as it best could.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 97. *ἀνεπαύριστα* *ἀνέπαυτον* *ἀνέπαυτον* *ἀνέπαυτον*.

² It is not difficult to understand the meaning of the word, which is expressed by *ἀνεπαύριστα*. In spite of the odds of the communication. And I

cannot but doubt the correctness of Dr. Smith's explanation, when he says: "The Syracuse on a sudden drove at their leading ships, made their way to the rear, and, by a lateral movement, laid them under the main sail." &c. The question was what the advantage required in order to strike the hearts of their superior manœuvring.

a Lokrian garrison was sent for its protection under Demosthenes, while the Leontine and Naxian, together with the Athenian squadron on returning from Kamaria, attacked it by land and sea in this moment of distress. A well-timed rally of the Eleuthere and Lokrians, however, dispersed the Leontine land-force, but the Athenian force, landing from their ships, attacked the auxiliaries while in the disorder of pursuit, and drove them back within the walls. The scheme against Mestini, however, had now become impracticable, so that the Athenians crossed the strait to Rhegium.¹

Thus inclusive was the result of operations in Sicily, during the first half of the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war; nor does it appear that the Athenians undertook anything considerable during the second half, though the fleet that under Eurymedon had then joined Pythodorus.² Yet while the presence of so large an Athenian fleet at Rhegium would produce considerable effect upon the Syracusan mind, the triumphant progress of Athenian arms, and the astounding humiliation of Sparta, during the months immediately following the capture of Epikleria, probably struck much deeper. In the spring of the eighth year of the war, Athens was not only in possession of the Spartan prisoners, but also of Pylus and Epiklos, so that a rising among the Helots appeared every improbable. She was in the full swing of hope, while her discouraged enemies were all thrown on the defensive. Hence the Sicilian Dorians, intimidated by a state of affairs so different from that in which they had begun the war three years before, were now eager to bring about a pacification in their island. The Dorian city of Kamaria, which had hitherto acted along with the Ionian or Chalkidic cities, was the first to make a separate accommodation with its neighbouring city of Gela; at which latter place deputies were invited to stand from all the cities in the island, with a view to the conclusion of peace.³

¹ Thucyd. iv. 96.

² Thucyd. iv. 92.

³ Compare a similar remark made by the Syracusan Hieronymus, after just afterwards, when the great

Athenian expedition against Syracuse was made way, regarding the increased disposition to make among the Sicilian cities, produced by common fear of Athens (Thucyd. vi. 82).

⁴ Thucyd. v. 18.

This congress met in the spring of 484 B.C., when Syracuse, the most powerful city in Sicily, took the lead in urging the common interest which all had in the maintenance of peace. The Syracusan Hieronymus, chief adviser of this policy in his native city, now appeared to vindicate and enforce it in the congress. He was a well-born, brave, and able man, superior to all pecuniary corruption, and clear-sighted in regard to the foreign interests of his country;¹ but at the same time of pronounced oligarchical sentiments, mistrusted by the people, seemingly with good reason, in regard to their internal constitution. The speech which Thucydides places in his mouth, on the present occasion, sets forth emphatically the necessity of keeping Sicily at all cost free from foreign intervention, and of settling at home all differences which might arise between the various Sicilian cities. Hieronymus impresses upon his hearers that the aggressive schemes of Athens, now the greatest power in Greece, were directed against all Sicily, and threatened all cities alike, Ionians not less than Dorians. If they selected one another by internal quarrels, and then invited the Athenians as arbitrators, the result would be ruin and slavery to all. The Athenians were but too ready to encroach everywhere, even without invitation: they had now come, with a real, overruling all obligation, under pretence of aiding the Chalcidic cities who had never aided them, but in the real hope of achieving conquest for themselves. The Chalcidic cities must not rely upon their Ionian kindred for security against evil designs on the part of Athens: as Sicilians, they had a paramount interest in upholding the independence of the island. If possible, they ought to maintain undisturbed peace; but if that were impossible, it was essential at least to confine the war to Sicily, apart from any foreign interference. Complaints should be exchanged, and injuries redressed, by all, in a spirit of mutual forbearance; of which Syracuse—the first city in the island and best able to sustain the heat of war—was prepared to set the example, without that foolish over-valuation of her own chance as reluctant even to first-rate powers, and with full sense of the uncertainty of the future. Let them all feel that they were neighbours, inhabitants of the same island, and called by the

¹ Thucyd. viii. 42.

common name of *Strophile*; and let them all with one accord repel the intrusion of aliens in their cities, whether as open assailants or as treacherous mediators.¹

This language from Heracleidae, and the earnest dispositions of Syracuse for peace, found general sympathy among the Sicilian cities, Ionic as well as Doric. All of them, doubtless suffered by the war, and the Ionic cities, who had solicited the intervention of the Athenians as protectors against Syracuse, conceived from the evident consciousness of the latter a fair assurance of her pacific demeanour for the future. Accordingly the peace was accepted by all the belligerent parties, each retaining what they possessed, except that the Syracusans agreed to send Megasthenes to Hamaxia, on receipt of a fixed sum of money.² The Ionic cities stipulated that Athens should be included in the pacification, a condition agreed to by all, except the Epiphephyrian Lelantine.³ They next acquainted Hieronymus and his colleagues with the terms; inviting them to accede to the pacification in the name of Athens, and then to withdraw their fleet from Sicily. These generals had no choice but to close with

Several years were
between the
Sicilian
cities.
Hieronymus
acceded to
the peace,
and with-
drew the
Athenian
fleet.

¹ Thus the speech of Heracleidae, Theop. iv. 37-41. One expression in this speech indicates that it was composed by Theophrastus many years after his peace date, subsequently to the great expedition of the Athenians against Syracuse in 413 B.C.; though I doubt not that Theophrastus indicated the circumstances for it at the time.

Heracleidae says: "The Athenians are now near us with a big ship, lying in wait for our fleet,"—and Hieronymus afterwards says: "The Athenians are to depart from us before long." (Theophrastus, iv. 37, 38.)

Now the fleet under the command of Hieronymus and his colleagues at Syracuse, included all or most of the ships which had sailed at Epiphephyria and Sicily, together with those which had been purchased at the siege of Thurium, under the leadership of Hieronymus. Hieronymus could not have been less than fifty sail, and may possibly have been sixty sail. It is hardly conceivable that any fleet, operating in the early spring of 413 B.C., should have included so few vessels, and, accordingly, Heracleidae would not have alluded to it, should it not be the interest of his argument

to exaggerate, rather than minimize, the Athenian manifestations of Athens.

But Theophrastus, regarding the speech after the great Athenian expedition of 413 B.C., at least some thousands and commanding in great respect, might not conceivably represent the fleet of Hieronymus as "a few ships," when he tacitly compared the fleet. This is the only way that I know of explaining such an expression.

The Theophrastus account that some of the ships in his fleet utilized the words before used, probably they noticed the contradiction which I have mentioned, and the passage may possibly be construed without these words.

² Theophr. iv. 40. The loan from Syracuse (Theophr. iv. 41, 42, 43, 44) of the Athenian vessels, purchased by him from the fleet of Valerius (Theophrastus had to his fleet from Sicily and the Athenians at 413 B.C., and Hieronymus bought, and had purchased in Sicily, vessels for Hieronymus, which speech Theophrastus mentions in a place of empty declaration.

³ Theophr. iv. 41.

the proposition. Athens then was placed on terms of peace with all the Sicilian cities, with liberty of access respectively for any single ship of war, but not for any larger force, to cross the sea between Sicily and Peloponnesus. Eurymedon then sailed with his fleet home.¹

On reaching Athens, however, he and his colleagues were received by the people with much displeasure. He himself was fined, and his colleagues Euphobides and Pythodorus banished, on the charge of having been bribed to quit Sicily, at a time when the fleet (so the Athenians believed) was strong enough to have made important conquests. Why the three colleagues were differently treated we are not informed.² This sentence was harsh and unwarranted; for it does not seem that Eurymedon had it in his power to prevent the Ionic cities from concluding peace—while it is certain that without them he could have achieved nothing serious. All that seems ascertained, in his conduct as requested by Thucydides, is, that his arrival at Rhegium with the entire fleet, in September, 425 B.C., does not seem to have been attended with any increased vigour or success in the prosecution of the war. But the Athenians (besides an undue depreciation of the Sicilian cities which we shall find totally misjudging them hereafter) were at this moment at the height of exuberant hopes, counting upon new triumphs everywhere, impatient of disappointment, and careless of proportion between the means attributed to, and the objects expected from, their commanders. Such unmeasured confidence was painfully corrected in the course of a few months, by the battle of Delium and the loss in Thracæ. But at the present moment, it was probably not less astonishing than previous to the three generals, who had all left Athens prior to the success in Spheacteria.

The Ionic cities in Sicily were soon made to feel that they had been premature in sending away the Athenians. Disputes between Leontini and Syracuse, the same cause which had occasioned the invasion of Athens three years before, broke out almost soon after the pacification of Gela. The democratical government of Leontini came to the resolution of strengthening their city by the enrolment of many new citizens; and a col-

¹ Thucyd. vi. 12-15.

² Thucyd. iv. 82.

cities, the rich Locustians deserted and dismantled their own city, transferred their residence to Syracuse, and were enrolled as Syracusan citizens. To them the operation was exceedingly profitable, since they became masters of the properties of the exiled Demes in addition to their own. Presently, however, some of them, dissatisfied with their residence in Syracuse, returned to the abandoned city, and fitted up a portion of it called Phokis, together with a neighboring strong post called Bekhris. Here, after being joined by a considerable number of the exiled Demes, they contrived to hold out for some time against the efforts of the Syracusans to expel them from their fortifications.

The new enactment of citizens, projected by the Locustian democracy, seems to date during the year succeeding the pacification of Gela, and was probably intended to place the city in a more defensible position in case of renewed attacks from Syracuse—the compensation for the departure of the Athenian auxiliaries. The Locustian Demes, in exile and suffering, doubtless bitterly repented that they had concurred in disarming these auxiliaries, sent envoys to Athens with complaints, and renewed prayers for help.¹

Justified from Thucydides: "Time and circumstances had greatly altered the state of property in all the Sicilian communities, since their resources and extensive portions of land, which had been made, on the general establishment of democratical government, after the expulsion of the family of Gelon. In other cities the year seemed nearer their lot; but in Locustia they were weak in respect to a just and equal partition; and to strengthen themselves against the power of the wealthy, they started, in the general assembly, a decree for appointing a number of new citizens" (Thucyd. II. G. ch. xcvi. and li. vol. II. p. 58).

I have already remarked, in a previous note, that Mr. Milford has misrepresented the re-division of lands which took place after the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty. This re-division was not based upon the principle of equal lots; it is not therefore correct to state, as Mr. Milford does, that the present movement at Locustia was

from the innovation made by time and circumstances in that equal division; as little is it correct to say that the year of Locustian dissent "is fresh and equal partition." Thucydides says and repeats about equal portions. He puts forward the enactment of new citizens as the subsequent primary resolution, actually taken by the Locustians, the re-division of the lands as a measure suggested and subsidiary to this, and as not existing only in respect to which Mr. Milford charges the first and equal division to have been the real object of dissent, and the enactment of new citizens to have been proposed with a view to establish the principle of equal lots generally at variance with that of Thucydides.

¹ Further, throughout the Sicilian general alliance with all the objects of unity and homogeneity, while withdrawing the Athenian auxiliary—"Sicilian unity, capital, maritime resources, of equal importance to all the Sicilians, corresponding necessities, common defence shared."

But Athens was then too much pressed to attend to their call. Her defeat at Delium and her losses in Thracæ had been followed by the truce for one year, and even during that truce she had been called upon for strenuous efforts in Thracæ to check the progress of Brasidas. After the expiration of the truce, she sent Phæax and two colleagues to Sicily (A.D. 422) with the modest force of two triremes. He was directed to try and organize an anti-Syracusan party in the island, for the purpose of re-establishing the Læontine Demos. In passing along the coast of Italy, he concluded amiable relations with some of the Grecian cities, especially with Lokoi, which had hitherto stood aloof from Athens; and his first addresses in Sicily appeared to promise success. His representations of danger from Syracusan ambition were well received both at Kamarina and Agrigento. For, on the one hand, that universal terror of Athens which had dictated the pacification of Gela had now disappeared; while, on the other hand, the proceeding of Syracuse in regard to Læontini was well calculated to excite alarm. We see by that proceeding that sympathy between democracies in different towns was not universal: the Syracusan democracy had joined with the Læontine aristocracy to expel the Demos—just as the despot Gelon had continued with the aristocracy of Megara and Kolone, sixty years before, and had sold the Demos of those towns into slavery. The birthplace of the famous rhetor Gorgias was struck out of the list of inhabited cities: its temples were deserted, and its territory had become a part of Syracuse. All these were circumstances so powerfully affecting Grecian imagination that the Kamarinians, neighbours of Syracuse on the other side, might well fear lest the like unjust conquest, expulsion, and absorption should soon overtake them. Agrigento, though without any similar fear, was disposed, from policy and jealousy of Syracuse, to second the views of Thæas. But when the latter proceeded to Gela, in order to procure the adhesion of that city in addition to the other two, he found himself met by so resolute an opposition, that his whole scheme was frustrated, nor did he think it advisable even to open his way to Ebbora or Himara. In returning, he crossed the interior of the island through the territory of the Sikels to Katana, passing in his way by Drikimades, where the Læontine

Danae were still maintaining a precarious existence. Having encouraged them to hold out by assurances of aid, he proceeded on his homeward voyage. In the strait of Messina he struck upon some vessels conveying a body of expelled Lokrians from Messed to Lokri. The Lokrians had got possession of Messed after the pacification of Oela by means of an internal sedition; but after holding it some time, they were now driven out by a second revolution. Phaux, being under agreement with Lokri, passed by these vessels without any act of hostility.¹

The Leontine exiles at Delphoi, however, received no benefit from his assurances, and appear soon afterwards to have been completely expelled. Nevertheless Athens was never disposed, for a considerable time, to operations in Sicily. A few months after the visit of Phaux to that island came the peace of Nikias. The consequences of that peace occupied her whole attention in Peloponnesus, while the ambition of Alcibiades carried her on for three years in intra-Peloponnesian projects and co-operation with Argos against Sparta. It was only in the year 417 B.C., when these projects had proved abortive, that she had leisure to turn her attention elsewhere. During that year Nikias had contemplated an expedition against Amphipolis in conjunction with Perikles, whose death frustrated the scheme. The year 416 B.C. was that in which Nikias was besieged and taken.

Meanwhile the Syracusans had cleared and appropriated all the territory of Leontini, which city now existed only in the talk and hopes of its exiles. Of these latter a portion seem to have continued at Athens—proving their entreaties for aid, which began to obtain some attention about the year 417 B.C., when another incident happened to strengthen their claims of success.

A quarrel broke out between the neighbouring cities of Sellasia (Hellenic) and Epizephi (non-Hellenic) in the western corner of Sicily: partly about a piece of land on the river which divided the two territories, partly about some alleged wrong in cases of intermarital connexion. The Sellasians, not satisfied with their own strength, obtained assistance from the Syracusans,

¹ Thucyd. v. 2, 2.

Leontine
expelled
—the
exiles—
Leontine
exiles at
Athens.

B.C. 415.

War be-
tween
Syracuse
and
Epizephi—
the latter
appeals to
Athens for
aid.

their allies, and thus reduced Egypt to considerable straits by land as well as by sea.¹ Now the Egyptians had allied themselves with Lachis ten years before, during the first expedition sent by the Athenians to Sicily; upon the strength of which alliance they sent to Athens, to solicit her intervention for their defence, after having in vain applied both to Agrippinus and to Carthage. It may seem singular that Carthage did not at this time readily embrace the pretext for interference—considering that ten years afterwards she interfered with such destructive effect against Selinus. At this time, however, the fear of Athens and her formidable navy appears to have been felt even at Carthage;² thus protecting the Sicilian Greeks against the most dangerous of their neighbours.

The Egyptian envoys reached Athens in the spring of 418 B.C., at the time when the Athenians had no immediate project to occupy their thoughts, except the enterprise against Etilia, which could not be either long or doubtful. Though urgent in setting forth the necessities of their position, they at the same time did not appear like the Locustians, or more helpless suppliants, addressing themselves to Athenian compassion. They rested their appeal chiefly on grounds of policy. The Syracusans, having already extinguished one ally of Athens (Locustini), were now hard pressing upon a second (Egypti), and would thus successively subdue them all: as soon as this was completed, there would be nothing left in Sicily except an unimportant Etilian combination, allied to Poloponnesus both by sea and descent, and sure to lead effective aid in putting down Athens herself.³ It was therefore essential for Athens to forestall this coming danger by interfering forthwith to uphold her remaining allies against the encroachments of Syracuse. If she would send a naval expedition adequate to the rescue of Egypt, the Egyptians themselves engaged to provide ample funds for the prosecution of the war.⁴

B.C. 418.

Presence
of the Egyp-
tians:
envoys
allied to
Athens for
protection
in Sicily.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 62. Diod. xii. 60. The statement of Diodorus—that the Egyptian alliance applied not merely to Agrippinus but also to Syracuse, is highly improbable. The war which he mentions as having taken place seven years

before between Egypt and Lichium (vi. 52) is 424 B.C., and probably never began a war between Egypt and Athens.

² Thucyd. vi. 62.

³ Thucyd. vi. 6, Diod. xii. 62.

Such representations from the surveys, and fears of Syracuse apprehended as a source of strength to Peloponnesus, worked along with the prayers of the Lacedæmonians in retarding the appetite of Athens for extending her power in Sicily. The impression made upon the Athenian public, favourable from the first, was wound up to a still higher pitch by renewed discussion. The surveys were repeatedly heard in the public assembly,¹ together with those citizens who supported their propositions. At the head of these was Alcibiades, who aspired to the command of the intended expedition, targeting alike to his love of glory, of adventure, and of personal gain. But it is plain from these renewed discussions that at first the disposition of the people was by no means decided, much less unanimous; and that a considerable party sustained Nicias in a protestant opposition. Even at last, the resolution adopted was not one of positive consent, but a more term such as perhaps Nicias himself could not resist. Special surveys were despatched to Egota—partly to ascertain the means of the town to fulfil its estimate of defraying the costs of war—partly to make investigations on the spot, and report upon the general state of affairs.

Perhaps the commissioners despatched were men themselves not uniformly to the enterprise; nor is it impossible that some of them may have been individually bribed by the Egotians—at least such a supposition is not forbidden by the strange state of Athenian public morality. But the most honest or even suspicious men could hardly be prepared for the deep-laid stratagem put in practice to delude them on their arrival at Egota. They were conducted to the rich temple of Aphrodite, on Mount Eryx, where the plate and denaries were exhibited before them; abundant in number and striking to the eye, yet composed mostly of silver-gilt vessels, which, though falsely passed off as solid gold, were in reality of little pecuniary value. Moreover, the Egotian citizens were

¹ Thucyd. ii. 2. In describing the measures to take respecting the surveys, Thucydides is somewhat inconsistent in representing the Athenians as being at first favourable to the surveys, and afterwards as being opposed to them.

Mr. Mitchell takes no notice of all these golden vessels, which he says, were by the Athenians never and nowhere in the Sicilian despatch (ib. vol. ii. c. vii. p. 2. 32).

promise of defraying the cost of the war, the members of their tribunes, addressing the assembly in their character of citizens—beyond all suspicion of being bribed—overflowing with sympathy for the town in which they had just been so cordially welcomed—and full of wonder at the display of wealth which they had witnessed—would probably contribute still more effectively to kindle the sympathies of their countrymen. Accordingly, when the Egæstean envoys again renewed their petitions and representations, confidently appealing to the scruples which they had undergone—when the distress of the suppliant Leontine was again depicted—the Athenian assembly no longer delayed coming to a final decision. They determined to send forthwith sixty tribunes to Sicily, under three generals, with full powers—Nikias, Alkibiades, and Lamachos—for the purpose, first, of relieving Egæta; next, as soon as that primary object should have been accomplished, of re-establishing the city of Leontini; lastly, of furthering the views of Athens in Sicily, by any other means which they might find practicable.¹ Such resolution being passed, a fresh assembly was appointed, for the fifth day following, to settle the details.

We cannot doubt that this assembly, in which the reports from Egæta were first delivered, was one of unequalled triumph to Alkibiades and those who had from the first advocated the expedition—as well as of embarrassment and humiliation to Nikias who had opposed it. He was probably more astonished than any one else at the statements of the commissioners and senators, because he did not believe in the point which they went to establish. Yet he would not venture to contradict eye-witnesses speaking in evident good faith; and as the assembly went heartily along with them, he laboured under great difficulty in repeating his objections to a scheme now so much strengthened in public favour. Accordingly his speech was probably hesitating and ineffective: the more so, as his opponents, far from wishing to make good any personal triumph against himself, were forward in proposing his name first on the list of generals, in spite of his

Embarrassment of Nikias on account of the expedition.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 13; Diod. xij. 61.

own declared repugnance.¹ But when the assembly broke up, he became fearfully impressed with the perilous resolution which it had adopted, and at the same time conscious that he had not done justice to his own race against it. He therefore resolved to avail himself of the next assembly four days afterwards, for the purpose of reopening the debate, and again denouncing the intended expedition. Properly speaking, the Athenians might have declined to hear him on this subject. Indeed the question which he raised could not be put without illegality; the principle of the measure had been already determined, and it remained only to arrange the details, for which special purpose the coming assembly had been appointed. But he was heard, and with perfect patience; and his harangue, a valuable sample both of the man and of the time, is set forth at length by Thucydides. I give here the chief points of it, not confining myself to the exact expressions.

"Though we are met to-day, Athenians, to settle the particulars of the expedition already pronounced against Sicily, yet I think we ought to take further counsel whether it be well to send that expedition at all; nor ought we thus hastily to plunge, at the instance of others, into a dangerous war wholly belonging to us. To myself, personally, indeed, your resolution has offered an honorable appointment, and for my own bodily danger I care as little as any man; yet no considerations of personal dignity have ever before prevented me, nor shall now prevent me, from giving you my honest opinion, however it may clash with your habitual judgments. I tell you, then, that in your desire to go to Sicily, you leave many enemies here behind you, and that you will bring upon yourselves new enemies from Sicily to help them. Perhaps you fancy that your treaty with Sparta is an adequate protection. In name indeed (though only in name, thanks to the intrigues of parties both here and there) that treaty may stand,

Speech of Demosthenes at the second Assembly held by the Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 6. 4-11. Thucyd. describes the Assembly before the war. The reading here given is somewhat different from that of Thucyd. and is more in accordance with the sense, which latter would probably agree with the conception of your reader who was surprised that Thucyd. made in the second assembly a

speech which properly belonged to the first—when explained this by supposing that Thucyd. had not been present at the first assembly. Thus he was not present, however, at the first assembly. The reader, nevertheless, does require some explanation; and I have endeavored to supply one in the text.

so long as your power remains unimpaired, but on your first serious reverse the enemy will eagerly take the opportunity of attacking you. Some of your most powerful allies have never even accepted the treaty; and if you divide your force as you now propose, they will probably set upon you at once along with the Sicilians, whom they would have been too happy to procure as co-operating allies at the beginning of the war. Recollect that your Chalcidian subjects in Thracæ are still in revolt, and have never yet been subdued; other continental subjects, too, are not ready to be trusted; and you are going to redress injuries offered to Egæta, before you have yet thought of redressing your own. Now your conquests in Thracæ, if you make any, can be maintained; but Sicily is so distant and the people so powerful, that you will never be able to maintain permanent ascendancy; and it is absurd to undertake an expedition whose conquest cannot be permanent, while failure will be destruction. The Egæstians alarm you by the prospect of Syracuse's aggrandisement. But to me it seems that the Sicilian Greeks, even if they become subjects of Syracuse, will be less dangerous to you than they are at present; for, as matters stand now, they might possibly send aid to Peloponnesians, from desire on the part of each to gain the favour of Lacedæmon, but impartial Syracuse would have no motive to endanger her own empire for the purpose of putting down yours. You are now full of confidence, because you have come out of the war better than you at first feared. But do not trust the Spartans; they, the most sensitive of all men to the reputation of expediency, are lying in wait to play you a trick in order to repair their own dishonour: their oligarchical machinations against you demand all your vigilance, and leave you no leisure to think of these foreigners at Egæta. Having just recovered ourselves somewhat from the pressure of disease and war, we ought to reserve this newly-acquired strength for our own purpose, instead of wasting it upon the touchiness and desperate calls from Sicily."

Nicias then continued, doubtingly turning towards Alcibiades: "If any man, delighted to be named to the command, though still too young for it, exhorts you to this expedition in his own selfish interests, looking to adulation for his ostentation in chariot-racing, and to profit from his command as a means of

making good his extravagances, do not let such a man give celebrity for himself at the hazard of the entire city. Be persuaded that such persons are still unprincipled in regard to the public property and wasteful as to their own, and that this matter is too serious for the rash counsels of youth. I tremble when I see before me this head striving, by passionate concert, close to their leader in the assembly—and I in my turn exhort the elderly men, who are near them, not to be shamed out of their opposition by the fear of being called cowards. Let them leave to these men the vain and appetite for what is not within reach: in the conviction that few plans ever succeed from passionate desire—many from deliberate foresight. Let them vote against the expedition—maintaining undisturbed our present relations with the Sicilian cities, and desiring the Egyptians to close the war against Solima, as they have begun it, without the aid of Athens.' Nor be thus afraid, Prytane (Mr. President), to submit this momentous question again to the decision of the assembly, seeing that heads of the law in the presence of so many witnesses cannot expose them to impeachment, while then with afford opportunity for the correction of a previous misjudgment."

Such were the principal points in the speech of Miller on this remarkable occasion. It was heard with attention, and probably

1. I think, at 10-12, and at 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

I cannot speak in the assembly of Mr. Miller either on this passage, or upon the parallel case of the national debate in the Athenian assembly, in the opinion of the parliament to be delivered on the 11th of November, 1850, at 10-12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 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The discussion ended by Dr. Arnold,

between what was then and what was nearly complete, was then marked at Athens, both ways marked, and was then done. The time which the Athenian assembly, a warlike assembly, had given for its own deliberation and decision, was just as much time as those which it gained for the advantage of private citizens.

Such, in this case, and in the Athenian debate, I think the Athenian people continued to display. In the first case, every one is glad of the assembly, because it proved the utility of an army of citizens. In the second case, the utility was proved of practical and consequence, because as it seems to have brought about the humane extension of the war upon which the expedition was projected. And there will come in a few years a great extent of the population of the city, and after the battle of Argos, in which the population of Athens was a great advantage of Athens will appear probably and consequently marked.

made some impression ; since it completely reversed the entire debate, in spite of the formal illegality. Immediately after he sat down, while his words were yet fresh in the ears of the audience, Alkibiades rose to reply. The speech just made, bringing the expedition again into question, endangered his dearest hopes both of fame and of pecuniary acquisition. Opposed to Nikias both in personal character and in political tendencies, he had pushed his rivalry to such a degree of bitterness, that at one moment a vote of ostracism had been on the point of deciding between them. That vote had indeed been turned aside by joint consent, and discharged upon Hyperbolos ; yet the hostile feeling still continued on both sides, and Nikias had just manifested it by a parliamentary attack of the most galling character—all the more galling because it was strictly accurate and well-deserved. Provoked as well as alarmed, Alkibiades started up forthwith—his impetuosity breaking loose from the formalities of an oration.

"Athensians, I both have better title than others to the post of speaker of command (for the Senate of Nikias forces me to begin *Alkibiades* here), and I account myself fully worthy of it. Those very matters, with which he reproaches me, are sources not merely of glory to my ancestors and myself, but of positive advantage to my country. For the Greeks, on witnessing my splendid Theatry at Olympia, were induced to raise the power of Athens even above the reality, having before regarded it as broken down by the war ; when I went into the lists seven chariots, being more than any private individual had ever sent before—winning the first prize, coming in also second and fourth, and performing all the amusements in a manner suitable to an Olympic victory. Custom attaches honour to such exploits, but the power of the performer is at the same time brought home to the feelings of spectators. My exhibitions at Athens, too, choragic and others, are naturally viewed with jealousy by my rivals here ; but in the eyes of strangers they are evidences of power. Such so-called folly is by no means useless, when a man at his own cost serves the city as well as himself. Nor is it unjust, when a man has an exalted opinion of himself, that he should not conduct himself towards others as if he were their equal ; for the man in misfortune feels no one to bear a share of it. Just as, when we

are in distress, we find no one to speak to us, in like manner let a man lay his account to bear the insolence of the prosperous; or else let him give equal dealing to the low, and then claim to receive it from the high. I know well that such exalted personages, and all who have in any way stained themselves, have been during their lifetime unpopular, chiefly in society with their equals, and to a certain extent with others also; while after their decease, they have left such a reputation as to make people claim kindred with them falsely, and to induce their country to boast of them, not as though they were aliens or wrong-doers, but as her own citizens and as men who did her honour. It is this glory which I desire, and in pursuit of which I fear such reproaches for my private conduct. Yet look at my public conduct, and see whether it will not bear comparison with that of any other citizen. I brought together the most powerful states in Peloponnesus without any serious cost or hazard to you, and made the Lacedæmonians peril their all at Mantinea on the fortune of one day: a peril so great, that, though victorious, they have not even yet regained their steady belief in their own strength.

"Thus did my youth, and my so-called manhood fully, find suitable work to address the Peloponnesian powers, and earnestness to give them confidence and obtain their co-operation. Be not now, therefore, afraid of this youth of mine, but so long as I possess it in full vigour, and so long as Nikias retains his reputation for good fortune, turn as such to account in our own way."¹

Having thus vindicated himself personally, Alkibiades went on to deplore any change on the public resolution already taken. The Sicilian cities (he said) were not so formidable as was represented. Their population was numerous indeed, but factious, turbulent, often on the move, and without local attachment. No man there considered himself as a permanent resident nor cared to defend the city in which he dwelt; nor were there arms or organization for such a purpose. The native Sikels, detesting Syracuse, would willingly lend their aid to her enemies. As to the Peloponnesians, powerful as they were, they had never yet been more without hope of damaging Athens than they were now: they were not more desperate enemies now than they had

¹ Thucyd. vi. 18, 19.

been in former days.¹ They might invade Attica by land, whether the Athenians called to Sicily or not; but they could do no mischief by sea, for Athens would still have in reserve a navy sufficient to restrain them. What valid ground was there, therefore, to evade performing obligations which Athens had sworn to her Sicilian allies? To be sure they could bring no help to Attica in return; but Athens did not want them on her own side of the water—she wanted them in Sicily, to prevent her Sicilian enemies from venturing over to attack her. She had originally acquired her empire by a readiness to interfere wherever she was invited; nor would she have made any progress, if she had been backward or pedantic in scrutinising such invitations. She could not now set limits to the extent of her imperial sway; she was under a necessity not merely to retain her present subjects, but to lay claims for new subjects—on pain of falling into dependence herself if she ceased to be imperial. Let her then persist in the resolution adopted, and strike terror into the Peloponnesians by undertaking this great expedition. She would probably conquer all Sicily; at least she would humble Syracuse: in case even of failure, she could always bring back her troops, from her unquestionable superiority at sea. The stationary and inactive policy recommended by Nicias was not less at variance with the temper than with the position of Athens, and would be ruinous to her if pursued. Her military organisation would decline, and her energies would be wasted in internal war and conflict, instead of that springing readiness of enterprise, which, having become engrafted upon her laws and habits, would not be now renounced, even if had in itself, without speedy destruction.²

Such was substantially the reply of Alcibiades to Nicias. The debate was now completely reversed, so that several speakers addressed the assembly on both sides; more, however, doubtless in favour of the expedition than against it. The alarmed Egeians and Lesbians renewed their applications, appealing to the plighted faith of the city: probably also, those Athenians who had visited Egypt stood forward again to protest against what they would call the dangerous doubts and hesitations.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 12. and also also, *ibid.* Alcibiades, *ibid.* and also Alcibiades, *ibid.*
² Thucyd. vi. 14-16.

tions of Nichil. By all these appeals, after considerable debate, the assembly was so powerfully moved, that their determination to send the fleet became more intense than ever; and Nichil, perceiving that further direct opposition was useless, altered his tactics. He now attempted a manoeuvre, designed indirectly to disgust his countrymen with the plan, by enlarging upon its dangers and difficulties, and insisting upon a prodigious force as indispensable to surmount them. Not was he without hopes that they might be sufficiently dissuaded by such prospective hardships to throw up the scheme altogether. At any rate, if they persisted, he himself as commander would thus be enabled to execute it with completeness and confidence.

Accepting the expedition, therefore, as the pronounced fiat of the people, he reminded them that the cities which they were about to attack, especially Syennae and Sallana, were powerful, populous, free—well-prepared in every way with hoplites, bowmen, light-armed troops, ships of war, plenty of horses to mount their cavalry, and abundant corn at home. At best, Athens could hope for no other allies in Sicily except Naxos and Katana, from their kindred with the Locustians. It was no mere fleet, therefore, which could cope with enemies like these on their own soil. The fleet indeed must be prodigiously great, for the purpose not merely of maritime warfare, but of keeping open communication at sea, and ensuring the transportation of subsistence. But there must besides be a large force of hoplites, bowmen, and slingers—a large stock of provisions in transports—and, above all, an abundant amount of money; for the funds provided by the Egyptians would be found soon empty details. The army must be not simply a match for the enemy's regular hoplites and powerful cavalry, but also independent of foreign aid from the first day of their landing.¹ If not, in case of the least reverse, they would find everywhere nothing but active enemies, without a single friend. "I know (he concluded) that there are many dangers against which we must take precaution, and many more in which we must trust to good fortune, serious as it is for more men to do so. But I choose to have as little as possible in the power of fortune, and to have in hand all

Second speech of Nichil—representing the difficulties and dangers of the expedition, and demanding a large and the largest force.

¹ Thucyd. 4. 12.

he made the same demand, they were delighted to purchase his concurrence by adopting all such conditions as he imposed.¹

It was thus that Nikias, quite contrary to his own purpose, not only imparted to the enterprise a gigantic magnitude which its projectors had never contemplated, but threw into it the whole soul of Athens, and roused a burst of ardour beyond all former example. Every man present, old as well as young, rich and poor, of all classes and professions, was eager to put down his name for personal service. Some were tempted by the love of gain, others by the curiosity of seeing so distant a region, others again by the pride and supposed safety of enlisting in so irretrievable an armament. So overpowering was the popular voice in calling for the execution of the scheme, that the small minority who retained their objections were afraid to hold up their hands, for fear of incurring the suspicion of want of patriotism. When the excitement had somewhat subsided, an orator named Demosthenes, coming forward as spokesman of this sentiment, urged Nikias to declare at once, without farther evasion, what force he required from the people. Disappointed as Nikias was, yet, being left without any alternative, he sadly responded to the appeal, saying that he would take further counsel with his colleagues; but that, speaking on his first impression, he thought the triremes required must be not less than 120, nor the hoplites less than 5000—Athenians and allies together. There must further be a proportional equipment of other forces and accompaniments, especially heavy bowmen and slingers. Enormous as this requisition was, the vote of the people not only sanctioned it without delay, but even went beyond it. They conferred upon the generals full power to fix both the numbers of the armament and every other matter relating to the expedition, just as they might think best for the interest of Athens.

Pursuant to this unanimous resolution, the armament and preparation of the forces were immediately begun. Messages were sent to summon sufficient triremes from the nautical allies, as well as to invite hoplites from Argos and Mantineæ, and to hire bowmen

Enlistment in Greek army of ancient times—great increase in the whole in which the expedition was planned.

v. c. 411.
A. D. 411.
Large pre-
parations
made for the
expedition.

¹ Platarch. Compare Nikias and Demos, c. 2.

and diages elsewhere. For three months the generals were busily engaged in this proceeding, while the city was in a state of alarm and bustle—totally interrupted, however, by an incident which I shall recount in the next chapter.

Considering the prodigious consequences which turned on the expedition of Athens against Sicily, it is worth while to bestow a few reflections on the preliminary proceedings of the Athenian people. Those who are accustomed to impute all the misfortunes of Athens to the hurry, passion, and ignorance of democracy will not find the charge borne out by the facts which we have been just considering. The applications of Eggestes and Leontides, forwarded to Athens about the spring or summer of 426 B.C., undergo careful and repeated discussion in the public assembly. They at first meet with considerable opposition, but the repeated debates gradually kindle both the sympathies and the ambition of the people. Still, however, no decisive step is taken without more ample and correct information from the spot, and special commissioners are sent to Eggesta for the purpose. These men bring back a decisive report, triumphantly certifying all that the Eggestans had promised. We cannot at all wonder that the people never suspected the deep-laid fraud whereby their commissioners had been duped.

Upon the result of that mission from Eggesta, the two parties for and against the projected expedition had evidently joined issue; and when the commissioners returned, bearing testimony so decisive in favour of the former, the party thus strengthened thought itself warranted in calling for a decision immediately, after all the previous debates. Nevertheless, the measure still had to surmount the reserved and hearty opposition of Nikias, before it became finally settled. It was this long and frequent debate, with opposition often repeated but always retreating, which, working gradually deeper and deeper conviction in the minds of the people, brought them all into hearty unanimity to support it, and made them cling to it with that tenacity which the coming chapters will demonstrate. In so far as the expedition was an error, it certainly was not error arising either from hurry, or want of discussion, or want of inquiry. Never in

History of
these public
affairs, ac-
cording to
the evidence
of the
expedition.

Greek victory was any measure more carefully weighed beforehand, or more deliberately and unanimously resolved.

The position of Nikias in reference to the measure is remarkable. As a dissuasive and warning counsellor, he took a right view of it; but in that capacity he could not carry the people along with him. Yet such was their steady esteem for him personally, and their reluctance to proceed in the enterprise without him, that they eagerly embraced any conditions which he thought proper to impose. And the conditions which he named had the effect of exaggerating the enterprise into such gigantic magnitude as no one in Athens had ever contemplated, thus casting into it so prodigious a proportion of the blood of Athens, that its discomfiture would be equivalent to the ruin of the commonwealth. This was the first mischief committed by Nikias, when, after being forced to relinquish his direct opposition, he resorted to the indirect measures of demanding more than he thought the people would be willing to grant. It will be found only the first among a sad series of other mistakes—fatal to his country as well as to himself.

Giving to Nikias, however, for the present, full credit for the wisdom of his dissuasive counsel and his scepticism about the reports from Egypt, we cannot but notice the opposite quality in Alcibiades. His speech is not merely full of overbearing insolence as a manifestation of individual character, but of rash and ruinous insouciance in regard to the foreign policy of his country. The arguments whereby he urges the expedition against Syracuse are indeed more mischievous in their tendency than the expedition itself, for the failure of which Alcibiades is not to be held responsible. It might have succeeded in its special object, had it been properly conducted; but even if it had succeeded, the remark of Nikias is not the less just, that Athens was sliding at an uncontrolled breadth of empire, which it would be altogether impossible for her to preserve. When we recollect the true political wisdom with which Perikles had advised his countrymen to maintain strenuously their existing empire, but by no means to grasp at any new acquisitions while they had powerful enemies in Peloponnesus, we shall appreciate by contrast the feverish system of never-ending aggression incited by Alcibiades, and the

destructive principles which he lays down that Athens must for ever be engaged in new conquests, on pain of forfeiting her existing empire, and tearing herself to pieces by internal discord. Even granting the necessity for Athens to employ her military and naval force (as Nicias had truly observed), Amphipolis and the revolted subjects in Thracæ were still unachieved; and the first employment of Athenian force ought to be directed against them, instead of being wasted in distant hazards and precarious novelties, creating for Athens a position in which she could never permanently maintain herself. The parallel which Alkibiades draws between the enterprising spirit whereby the Athenian empire had been first acquired, and the uncalculated speculations which he was himself recommending, is altogether fallacious. The Athenian empire took its rise from Athenian enterprise, working in concert with a serious alarm and necessity on the part of all the Grecian cities in or round the Ægean Sea. Athens rendered an essential service by keeping off the Persians, and preserving that sea in a better condition than it had ever been in before: her empire had begun by being a voluntary confederacy, and had only passed by degrees into constraint; while the local situation of all her subjects was sufficiently near to be within the reach of her controlling arm. Her new career of aggression in Sicily was in all these respects different. Nor is it less surprising to find Alkibiades asserting that the multiplication of subjects in that distant island, employing a large portion of the Athenian naval force to watch them, would impart new stability to the pre-existing Athenian empire. How strange also to read the terms in which he makes light of success both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily, the Sicilian war being a new enterprise hardly less in magnitude and hazard than the Peloponnesian!—to notice the honour which he claims to himself for his operations in Peloponnesus and the battle of Mantinea,¹ which had ended in a complete failure, and in restoring Sparta to the mastery of her walls as it had stood before the events of Sphakteria! There is in fact no speech in Thucydides so replete with rash, misguiding, and fallacious arguments as this harangue of Alkibiades.

As a man of action, Alkibiades was always brave, vigorous, and

¹ Thucyd. vi. 1. cf. *scattered over the Peloponnesian States*; compare vi. 36.

² *Discourse of Alcibiades*, Fragment. See *Thucyd. vi. 16*.

When we recollect how loudly the charges have been preferred against Kleon—of presumption, of rash policy, and of selfish motives, in reference to Sphakteria, to the prosecution of the war generally, and to Amphipolis, and when we compare these proceedings with the conduct of Alcibiades as here described—we shall see how much more readily such charges attach to the latter than the former. It will be seen that the vices of Alcibiades and the defects of Nicias were the cause of the greater ruin to Athens than either Kleon or Hyperbolas, even if we regard the two latter with the eyes of their worst enemies.

(Thucyd. vi. 16.) We thus indeed state one of the general purposes of this opposition. But it should be said that he is here speaking in the strongest manner, since which were only according to his own feelings—as we may observe from a casual perusal of the very lively passages in the sixth book of Thucydides.

In the Oration in Praise of Alcibiades (vol. vii.) it is alleged that the Syracuse sent an embassy to Athens, a little before this opposition, supplicating to be admitted as allies of the Athenians, and offering that Syracuse would be a more valuable ally to Athens than Sparta or Thebes. This statement is wholly untrue.



END OF VOL. V.



PLAN ILLUSTRATING THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE ATHENIAN FLEET UNDER PHORMIO AND THE PELOPONNESIAN FLEET
 EQUIPMENT IN THE JONIAN SEA, 427 B.C.



1. Position of Phormio and the Athenian fleet.
2. The position of the Peloponnesian fleet.
3. Position of the Athenian fleet in various tactical dispositions at the moment of the battle.
4. Position of the Peloponnesian fleet in various tactical dispositions at the moment of the battle.

Cambridge, Mass., 1911.

